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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
ABSTRACT 
The Subject of Jouissance: The Late Lacan and Gender and Queer Theories 
by 
Frédéric Baitinger 
Adviser: Royal S. Brown 
 The Subject of Jouissance argues that Lacan’s approach to psychoanalysis, far from being 
heteronormative, offers a notion of identity that deconstructs gender as a social norm, and opens 
onto a non-normative theory of the subject (of jouissance) that still remains to be fully explored 
by feminist, gender, and queer scholars. Drawing mostly on the later Lacan, The Subject of 
Jouissance shows that by locating the identity of the subject in the singularity of its bodily mode 
of enjoyment (that Lacan calls “jouissance”), and not in the Imaginary illusions of the ego, nor in 
the Symbolic social structures, Lacan fosters thinking about identity as an ethical act through 
which a subject learns how to make something socially valuable out of what would have 
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remained excessive, autistic or perverse in its own singular mode of jouissance.  
 To contextualize this idea and emphasize its relevance, The Subject of Jouissance stages 
encounters between Lacan and the work of feminist and queer scholars such as Judith Butler, 
Hélène Cixous and Lee Edelman, as well as the works of French post-structuralists who 
influenced Lacan’s late teaching, such as Jacques Derrida and Georges Bataille. In doing so, this 
dissertation intervenes in current debates in American academia that oppose relational theorists, 
who support the optimism of identity politics, like the lgbt+ movement, and anti-relational 
theorists, who favor a “queer” dissolution of the very notion of identity. In The Subject of 
Jouissance I argue that it is possible to build an ethics of jouissance that preserves, on the one 
hand, the singularity of one’s own mode of jouissance and, on the other, keeps as a primary goal 
the creation of new forms of sociality that goes beyond the limits that impose onto our psychic 
life the discourse of economy and the discourse of (neuro)science. 
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PREFACE 
  
 My dissertation proposes re-opening a dialogue between psychoanalysis and gender and 
queer theories by taking as its compass the late and last teaching of the French psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan. Opposing the idea hold by most gender and queer scholars according to which 
psychoanalysis is a technique aiming at correcting or normalizing a potentially “deviant subject,” 
my dissertation underscores that Lacan’s late and last approach to psychoanalysis puts at the very 
center of its preoccupation the singularity of each subject’s unconscious desire. However, 
differing from most gender and queer scholars who also emphasize the importance of singularity, 
Lacan’s late teaching does not use singularity as a point of departure for minority politics, nor as 
a weapon against any form of symbolic power. On the contrary, he suggests that it is possible for 
each subject to build a knowledge of its own singularity that that could help it, on the one hand, 
to contain what is potentially negative, deadly or anti-social in its singularity and, on the other 
hand, that would give to this subject the occasion to turn its singularity into a new source of 
agency and social bonding. 
 To situate my argument I use in my introduction The Ethics of Opting Out (2017), a book 
by Mari Ruti in which she suggests that when it comes to the question of the singular, there 
exists at least two opposite groups of feminist, gender and queer scholars. There is the group of 
gender and queer scholars that she calls “relational,” who believe like the lgbtiq++ movement 
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that the singularity of each subject needs to be recognized at a political level through the 
development of minority/identity politics. And there is the group of queer scholars that she calls 
“anti-relational,” who think that identity politics betrays the very notion of singularity that is at 
the core of the queer protest. Likewise, Ruti suggests that the opposition between the two groups 
is also visible when it comes to the way in which these thinkers approach, understand and use 
psychoanalysis in general, and Lacanian psychoanalysis in particular.  
 For most relational theorists, psychoanalysis is generally considered a conservative 
theory or, at best, an interesting theory about subjection. It is, for example, how Judith Butler in 
The Psychic Life of Power (1997) uses the work of Freud and Lacan to understand how 
subjectivity is created through the interiorization of a certain dominant discourse and how certain 
subjective singularities (such as the one of gays, lesbians or queers subjects) are bound to feel 
melancholic, or depressive given certain historical contexts. However, as soon as the question 
moves from the one of subjection to the one of subversion, most relational thinkers prefer using 
an ethical framework such as the one of Emmanuel Levinas, or a psychological framework such 
as the one of Silvan Tomkins, or a post-structuralism framework such as the one put forth by 
Jacques Derrida.  
 Differing from the relational theorists, most anti-relational theorists do not focus on the 
normative aspect of psychoanalysis, but on what makes the very notion of norm problematic 
from a psychoanalytic point of view. For Lee Edelman, for example, in No Future: Queer Theory 
and the Death Drive, the notion of jouissance—and all the more the notion of the sinthome that 
!vii
Lacan developed in his very last teaching on James Joyce—is, par excellence, a notion that 
enables a radical critique of the conformism entailed by the relational position. This is how 
Edelman opposes, in a gesture very similar to the one of Georges Bataille in The Accursed Share, 
a restricted economy oriented towards the future and the preservation of life, which he associates 
with a relational position, and a general economy oriented towards jouissance and expenditure, 
which he associates with a radically queer affirmation of one’s singularity. Consequently, one 
could argue that an “anti-relational” theorist like Edelman, contrary to a “relational theorists” 
like Butler, do not consider psychoanalysis, and even less Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a 
conservative theory but as a potentially very subversive one.  
 However, the problem with this “anti-social” reading of Lacanian psychoanalysis is that it 
greatly undermines what is traumatic for any given subject in its experience of jouissance. To put 
it simply, it  confuses the notion of jouissance with the notion of desire by raising the moment of 
jouissance, as well as the fading of the subject that it triggers, to the level of an affirmation of 
one’s own singularity, while under-evaluating the deep alienation that such moment of sensible 
ecstasy implies on the side of the subject that undergoes it. In other words, even if anti-relational 
theorists have tried to find in Lacanian psychoanalysis a subversive dimension, they did so by 
deeply undermining what is potentially deadly and abusive in one’s singular mode of jouissance. 
Instead of understanding how jouissance, unlike desire, partakes in the contemporary capitalist 
super-ego (which forces us to “enjoy”), or with all kinds of abuses or addictions, they celebrated 
it as what is the most singular in one’s identity, as well as what enables a deviant subject to 
transgress any given norms.   
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 Taking as its standpoint this opposition between relational and anti-relational thinkers, 
my dissertation asks three fundamental questions. First, it questions if the group of relational 
thinkers is justified to say that psychoanalysis as the late and last Lacan defines it is a 
conservative theory, or if it could offer a non-normative theory of gender? Second, it asks if 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is really a neo-libertine theory that systematically values jouissance 
over castration, or if Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a way to take jouissance into account while 
not giving to it free rein. Finally, my dissertation examines wether the late and last Lacan can 
offer a theory of the subject that could potentially reconcile the anti-relational desire to take into 
account the singularity of one’s own mode of jouissance, and the relational need for political 
recognition, which always implies, in one way or another, a limitation on the free rein of 
jouissance. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE SUBJECT OF JOUISSANCE 
The Death of the Humanist Subject 
Starting right after World War I, and growing increasingly stronger after the horror of World War 
II and the disappointment created by Communism, an intellectual revolution happened in France 
that led to the emergence of what the historian Stefanos Geroulanos has called “an atheism that is 
not humanist.”   This new atheism, which also took the name of “anti- humanism” by the early 1
60s, aimed at questioning, in general terms, all the values defended by humanism, and more 
specifically, the very meaning of what the human, as an immutable and metaphysical “nature,” 
is.  Authors such as Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, 
Jacques Derrida and then Jacques-Alain Miller, Jacques Rancière, and Jean-Luc Nancy, to name 
only a few, suggested, in many different ways, that the values defended by humanism were in 
fact nothing but ideological claims turned into a certain set of transcendental values.  For 2
example, when humanists from the Renaissance use the expression humanum of Man, one has to 
understand in the word humanum what makes of Man the guarantor of certain cultural values 
 Geroulanos, Stefanos. An Atheism That Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought. Stanford, Stanford 1
University Press, 2010. The very phrase “an atheism that is not humanist”comes from Emmanuel Lévinas’s book on 
Blanchot. See, Lévinas, Emmanuel. “On Maurice Blanchot,” in Proper Names. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 1996. Lévinas writes, “Contemporary thought holds the suprise for us of an atheism that is not humanist. The 
Gods are dead or withdrawn from the world, concrete, even rational man does not contain the universe. In all those 
books that go beyond metaphysics we witness the exaltation of an obedience and faithfulness that are not obedience 
or faithfulness to anyone” (127).
 See, for example, Nancy, Jean-Luc, “The Forgetting of Philosophy,” in The Gravity of Thought. Trans. Francois 2
Raffoul and Gregory Recco. New Jersey: Humanities Press. 1993. pp. 7-74. In this text, Nancy, aligned with the 
position defended by Heidegger in Letter on Humanism, argues that to be in favor of humanism amounts to being 
favor of forgetting what the task of philosophy is, which means, of forgetting the task of criticizing ideologies. 
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that Heidegger associates, in his Letter on Humanism, with the Greek Paedeia.  When 3
philosophers of the Enlightenment, like Montesquieu, Rousseau or Condorcet use the word 
“humanism,” they use it to express their personal belief in the existence of a human subject 
naturally inclined towards the good of others (kindness and benevolence towards one’s fellow 
human beings), and a subject capable of becoming, as Descartes had it, "the master and 
possessor" of himself and the world. Finally, when 19th century philosophers such as Hegel, 
Feuerbach, Humboldt or Marx, or utopian socialists such as Proudhon, Saint Simon or Comte, 
talk about humanism, they express their belief in the idea of progress, which is to say in a form 
of “anthropotheism” that tends to make of Man the new absolute value.  Auguste Comte, for 4
example, developed at once the most scientific and atheistic theory of the social while grounding 
his utopian socialism in a “Religion of humanity.”  Likewise, Proudhon and Saint-Simon used 5
the ideal of science in order to build a “new Christianism” [Nouveau Christianisme ] or a 6
“scientific socialism.”   7
 See, Heidegger, Martin. “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of 3
Thinking (1964). Editor David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. pp. 193-242. Heidegger writes: 
“Humanitas, explicitly so called, was first considered and striven for in the age of the Roman Republic. Homo 
humanus was opposed to homo barbarus. Homo humanus here means the Romans, who exalted and honored Roman 
virtus through the “embodiment” of paideia [education] taken over from the Greek.” For a full analysis of Greek 
Paideia, see Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Print.
 See, for example, Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Religion: God the Image of Man: Man's Dependence Upon 4
Nature the Last and Only Source of Religion. Transl. Alexander Loos. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2010. 
In this book, Feuerbach suggested that everything that Man had attributed to God was actually attributes of Man. 
See also, Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The Marx-Engels Reader. Transl. Robert C. Tucker, New York: Norton, 
1978. In a manner very similar to Feuerbach, Marx writes, “The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man 
is the highest being for man—hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a 
debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable beings.” (65). The same reasoning could be found in Hegel’s vision of 
history of course. 
 See, for example, Comte, Auguste, and Stanislav Andreski. The Essential Comte: Selected from Cours De 5
Philosophie Positive by Auguste Comte: First Published in Paris 1830-42. New York: Routledge, 2015. Internet 
resource.
 See Saint-Simon. Le Nouveau Christianisme et les Ecrits sur la religion. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969. 6
 See Proudhon, Pierre.-Joseph. Qu'est-ce que la propriété? Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2012.7
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 As a result, one could argue that humanism, since its inception in Greek Paideia, its 
scientific turn during the Enlightenment, and its final utopian socialist twist in the 19th century 
has always been traversed by a contradiction between an aspiration towards  scientific rigor (and 
thus a rejection of religion and all its transcendental values), and a hidden return, at a political 
level, to a strange form of religiosity, incapable of seeing itself as such, but ready to use all 
technologies available to put in motion its most metaphysical and most of the time racist dreams. 
Lacan, summarizing this strange connection between humanism, metaphysics and politics, 
famously said, in a letter addressed to Heidegger: “Metaphysics has never been anything and can 
only continue by plugging the hole of politics.”  Following suits, many anti-humanist thinkers 8
ended up arguing that humanism, despite its alleged good intentions, was in fact bound to 
produce the most horrible ideologies (such a Nazism, Stalinism, or Maoism, etc.), which in turn 
were most likely to provoke the fall of Man and then, in its wake, the collapse of Europe, and 
then the collapse of the rest of the world. Commenting on this idea, Geroulanos writes: 
If the nineteenth century was marked by a “Death of God,” Man after the era of 
catastrophe—the age of World War I, the rise of Nazism, Stalinism, World War II, and 
the immediate postwar period—could no longer claim to feel the void left by God’s 
absence without bringing forth the worst in Human history and paradoxically denigrating 
the dignity of the human subject. Nor could the persistent conception of this world in 
terms of the philosophical and political centrality of Man (a conception dating to 
Descartes and proceeding to the tradition of natural law, the Enlightenment, the French 
 For a very stimulating comment on this famous sentence, see, Badiou, Alain. Lacan: Anti-Philosophy 3, Translated 8
by Kenneth Richard and Susan Spitzer, New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 
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Revolution, and nineteenth-century liberalism and Marxism) offer satisfactory 
alternatives to the economic, material, and political division and ruin of Europe. (2)   
This is why the anti-humanist critique of humanism did not stop in France and Europe, but 
spread rapidly into the rest of the world—and especially in American Universities, before 
becoming one of the most important influences of the contemporary  field of  “Critical Theory.” 
As early as the beginning of the process of decolonization, engaged in the early sixties, for 
example, many anti-humanist post-colonial theorists, such as Homi Bhabba or Gayatri Spivak 
argued that the entire history of western countries was, in fact, mostly the expression of the 
ideological hubris of humanism, and the humanist subject nothing but the one and only 
responsible for the history of slavery, for the history of colonialism, and nowadays, for powering 
an economic system that is on the verge of destroying the whole planet.  Likewise, for many 9
feminists, and queer scholars  such as Judith Butler or Lee Edelman, it is the very notion of 
identity, supported by the fundamental essentialism of humanism that needed to be questioned. 
However, it would be a mistake to think that the anti-humanist critique of the humanist subject 
and its aftermath in feminism, gender and queer theory is new.  
The Birth of the Decentered Subject  
Hegel, in the The Philosophy of Rights, had already criticized Kant's moral definition of moral 
autonomy for opening the possibility of making one's subjectivity the center of a malevolent 
 See, for an excellent reading of this branch of thought, Chakrabarti, Sumit. The Impact of the Postcolonial 9
Theories of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha on Western Thought: The Third-World Intellectual in 
the First-World Academy. Lewiston, N.Y: Mellen, 2011. 
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maxim raised to the level of a universal.  Likewise, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, in 10
his famous text “Kant with Sade,” argued that the very structure of the modern moral subject, as 
defined by Kant in The Critique of Practical Reason, was similar to the structure of the subject 
implied by the maxims defended by the marquis de Sade, both of them implying a subject 
gaining his agency out of his sadism.  Post-structuralists thinkers such as Georges Bataille, 11
Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida tried, in many different ways (through 
eroticism and transgression, jouissance and the Real, desubjectivation and the care of the self, 
desiring-machine or différance), to deal with this ambiguity.  The result of their theoretical 12
investigation was summarized by American scholars in the expression  of “the decentered 
subject.” 
 The decentered subject is a subject divided between a conscious subject, associated with 
the “I” that speaks, and an unconscious subject that stands for the locus of polymorphous drives 
looking for satisfaction.  As such, the decentered subject, far from being a stable ground upon 13
which the Good, the True, and the Beautiful had erected their empire, is a subjected subject, a 
subject that lacks any form of transparency and thus the agency necessary to control the 
perversity of its drives. The decentered subject is thus doubly decentered. It is deprived of the 
kind of mastery necessary to ground the discourse of science, and deprived of the agency to act 
 Hegel, Georg W. F, and Stephen Houlgate. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. Oxford [UK: Oxford University 10
Press, 2008.
 Nobus, Dany. The Law of Desire: On Lacan's "Kant with Sade. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. For a full 11
analysis of Lacan’s position on Sade, see Epilogue. 
 Bataille, Georges, The Accursed Share: 2/3. New York: Zone Books, 1991; Foucault, Michel. The History of 12
Sexuality: An Introduction.  2014; Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983; Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference, 2017.
 See, for example, Dean, Carolyn J. The Self and Its Pleasures: Bataille, Lacan, and the History of the Decentered 13
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morally. This is perhaps why, as Lacan suggested in his Seminar XVII The Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis, Freud himself eventually shied away from the most radical implications of his 
own discovery when he introduced the notion of the pleasure principle and its supposed 
masochistic beyond, the death drive.  And this is perhaps why also most post-structuralist 14
scholars of Judith Butler's generation are fixated on the idea that the humanist subject must be 
abandoned.   15
 However, the abandonment of the category of the humanist subject remains problematic 
in many ways. The most obvious being that it radically goes against the idea of empowering 
subaltern populations. How is it possible to propose at the same time the critique of the colonial, 
white, masculine subject and the empowerment of the disinherited, queer or subaltern subject? 
Butler herself, in Dispossession, battles with the problem.  The question being: what shall one 16
do with the negativity attached to the humanist subject? Shall one repress it in the name of the 
Other, which means in the name of the “service of the Goods” as Lacan calls it in his Seminar 
VII The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, or shall one make of it the source of the subversive potential of 
the decentered subject? Contextualizing this very question in the current debate that divides the 
field of gender and queer theory, Mari Ruti, in The Ethics of Opting Out, wonders how shall one 
“tease out all the different frequencies of negativity circulating in contemporary queer 
theory” (6)?  I would add to Ruti’s question: how shall one understand the positions that Lacan, 
and even more the late Lacan occupies within these frequencies? 
 Lacan, Jacques. The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. Editor Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans. Russell Grigg, New York: 14
W. W. Norton, 2008.
 Indaimo, J A. The Self, Ethics and Human Rights: Lacan, Levinas & Alterity. Cambridge: Polity, 20152015.15
 Butler, Judith, and Athena Athanasiou. Dispossession: The Performative in the Political: Conversations with 16
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I. WHAT TO DO WITH NEGATIVITY? 
One has to acknowledge that there is a division in the field of queer theory between relational 
theorists and anti-relational theorists, or between the Lgbtiq+ movement and the “antisocial” 
turn in queer theory that has opposed it. This division is centered on the question of “optimism,” 
and “integration.” Does the queer community need to gain more rights to help turn what was 
considered “abject” and queer in gay and lesbian sexuality into something respectable, or does 
the queer community need to keep fighting against the norm in general? More broadly, the field 
of gender studies, for almost two decades, has been traversed by a tension between its historical 
ties with the gay and lesbian communities (and their aspiration to gain more rights and 
recognition), and its ties to non-normative behaviors, alternative modes of sexuality and non-
patriarchal fantasies.  
 On one hand, the movement of queer studies is aligned with other identity politics 
movement (like feminism or black lives matters) in its quest to grant to gay and lesbian people 
the same rights as straight or white people. On the other hand, a part of the queer movement sees 
this attempt at "normalizing" the queer population as a way to betray the very "anti-normative" 
spirit that should animate, at a radical level, this community. In this sense, one could say that the 
field of queer theory is divided between two very distinct positions, one that claims that gay and 
lesbian people are actually "normal" people that were kept in the closet for too long, and the 
other that protests by saying that there is something deeply non-normative in gay and lesbian 
desire.   
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No Bad Feelings Allowed Here 
To problematize this tension, Lauren Berlant, in Cruel Optimism, suggests that a relation of cruel 
optimism exists when something we desire is in reality an impediment to our flourishing, like 
when we remain faithful to specific fantasies of satisfaction even if they have repeatedly 
disappointed us.  Cruel optimism could thus be defined as the stubborn and irrational belief 17
according to which certain ways of life that have hurt us in the past will eventually pay off and 
make us happy in the future. To name only a few of them, such cruel optimism implies the 
fantasy that the belief system we have inherited from our society and families will bring us love, 
intimacy, success, security, financial reward, or the so called “goodlife” that we crave even when 
they are extremely unlikely to do so. One could even argue that when the script did not really 
deliver the promised happiness, it is generally not the script itself that is considered at fault but 
the person who failed to follow it correctly. As a result, it is most of the time the subject who is 
judged guilty, and not the “happiness script.” This is why such cruel optimism provokes a 
limitation of life, of what is desirable, of what is deemed “valuable,” etc. In a similar vein, Sarah 
Ahmed, in The Cultural Politics of Emotions, writes, “If we do not assume that happiness is what 
we must defend, if we start questioning the happiness we are defending, then we can ask other 
questions about life, or what we want life to become. Possibilities have to be recognized as 
possibilities to become possible.”    18
However, optimism as such is also necessary to build a meaningful life. Sara Ahmed, in 
The Promise of Happiness (2010), argues for example that gay marriage brings the queer 
 Berlant, Lauren G. Cruel Optimism, Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.17
 Ahmed, Sara. The Cultural Politics of Emotion, New York: Routledge, 2015, p. 19. 18
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community into the “The right kind of queer by deposing your hope for happiness in the right 
place”  (18). But is this hope not a trap? Not a way to tame the queer subversive potential? 19
From the perspective of capitalism, it is better that you be married than that you cruise sex clubs 
until 4am. Marriage channels sexuality and the potential messiness of the drives. Marriage is the 
oldest institution created to channel sexual energy into specific pathways in order to generate a 
well-oiled economic order. Marriage is a way to submit sexuality and jouissance to the 
“performance principle” that is guiding the system of neo-liberalism. Marcuse knew this in the 
50s when he wrote, “in a repressive order, which enforces the equation between normal, socially 
useful, and good, the manifestations of pleasure for its own sake must appear as a fleur du 
mal.”   20
Likewise, Foucault in The Birth of Biopolitics also saw in marriage a biopolitical 
mechanism that helps the social power to penetrate the most intimate corner of our beings.  21
Marriage is a tool at the service of the power in place to use sexuality as a way to control the 
unruliness of jouissance, to channel it in order to put it at the service of the community, and not 
at the service of an isolated individual. Laura Kipnis, in Against Love (2003), critiques the 
“ideology” of marriage by arguing that it reduces love to a kind of “work.”  One has to work on 22
his/her marriage, on his/her sex-life as one has to work to make money. Marriage is an 
investment that requires work, like everything else. It is thus the negation of jouissance and its 
 Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Promise of Happiness. Durham [NC]: Duke University Press, 2013.19
 Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (1950). New York: Routledge, 2015, 20
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instant reward, its negation of the future. Kipnis argues that the ideology of romantic love that 
supports the ideology of marriage is also what creates, in the first place, “the modern notion of 
the soul”—a critique that Lacan had already precisely formulated in his Seminar XX, Encore, in 
the lesson called “A Love Letter.” To love is to love romantically. And to love romantically is to 
love according to certain idealized image valued by the market. To love romantically is thus to 
love in agreement with the desire of the Other, Lacan would say.  
To go even further, and add one layer of complexity, it is interesting to point out that 
compared to a prior stage of capitalism, one can argue that neo-liberalism does not repress desire 
as such but uses desire to increase the productivity of its workers. It is what Herbert Marcuse 
calls, in Eros and Civilization, the “performance principle,” which is the capitalist equivalent of 
Freud's reality principle. As long as a desire is productive, as long as it pushes the worker to 
work even more, and sometimes without even being paid, desire is “good” and, even, one of the 
motors of late capitalism. Efficiency is not only a social good, but a personal virtue. One has to 
be productive, and productive at a personal level. One has to harness his/her desire to his work in 
order to produce more. In this sense, the very affirmation of desire, as soon as it gets attached to 
the productivity principle, becomes the affirmation of the desire of the Other, which is to say the 
affirmation of the values defended by the current dominant discourse. This reduction of desire to 
the form of the desire of the Other is what Marcuse called “sur-plus repression,” and that Lacan 
called, in his Seminar XVII, “surplus-jouissance.” This sur-plus involves a kind of manipulation 
of jouissance, a way to put it at the service of the neoliberal machine.  
To illustrate this argument and connect it to the field of feminism, gender and queer 
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studies, one could link it to sexuality. While sexuality has been considered a highly transgressive 
site for more than three decades, the democratization of the porno industry has turned sexuality 
into a host of new markets. With neo-liberalism, it is libido itself, with its polymorphous 
perversity that is used to fuel new porno markets. Every sexual fantasy becomes a “niche” to 
create new products. We are ordered to enjoy, order to express our desire, ordered to explore 
fantastically our sexuality.  
The New Super-Ego of Capitalism: Enjoy!  
This is why today, as Jacques-Alain Miller points in “The Unconscious and the Speaking Body,” 
the paradigm is no longer the one of repression. It is the one of enjoyment, of a perverse 
submission to a set of socially acceptable regimes of jouissance. One has to enjoy, to take care of 
one’s body, to unleash its fantasies, to act upon them. Likewise, Žižek, in Neighbors and Other 
Monsters, argued that we are “bombarded from all sides by the different versions of the super-
ego injunction, “Enjoy.”  To put it in an axiomatic form, one could say that the new paradigm of 23
our time is the one of pornography. Pornography is the paradigm of today’s world. It is entirely 
imaginary and grounded on a compulsory injunction coming from the drives, elevated at the 
status of a new super-ego. This is why the transgression that is praised in pornography is not a 
transgression that aims at liberating the individual from the grip of the Other, but a transgression 
that is linked to perversion. And the truth that this transgression reveals, as a symptom, is nothing 
but what Lacan called, at the end of his teaching, the fundamental absence of sexual relationships 
between the sexes. Everyone is alone in his fantasy.  
 Žižek, Slavoj, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard. The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology; with 23
a New Preface. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 2013, p. 52. 
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 In such a perverse world, governed by the super-ego of pornography, the body that was 
supposed to be entirely liberated, and thus free to attain satisfaction is, in reality, reduced to be an 
imaginary body, reduced to a fixed image. It is a body entirely imaginary, a fetish fixated to an 
Image, regulated by the Other. Miller writes, “The Body conditions everything that the register 
of the imaginary lodges of representations, as well as what it signifies, in terms of meaning and 
representation, even the image of the world itself. It is in the imaginary body that the words of 
language makes the representations enter, and it is these words too that constitutes an illusory 
world on the model of the unity of the body” (Miller, The Unconscious and the Speaking Body, 
my translation, 8). Such imaginary body is what is incarnated in all the images through which 
one lives one’s gender, and more broadly one’s narcissistic relationship to one’s own body.  
However, the body as imaginary is, as paradoxical as it may sound, the worst enemy of 
the real body since its image is the source of an illusionary mastery that remains alien to the body 
and its mode of jouissance. While the image is fixed and flat, the real body is continually 
changing and has affective depth. Unfortunately, it is through the false mastery of the imaginary 
that most contemporary discourses about well-being, but also about the construction of identity, 
contend that a true return to the body is possible (cf. Mari Ruti). Eric Laurent, in L’envers de la 
Biopolitique writes, 
What hides the paradox of the current discourse about a “return to nature,” is that it 
evokes the image of the body in order to make the real of jouissance disappear. The shape 
of the body and its inner functioning, as well as the multiplication of its images, always 
presented as the only real dimension of the body, fascinates most people, and presents 
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itself as being all the more a good remedy to the contemporary anxiety that this images 
are relying on innovative technologies. The body as a machine functions in couple with 
the body as an image. But let’s not be fooled by it. The power of the techno-scientific 
discourse, as well as the products that it produces only aims at ruling over jouissance 
through a scopic control of the body.”   (My translation)  24
There is, on the one hand, the fragile and fragmented body of jouissance, and all its organs, ready 
to be modified, exchanged, etc. On the other, there is the imaginary unified image of the body, 
linked to the narcissistic image that a subject has of itself. In this relationship, the function of the 
image is to incarnate, in an external space, the unity of the body that would otherwise remain 
fragmented. This unity, however, is not a unity that is anchored in the jouissance of the body 
itself, but it is an external unity that aims at controlling through a kind of scopic regulation, the 
body and its jouissance. It is a unity that precisely “troubles” the functioning of the real body, as 
Judith Butler would have it.  This is why, for Eric Laurent, and contrary to one might think, the 25
“return to the body” that is celebrated today is nothing but an indirect celebration of an increased 
control over the real body through a hyper-modern technologic regulation of the body through 
the imaginary. To put it differently, the more we use modern technology to gain an imaginary 
control over our body, the more we are becoming the very instrument of these technologies, and 
through them, the very instrument of the dominant discourse.  
 This techno-scientific belief rests, mostly, on the idea that if a technology can produce an 
image of a given phenomenon, this image will reveal the truth of it. However, such idea is not 
 Laurent, Éric. L'envers de la biopolitique: une écriture pour la jouissance, 2016, p. 24.24
 Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter. Routledge, New York, 2015.25
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only false, but dangerous as Dennis Forest argues in his new book Neuroscepticisme, since it 
introduces, in the name of science, a new form of essentialism.   26
Jouissance as the Other of Enjoyment 
What escapes this new essentialism, entirely trapped in the field of the Imaginary, is precisely 
jouissance, since jouissance is what escapes the mastery of the Imaginary, what threatens it, what 
slips beyond or beneath its grasp. Indeed, there is no image that can adequately represents 
jouissance, since jouissance is the ir-representable Other within the body. Jouissance is also what 
fractures the unity of the Imaginary, its wholeness, via the symptoms it produces. Finally 
jouissance is what is impossible to negate, while being forever unpredictable. Jouissance, indeed, 
contrary to controllable enjoyment, is sometimes ecstatic or ravishing, as Marguerite Duras has it 
(In the Ravishing of Lol V Stein), or sometimes traumatic and anxiety building as in the case of 
eroticism.  Eric Laurent, commenting on this series of idea in his book The Other Side of 27
Biopolitics, writes:  “The moment of ecstasy is the reverse of what appears as obvious in a 
image. The ecstasy is the manifestation of a body without image, from which the subject is 
absent, as if it was outside of itself” (my translation, 15). There is thus a radical disjunction 
between the body as imaginary and the real body as a locus for jouissance. Faced with this 
division, the question is: should this division be reduced through a renewed usage of the 
Imaginary, or should the false mastery of the Imaginary be traversed in order to attain another 
body, free from its Imaginary reduction? Or in which way would it be possible to approach the 
 Lancelot M. 2016. "Neuroscepticisme (Denis Forest)". Medecine/Sciences. 32, no. 12: 1135-1137.26
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question of jouissance beyond its Imaginary regulation, and its narcissistic dimension? (Could it 
be, for example, what drives the beautiful movie The Shape of Water?).   28
II. THE TEMPTATION TO OPT OUT  
To give an answer to this question, a new trend in queer theory has appeared, the trend to opt out. 
To opt out means, first, to oppose the Imaginary injunction of neoliberalism to enjoy, to be 
happy, to keep working and consuming in agreement with the discourse of the master.  To opt 29
out means also to refuse to believe in the ideology of happiness that surrounds the American 
dream of consumption and mass production. Commenting on this trend in The Ethics of Opting 
Out, Mari Ruti writes, “Opting out—the ability to defeat cruel optimism, as it were—
presupposes the capacity to resist what Ahmed calls the dominant “happiness script” of our 
society, for happiness is more or less an unquestioned value in our culture: something that 
everyone is supposed to want.”   Surplus-jouissance, surplus-production, “keep working.” The 30
system needs to maintain in us a lack that serves as the motor for our desire for consumption. 
Consequently, to defy such a script, some recent queer scholars have argued that to maintain a 
critical distance from the neo-liberal optimistic ideology, one needs to ally with the death-drive. 
In other words, if one wants to escape the grip of the imaginary, and the submission to the social 
Other that it implies, one has to pass an alliance with what is excessive in jouissance, to embrace 
in jouissance what does not fit into the boxes of the socially acceptable regimes of jouissance. 
 Toro, Guillermo del, et al. The Shape of Water. 2018.28
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The queer scholars who defend such position have been named, for these reasons, the anti-social, 
anti-relational theorists.  
The Queer Lacanianism of Anti-relational Theorists  
The Anti-social, anti-relational theorists consist of prominent Lacanian scholars, such as Leo 
Bersani and Lee Edelman, but also of anti-psychoanalytic Foucauldian scholars such as 
Halperin.  What unites these different thinkers, beyond their differences, is their valorization of 31
negativity in order to oppose what they consider to be the “fake” optimism of the lgbtiq+ 
movement. To give a simple illustration to this position, one could say that the anti-hero of this 
movement is Jean Genet. The movement towards abjection that Genet accomplished represents 
the model of a Queer ethics of opting out: a refusal to endorse the values of neo-liberalism, i.e., 
of productivity, rationality, commitment, responsibility, etc. Instead, Genet is deemed by these 
thinkers to be the Saint of transgression, perversion, etc. For Halperin, Genet represents the thrill 
of “being naughty, disobedient, sinful, bad” (2007, 57). The best representative of this position is 
Lee Edelman’s No future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. In this book, Edelman rejects all 
the fantasies about a better future, all the fantasies of progress that supports the development of 
neo-liberalism and the mainstream of lgbtiq+ identity politics. Edelman calls this hope that 
supports this position, “reproductive futurism,” a hope which itself subordinates the vision of the 
future to a set of values that Edelman summarizes in the notion of “reproductive futurism,” 
which is to say a vision of the future centered around the figure of the child. For Edelman, the 
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point at stake is to make visible that queer theorists want to escape this vision of the future, 
which is entirely subordinated to a certain vision of the common good; they need to posit a sense 
of ethics that departs radically from any categories of right and wrong. The need to posit what 
Edelman calls, in reference to Lacan’s Seminar on Joyce, The Sinthome, the concept of 
sinthomosexuality.   
Likewise, in The Queer Art of Failure (2011), Jack Halberstam promotes failure in all its 
various forms (stupidity, ignorance, forgetfulness, refusal to learn, unemployment, self-cutting, 
etc.) to oppose the subordination of queer theory to the neo-liberal “principle of productivity” 
and the idealized sense of hope that underpins it.  To oppose the injunction to perform well, 32
Halberstam promotes that art of “failing.” The negative feeling that comes with failing can be 
used to poke holes in the otherwise seamless optimistic narrative about success (as in “It is 
getting better.”) Halberstam writes, 
Failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behaviors and manage 
human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and 
predictable adulthoods. Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and 
disturb the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers. 
And while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as 
disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the opportunity to use these 
negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life.” (34)   
Another good representative of the ethics of opting out, is Jasbir Puar’s Terrorist Assemblage 
 Halberstam, Judith. The Queer Art of Failure. Queer Art of Failure. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.32
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(2016), where he aligns suicide bombing with queerness.  The suicide bombing, unlike the 33
queer seeking social recognition and integration, represents the pure negativity of the system, 
and what refuses, until the very end, to be part of the system. The suicide bombing is the pure 
representative of the death drive, of the desire to put a radical end to a cycle, and to clean the 
table for a fresh start. Puar reads the suicide bombers as the perfect example of the dissolution of 
subjectivity that poststructuralists, and particularly Deleuze-Guattari, advocate.  34
The Critique of the Anti-relational Theorists  
The problem with the anti-relational position is that it only reflects the stance of certain queer 
scholars who are mostly interested in promoting the subversive potential of radical negativity, by 
highlighting the connection between jouissance and self-undoing. Munoz, during the PMLA 
round table from which the very split between relation and anti-relational theories emerged, 
called this position “the last stand of the white gay man.”  To support his claim, Munoz argued 35
that the antisocial position is actually a position that implies, on the behalf of the one who 
defends it, not be threatened in his identity in the first place. It is a position that takes as its point 
of departure a strong subject, encapsulated in itself, and as its point of arrival, a shattered subject, 
which is to say a subject that has the capacity to shatter its own self without completely 
collapsing. This is why one can go as far as suggesting that such an ethical position, primarily 
defended by Lee Edelman in No Future, but also by Lynn Huffer in Mad for Foucault, is actually 
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a position that reflects a certain white privilege.  Such a position, moreover, always relies on the 36
most simplistic reading of post-structuralism, by taking Foucault's concept of desubjectivation, 
Deleuze & Guattari praise of schizophrenia, and Lacan’s emphasis on jouissance in his late 
teaching, as an unproblematic claim, instead of interrogating the historical context in which such 
a fascination for the shattering of the self-emerged.  
As Carolyn Dean argues, in the The Self and its Pleasure, or Allan Stoekl in Politics, 
Writing, Mutilation: The Cases of Bataille, Blanchot, Roussel, Leiris, Ponge, the very idea of 
such a shattering of the self, which became central in the work of Maurice Blanchot or Samuel 
Beckett for example, was created in Europe, after the Second World War, by white men who 
were not only occupying a privileged position in the symbolic order, but who also had a very 
high sense of self-mastery (as it is still clearly the case with Lee Edelman).  As such, the ideal of 37
self-shattering or decentering represented for them a form of subversion of their too self-secured 
sense of identity. But, in turn, one can wonder what does it mean to propose such a "subversion" 
to contemporary subjects who are neither secure about their symbolic position (their economic 
sustainability), nor in their identity (their subjective sense of oneness). This is why, most of the 
time, anti-relational queer theorists remain at the level of rhetoric, and give the impression that 
they are deeply disconnected from any concrete practice of political activism. Perhaps, instead of 
praising the antisocial turn for its rhetorical radicalism, one should question wether this 
systematic attack on the subject, in the name of its “queerness,” is not, actually, a politico-ethical 
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dead end? The larger question is whether it is possible to reclaim the category of the subject 
without falling back onto the imaginary trap that the humanist subject entails?  
The Relational Critique of the Antisocial Turn 
Opposed to this position stands the position defended by “the rest of us,” which is to say those 
who are interested in understanding the relations between sexuality, race, class, gender, 
nationality, and other collective identity markers without turning every symbolic construction 
into a source of alienation. To give just one example, for Judith Butler, in Frames of War, the 
anti-relational position is wrong inasmuch as it produces a “defiant subject” at the expense of the 
group, at the expense of the existence of the others.   38
 However, for Butler, to criticize the desire to opt out does not mean to call for a return of 
the humanist subject either. On the contrary, any attempt to re-center the subject is intrinsically 
evil. In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler argues that there is “no re-centering of the subject 
without unleashing unacceptable sadism and cruelty (77).  For Butler, to advocate for the return 39
of the subject always means to advocate for the return of its narcissistic and aggressive ego. 
Butler writes, “the subject is produced at the expense of a relational social ontology” (55). There 
is thus a kind of either or for Butler. It is either the centered subject, bound through his illusion of 
 Butler, Judith P. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso, 2016.38
 Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. Vancouver: Crane Library at the University of British Columbia, 39
2011.
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mastery to sadism and cruelty, or the decentered subject, completely submitted to death drive.   40
In an effort to bypass this double dead end, Tim Dean, in Unlimited Intimacies, or 
Bersani and Adams, in Intimacies (2009), and all the more Ruti in The Ethics of Opting Out 
(2017), using Lacan's stand on ethics, tried to forge an ethics on what remains in the Other 
forever alienated.  This foreign body, within the narcissistic body, is what Jacques-Alain Miller 41
calls, the extimate ennemies, which is to say, what is at the same time the most intimate and the 
most alien in someone, and also what grounds, on the ordinary basis, the mode of jouissance of a 
subject. 
III. LACAN IN THE FIELDS OF FEMINISM, GENDER AND QUEER STUDIES 
The early Lacan of the "Return to Freud" has been used by Butler's generation of Gender and 
Queer theorists to understand how alienation works. They emphasized, thus, what was of the 
order of the Symbolic. Lacan was useful inasmuch as his theory of the Symbolic, once reread 
through Althusser, could provide a powerful understanding of how subjectivity is created by the 
Symbolic order, and of how the subject produced by this Symbolic structure was the puppet of it.  
(It is what I demonstrate in the first part of chapter two).  
  
 Ruti, in the The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects, criticizes Butler for two reasons. Ruti 40
writes, “Butler’s anxiety about the subject’s possessive and aggressive tendencies is so excessive that it threatens to 
exclude the possibility of benign relationship altogether. On the one hand, she elevates relationality to the ultimate 
good. On the other, she implies that non-violent relationality is more or less impossible because of the subject’s 
narcissistic and colonizing inclinations. The result of this contradiction is that the only way to be an acceptable 
subject, in Butler’s vision, is to adopt a stance of unmitigated masochism; the good subject, in Butlerian terms, 
accepts its violation by the other while meticulously safeguarding against its own violent tendencies.” (57)
 Dean, Tim. Unlimited Intimacy Reflections on the Subculture of Barebacking. Chicago, University of Chicago 41
Press, 2009; Bersani, Leo, and Adam Phillips. Intimacies. University of Chicago Press, 2008.
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 On the opposite side, queer theorists like Bersani, Edelman, etc. have used the late Lacan, 
and its emphasis on the real and jouissance to posit a form of liberation from the Symbolic. As a 
result, there is a split between a vision of Lacan as a structuralist that deprives the subject of any 
form of agency—which is the position of Butler and other relational theorists. And there is the 
vision of Lacan as the supporter of an unbridled jouissance, which is the position defended by 
Edelman.  Commenting on this strange split, Ruti writes,  42
First, Lacan has been hijacked by antirelational hardliners, such as Edelman, to such an 
extent that critics who advocate a more relational approach—critics who comprise queer 
theory’s so called social (relational) school—have found it difficult to find a palatable 
entry point to Lacanian theory. Second, many queer theorists have interpreted Foucault’s 
(1961) early critique of psychoanalysis as a normalizing discourse to mean that Foucault 
and psychoanalysis are incompatible. This perspective overlooks the ways in which 
Foucault’s (entirely justified) attack on the conservative tendencies of psychoanalysis 
does not apply to Lacan. (4-5) 
What Lacan tried to accomplish, throughout his whole teaching, and all the more in his late and 
last teaching, was not to destroy the notion of the subject, but to build a new subject that would 
be, at the same time, the product of the critique of the humanist subject, and the foundation of a 
new subject, capable of a different kind of agency. The goal of psychoanalysis for Lacan is to 
help the analysand dissociate his desire from the desire of the Other in order to go beyond the 
 Ruti writes, “(…) the queer theoretical community appears fairly starkly divided between those who have chosen 42
to follow Lacan (Bersani, Edelman, and Tim Dean), and those who have chosen to follow Foucault (Halperin, Lynn 
Huffer, and a whole host of scholars who are “vaguely foucauldian” without overtly proclaiming themselves as 
such).” (4)
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cruel optimism that attaches it to the powerful symbolic structures and their super-ego command 
to enjoy.  
The Lacanian Defiant Subject 
Contrary to most queer scholars, relational or anti-relational, Lacan has a theory of the Subject to 
offer, even though Lacan’s subject is everything but a humanist subject. As Ruti has it: “What is 
unique about Lacan is precisely that he theorizes autonomy (defiance) in the context of a 
conception of subjectivity that is otherwise completely antithetical to the ideals underpinning the 
sovereign humanist subject” (56).   
 To give an idea about how Lacan managed to theorize subject’s autonomy outside any 
reference to the ideals underpinning the humanist subject, it suffices to mention, in this 
introduction, Lacan’s Seminar VII on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, where Lacan takes the figure 
of Antigone to define what an ethical act is from his anti-humanist perspective.  Lacan says,  43
It is because we know better than those who went before how to recognize the nature of 
desire… that a reconsideration of ethics is possible, that a form of ethical judgment is 
possible, of a kind that gives the question the force of a Last judgment: Have you acted in 
conformity with the desire that is in you? … I propose then that, from an analytic point of 
view, the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s 
desire (44).  
 Lacan, Jacques, Jacques-Alain Miller, and Dennis Porter. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII, Book VII. 43
Seminar of Jacques Lacan. London: Routledge, 2008; see also, Kesel, Marc De, and Sigi Jottkandt. Eros and Ethics: 
Reading Jacques Lacan's Seminar VII. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009.
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The Lacanian ethical act is thus a destructive (or self-destructive) act through which the subject 
utters a categorical “no!” to the Symbolic order. This “no!” breaks all attachment to the 
hegemonic power.  As such, the Lacanian ethics of psychoanalysis is not normative in any sense. 
Lacan does not want to help the analysand to conform to the values and ideals of its time. He 
does not want to make of psychoanalysis an instrument at the “service of the goods,” and neither 
at the service of an unbridled jouissance, but to put it at the service of the singularity of the 
subject.  
 While ethics, since Aristotle at least, is mostly concerned with the “cleaning up of 
desire,” and the affirmation of the Good, Lacan’s ethical act is centered, on the contrary, on the 
rebellious insurgence of desire, as well as a potentially excessive jouissance. Just as Antigone 
says to Creon, “that’s how it is because it is that’s how it is,” the ethical act is an act that is at the 
same time non-negotiable, and potentially in absolute rupture with what the symbolic order 
requires from the individual. As such, one could even argue that it is through this act that the 
Lacanian subject asserts its agency. It is at least thanks to this act that the lacanian subject gains a 
chance to  free itself from the desire of the Other, while forcing this Other to recognize the 
heresy of its desire. Commenting on the radicalness of Lacan’s ethics, Ruti writes, “This is why 
Lacan can, somewhat counterintuitively, offer queer theory a more robust theory of agency than 
Butler (and the rest of poststructuralist theory) has been able to devise” (42).  
 The agency of Lacan’s subject, which is of the same kind as the radical freedom of 
Antigone in the face of Creon’s Symbolic law, is also what connects Lacan’s ethic to the notion 
his most fundamental and personal concept, i.e. the Real. The Real, in Lacan’s work, is what 
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escapes the grasp of the symbolic, what disrupts it from within. This is why the Real, in a sense, 
can be considered as the foundation of the Lacanian subject’s renewed sense of agency and 
freedom. It is because the Real of Antigone’s act appears, where her Symbolic submission should 
have been that the Lacanian subject can affirm a form of ex-sistence (as a form of exit) that goes 
beyond the limits that has been assigned to it by a given law or a given discourse.   
Žižek, in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, says that the Real that the Lacanian 
ethical act introduces in the world is like a bone in the throat of the Symbolic that makes it 
choke. Zizek argues that the Lacanian ethical act is like a “gesture which, by definition, touches 
the dimensions of some impossible Real. (…) In a situation of a forced choice, the subject makes 
the “crazy,” impossible choice of, in a way, striking at himself, at what is most precious to 
himself” (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek, 122). The Lacanian ethical act is not an act that is concerned 
primarily with the Other (the Good, or any other Universal), nor directly with the others (as is it 
the case in Affect Theory), but with the construction of a subject that is neither unhooked from 
the Other, nor enslaved by the Other. It is an act that requires the subject to stay faithful to the 
truth of its desire while remaining in contact with the Other, even though this contact can be 
conflictual. Alenka Zupancic, in Ethics of the Real, writes: “Will I act in conformity to what 
threw me out of joint, will I be ready to reformulate what has hitherto been the foundation of my 
existence”  (2000). 44
However, to affirm one’s own desire, and thus to poke in the name of the Real a hole in 
the structure of the discourse of the Other (which is normally in charge of defining the limits of 
reality) does not mean, either, that the desire and the jouissance that triggers this radical act are 
 Zupancic, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. London: VERSO Books, 2012, 353.44
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not, in one way or another, also the product of the Symbolic. The difficulty, in Lacan's ethics, is 
to be able to distinguish what, in the subject, belongs to the desire of the Other, and what belongs 
to the truth of one's desire and, beyond this question, what distinguishes the notion of desire from 
the notion of jouissance.  
It is around this question that the split between anti-relational and relational theorists take 
place. While for a relational theorist like Butler such a split is deemed impossible insofar as the 
subject is considered the pure product of the Other, it is what Lacan's notion of the Real posits at 
the very center of his theory of the subject. Even though, for Lacan, the influence of the Other on 
the construction of the subject of the unconscious is decisive, this influence could nonetheless be 
limited. The entry into the Symbolic implies a loss of jouissance that Lacan, following Freud, 
conceptualizes with the notion of Castration. But this loss of jouissance leaves a remainder that 
cannot be negativated, and which Lacan called object a (we will see how in chapter one). And it 
is thanks to this remainder, impossible to integrate into the symbolic that Lacan intends to foster 
a new subject, an  radically anti-humanist subject, but that would be capable, at the same time, to 
assert a new form of agency, a form of agency that would take into account not only the desire of 
the subject (and its relation to the Other) but also the very element that connects the two at the 
level of the body, i.e., jouissance.  
Lacan’s Subject of Jouissance 
The goal of Lacan, during his late teaching, was to understand how one can learn how to do 
something with his symptom, with his negativity, and he became capable of putting it at work 
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against the apparently omnipotent power of the Other. The secret, when it comes to jouissance, is 
to learn how to manipulate it, in order not to become its slave. For it is only when jouissance  is 
no longer invasive and excessive that the very possibility of desire reopens, and thus the 
possibility of a Lacanian ethical act for the subject. Such an ethics represents, from my point of 
view, a possible point of resistance to the Butlerian idea according to which there could be no 
resistance that does not imply a form of alliance, and thus a form of submission to the dominant 
power. In a Butlerian framework, indeed, agency is always a function of power, and power a 
question of Imaginary representations and Symbolic structures. Thus, for Butler and many other 
relational theorists, the only way to reclaim some form of agency is to harness, through parodic, 
playful reappropriations, the very power that has shaped the subject. Subversion is always a 
question of reappropriation and resignification. But it is never directly a question of desire, and 
neither of jouissance. As a consequence, the option of opting out, unlike in Lacan’s ethics of 
desire, is never one for Butler, since there is no “outside” of the power structure whatsoever. 
Ruti, commenting on the limits of Butler’s theory of subversion in comparison to Lacan’s and 
Žižek, writes,  
The crux of the disagreement between Butler and Žižek (or between the Foucault of 
biopolitics and the Lacan of the Real): if for Butler the subject arises when social 
interpellation succeeds, for Žižek the subject emerges when interpellation falters; if for 
Butler the subject consists in a nexus of internalized ideological forces, for Žižek the 
subject only becomes a “real” subject when it attains a degree of freedom from ideology. 
(50) 
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Dwelling on this opposition, constructed by Ruti, this dissertation will argue that Lacan’s notion 
of ethics offers not only a much more radical theory of agency than Butler and the relational 
“camp” of queer theory, but offers also a very stimulating critique of the fascination for death 
and jouissance that haunts the “anti-social turn” in queer theory.  
IV. THE SUBJECT OF JOUISSANCE AND THE LATE LACAN  
It is well known that Lacan has been accused by Butler's generation of scholars of formalism and 
a-historicism as if the notion of the big Other that he used to talk about Symbolic structure was a 
logical structure floating above the fluctuations and violence of history.  Lacan, indeed, through 45
his early emphasis on the Symbolic, was considered to have elevated the structure of patriarchy 
to the level of a transcendental structure. But this reading of Lacan relies on a profound 
misunderstanding of Lacan's conception of the Symbolic.  
 While most of Lacan’s American readers have understood the notion of the Symbolic and 
the notion of the Other as a closed structure, interpellating the subject from the outside, Lacan 
always maintained the idea that the Other is fundamentally incomplete, which means that there is 
no “hegemonic” Other that could be entirely secured and absolute.  Quite on the contrary, by 46
asserting that "there is no Other of the Other" Lacan wanted to emphasis the fact that the Other, 
just like any form of symbolic order, is always dependent for its sustainability on specific 
historical configurations, and thus on specific master discourses. Žižek, commenting on this idea 
in Contingency…, writes, "When Lacan emphatically asserts that "there is no big Other," his 
 Copjec, Joan. Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists. London: Verso, 2015.45
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point is precisely that there is no a priori formal structure scheme exempt from historical 
contingencies—there are only contingent, fragile, inconsistent configurations” (310).  47
A Lacanian New Body 
This fragility is all visible, for example, in the relationship of the subject to its body, which is 
normally characterized by a form of passionate attachment that Freud named “primary 
narcissism,” and that implies an identification to an external image that is loved and admired. 
But the body, in the late Lacan, and more specifically, in Seminar XXIII, Joyce the Sinthome, is 
no longer related to the “Mirror Stage,” and its link to the presence of a parent that confirms it at 
a symbolic level. The body, instead, becomes a primitive “having” upon which the subject of the 
unconscious has to learn how to ground its “being.” For the late Lacan, there is thus a radical 
inversion between “having” and “being.” It is not, as the discourse of philosophy has argued, 
since Descartes at least, “being” that comes first, and “having” that comes second, but it is 
“having,” in the sense of “having a body” that comes first and “being” that comes after. 
Commenting on this idea, while emphasizing its importance, Eric Laurent writes,  
Jouissance has to be experienced, to be felt. And it is only after this experience is done 
that effects of knowledge, themselves related to effects of the signifiers, are produced on 
the body. (…) For Descartes, what is felt is thinking, through which, thanks to a 
demonstration (ergo), is given the certainty of being.  For Lacan, what is felt is 
jouissance, starting from the fact that one has a body. And from this body, marked with 
 Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues 47
on the Left. London: Verso, 2011.
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events of jouissance, with the traumas of lalangue, will come afterwards unconscious 
effects of meaning that Lacan approaches as effects of knowledge. It is a different kind of 
demonstration, an ergo through jouissance. (my translation, 59) 
In other words, for the late Lacan, the dialectic of “having” and “being” is completely detached 
from the earlier Lacanian logic of the Phallus in which a woman was supposed to “be” the 
Phallus for a man who “has” it.  Opposed to such a logic, anchored in the Phallus, all speaking 48
beings, for the late Lacan, regardless of their bodily anatomy, “have” a primitive relation to their 
bodies in the form of an opaque jouissance, and construct their “being” in relation to this 
primitive “having,” or in denial of it. Having is on the side of existence and jouissance, while 
“being” is on the side of language and meaning (on the side of the parlote of lalangue). This is 
why the body changes status in Lacan’s late teaching and becomes the “speaking body.” The 
speaking body is a mystery that is close to the concept of the flesh developed by the late 
Merleau-Ponty (un corps sentant, senti). Miller writes, 
The sign slices up the flesh, devitalizing and cadaverising it, and then the body becomes 
separate from it. In this distinction between body and flesh, the body shows itself to be 
something that is able to flesh out the locus of the Other of the signifier as a surface of 
inscription. For us, the Cartesian mystery of psychosomatic union is displaced. What is 
mysterious, but which remains indubitable, is what results from the symbolic’s purchase 
on the body. To put it in Cartesian terms, the mystery is rather that of union between 
speech and the body. By dint of this fact of experience, one can say that it belongs to the 
 Vanheule, Stijn, Derek Hook, and Calum Neill. Reading Lacan's Écrits: From “Signification of the Phallus” to 48
“Metaphor of the Subject,” 2019. For a full description of Lacan’s early logic of sexuation, see chapter 3. 
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register of the real. (trans. Adrian Price, The Unconscious and the Speaking Being). 
What the late Lacan has to offer to contemporary field of feminism, gender and queer studies is 
thus this radical alternative between, on the one hand, a submission to the false mastery of the 
imaginary, which always implies a form of submission to external gender norms and, more 
broadly to any kind of ideological discourses. And on the other hand, the choice of the mystery 
of the speaking body and the ethics of desire that goes with it, i.e. the ethics that aims at learning 
how to deal with one’s symptom in order to make of it the point of departure of a renewed sense 
of agency, as well as a renewed point of departure for a new conception of the social bond. Eric 
Laurent writes, “A choice opens up between conformism as selflessness, and the safeguarding of 
singularity” (21). It is this choice that chapter one, Everyone is Queer, which is to say Singular, 
opens.  
To Speak the Language of the Body 
However, this emphasis on singularity over conformism is itself divided into two different 
approaches. Learning how to speak the language of the body [lalangue du corps] implies, for the 
late Lacan, to be able to write, at a logical level, the inscription of the body in the three registers 
of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. This point is fundamental, and defines the 
originality of Lacan’s position. If Lacan is in favor of singularity, it does not mean that he is in 
favor of the dissolution of the ideal of universality carried by the discourse of science. Quite of 
the contrary, Lacan never stoped inventing new forms of writing that were, at the same time, 
universality transmittable, and capable of producing a knowledge of the singular. This is why 
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Lacan’s ethics of desire, and the kind of writing and thinking that it unlock should not be 
confused, as chapter two demonstrates, with the notion of writing and deconstruction developed 
by Derrida in Writing and Difference, nor with Hélène Cixous’ concept of feminine writing, as 
chapter three shows, nor with Georges Bataille’s notion of non-knowledge, as chapter four 
exposes. On the contrary, it is a writing—a matheme—that provides what the late Lacan of 
Seminar XXIII calls “a support for thinking.” And such a support for thinking is necessary as 
soon as one accepts that within language, there is no stable meaning inasmuch as there is no 
“reference” in the world that could stabilize it. Lacan writes, in his Seminar XVIII D’un discours 
qui ne serait pas du semblant, “it is for this reason that the reference is only real, because it is 
impossible to designate. As a result, one has to construct it. And one construct it only if one is 
capable of it” (my translation, 388-389).  
 More radically, with the vanishing of any form of reference, what vanishes too is the idea 
of a master-signifier that could guarantee the “good” functioning of language. As chapter four on 
Georges Bataille’s notion of inner experience (and its relation to the impossible) shows, if there 
is no such a thing as God, or science, or reason, or law to support the closure of the production of 
meaning and its endless drifting along the metaphorical or metonymical chain of signification, 
then one needs, as Lacan did, to reclaim the possibility of constructing a knowledge of the 
singular, in order to maintain open the possibility of the subject, and through this possibility, the 
possibility of an ethics of desire, and an ethics of jouissance. To put it differently, how can a 
subject, once impacted in its body by a signifier, which itself has produced a contingent event of 
jouissance, can learn how to transform such contingent event into a singular knowledge. And can 
this singular knowledge, once built by the subject, can become the ground upon which the newly 
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born subject (of jouissance) will become capable of asserting its desire—against the desire of the 
Other.  
   
The Subject of Jouissance and the Speaking Body  
At the end of his critique of the Oedipus complex, in Seminar XVII, Lacan opposes the 
discourse of universality, which excludes the subject of jouissance and its excessive and 
opaque jouissance, to the discourse of psychoanalysis, which tries to elaborate a logical 
writing of the perturbation that the subject of jouissance introduces in every form of 
discourse and thus, in every form of structure. The stakes of this distinction is to think anew 
the relationship between the Symbolic and the body as Real, which is to say the relationship 
between what the universal discourse of science can grasp of the singularity of the subject, 
and what necessarily remains out of its grasps, as a leftover. Commenting on this idea, Miller 
says,  
This leftover is not the failure of psychoanalysis but is strictly speaking what 
constitutes your worth, if indeed you find out how to transfer it into the state of an 
oeuvre. It is doubtless in this respect that everyone flounders, stumbles and hobbles 
along, but this is also what makes for the difference and nobility of each and every 
one of you. Lacan spoke of the bar on the S of his subject as a trait of “noble 
bastardy.” (96)  
And it is this trait of “noble bastardy,” I would say, that makes of the late teaching of Lacan a 
very queer one, since it makes of everyone’s floundering and stumbling the ground of each 
one’s future noble bastardy. 
!33
WORK CITED  
Ahmed, Sara. The Cultural Politics of Emotion, New York: Routledge, 2015. 
—-. The Promise of Happiness. Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 
Artaud, Antonin. Oeuvres complètes 1, 1. Paris: Gallimard, 1972. 
Badiou, Alain. Lacan: Anti-Philosophy 3, Translated by Kenneth Reinhard and Susan Spitzer,   
 New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 
Barraclough, Oswald. The Future of Man: A Humanist Manifesto. Penzance: United Writers,   
 1987.  
Bataille, Georges, The Accursed Share: 2/3. New York: Zone Books, 1991. 
Berlant, Lauren G. Cruel Optimism, Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter. New York: Routledge, 2015. 
—-. Giving an Account of Oneself. Vancouver: Crane Library at the University of British    
 Columbia, 2011. 
Butler, Judith, and Athena Athanasiou. Dispossession: The Performative in the Political:    
 Conversations with Athena Athanasiou. Cambridge: Polity, 2015. 
Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality:    
 Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London: Verso, 2011. 
Chiesa, Lorenzo. The Not-Two: Logic and God in Lacan. MIT Press, 2016. 
Comte, Auguste, and Stanislav Andreski. The Essential Comte: Selected from Cours de 
Philosophie Positive by Auguste Comte, First Published in Paris 1830-42. New York: 
Routledge, 2015. Internet resource. 
Copjec, Joan. Radical Evil. London: Verso, 1996. 
—-. Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists. London: Verso, 2015. 
Dean, Carolyn J. The Self and Its Pleasures: Bataille, Lacan, and the History of the Decentered   
 Subject. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2017. 
!34
Dean, Tim. Unlimited Intimacy Reflections on the Subculture of Barebacking. Chicago,    
 University of Chicago Press, 2009; Bersani, Leo, and Adam Phillips. Intimacies.    
 University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of   
Minnesota Press, 1983. 
—-.  A Thousand Plateaus: Rhizomes. Berkeley, CA: Venus Pencils, 2009. 
Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference, New York: Routledge, 2017. 
Duras, Marguerite. The Ravishing of Lol Stein. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986; Artaud,   
 Antonin. Oeuvres complètes 1, 1. Paris: Gallimard, 1972. 
Edelman, Lee. No Future -Queer Theory and the Death Drive-. Durham: Duke University Press,  
 2007. 
Ehrenreich, Barbara. Bright-Sided: How Positive Thinking Is Undermining America. New York:   
 Picador, 2010. 
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction,  New York: Vintage, 2014. 
—-. Foucault, Michel, and Michel Senellart. The Birth of Biopolitics Lectures at the College De   
France, 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Halberstam, Judith. The Queer Art of Failure. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.  
Hegel, Georg W. F, and Stephen Houlgate. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. Oxford:    
 Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Religion: God the Image of Man: Man's Dependence Upon 
Nature the Last and Only Source of Religion. Trans. Alexander Loos. Whitefish, MT: 
Kessinger Publishing, 2010. 
Geroulanos, Stefanos. An Atheism That Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought. Stanford:   
Stanford University Press, 2010. 
Halperin, David M. Saint Foucault. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Kesel, Marc De, and Sigi Jottkandt. Eros and Ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan's Seminar    
 VII. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009. 
Heidegger, Martin. “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to 
!35
The Task of Thinking (1964). Editor David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 
Indaimo, J A. The Self, Ethics and Human Rights: Lacan, Levinas & Alterity. New 
York: Routeledge, 2015. 
Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Kipnis, Laura. Against Love: A Polemic. New York: Vintage, 2009. 
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan:The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. Editor 
Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans. Russell Grigg, New York: W. W. Norton, 2008. 
—-. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Editor Jacques-  
 Alain Miller, Transl. Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 2005.  
Lancelot M. 2016. "Neuroscepticisme (Denis Forest)". Médecine/Sciences. 32, no. 12:    
 1135-1137. 
Laurent, Éric. L'envers de la biopolitique: une écriture pour la jouissance. Paris: Navarin, 2016. 
Lévinas, Emmanuel. “On Maurice Blanchot,” in Proper Names. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1996. 
Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry in to Freud (1950). New York:  
 Routledge, 2015. 
Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels. The Marx-Engels Reader. Transl. Robert C. Tucker, New York:  
 Norton, 1978. 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. “The Forgetting of Philosophy,” in The Gravity of Thought. Trans. Francois  
 Raffoul and Gregory Recco. New Jersay: Humanities Press. 1993. 
Nobus, Dany. The Law of Desire: On Lacan's "Kant with Sade. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan,   
2017. 
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. Qu'est-ce que la propriété?, Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2012. 
Puar, Jasbir K., Inderpal Grewal, Caren Kaplan, and Robyn Wiegman. Terrorist Assemblages   
Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. 
Ruti, Mari. The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects. New York: Columbia  
 University Press, 2017. 
!36
Saint-Simon. Le Nouveau Christianisme et les Ecrits sur la religion. Paris: Editions du Seuil,   
 1969.  
Tuhkanen, Mikko. Leo Bersani: Queer Theory and Beyond, SUNY Press, 2015. 
Vanheule, Stijn, Derek Hook, and Calum Neill. Reading Lacan's Écrits: From "Signification of   
The Phallus" to "Metaphor of the Subject". New York:” Routeledge, 2019. 
Žižek, Slavoj, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard. The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political 
 Theology; with a New Preface. Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 2013. 
Zupancic, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan. London: VERSO Books, 2012. 
!37
!38
CHAPTER ONE: EVERYONE IS QUEER, WHICH MEANS SINGULAR 
“Psychoanalysts do not have to join 
in the choir of mourners who yearn 
for time past. They can be humanist 
if they want, Christians, why not, but 
as analysts they cannot be 
traditionalists because this reactive, 
reactionary, conservative position 
goes against the grain of their act.” 
Jacques-Alain Miller 
“How does one go about teaching 
what cannot be taught? This is 
something Freud ventures into. He 
thought that all is but a dream and 
that everyone (if one can say such a 
thing), that everyone is mad, that is, 
delusional.” 
Jacques Lacan 
What's Wrong with Psychoanalysis? 
It is a fact; or rather a matter of efficiency: psychoanalysis as Freud invented it, and as Lacan 
redefined it through his “Return to Freud,” have fallen out of fashion in the United-States. As a 
medical practice, most American patients (and health care insurance) prefer a drug-based 
treatment, a behavioral approach grounded in neuroscience, or one of many forms of short term 
therapy.  As a paradigm to interpret culture, feminists or other gender or queer scholars or 49
activists prefer the pragmatic angle of identity politics. As an ethical current devoted to fostering 
 See, for a detailed panorama of the situation of psychoanalysis in the United States today, Svolos, Thomas. 49
Twenty-first Century Psychoanalysis. Taylor and Francis, London, 2018. See also, Meyer, Catherine. Le Livre Noir 
De La Psychanalyse: Vivre, Penser Et Aller Mieux Sans Freud. Paris: Arènes, 2013. Print. For the equivalent in 
France, see Le Livre noir de la psychanalyse: Vivre, penser et aller mieux sans Freud. Edited by Catherine Meyer. 
Edition Les Arenes, Paris, 2005. 
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self-knowledge and reflection, post-modern/post-colonial subjects prefer discourses enhancing 
empowerment. It is as if, since the 1970s at least, a cultural shift took place in the United-States 
in which Freud’s vision of the human psyche, as well as Lacan’s version of it, have been 
ceaselessly attacked as something “inefficient,” “un-scientific,” “sexist” and “repressive.” 
Jacqueline Rose, in Sexuality in the Field of Vision (1986), summarizes these critiques thus. 
“First the quarrel over sexual difference (the dispute over the phallo-centrism of Freud); then the 
concept of ideology (femininity as a norm); and now the concept of the death drive which was no 
less controversial than the other two.”  Likewise, Juliette Mitchell, in Feminine Sexuality, 50
declared that “Freud, and Lacan after him, are both accused of producing phallocentric theories–
of taking man as the norm and woman as what is different therefrom.” (8)  Finally, Elisabeth 51
Grosz, in Lacan: a Feminist Introduction suggested that “The relations between [Lacan’s] 
version of psychoanalysis and feminism remain ambivalent. It is never entirely clear whether he 
is simply a more subtle misogynist than Freud, or whether his reading of Freud constitutes a 
‘feminist’ breakthrough.”  As a result of these critiques, it is the very hypothesis of the 52
unconscious that most contemporary scholars, social workers and activists have also 
abandoned.  But how should we evaluate this move away from Freud and the unconscious? 53
What historical and political context motivated such a move, and what kind of impact does it 
have on the ways in which questions of identity and subjectivity are addressed by contemporary 
 Rose, Jacqueline. Sexuality in the Field of Vision. Verso, London, 1986, p. 16.50
 Mitchell, Juliette. Feminism and Psychoanalysis: Freud, Reich, Lang and Women, Vintage Book, New York, 51
1975. 
 Grosz, Elizabeth. Jacques Lacan: a Feminist Introduction, Routledge, New York, 1990, p. 148. 52
 See, for more details, Michel, Robert. “Psychoanalysis and its Discontents” in Whose Freud? The Place of 53
Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture, Yale University Press, 2000. 
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feminist, gender and queer scholars today?   
Eli Zaretsky, in Political Freud, a History (2015) suggests that the trend towards 
introspection that characterized Freud’s work was actually the product of its own place and time 
(early 20th century Vienna), while the current trend towards empowerment and political identity 
should be seen as a symptom of the current American hedonistic culture. While Freud invented 
psychoanalysis at a moment when Europe was still a repressive and patriarchal culture, and 
capitalism still anchored in a Protestant ethics, psychoanalysis fell out of fashion at a moment 
when capitalism, led by the economic imperialism of the United States, entered a new phase of 
its development. Zarestky writes,  
The first and most important of the changes in the spirit of capitalism occurred when 
narcissism, as the libidinal face of egoism, replaced asceticism, the first component of the 
spirit of capitalism as described by Weber. For Weber, capitalism required instinctual 
renunciation, or asceticism, because of the imperative of saving. As we saw, when the 
mantra shifted from saving to spending, the Protestant ethic faded. By the seventies, the 
new spirit of capitalism assumed the naturalness of egoism or, as it came to be called, 
rational choice. (180) 
What became important, by the seventies, was thus no longer the critique of the overly repressive 
nature of culture, as it was the case with Freud, but the pragmatic enhancement of each 
individual’s happiness.  As such, it is the narcissism of each individual, and not the nature of the 54
collective super-ego that became the center of theoretic and practical attention.  
 See the introduction for a longer analysis of this phenomenon. 54
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However, one has to admit that the emphasis on individual happiness did not bring the 
outcome that one was expecting from it. (I return to this question in the Epilogue). Today we are 
witnessing—it is all over the news—a strong return of the repressed. On the side of mental 
health, short-term treatment leaves most patients addicted to chemical substances and literally 
incapable of dealing in depth with what provoked their mental disorder in the first place.  On 55
the side of the social, most institutions (medical, educational, familial) that were guaranteeing the 
wellbeing of each citizen are slowly disappearing. As a result, an increasing number of people 
are each day becoming more and more under-educated, underpaid and, as Judith Butler has it, 
vulnerable.  On the side of politics, one could pretty much make the same argument since one of 56
the effects of thirty years of identity politics has been to either normalize previously villainized 
minorities, or to increase contemporary forms of segregation. In other words, within the 
paradigm of identity politics, most political victories have also led to increase the number of 
deadly confrontations, at an Imaginary level, between oppressed minorities, “frozen” in their 
identity, fighting for their rights, and an oppressive majority, also congealed in a fixed identity, 
and fighting to maintain the privileges that comes with its “stable” identity. Finally, on the side of 
ethics, the abandonment of Freud’s unconscious hypothesis has triggered, one could say, the 
abandonment of any attempt at exposing at a global level the hidden sources of violence and 
racism that are currently threatening the very functioning of western democracies.  
Of course, by underlining these facts, my intention is not to diminish all the political and 
 See, for a detailed discussion of this issue, Laurent, Eric. Lost in Cognition, Psychoanalysis and the Cognitive 55
Sciences, New York: Karnac Books, 2014. 
 See, Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, Leticia Sabsay (dir.), Vulnerability in Resistance, Durham and London, 56
Duke University Press, 2016
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social “victories” that identity politics movements have achieved during the past thirty years. On 
the contrary, my claim would be more that these political victories have also served as an alibi 
not to question the egoistic and narcissistic ideology that is at the very core of our current social 
and economic system. If one takes the case of feminism, for example, it is quite clear that while 
the feminist movement has achieved many political and economic victories, these victories have 
served also, one could argue, to undermine all the “feminine” values that do not coincide with 
the values put at the fore by the capitalist market. This is why the very notion of love, for 
example, as bell hooks argues in her book Communion: the Female Search for Love (2002),  or 57
Mari Ruti in The Summons of Love (2015),  was abandoned by the feminist movement as a 58
notion that was desperately entangled with female masochism, and more broadly with a female 
desire to submit to male authority. Moreover, one could add, as Judith Butler did in Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1991), that the feminist movement, for a very 
long time, has also left out of its political activism all the “women” that did not fit the definition 
of what a white heterosexual woman is.  Likewise, in the case of the gay and lesbian liberation 59
movement, it is clear that this movement has won very important political victories, which 
enabled gay and lesbian communities to obtain new rights and new forms of social recognitions, 
but at the expense of a certain “normalization” of the movement.  This is why a queer scholar 60
like David Halperin in Saint Foucault writes,  
 hooks, bell. Communion: The Female Search for Love. New York: William Morrow Paperbacks, 2016.57
 Ruti, Mari. The Summons of Love. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.58
 Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble, New York: Routledge, 1990, Bodies that Matter, on the Discursive Limits of Sex,    59
New York, Routledge, 1993. 
 Halperin, David. Saint Foucault, Towards a Gay Hagiography, Oxford University Press, 1995, 112-113.60
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Coined in 1990 by Teresa de Laurentis expressly in order to disturb the complacency 
embodied in the routine conjunction “gay and lesbian” (…), “queer theory has since been 
transformed into an unproblematic, substantive designation for a determinate subfield of 
academic practice, respectable enough to appear in advertisements for academic jobs and 
in labels on shelves of bookstore. In any case, the more it verges on becoming a 
normative academic discipline, the less queer “queer theory” can plausibly claim to be. 
(112)   
This is why also another queer scholar like Lee Edelman wrote, as a reaction, No Future: Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive, a book in which he accused the gay movement of having submitted 
itself, in order to gain a form of social recognition, to the values of the capitalist market.  In 61
other words, each time identity and politics have worked together to improve the situation of a 
given oppressed minorities, they did so by excluding from their fight all the people that did not 
fit in the general definition of the group, or by staging as potential enemies all the people that 
belonged to a more privileged group.  
More dramatically, I would argue, they did so by re-essentializing, in one way or another, 
the concept of identity that they were using, instead of fostering, as Halperin has it, “the function 
of queer identity as an empty place holder for an identity that is still in progress” (112). This is 
why, to go beyond such a vicious circle, this chapter argues that it is precisely through a return to 
psychoanalysis, and even more so, to Lacanian psychoanalysis, that a proper conceptualization 
and practice of a radically queer identity could emerge. By radically queer identity, I simply 
 Edelman, Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.61
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mean an identity that would always be singular and, in the making, rather than an idealized 
identity that would function as the Imaginary referent of an actual existing human being.  
 I proceed in this introductory chapter as follows. First, I explain why psychoanalysis in 
general, as well as Lacanian psychoanalysis in particular, have been so often described as an 
ideological practice in charge of normalizing possibly deviant subjects. Second, I challenge this 
negative reading by suggesting that Lacan’s over-all teaching, far from being normative and 
phallo-centric is, on the contrary, entirely grounded on a notion—the notion of object a—that is 
making of the Lacanian subject a potentially very queer subject. Taking up Tim Dean’s idea 
according to which “Lacanian psychoanalysis is a queer theory,” I undertake a close reading of 
Lacan’s Seminar X in order to show how Lacan’s theory of object a does actually provide the 
right conditions to support the identity of a radically queer subject. Finally, I close the chapter by 
showing how Butler’s definition of identity, while prefiguring what a queer subject could be, 
actually failed, from a Lacanian point of view, to access the “true” queerness of a subject, since 
this queerness is not to be found in the register of the Imaginary but, as this chapter will start to 
show, in the register of the Real.   
I. UNDOING SOME FALSE IDEAS ABOUT PSYCHOANALYSIS 
If psychoanalysis in general, and Lacanian psychoanalysis in particular, has become the target of 
so many critics coming from feminist, post-feminist, gender, and queer scholars in the United-
States, it is certainly due to the fact that Freud's American appropriation happened from a 
pragmatic perspective. To use Bourdieu’s famous expression, this appropriation happened in 
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agreement with the values of the “homo economicus,” constantly on the lookout to become 
better adjusted to the capitalist system. The term “homo economicus” designates, in economy, a 
subject that always acts to obtain the highest possible well-being for him or herself, given 
available information about opportunities and other constraints (natural and institutional). Under 
the figure of the “homo economicus,” what is at stake, from a psychoanalytic point of view, is 
the relation of the subject to pleasure and its beyond—i.e., what Lacan calls jouissance. 
 The word jouissance is the name that Lacan gave to the fact that human beings, because 
they speak, and because this ability to speak has effects on the functioning of their drives, makes 
this functioning slide into what Freud named the death drive. This is why Lacan defines 
jouissance “an excess of affects,” or as a form of enjoyment that is always on the verge of 
exceeding the limits assigned to pleasure by Freud’s pleasure principle. In regard to this notion, 
the question at stake for psychoanalysis is, in which sense this excess should be subsumed under 
the logic of reason, and in which sense this excess should be taken into account as something that 
would remain, at a fundamental level, entangled in the death drive and thus, radically queer?   62
Is Psychoanalysis Always at The Service of The Master? 
Unfortunately, far from being a queer theory, psychoanalysis, since its arrival into the United-
States, has become nothing but a forceful tool to maintain the system of power in place. Its major 
goal, indeed, has been to make sure that the mode of enjoyment of a subject conforms to the 
ways in which the society is allowing its members enjoyment. Freud’s heritage, upon his landing 
 Commenting on the relationship between the figure of the Homo Economicus and psychoanalysis, Louis 62
Althusser writes, in his famous text Freud and Lacan (1964), “Marx based his theory on the rejection of the myth of 
the  ‘homo Economicus,’ Freud bases his theory on the rejection of the myth of the “homo psychologicus.”” Lacan 
has understood Freud’s liberating rupture. He has understood it in the fullest sense of the term, taking it rigorously at 
its word and forcing it to produce its own consequences, without concession or quarter.” (147)   
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in the United States, as well as through his legacy in the I.P.A (International Psychoanalytical 
Association), was immediately reworked and reduced by the Anglo-Saxon community of 
psychoanalysts to the goal of re-adapting the “deviant” subject to the rules and norms of the 
society, to make of it a happy consumer. The most important figure to foster such a reception of 
Freud in the United States was Heinz Hartmann. Heinz Hartmann (1894 – 1970) was an Austrian 
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst born in Vienna. He did his training analysis with Sandor Rado and 
a second analysis with Freud (which Freud offered to do for free). Freud considered Hartmann 
one of his best pupils. He presented his first paper on ego in 1937, which became afterward the 
basis of his development of ego-psychology. Fleeing the Nazis’ regime, Hartmann arrived in the 
United-States in 1941. He founded, in 1945, with the help of Anna Freud and Ernst Kriss the 
journal The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, and became the president of the I.P.A in 1950, and 
received afterward the honorary title of lifetime president of the association.  
In Ego, Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1937) Hartmann argued that 
psychoanalysis primary task was not to aim at revealing repressed primitive impulses but to 
repair the structure already there, to make it more efficient, better adjusted to the task. Hartmann 
posited, within the sphere of the ego, which is normally the place where the sexual demands of 
the Id and those of the Super-ego meet and battle, “conflict-free ego capacities.” He claimed that 
every newborn arrived with a built-in ego, waiting only for favorable environmental conditions 
to spark and grow. Ego defense mechanism became thus an element playing an important role in 
the whole economy of the psyche seen as an adaptive process. Hartmann proposed the word 
neutralization to describe the task that ego psychology was reassigning to the psychoanalytic 
treatment. By neutralization, Hartmann meant the operation through which the ego slowly gains 
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control over the sexual and aggressive component of the drives.   
Likewise, increasing importance given to the D.S.M. (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders),  as well as the recent development of C.B.T. (cognitive behavior therapy), 63
should be seen as the radicalization of the aim and goal of ego-psychology through its renewed 
alliance to science and the logic of capitalism (through its relation to health care insurance issues 
and efficiency).  Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is a type of psychotherapy that focuses on 64
changing unhelpful cognitive behaviors through specific therapeutic interventions. As such, CBT 
is a "problem-focused" and "action-oriented" form of therapy used to treat specific problems 
related to specific mental disorder. It is thus different from a psychoanalytic approach to 
psychotherapy where the therapist looks for the unconscious meaning behind the behaviors in 
order to help the patient to become aware of it. Instead, in CBT, the therapist's role is to assist the 
client in finding and practicing effective strategies to decrease symptoms of the disorder. 
Consequently, with C.B.T, psychoanalysis is being reduced to the question: what could be the 
most efficient and the cheapest way to put back to work a “deviant” or “pathological” subject? 
How can his/her symptom be cured as a detached piece, which is to say without having to 
question the whole unconscious system that has generated it? As such, it becomes obviously easy 
to see this kind of approach to psychoanalysis as nothing but the most refined and recent 
instrument developed by society to control its undesirable or even potentially dangerous subjects. 
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is a reference book on Mental Disorders, 63
published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). It offers a standard criteria for the classification of mental 
disorders. Many clinicians and researchers working with health insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies and 
policy makers use it. As such, the DSM has generated controversy and criticism over the validity and reliability of 
its diagnostic categories; its reliance on superficial symptoms; or its use of artificial dividing lines between 
"normality" and mental disorder; as well as possible cultural bias concerning the medicalization of human distress.
 For a full analysis of the relationship and the differences between C.B.T and Freudian and Lacanian 64
psychoanalysis, see Eric Laurent, Lost in Cognition, Trans. Adrian Price, London: Karnac, 2014. 
!48
It is clearly against this deviation of psychoanalysis that Michel Foucault, in Madness and 
Civilization (1961) , as well as in History of Sexuality, Vol 1 (1978) , took a stand. Advocating 65 66
in favor of an epistemological as well as an historical approach to madness and sexuality, 
Foucault wanted to criticize the “scientist” as well as the “moralist” turn that psychology and 
psychiatry took through their increasing alliance with political power. He praised, on the 
contrary, psychoanalysis for having been the only discipline that tried to unveil the secret 
relationship between mental health and power.  Foucault writes, in Madness and Civilization, 67
“It is not psychology that is involved in psychoanalysis: but precisely an experience of unreason 
that has been psychology’s meaning, in the modern world, to mask.” (198)   
Unfortunately, Foucault’s reception in the United States (by feminists, post-feminists, 
gender and queer scholars) used his critique of psychology and psychiatric power to criticize 
psychoanalysis in general.  Forgetting, by doing so, that Foucault wrote, in Madness and 68
Civilization, that psychoanalysis was precisely not to be confused with psychology. Reciprocally, 
one could argue that many Anglo-American scholars used Foucault to mask, once again, the 
 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Trans. Richard Howard, 65
New York, Random House, 1965.
 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol I, An Introduction, Transl. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Book 66
Edition, 1990. 
 See, also, on this question, Winnubst, Shannon. “The Missing Link: Reading Foucault and Bataille together” in A 67
Companion to Foucault, Edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary and Jana Sawicki, Wiley-Blackwell, 
Oxford, 2013, 453-471. In this article, Shannon Winnubst argues that Bataille’s conception of eroticism influenced 
Foucault’s critic of capitalism, and more importantly, his critique of the figure of the “homo economicus”—a figure 
that is totally opposed to the figure of the erotic man whose behavior is oriented towards expenditure, and not 
conservation. 
 For a very interesting analysis of the reception of Foucault in the United States see, Reid, Roddey. “Foucault in 68
America” in Cultural Critique. #35, Winter 1996-1997, 179-211. 
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experience of unreason that psychoanalysis was supposed to put forward.  Instead, those 69
scholars misread psychoanalysis as an instrument of subjection created by the modern state to 
replace a dying class of priests. As a result of this very specific reception, all the feminist, gender 
and queer scholars who tried to think about sexuality outside the framework of gender identity 
have taken psychoanalysis as one of their most important enemies. Gay and lesbian studies, for 
example, saw in Freud’s description of homosexuality a way to reduce it to perversion.  Eve 70
Sedgwick, for example, in her now famous book Epistemology of the Closet (1990), argued that 
the binary and simplistic opposition between heterosexuality and homosexuality, and thus 
between genital love and perversion, was just a way to shut down thinking, and with thinking, 
new possibilities of existence.  Likewise, many feminist and queer scholars saw in Freud and 71
Lacan’s emphasis on the Phallus a way to reduce femininity to a masquerade, as well as a way to 
reduce queer and trans people to potential perverts or psychotics. In other words, feminist, 
gender and queer scholars saw in psychoanalysis nothing but a “religion of castration,” i.e. the 
new social institution that was trying to reject in the realm of the pre-Oedipus any sexual 
orientation (or any mode of enjoyment/jouissance) that was not aligned with the goal of 
patriarchy and capitalism. Jan Campbell, in Arguing with the Phallus (2000)  writes,  72
It seems then, for psychoanalysis, that the only positive alternative to our unconscious 
 For an interesting analysis of this see Sangren, P. Steven. “Psychoanalysis and Its Resistances in Michel Foucault's 69
‘The History of Sexuality’: Lessons for Anthropology.” Ethos, vol. 32, no. 1, 2004, 110–122. JSTOR, JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/3651889.
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negativity is the law. Return from abject narcissism and borderline psychosis means the 
upholding of Oedipal Law, and the ethical and religious principles that accompany this 
kind of patriarchal and colonial society. From Freud to Lacan and Kristeva, the oedipal 
law is our only hope of a “civilized” society; without it we are left to the ravages of our 
narcissistic and ‘primitive’ imaginaries that occludes ethics and difference with 
uncontainable aggressive identification. (Campbell, 2) 
But in what sense can those critical judgments about Freud and Lacan be applied to the French 
reception of Freud, and to the way in which Lacan conceived his “Return to Freud”?  
Lacan’s Return to Freud and Its Political Implications 
Freud famously said that the real battle for psychoanalysis would not take place in a country, like 
America, that would accept it too easily but, in a country, and a culture that would reject it 
violently at first. And he added, five years later, in On the History of the Psychoanalytic 
Movement (1914) that “Among European countries, France has… shown itself the least disposed 
to welcome psycho-analysis.” (32) And it is true that, at first, the medical reception of Freud in 
France was not very friendly.  But this rejection did not prevent Freud from finding in the 73
Princess Marie de Bonaparte one of his most important supporters;  to creating the 74
 See, Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “L’inconscient à la française,” in La Bataille de cent ans. Histoire de la psychanalyse 73
en France, 180-221. 
 For more details on Marie de Bonaparte and her links with Freud, see Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Son altesse, la 74
princesse Marie Bonaparte.” La Bataille de cent ans, Histoire de la psychanalyse en France, Volume I, 1885 – 1939. 
Edition Ramsay, Paris, 1982, pp. 320-342.
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Psychoanalytic Society of Paris (PSP) as early as 1925;  and for France to become, right after 75
the Second World War, a very active center for psychoanalysis, with personalities as important as 
Henri Ey, Serge Leclair, Daniel Lagache, Francoise Dolto and, of course, Jacques Lacan.  76
However, to present the history of the reception of Freud in France under such a positive light 
would be misleading and reductive in many ways since, as Sherry Turkle brilliantly 
demonstrated it in her book Psychoanalytic Politics (1978), what is most essential to understand 
is that psychoanalysis entered France, first and foremost, through the mediation of artists and 
writers  and that psychoanalysis became, afterward, for many leftist, Marxist and feminist 
movements, one of their most important theoretical tools.  “Since May 68” writes Turkle, 77
“French Marxism, French Feminism, French Anti-psychiatry, and French Psychoanalysis have 
become so tied up with one another that they resemble a complex knot—it is sometimes hard to 
tell where one strand leaves off and the other begins.” (8)  
One of the best examples of such a complex knot could be found in the MLF (Women’s 
Liberation Movement) founded by Antoinette Fouque.  The MLF was created in May 1968. At 78
the beginning, it was named Feminism, Marxism, and Action and was trying to bring together a 
Marxist approach to class struggle and feminism. As such, the movement was split in different 
tendencies. One was centered on a Marxist tendency that emphasized the economic component 
of women’s alienation. A lesbian tendency was supported by Monique Wittig who tried to 
 For more details about the creation of the PSP, see. Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “La société psychanalytique de Paris.” 75
La Bataille de cent ans, Op. Cit., pp.343-412. See also, Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Life and Death of Société Francaise 
de Psychanalyse.” Jacques Lacan & Co. A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985., Translated by Jeffrey 
Melhman, The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
 See Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Freudian France in Full Array.” Jacques Lacan & Co, 372-645.  76
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 See Antoinette Fouque, There are 2 Sexes, Essays in Feminology, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 78
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abolish the use of the word woman, as well as the notion of gender in her book The Straight 
Mind. And finally, as a reaction to these previous tendencies, a third, Psych et Po, was more 
focused on the psychoanalytical dimension of the fight (largely inspired by Lacanian 
psychoanalysis), led by Antoinette Fouque, and who advocated for the creation of a “feminine 
subject” that would not try to empower women as if they were men, but to empower the 
“feminine” (I will come back to this question in Chapter Three: To Believe Weeping). As such, 
Psych et Po chose to focus on the psychosexual dimension of women’s oppression by trying to 
bring the “feminine” into existence through the creation of autonomous female spaces (where 
women could explore their sexualities outside the male gaze), and the invention of a kind of 
writing that could defy the ordering of Logos, that is to say, a writing that could undermine the 
naming and ordering of what Derrida described under the term of Pha-logo-centrism (for a 
precise definition of the notion, see Chapter Two, The Purloined Lacan).   79
We are thus confronted with a very interesting split between France and America. While 
psychoanalysis has been taken as the best new support to the existing institutions in America, it 
has been taken as the best ally to left-wing political movements in France. Reciprocally, while 
most forms of left thinking in the United States have taken the form of an attack against 
psychoanalysis, most left-wing theories in France have been incorporating psychoanalysis as one 
of their major tools toward a new form of critical politics. But how shall we understand the 
position of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the coordinates of this debate?   
 For more details on this question, see Chapter Three on the notion of the Not-All, and the notion of feminine 79
writing as developed by Hélène Cixous and its relation to the MLF and to Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
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 Opposed to the conservative reduction of Freud generated by the heralds of ego-
psychology, Lacan, through his “Return to Freud,” interrogated and reframed the relations that 
Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis entertained with the structure of the patriarchal 
family, and more specifically with the function and the authority that such a structure attributes 
to the figure of the father. Simply put, Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex was either 
abandoned by post-Freudians with a feminist twist and replaced by an exploration of the pre-
Oedipal, non-verbal stage of infancy (Klein), or by a psychoanalysis of the will to power (Adler, 
Horney).  Alternatively, it was reinforced by the more conservative branch of Freudianism 80
represented by Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and more broadly the supporters of ego-
psychology. In other words, each early critique of Freud turned out to be, primarily, a critique of 
Freud’s conception of the Oedipus complex, and more specifically, of the function that Freud had 
attributed to the father. This place and function were either too strong for the feminists or not 
strong enough for the supporters of ego-psychology. But how shall we situate Lacan’s “Return to 
Freud” in the coordinates of this debate? 
 For more detail on Melanie Klein, see, for example, Klein, Melanie. “Early Stages of the Oedipus Complex.” 80
Psychoanalytic Review, Vol. 15, 1928, pp. 85-107; or “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,” International Journal 
of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 37, pp. 99-110; or “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States.” 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 12, pp. 206-218. For Adler, see, for example, Adler, Alfred. The 
Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, Edited by Heinz L. Ansbacher & Rowena R. Ansbacher, New York, Basic 
Books, 1956; or Understanding Human Nature. Trans. by Walter B. Wolf, New York, Allen and Unwin, 1928. 
Finally, for Karen Horney, see, for example, Horney, Karen, “The Flight from Womanhood: The Masculinity 
Complex in Women, as Viewed by Men and Women,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 7, July-October 
1927, 324-339; or “The Problem of Feminine Masochism,” Psychoanalytic Review, 22, 1933, 241-257; or “The 
Dread of Woman,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 13, July 1932, 348-360.
!54
II. LACAN’S EARLY DISCONTENT WITH PSYCHOANALYSIS 
While Lacan is all too often reduced to his so-called structuralist period by most Anglo-
American scholars —which goes from Seminar XI to Seminar XIX (1963-1972)—and thus 81
considered less “critical” than, for example, Derrida's deconstructive post-structuralism, Lacan's 
teaching was not a typical structuralist one, as this Chapter will start to suggest, and as Chapter 
Two will demonstrate in detail. From the start, and all the more in his late and last teaching, 
Lacan developed a unique form of post-structuralism that can only be grasped on the condition 
of not reducing his teaching to a systematic construction but, rather, to see it as an open 
construction that never stops criticizing itself. Without going as far as Lacan’s late teaching, it is 
possible to locate Lacan’s opposition to the idea that the unconscious was reducible to a structure 
in Lacan's first opposition to the structuralist “ideology,” as well as his opposition to ego-
psychology, in the first version of the “The Mirror Stage” (1936)  published as a part of his text 82
“The Family Complexes.”   
The Oedipus Complex and Its Historical Crisis 
“The Family Complex in the Formation of the Individual” (1938) is the first important 
psychoanalytical text written by Lacan. He published it in a French Encyclopedia directed by 
 See, for example, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan the Absolute Master, trans. Douglas Brick, Stanford University 81
Press, 1991. See also, for a detailed analysis of the American feminist reception to Lacan, the introduction of 
Chapter Three. 
 The original version of the presentation given by Lacan at the International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 82
Marienbad has been lost. The best account that still exists of this paper is the description of the “mirror” stage that 
Lacan gave in his first published article, “The Family Complexes,” and then in its final rewriting in 1949 called 
“The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience”. For both of 
these texts see, Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, Trans, Bruce Fink, Heloise Fink and Russell Grigg, New York: Norton & 
Company, 2002.
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Henri Wallon.  In agreement with the early Freud, Lacan emphasizes the importance of the 83
agency of culture in the formation of the human family, and pointed to the fact that human life, 
as such, always involves “a paradoxical economy of instinct” (5). The family, according the early 
Lacan, is not the expression of nature but a cultural institution whose goal is to conserve and 
transmit certain social structures through what Freud called the Oedipus complex. The notion of 
the complex is quite refined in Lacan’s text. Suffices it to say that it intends to name, on the one 
hand, all the social rules and Symbolic structures that organize the institution of the family and, 
on the other, all the ways in which these rules and structures are incorporated at a singular level 
by each individual belonging to a given family. The idea of complex is thus at the same time a 
form and a set of activities. The complex is a form in the sense that it represents a certain fixed 
reality within the development of the institution of the family, itself marked by a certain 
economical and historical configuration. The complex is also composed of a certain set of 
activities that are supposed to ensure the repetition of these fixed and dated forms of the family 
institution, as well as the lived emotions attached to these forms. Lacan writes, 
It is this that complex defines, that it reproduces a certain reality of ambiance, and for two 
reasons. 1) Its form represents this reality in what is objectively distinct at a given stage 
of psychic development; this stage specifies its origins. 2) Its activity repeats in lived 
experience the reality thus fixed, each time that some experiences occur that would 
demand a superior objectification of this reality; these experiences specify the 
conditioning of the complex. (3)  
 Henri Wallon was a philosopher (agrégé de philosophie), a doctor, a politician and a professor at the College de 83
France. He was also the son of the historian and politician Henri Wallon who played a major part in the creation of 
the Third Republic. It is also from him that Lacan borrowed his concept of the “Mirror Stage.”  
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But if the fixed forms that a complex is supposed to repeat at a subjective level are also said to be 
historical forms that keep evolving throughout history, it means that those fixed forms evolve 
through moments of crisis and are able to reach what Lacan calls, in a very Hegelian manner, 
“superior forms objectification.” However, it is important to underscore here, these moments of 
crisis are precisely what the complex is constantly trying to avoid since the form of the complex 
is, normally fixed. However, by emphasizing the possible evolution of the form of the complex 
through a dialectical confrontation of the individual to the historical limits of a given form of the 
family, Lacan was already departing from Freud’s universal conception of the Oedipus complex, 
and from the adaptive position defended by Anna Freud and ego-psychology. 
 Three smaller complexes organize the Family Complex as a whole. These three 
complexes, which are not without rapport to Freud’s theory of libidinal stages are, however, not 
the direct expression of it since, contrary to Freud’s theory, these three complexes are not, for 
Lacan, unlike for Freud, the expression of an internal excess of the partial drives but the product 
of a fundamental deficiency. The notion of deficiency, when used by Lacan, refers to the idea 
that the development of a human being is grounded in the incapacity in which he/she is to 
survive without the presence of his/her parents, and without the existence of society. In other 
words, for the early Lacan, what is universal in human experience is not, contrary to what Freud 
thought, the Oedipus complex and its link to an overly powerful father but, quite on the contrary, 
the state of deficiency in which every infant finds itself. Commenting on this point, this 
deficiency is also, for Lacan, what generates the most important element that is at the core of the 
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notion of complex, namely the unconscious function that the imago plays in it.  (14) As we will 84
see, the complex as a whole is organized by Lacan in three smaller complexes that are all 
centered on one type of imago.  
The first complex isolated by Lacan is the weaning complex. The weaning complex is the 
transposition, at a psychic level, of the feeding relationships between the mother (or the 
caretaker) and the baby. It thus represents the primordial form of relation between the individual 
and the family institution. It is what constitutes the most fundamental form of the maternal 
imago. What is at stake in this complex is the possibility of turning a vital tension (the need for 
the breast) into a mental intention (the capacity to lose the breast), i.e., to turn a feeling of 
frustration and loss into a sense of control and freedom. If the loss is accepted, the infant can 
pass onto the next stage, but if the loss is somehow refused, it is what will open the way to a 
certain appetite for death, which is to say what will lead to the emergence of what Freud called, 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922), the death drive. This appetite for death, which is a 
consequence of the direct refusal to lose the maternal imago, expresses itself in the form of an 
oceanic desire to go back into the womb of the mother (which becomes death itself).  Or, 85
perhaps in a more sublimated fashion, the weaning complex can be said to be at the origin of the 
“nostalgia for wholeness” that is at the foundation of all the metaphysical systems that try to 
represent the “mirage of a universal harmony,” (23) or “the mystical abyss of affective 
 Gustav Jung coined the word imago in his work Psychology of the Unconscious (1912) to describe how people 84
form their personality and apprehend others through multiple identifications. Freud, the very same year, used it too 
to name the journal he just had created with Hanns Sachs and Otto Rank. And when he used it in his own writing, as 
in “The Dynamics of Transference” (1912), he reduced its meaning to an erotic fixation related to traits belonging to 
the primary object. 
 This reading of the death drive as a desire to return into the womb of the mother could be linked to Romain 85
Rolland’s notion of oceanic feeling, as Freud talks about it at the beginning of Civilization and its Discontents 
(1930). 
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fusion” (24). The “death drive” is thus not, for Lacan, the direct expression of a drive but the 
result of a “congenital insufficiency” (24) that drives humans towards their own death.  If this 
“congenital insufficiency” is not corrected by the effect of the Family complex, it leaves the 
individual vulnerable to the attraction of death (which will become, in Lacan’s later teaching, the 
individual’s desire to lose himself in jouissance). Jacques-Alain Miller, commenting on this idea 
in his text “A Critical Reading of the Family complex” (2005) writes:  
Everything that is a fantasy of death, a call to death, even to suicide, is to be found in the 
clinic, and Lacan will not deny this later -, as soon as it is a question of that, it is the 
mother, the maternal imago which comes to give logic to that. The mother rules over – it 
is his idea – the primitive loss, that of the breast. The maternal imago is called up again in 
the subject, with a variable intensity, each time that a loss of jouissance takes place. (13)  
To fight against the morbidity contained in the maternal imago Lacan created his second 
complex, called the intrusion complex.   
The intrusion complex is the generalization of the feeling of jealousy that appears within 
the oldest children of a family when a younger sibling is born. The imago at stake in this 
complex is not the maternal imago, but the imago of the fellow human (semblable). Through the 
notion of the imago of the fellow human, what Lacan wants to emphasis is how, in the mental 
life of human beings, the image of the other is constantly mixed or assimilated within the 
narcissistic image of the individual. As such, Imaginary relations are bound to generate feelings 
of jealousy and rivalry inasmuch as they imply an identification with the person that we are in 
competition with, or in love with. This is why Lacan links the appetite for death in relation to the 
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maternal imago, and the aggressiveness or violence against the rival in the intrusion complex. To 
explain further this link, which presupposes the idea of affective identification, Lacan goes back, 
once again, to his theory of the “Mirror Stage.” In this stage, the infant anticipates, through the 
recognition of his own image in the mirror, a sense of unity of his person that he has not yet 
acquired. Even though this sense of unity and mastery is purely Imaginary it does provide to the 
infant a sense of affective unity which can be taken as the proper explanation of what Freud 
called imprecisely, affective identification. This “affective unity,” achieved through an 
identification to an image, is thus deeply narcissistic and, as such, excluding of all others. This is 
why the complex of intrusion, as well as the “Mirror Stage” are both calling for a third complex 
which could provide a way to organize and pacify what would otherwise constantly sway in 
between a “non-violent” but deeply masochistic appetite for death, and an aggressive and violent 
sense of rivalry. This third complex, which is supposed to introduce a higher organization 
through a possible sublimation of all the negative dimensions of the two prior complexes, is the 
complex of Oedipus.   
The Fragility of the Paternal Imago 
Lacan’s entire interpretation of Freud’s Oedipus complex revolves around the notion of a 
paternal imago developed as a counter point to the value attributed to the father by Freud in the 
Oedipus complex. In the classical Freudian version of the Oedipus complex, the fantasy of 
castration is only attached to the masculine side of sexuation. Only boys, indeed, can be 
threatened with castration by their father if they do not manage to take control over their 
premature genital desire. It is thanks to this “fear of castration” that the first repression of 
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sexuality can take place in Freud’s theory and that a process of sublimation, through the 
incorporation of the imago of the father, can take place (which in turn generates the Ego Ideal). 
On the female side, on the contrary, since it appears to be castrated from the start, the fantasy of 
castration is replaced by Freud by its exact opposite: the penis-envy complex.  But this 86
dissymmetry between men and women when it comes to the fantasy of castration needs to be 
corrected according to Lacan. The origin of the fantasy of castration should not be located in the 
threatening presence of the father but as a consequence of a possible return of the imago of the 
mother and its subjective correlate: the fragmented body, which is to say, as a “gender inclusive” 
reaction against a possible regression to a stage prior to the weaning complex. As such, one could 
argue that Lacan’s rereading of Freud’s complex of castration aligns him with an analyst like 
Karen Horney, who proposed to reread Freud’s anxiety of castration in terms of the fear of the 
maternal imago (as a devouring vagina). Castration is thus no longer centered on the penis for 
Lacan but becomes the symbol of the body as being fundamentally fragmented.  Miller adds: 87
“Castration treated as a fantasy is nothing other than the partialization, on a special part of the 
body, of these fantasies, which are fundamentally always fantasies of dislocation, of 
dismemberment” (14). The notion of fantasy, at this stage of Lacan’s teaching, relates to the one 
of narcissism. Narcissism is the “glue” that holds the detached pieces of the fragmented body 
together, and the fantasy of castration is what reveals the precariousness of the narcissistic ego 
and the fragmented body that sustains it. In other words, narcissism, as a narcissistic function, is 
 For a full analysis of the penis envy complex, see Chapter Three, first Part.  86
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “Passage à l’acte et Acting Out,” in Seminar X, Lacan writes, “Here is the possibility of this 87
phantasy of the fragmented body which some of you have recognised, have encountered, in schizophrenics. This 
does not for all that allow us to decide on the determinants of this phantasy of the fragmented body which those of 
whom I am speaking have seen being outlined in the schizophrenic” (Gallagher, 80).
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what renders necessary the function of the paternal imago. The function of the paternal imago is 
what is in charge of causing a split between the object that one desires and the object that one 
identifies with. This splitting, which announces the split that causes the Phallus in the theory of 
the Name-of-the-Father, must be in place in order to prevent the appearance of anxiety attached 
to the maternal imago when the emergence of genital desire brings it back. The paternal imago 
stands, at the same time, as an obstacle, and as a model that transgresses such an obstacle. Lacan 
writes, “it [the paternal imago] appears to the ego at the same time as the support of its defense 
and the example of his triumph.” It is also what enables the subject to substitute for the object of 
his desire (the maternal imago) a different one—the “paternal object,” which is not an object of 
desire but an “object of identification.” Miller, in his commentary of Lacan’s text, writes, “The 
value of this reprise of the Oedipus complex is to make us pass from the deadly maternal other, 
from the semblable as other which is also deadly [the imago of the fellowman], to a sublimated 
other. In other words, without the paternal imago, no sublimation, and without sublimation, no 
separation from the deadly maternal imago.” This articulation of the notion of sublimation (of 
the deadly imago of the mother) with the one of the paternal imago is the kernel of Lacan’s early 
Return to Freud. It is so central that Lacan did not even hesitate to make the psychic 
development of the individual depend on it.  
To Think the Paternal Imago Outside Patriarchy   
However, it does not follow from Lacan’s emphasis on the importance of the paternal imago in 
the structuring of the psyche, that his rereading of Freud’s complex should be considered 
conservative. On the contrary, as early as the 40s, Lacan was saying that,  
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I am not one to bewail the so-called loosening of family ties. Is it not significant that the 
family should have become reduced to its biological group to the degree that it integrated 
the most advanced forms of cultural progress? But I do think that a great many 
psychological consequences follow the social decline of the paternal imago. Whatever its 
future this decline constitutes a psychological crisis. It may even be that the emergence of 
psychoanalysis itself is linked to this very crisis. (Gallagher)  88
For Lacan, if there is a decline of the ties of the family, this decline does not necessarily mean 
something negative. Quite the contrary, the reduction of the size of the family has brought with it 
many cultural achievements. But these achievements should not hide the fact that alongside the 
decline of the patriarchal structure of the family, another decline is happening, the decline of the 
paternal imago. In other words, one should not be confused and read too rapidly Lacan's “Return 
to Freud,” because Lacan is not linking what worries him in the decline of the family ties to the 
decline of the figure of the father, and even less so to the decline of patriarchy. More prudently, 
Lacan is warning those who are focusing their attention on this decline to look at a more 
problematic decline, the decline of the paternal imago as a symbolic function. What Lacan 
 The French version goes, “Nous ne sommes pas de ceux qui s’affligent d’un prétendu relâchement du lien familial. 
N’est-il pas significatif que la famille se soit réduite à son groupement biologique à mesure qu’elle intégrait les plus 
hauts degrés culturels? Mais un grand nombre d’effets psychologique nous semblent relever d’un déclin social de 
l’imago paternelle. Quel qu’en soit l’avenir, ce déclin constitue une crise psychologique. Peut-être est-ce à cette 
crise qu’il faut rapporter l’apparition de la psychanalyse elle-même.” (Family Complexes, Gallagher, 60). To 
contextualize this position, one has to remember that the idea of the decline of the patriarchal structures was not new 
in 1938. During the XIXth century, authors such as Henry Lewis Morgan (1818-1881), Friedrich Engels 
(1820-1895) or Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887) had already argued over the origin, the value and the future of 
the patriarchal structures. By patriarchal structure, one has to understand a family structure where the rights over the 
property of the family obeys a patrilineal filiation where the authority over these properties belongs exclusively to 
the father. Engels, in his famous essay on “The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State: in the light of 
the Researches of Lewis H. Morgan” (1884) argued that the most ancient domestic institution was not the family as 
we know it but a matrilineal clan. Aligned with the position defended by Morgan in his influential book Ancient 
Civilization (1877), Engels thought, indeed, that the patriarchal family was not the first form of the human family 
but, in fact, the very symbol of “the world-historic defeat of the female sex, as well as the landmark of the 
instauration of private property over a more primitive communism. 
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deplores is the crumbling of the power or the effectiveness of the paternal imago, and not the 
crumbling of the patriarchal form of the family, which means that Lacan is warning us against 
the decline of the Symbolic supports without which there can be no separation from the maternal 
imago. It is, for example, because the paternal imago was already not properly functioning in 
Freud's Vienna that neurotic and psychotic subjects came to seek help from him, and that 
psychoanalysis was invented.  It was perhaps also invented, Lacan dares to suggest, thanks to 89
the humiliation of the figure of the father, and the mockery of his authority.    
It is the kernel of the majority of neuroses—this must be recognized as the great neurosis 
of our time. Our experience leads us to designate its principle determinant in the 
personality of the father which is always lacking in some way or another, whether he be 
absent or humiliated, divided or a sham. It is this lack which, as explained by our theory 
of the Oedipus complex, exhausts instinctual energy and vitiates the dialectic of 
sublimation. (Gallagher, 56) 
 If the paternal imago is in decline, if it no longer performs its task as efficiently as before, 
providing the right Imaginary and Symbolic support to enable a dialectical process of 
sublimation for the child, it is because the modern father is fundamentally humiliated. It is, one 
could say, because the imago of the father has been fractured, just as in La Trilogie des 
Opposed to such a negative reading, Bachofen argued in Mother Right: an Investigation of the Religious and 
Juridical Character of Matriarchy in the Ancient World (1861) that even if matriarchy preceded patriarchy, the 
passage from the former to the later was not the mark of a defeat but, quite on the contrary, the very symbol of 
humankind’s progress. Matriarchy, indeed, was not the symbol of a primitive communism for Bachofen but, in a 
quite misogynist vein, the very symbol of an overly powerful, threatening and irrational Nature. This is why Emile 
Durkheim (1858-1917), the father of French sociology, ended up arguing, in Leçon de Sociologie physique des 
moeurs et du droit (1893), that the patriarchal structure were, in fact, in danger themselves of being replaced by the 
structure of the bourgeois/conjugal family. These structures, for Durkheim, were supposed to be weaker than the 
ones of the larger patriarchal families, and thus supposed to be responsible for the creation of the modern hyper-
individualistic personality, and for the progressive destruction of the social links. See, for more details on the 
question, Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Patriarchat,” in Dictionnaire de la psychanalyse, Fayard, Paris, 1997, 771-772.
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Coûfontaine of Paul Claudel, that the very possibly of interrogating the mechanics of its 
efficiency and the nature of its power has become possible.  If Freud was able to invent 90
psychoanalysis, it is because the very imago that was sustaining the process of socialization, 
starting with the imago of God, had already started to crumble, to vacillate.  
It has often been commented upon that Freud, through the invention of the unconscious, 
asserted the third major blow to human narcissism.  The first one being the one made by 91
Copernicus, decentering the earth from its center position; the second the one made by Darwin, 
re-inscribing the human species in the history of biology; and finally the one asserted by Freud, 
depriving mankind of its most precious ability, consciousness, and even more than 
consciousness, agency. However, for Lacan, these blows had not been correctly situated. To 
become interesting, one has to connect them with the social context in which they have taken 
place. During the patriarchal years, any man, no matter how gifted or stupid he was, could 
incarnate the function as long as the Symbolic order could secure his authority. Men living 
during 19th and early 20th century, on the contrary, were starting to lose some of the power that 
the social structure had granted them, becoming progressively vulnerable, and thus potentially 
 See, in particular, Claudel, Paul. Le Père Humilié: Drame En Quatre Actes, Paris: Gallimard, 1965. 90
 See, Freud, Sigmund. Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Parts I and II), in the Standard Edition of the 91
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XV (1915-1916). The Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psycho-analysis, London. Freud writes, “Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science 
two great outrages upon its naive self-love. The first was when it realized that our earth was not the center of the 
universe, but only a tiny speck in a world-system of a magnitude hardly conceivable; this is associated in our minds 
with the name of Copernicus, although Alexandrian doctrines taught something very similar. The second was when 
biological research robbed man of his peculiar privilege of having been specially created, and relegated him to a 
descent from the animal world, implying an ineradicable animal nature in him: this transvaluation has been 
accomplished in our own time upon the instigation of Charles Darwin, Wallace, and their predecessors, and not 
without the most violent opposition from their contemporaries. But man's craving for grandiosity is now suffering 
the third and most bitter blow from present-day psychological research which is endeavoring to prove to the ego of 
each one of us that he is not even master in his own house, but that he must remain content with the veriest scraps of 
information about what is going on unconsciously in his own mind. We psycho-analysts were neither the first nor 
the only ones to propose to mankind that they should look inward; but it appears to be our lot to advocate it most 
insistently and to support it by empirical evidence which touches every man closely.” 
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humiliated.  That at least was the thesis that Lacan defends in this early text, and that he takes 92
from Emile Durkheim's analysis of the history of family and his theory of the decline of the 
father in the reduced form of the bourgeois family. This thesis has been proven wrong by many 
recent studies, underlining the relativity of the patriarchal form of the family in human history.  
However, if the decline of the paternal imago is a problem for Lacan, it is only insofar as 
it opens up the space for the questioning of the genitalization of the Oedipus complex as such, 
which means only inasmuch as it allows questioning Freud's assertion according to which the 
Oedipus complex is universal. In order not make the mistake of reducing the paternal imago, as 
a function, to its historical incarnation in the patriarchal form of the family, one has to let go of 
the idea that the only way for the paternal imago to perform its function is to take the form of the 
patriarchal family. Lacan writes,  
The whole argument of this study is to demonstrate that the Oedipus complex 
presupposes a certain typical structure in the psychological relations between the parents, 
and we have in particular insisted upon the twofold role played by the father in 
representing authority and being at the center of the revelation of sexuality. It is to this 
very ambiguity of his imago, as the incarnation of repression and the catalyst of an 
essential access to reality, that we have related the twofold progress typical in our culture, 
of a certain tempering of the super-ego and of a highly evolutionary orientation of the 
personality.  (Gallagher, 78) 
 A terrifying illustration of this idea can be found in the “Incel” (involuntary celibate) movement that emerged 92
recently in Canada. See, for example, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/minority-report/201804/the-incel-
movement.
!66
If Lacan, in this passage, condemns the Oedipus complex, he nonetheless wants to save a part of 
its structure. What he eliminates is the supposed universalism of the preeminence of the father, as 
well as the political nostalgia that goes with it (this sour desire to return to the old forms of the 
father, being in the form of a restauration of the power of God, or in the one of nationalism or 
populism, as we are witnessing now). Contrary to this backward trend, Lacan, already in the 30s, 
was trying to extract from Freud's Oedipus complex what was not linked to Freud's masculinist 
bias. In other words, what Lacan is already trying to do, here, is to link the deadly effect of the 
maternal imago, to the function of the paternal imago. To put it in the form of a question: how is 
it possible to maintain the functioning of the paternal imago, in order not to be absorbed in the 
maternal imago, while giving up the historical authority that permitted its incarnation? In other 
words, how should the question of the afterlife of the paternal imago be approached, once it has 
entered the era of its decline? And why would Lacan’s answer to this question could still be of 
interest for contemporary gender and queer theorists?  
III. QUEER THEORY MEETS LACAN 
Right at the opening of his chapter “Lacan Meets Queer Theory,” in his book Beyond Sexuality,  93
Tim Dean asks himself this question: how could a dialogue between Lacan, or a French 
Lacanian, and Queer scholars be envisioned? Of course, Dean asked that question before the 
“antisocial turn” in queer theory had happened.  As such, this question, which will be mine too 94
for the time being, could thus be rephrased as: how could a dialogue between Gender and Queer 
 See, Dean, Tim. “Lacan Meets Queer Theory,” in Beyond Sexuality, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000, 93
210-250.
 See Introduction for a precise description of this debate, and an analysis of its theoretical stakes. 94
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relational theorists, such as Judith Butler, and Lacan can be envisioned?  
On the French side of the dialogue, Jacques-Alain Miller, in a text called “Pure 
Psychoanalysis, Applied Psychoanalysis,”  argued that young American analysts are in need of a 95
theoretical change within their practice, even though they are not ready or well equipped to 
understand the last teaching of Lacan. On the side of the university, he thinks that most American 
scholars, who are studying Lacan within the field of Critical and Social theory, like Tim Dean for 
example, are strange Lacanians, for they want to read Lacan without undergoing a 
psychoanalysis themselves. Yet, on the American side, the situation seems slightly different, 
since there is a real curiosity, claims Dean, at least on the behalf of certain Queer scholars, but 
this curiosity is being pushed away by French Lacanians. Here is how Tim Dean talks about the 
situation,  
I discovered to my disappointment at an International Conference on Sexuation (in New 
York City, April 1997, where I first presented a preliminary version of this chapter), that 
for their part Lacanian analysts proved far less willing to engage queer theory than I, 
perhaps naively, had anticipated. Yet spurred on by my conviction that psychoanalysis is 
a queer theory. I’ve persisted with this imaginary encounter, a dialogue between—to 
invoke Yeats—self and antiself. (215)  
Although Dean, as a queer scholar, is convinced that psychoanalysis is a queer theory, French 
Lacanians have not been interested so far in furthering the relationship between the two. But why 
could psychoanalysis, and more specifically, a Lacanian approach to psychoanalysis be said to be 
 Jacques-Alain Miller, “Pure Psychoanalysis, Applied psychoanalysis,” Trans. by Barbara P. Fulks, in lacanian ink 95
20, (Spring 2002), 4-43.
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queer? To answer this question, Dean underlines the fact that, for Lacan as well as for Queer 
scholars like Gayle Rubin in Thinking Sex: Note for a Radical Theory of the Politics of 
Sexuality,  the question of sexuality (and sexual relationships) needs to be problematized outside 96
the terms of gender. Indeed, Lacan’s account of sexuality “reveals desire as determined not by 
the gender of object-choice, but by the object a, which remains largely independent of 
gender” (212). From there Dean argues that such a Lacanian approach of object through object a 
could in turn be used to think anew contemporary identity politics in a queer way. But what is 
object a, and in what relation does it stand with the subject?  
 To start exploring these questions, which will guide the rest of this dissertation, I will use 
Lacan’s Seminar X on Anxiety where he rearticulates the notions of desire and jouissance through 
the invention of object a. 
Lacan’s Object a, and the Birth of the Subject of Jouissance 
Seminar X, on Anxiety [1962-1963] accomplishes in Lacan’s teaching a major conceptual shift. 
In it, Lacan takes his distance from Freud’s myth of the Oedipus complex in order to think anew 
the question of castration and its relation to the phenomenon of anxiety.  While Freud, in Totem 97
and Taboo, grounded the anxiety of castration in the threatening presence of the primitive father, 
Lacan, in Seminar X, relocates this threat in the biological functioning of the male organ and, 
through it, to object a. By undertaking this shift Lacan, as Jacques-Alain Miller suggested in his 
 Rubin, Gayle. “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” Pleasure and Danger: 96
Exploring Female Sexuality, Ed. Carole S. Vance. London: Pandora. 1992. 267-293.
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire Livre X, L’angoisse. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Edition du seuil, Paris, 97
2004. For the English version, Lacan, Jacques, Anxiety, Trans. Adrian Price, UK, Polity, 2014.
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presentation of the Seminar, revolutionized his own thinking.  Lacan affected a passage from a 98
Copernican system of thought, centered on the concept of the Name-of-the-Father, to an 
Einsteinian system of thought, with multiple Names-of-the-Father.  Seminar X is thus a very 99
important moment in Lacan’s teaching. This seminar introduces for the first time the idea that the 
function of the father, as the bearer of the law within the Oedipus complex, is now disappearing, 
and that what is taking its place is the Real of the body. As such, it makes explicit that Lacan’s 
teaching is not just reducible to Freud’s Oedipus complex but is also a very thorough critique of 
it. This Seminar is thus a very important one in order to understand why the teaching of Lacan 
cannot be reduced to a formalization of the Freudian concepts, which is, unfortunately what is 
most often remembered of the teaching of Lacan.  
Taking his distance from Freud, Lacan is redefining Freud’s entire network of concepts 
by making of them a particular case of a broader function. It is as if Lacan were starting to see in 
Freud’s Oedipus complex, not the universal structure of the human psyche but a particular case 
elevated in the master’s discourse to the level of a universal. As such, Seminar X represents the 
first step towards a deconstruction of the Oedipus complex, as well as the first step towards the 
construction of a new form of psychoanalysis that would erase the normative aspects of Freudian 
psychoanalysis and its potentialities for segregation (between the “normal,” and the non-normal).  
Contrary to the classical approach of anxiety by the tenet of ego-psychology, or the new 
approach of it by CBT, Lacan, in Seminar X, does not consider anxiety as a malfunction in need 
of a treatment. On the contrary, Lacan wants to return to a philosophical approach of anxiety in 
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Jacques Lacan’s Seminar on Anxiety,” in Lacanian ink, 26, Fall 2005.   98
 See, Lacan, Jacques. On the Names-of-the-Father. Trans. by Bruce Fink. Malden: Polity, 2013. 99
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order to understand the place that anxiety occupies in the functioning of the human psyche. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, in his introductory lesson to this Seminar, writes: “Under the title of 
Anxiety, is a book where anxiety, properly speaking, is not a trouble, where it is not about 
treating it, but where what is at stake is to give to it its right place, its conceptual place, with a 
reference to Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety” (my translation).   100
In The Concept of Anxiety (1844)  Kierkegaard defines anxiety as the “dizziness of 101
freedom,” which itself is related to the Christian notion of sin. To take just one famous Biblical 
example, one could say that it is precisely because Adam knew that God had forbidden him to eat 
the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil but remained “free” to do it that anxiety 
emerged in him. It is because Adam was free to make the wrong decision (free to decide to eat 
the fruit) that he was possibly a sinner, and it is because Adam was also aware of that and then of 
guilt (if Adam was to become conscious of the wrongness of his action). As such, anxiety is, for 
Kierkegaard, what engenders, at the same time, the possibility of sin and guilt. However, anxiety 
is not only negative for Kierkegaard since it is thanks to this affect that one can become truly 
aware of one’s true freedom. It is thanks to anxiety, indeed, that one can become aware of the 
very nature of one’s acts, and reciprocally, of one’s own guilt. Kierkegaard writes, in The 
Concept of Anxiety: 
That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which everything turns. Man is a 
synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two 
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain, L’Orientation Lacanienne, III, 6 (2003-2004), Leçon 15. Unpublished.100
 See, Kierkegaard, Soren. The concept of Anxiety, A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 101
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin (1844), Trans. by Reidar Thomte, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1980.
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are not united in a third. This third is spirit. In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if 
he were at any moment of his life merely animal, he would never become man. So spirit 
is present, but as immediate, as dreaming. Inasmuch as it is now present, it is in a sense 
now a hostile power, for it constantly disturbs the relation between soul and body, a 
relation that indeed has persistence and yet does not have endurance, inasmuch as it first 
receives the latter by the spirit. On the other hand, spirit is a friendly power, since it is 
precisely that which constitutes the relation. What, then, is man’s relation to this 
ambiguous power? How does spirit relate itself to itself and to its conditionality? It 
relates itself as anxiety. (43-44)  
If anxiety is a concept, for Kierkegaard, and not only an affect (a fear without object), it is 
because Kierkegaard attributes to it a very specific function in a very precise architecture of 
concepts. Anxiety is what defines the ways in which spirit—as an “ambiguous power”—relates 
to itself. Anxiety is the knot at the crossroad of the psychical and the physical that reveals to the 
person that feels the ambiguous nature—sometimes as a hostile power, sometimes as a friendly 
power—of spirit. Anxiety is thus located at the crossroad of many other concepts, and functions 
as an inner signal that denotes the nature of the relationship that all the other concepts have with 
one another. Likewise, for Lacan, the phenomenon of anxiety is primarily a notion that is located 
in a very precise architecture of concepts that Lacan summarized in his Graph of Desire.  But 102
what is Lacan’s graph of desire, and where is the phenomenon of anxiety located in it? 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Seminaire V, Les formations de l’inconscient, Text established by Jacques-Alain Miller, 102
Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1998. See, also, Lacan, Jacques. « Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désire dans 
l’inconscient freudien, » in Ecrits, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1966. pp. 793-828. Finally, for a very good reading of the 
whole graph of desire, see Van Haute, Phillipe. Against Adaptation: Lacan’s Subversion of the Subject. The Lacanian 
Clinical Field, The Other Press, 2001.  
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Lacan’s Graph of Desire and its Relations to Jouissance 
Lacan developed his Graph of Desire in Seminar V, Les Formations de l’inconscient 
(1957-1958), and in “Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désire dans l’inconscient 
freudien.” (1960)  In the Graph, the subject of speech, written s, is in relation to the Other, O, as 
the locus of the signifiers: s (O). The subject of the unconscious, in turn, takes its position in 
relation to the Other as a $, which is to say as a subject identified with the Other through a unary 
trait. This division of the subject of the unconscious, in turn, is reflected in the division that 
affects the Other between the big Other O and the little other written o. This division of the Other 
is what guarantees, in Lacan’s schematism, that the Other is not equivalent to a universal 
signifier like God. For if the Other were equivalent to such a master signifier, just as in the case 
of Schreber’s paranoia, there would be no remainder, i.e., nothing in the subject that could resist 
his complete identification to this Other, and thus nothing that could stand in the way of the 
Subject’s complete “normalization”.  This situation is written $ <> a on the Graph, since the 103
remainder in question is precisely what Lacan will call object a, and what is associated in the 
affective life of the subject with the affect of anxiety. As such, for Lacan, object a is not an object 
per se since it does not belong to the Imaginary space defined by the “Mirror Stage.” On the 
contrary, the construction of object a, Miller suggests in his presentation, engages Lacan in a 
kind of deconstruction of the specular object as such. 
 To go even further, one could say that the whole Seminar X is a critique of the Imaginary 
as Lacan developed it through the two versions of his “Mirror Stage” (1936 -1949). This is why, 
 For a more detailed analysis of Schreber’s case, see the introduction of Chapter Four. 103
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as Seminar X moves toward the definition of object a, most of Lacan’s early schemas related to 
the “Mirror Stage,” like the one of the inverted bouquet, for example, are not only revisited but 
abandoned. The notion of the specular that Lacan uses to describe what takes place at the level of 
the “Mirror Stage,” are now reconsidered as phenomenon in which object a is absent, which is to 
say as a mode of the subject in which the subject is secured from object a, and thus from anxiety. 
The field of the specular becomes the field where the subject avoids anxiety. At the opposite of 
such an avoidance of anxiety and object a, Lacan wants to make of anxiety, in his Seminar X, a 
way to access the Real.  
 In his text on anxiety, Inhibition, Symptoms, Anxiety (1926), Freud makes of inhibition 
the most important signifier in order to understand what anxiety is, especially when it comes to 
understanding the malfunctioning that it introduces in a subject in the form of symptoms. 
Following Freud’s footsteps, Lacan defines anxiety as what points, inside the subject, to what 
escapes the hold of the signifier and the Symbolic order. It is the barrier or the inner obstacle that 
prevents the Symbolic order subsuming in its dialectic all the Imaginary elements that were 
previously outside of it. As such, anxiety becomes, in Seminar X, the ultimate sign of what 
cannot be aufheben (dialecticized), i.e. what points towards what cannot be integrated in the 
movement of symbolization that marks “Lacan’s Return to Freud” and that Miller calls Lacan’s 
second paradigm.  In other words, anxiety is what marks the limits of the process of 104
symbolization opened by the elaboration of the “Mirror Stage.” It is what points towards an 
ultimate remainder that cannot be integrated in a broader logic, nor dissolved into more simple 
 See Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Les 6 Paradigmes de la jouissance.” In the second paradigm, Lacan tries to integrate 104
into a Symbolic network all the Imaginary elements that he had previously isolated during his early phase on the 
“Mirror Stage.”
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and comprehensible elements.  
 To illustrate this function of anxiety, Lacan mentions Otto Rank’s description of The 
Trauma of Birth (1952). Anxiety is, primarily, the sign of the subject’s hilfossigkeit, which is to 
say the sign of its fundamental distress, as well as its fundamental paralysis when its life lacks 
meaning. However, this distress is surprisingly not connected by Lacan to what normally 
constitutes for Freud the major source of anxiety within his theory, namely the anxiety of 
castration. This form of anxiety is not related to any object but to its lack (it is when the little boy 
becomes aware of what is missing in the little girl that he starts to fear its loss). But this loss is 
totally absent in Seminar X (I will explain why in full detail later). Likewise, the reference to the 
Oedipus myth, as well as its rewriting in purely logical terms as developed by Lacan in Seminar 
IV on La Relation d'Objet (1956-1957), is also completely absent from Seminar X (again, the 
explanation of this absence will come later).   105
 It is as if Seminar X was the negative of Seminar IV. While in Seminar IV, anxiety was 
approached through the Freudian notion of the anxiety of castration, it is approached in Seminar 
X through the Real and the notion of object a. In other words, what changes between Seminar IV 
and Seminar X is not only the notion of anxiety, but also the notion of object. While the notion of 
object was seen, in Seminar IV, as a way to avoid anxiety, as in the case of the little Hans where 
his phobia of horses gives an object to his otherwise “empty” and uncontrollable anxiety of 
castration, object a is a remainder that resisted the first reduction of anxiety to a phobic object.  106
Consequently, anxiety is also what comes to re-define, in Lacan’s teaching, the function that the 
 Lacan, Le Séminaire, Livre IV, La Relation d’objet. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du seuil, 1994. 105
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Phallus had so far, since anxiety re-defines the limits of the process of symbolization described 
by Lacan in “The Signification of the Phallus” (1958). Lacan writes: 
The Phallus is the signifier of this very Aufhebung, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its 
disappearance. This is why the demon of Aidos (Scham) springs forth at the very moment 
the Phallus is unveiled in the ancient mysteries (see the famous painting in the Villa of 
the Mysteries in Pompeii). It then becomes the bar with which the demon’s hand strikes 
the signified, marking it as the bastard offspring of its signifying concatenation.” (Ecrits, 
692) 
The signified stroked by the demon (by the Phallus) is, of course, the one that comes from the 
Imaginary, which is to say from the specular dimension described in the “Mirror Stage.” This is 
why, in Seminar X, Lacan underlines that anxiety cannot be struck by the demon of Aidos 
inasmuch as it is not a signified. Anxiety, on the contrary, is what gives access to what cannot be 
integrated into the process of symbolization, i.e., what can give access, or at least what can point 
towards “the true grasp on the Real”. To put it differently, while, prior to this Seminar, the notion 
of the Phallus was the one that was responsible for introducing a lack, as well as a split (a 
spaltung) in the subject, it is now anxiety and its links to the body that are supposed to introduce 
these elements. To sum up, it is during this Seminar, that Lacan approached for the first time the 
question of castration and sexual difference, but from a perspective of jouissance, and not from a 
purely Symbolic perspective. 
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Detumescence: a Castration of/by Jouissance 
Throughout his early teaching, Lacan used the sign -φ to designate, at the same time, the 
Imaginary object of castration (the mother’s phallus φ) as well as its suppression by the 
Symbolic operation of castration accomplished by the Phallus (-φ). In Seminar X, however, 
Lacan initiates a new way of approaching the question of castration that is grounded on the body 
and its specific modes of jouissance.  As such, one could even add, as Miller does, that Lacan 107
discovered in this Seminar what will slowly become the very center of his late and last teaching, 
which is to say, the jouissance of the body in relation to the Real. Lacan undertook this shift 
inasmuch as he could not find, within the relationship of the subject (s) to the Other (O), either in 
the form of a separation (aphanasis: disappearance of desire) or of an alienation (as the object of 
the Other’s desire), the proper place to locate object a. Neither on the side of the subject, nor on 
the side of the Other, object a occupies, just as in Kierkegaard, a place of exception.   108
 Anxiety and object a are phenomena that cannot be reduced to the dimension of the 
signifier inasmuch as they belong exclusively to the body and its modes of jouissance, which is 
to say to the body as a living entity, and not as an object mortified by the signifier. Beyond the 
specular body of the “mirror stage” exists a remainder of a certain jouissance that cannot be 
 See, for more details, Lesson 19 of Seminar X. It is in this Lesson that Lacan argues for the first time about a 107
form of castration that is not related to the threatening presence of the father but that has everything to do with the 
male organ and the biological fact of detumescence. 
 And it is precisely this place that became, once formalized by Lacan through the concept of the “not all”, the 108
point of departure and the support of the late and last Lacan. However, the notion of the “not-all” (that I will define 
at length in a different chapter) should not be confused with the notion of exception inasmuch as the notion of 
exception presupposes the existence of a universal, a “for all” that the notion of the “not-all” precisely denies. In his 
Seminar XX Encore (1972-1973), Lacan will even go as far as saying that the exception that object a represents in 
his early teaching is actually describing the condition of all signifiers, which is to say the fact that they are all “not 
all” reducible to their functioning in the symbolic order. To put it differently, Lacan will advance the idea, in Encore, 
that there is a constant alliance between the order of signifier (the order of the Other) and the order of the modes of 
enjoyment (of jouissance)—constant alliance that he will name lalangue (I will of course come back at length also 
to that notion).
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negativized by the effect of the signifier (and it this remainder that Chapter Four studies in 
details). It is a jouissance that resists the order of the Phallus, a jouissance that cannot be entirely 
integrated into its Symbolic order. From the perspective of the Symbolic order, the anxiety of 
castration is related to the perception of the absence of the phallic organ in the woman, as well as 
to all the behaviors or fantasy that comes from the desire to deny such an absence. This is why 
anxiety is generally said to have no object. In his Seminar IV, for example, in “Dialectic of 
Frustration,” Lacan underlines the fact that castration is essentially related to a Symbolic order 
that attributes to the Phallus, defined as the symbol of man’s power, a special signification.  109
This is why the notion of castration, approached from a Symbolic perspective, is also related to 
the Oedipus complex and the notion of the Law that such a myth is supposed to legitimize. 
Within the myth of the Oedipus, indeed, castration is never related to the actual penis of the boy, 
or the actual privation of penis for the little girl, but to the acceptation of a certain Symbolic 
order which attributes certain rights and duties to the subject according to their anatomical 
differences. To accept castration is to accept a given Symbolic order; and to accept a certain 
Symbolic order is to accept its Law; and to accept its Law is to accept being integrated into the 
Symbolic order. Finally, this acceptance is what Lacan calls the acceptance of the Symbolic debt, 
which is to say, to renounce being the Imaginary Phallus of the mother, i.e. to renounce the 
illusion of an absolute power.  
 To think differently about the relationship between anxiety and castration, Lacan stops 
considering the Phallus as a signifier and starts seeing it as an organ. It is as if Lacan, in this 
Seminar, managed to give its organs back to the Imaginary body of the “Mirror Stage” since the 
 See, Lacan, “La dialectique de la frustration,” in Séminaire IV, La relation d’Objet, p. 61. 109
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Imaginary body of the mirror stage is a body without organs. The body of the “Mirror Stage,” 
indeed, is a body that is entirely under the spell of its specular image and, as such, a body that is 
entirely subsumed or mortified by its introduction (or submission) into the Symbolic order. 
Contrary to this Imaginary body, mortified by its entrance into the Symbolic order, the notion of 
the phallus as an organ that Lacan develops in this Seminar leads him to redefine the Freudian 
libido as a paradoxical organ defined through the myth of the Lamelle.  Lacan introduces the 110
myth of the lamella to replace the notion of the Phallus, as well as to give some life to the 
concept of libido as a paradoxical organ. The libido as a paradoxical organ designates, in Lacan’s 
teachings, what Freud named the points of fixation of the libido, which is to say a point of 
fixation in the mode of jouissance of the subject that cannot be changed by any form of Symbolic 
operation inasmuch as those points resist the grasp of the phallic aufhebung.  Consequently, one 
can argue that Lacan, in Seminar X, liberates jouissance from its submission to the Symbolic in 
order to isolate in it a jouissance impossible to negate. This jouissance is what Lacan connects to 
a new series of organ-objects subsumed under the name of object a. In other words, Lacan, in 
this seminar, proposes a radically new approach to the notion of castration and anxiety through 
biology, anatomy, and the properties of the male.  
 Within this new paradigm, the -φ that was used to mark the effect of the Symbolic 
castration becomes, purely and simply, a way to mark an anatomical property of the male organ: 
the detumescence that happens after the moment of jouissance of the organ. Miller writes: 
“[Lacan] makes of the detumescence of the organ, of its deficiency, of the disappearance of the 
phallic function during the sexual act, the principle of the anxiety of castration.” (OL III, 6, 
 See, Lacan, “Position de l’inconscient.” in Ecrits, 846-847.110
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Lesson 17, my translation) Such a property of the male organ, it has to be emphasized, does not 
require any external element to be actualized, unlike the complex of castration described by 
Freud in the Oedipus complex. This castration happens at a biological level through the male 
organ and not through the encounter with the Phallus as a signifier. As such, it is a castration that 
does away with the narrative of the Oedipus complex (which implements the anxiety of 
castration through the figure of the father) by relocating the source of the anxiety of castration at 
the very level of the organ.  
An Elevation of the Feminine Position 
The feminine position, in this new bodily approach of the notion of castration, stops being 
considered a position that has always already been castrated. In other words, while the masculine 
position was the one holding the upper hand in the Oedipus complex, it now becomes, through 
the logic of the organ, the position that can castrate itself. On the contrary, while the feminine 
position, in the Oedipus complex, was linked to a certain feeling of inferiority, and to the 
necessity of accepting to “be” the Phallus for a man who “has” it, it now becomes the position 
that lacks nothing. Thus, when it comes to jouissance, it is the masculine position that is always-
already castrated, while the feminine position is not.  
 This idea will become the compass that will orient Lacan’s late and last teaching. It is in 
the form of an elegy to the feminine body that Lacan constructs his late and last teaching, since 
the feminine position is a position that cannot lose anything in her encounter with jouissance.  111
This, in turn, allows her to have a non-mediated relation to the desire of the Other, unlike the one 
 See chapter Five for a full analysis of the question. 111
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of the male who fears castration as an effect of jouissance. To put it in another way, women only 
have to enter the order of the Phallus inasmuch as they want to enter in relationship with the 
desire as well as the jouissance of a male. It is only because women have to deal with the 
functioning of the male organ and its relation to the phallic order that they have to accept (or not) 
to enter the theatre of the Phallus in the guise of a masquerade. This specific relationship to the 
Phallic order, however, is what makes them more capable of becoming conscious of the 
artificiality of the whole Symbolic order, which is why Lacan will connect, in his Seminar XX, 
Encore, the feminine position to the matheme S (₳) (for a full discussion of this matheme, see 
Chapter Three, Part II, and Chapter Four, Part II).  This new approach to castration is what will 
lead Lacan to develop what he called the two fundamental fantasies that comes with the 
functioning of the male and the female organ.  
The Two Fundamental Fantasies 
On the male side, the fantasy is the one of feminine masochism, which is to say the fantasy of a 
woman that would be entirely passive, and that would enjoy being exclusively the object of 
men’s desire. Lacan writes, “the feminine masochism is a masculine fantasy.” (222) In other 
words, on the male side the fantasy is one that tends to substitute for the threat of castration, an 
object that can provoke an erection without becoming a threat for detumescence. On the female 
side, the fantasy is the one of Don Giovanni, which is to say the fantasy of a man that would not 
be under the threat of castration, and that would not need any form of participation of his woman 
in the phallic masquerade. Lacan writes, “Don Giovanni is a feminine dream.” (224) In other 
words, the figure of Don Giovanni is the figure of a man that denies the actual castration of the 
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organ, and that pretends to not need the desire of the woman to help him master his own relation 
to jouissance.  At the heart of those two fantasies is the notion of separation. The notion of 112
separation is what will come to replace the notion of castration at the level of the body and the 
organs. To be even more precise, Lacan makes of castration, in Seminar X, a particular case of 
the broader notion of separation. If castration is the specific name given to the anxiety 
experimented by a male when it comes to the detumescence of the penis, separation is the 
generic name of all the experiences of anxiety that are attached to the disappearance of an organ. 
This is why Lacan, in his Seminar XI, will add to the Freudian list of “organs,” such as oral, anal, 
and phallic, the visual (scoping) as well as the voice organ.  113
To illustrate his new approach of castration through the notion of separation, Lacan 
introduced the myth of the Lamella. Lacan writes, “the lamella is something extra-flat which 
moves like the amoeba. (…) it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed being, immortal—because 
it survives any division, any scissiparous intervention. And it can run around. This lamella, this 
organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ (…) is the 
libido” (The Four…, 197-198).   This myth expresses the idea that castration is not, as in the 114
Oedipal myth, the result of a transgression, or of a punishment, but more simply the result of 
sexual reproduction, i.e., that in animals like humans, the libido becomes an organ that can be 
lost on the male side of sexuation. This loss of the organ is not the result of the presence of the 
Other, but it is a loss that is as necessary as the laws of entropy. In other words, in Lacan’s myth 
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Les formules de la sexuation.” 112
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of the lamella, the concept of castration is reduced to the moment of disappearance of the organ 
after the moment of orgasm.  
IV. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX 
Lacan, however, will preserve the notion of castration as a quilting point to understand Freud’s 
libidinal stages. Lacan will maintain the notion of Symbolic castration as introduced by Freud in 
order to maintain the structure of the object within the development of the psyche. This structure, 
however, is no longer the faithful description of a biological maturation but a fantasmatic 
construction that takes its meaning only retroactively, that is to say, once the Oedipus complex 
has been posited as a quilting point. To posit the Oedipus complex as a quilting point is to 
underline the fact that the very notion of object (as oral object, anal object, and genital object) is 
inconceivable outside the framework of the Oedipus complex.  It means that desire and the law 115
are but one thing, i.e. that desire and the law have a common object—the object that is forbidden 
by the law and that desire takes as its aim. As such, the construction of the object within the 
coordinates of the Oedipus is linked to the paternal law and to the desire of the mother that the 
father, as the representative of the law, forbids.   
If we connect now the structure of the Oedipal object and the structure of object a (which 
does not imply the presence any authoritative figure), one can see that the structure of the 
Oedipus complex becomes nothing but a lucubration of knowledge on a much more basic 
 See in particular, “The Partial Drive and Its Circuits,” in Seminar XI, 178-180.115
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biological phenomenon that Lacan calls separation.  While separation at the level of the organ 116
has to do with a form of auto-mutilation, castration on the side of the Oedipus has to do with a 
hetero-mutilation. Consequently, if the castration of the organ stands as the paradigm, and the 
Oedipal castration only as a particular case, it means that the function and the place granted to 
the father by Freud was not an essential feature of the complex, but simply a way to exteriorize, 
in the figure of the father, a mutilation that would have happened inside the individual in any 
case. Even more to the point, it means that the father, as well as all the concepts that such a 
figure carries in Freud as well as in the early Lacan (like The-Name-of-the-Father or the Paternal 
Metaphor, etc.) are no longer necessary.  
At the pure level of the castration of the organ, what is produced is an object that is prior 
to the level of desire. It is an object that is prior to the law too. This is why Lacan, towards the 
end of Seminar X, calls into question the function of the Name of the Father and, through this 
function, the place and the function of love.  
Love and Desire, Anxiety and Jouissance  
The economy of desire, as Lacan developed it through his early teaching, is entirely grounded on 
 See, for a detailed analysis of the notion of separation, Lacan, Jacques. “La bouche et l’Oeil,” in Seminar X 116
265-279. Lacan writes, “The fundamental “separtition,” not separation, but partition within, this is what is found at 
the origin and from the level from the oral drive on, inscribed in what will be the structuring of desire. Hence the 
astonishment at the fact that we have gone to this level to find some more accessible image for what has always 
remained for us - and why? - a paradox up to now, namely that in phallic functioning, in the one linked to 
copulation, it is also the image of a cut, of a separation, of what we improperly call castration, because it is an image 
of gelding that functions. It is no doubt not by chance, nor no doubt in a misguided way, that we went searching in 
older phantasies for the justification of what we did not know very well how to justify at the level of the phallic 
phase, it must nevertheless be noted that at this level something has been produced which is going to allow us to find 
our bearings in the whole subsequent dialectic” (Gallagher, 165). 
!84
love.  It is because love trumps the Real satisfaction of the needs that the entire dialectic of 117
frustration can start and actually transform a Real object (such as the breast) into a Symbolic 
object. And it is also because love trumps the satisfaction of the needs that the notion of absolute 
satisfaction becomes one that only love can give, that is to say, that only an object that has been 
transformed into a symbol, not to say, into an agalma (into the precious, and over-valorized 
object of desire), can give.  118
 Opposed to this economy of desire grounded on love, there is the experience of anxiety 
which brings back to the Real object—the object a—that is, to the object of the drives and the 
Real satisfaction of jouissance that is attached to this object. And on this side, there is a clear 
disjunction between jouissance and desire. In other words, while love, within the dialectic of 
frustration, developed by the early Lacan, was the only force that could permit jouissance to 
condescend to desire, love becomes in Seminar X what veils anxiety and its product—object a. 
And while the Phallus, as a signifier, was occupying the place of what was lacking in the Other, 
it is now the object a which comes to occupy this place. This is why anxiety is said to be a 
“signal that does not fool” inasmuch as it is a signal that brings back to the Real satisfaction of 
the drives, while unmasking the semblance upon which love, desire and the Phallus are 
functioning. In other words, if anxiety cannot fool, it is because anxiety points towards what 
 See Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire livre VIII, Le Transfert. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 117
1991.  
 For a detailed analysis of the notion of agalma, see, Lacan, Jacques. “Agalma,” in Séminaire VIII, Le Trasnfert, 118
Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1991, 163-178. Lacan writes, agalma, from agallo, "to 
adorn, to ornament,” signifies in effect - at first sight - "ornament, adornment". First of all the notion of ornament, of 
adornment is not that simple; it can be seen immediately that this may take us very far. (…) You should not see in it 
any taste for rarity but rather the fact that in a text which we suppose to be extremely rigorous, that of the 
Symposium, something leads us to this crucial point which is formally indicated at the moment at which I told you 
the stage revolves completely and, after these games of praising regulated as they had been up to then by this subject 
of love, there enters this actor, Alcibiades, who is going to change everything” (163-178).
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cannot be integrated within the circuit of meaning, that is to say, towards an opaque jouissance of 
the drives, deprived of any meaning.  
This opaque jouissance of the drives, which is related to object a, is a jouissance to which 
Lacan gives a mythical status, i.e., a status that subtracts it from any temporal construction 
(unlike the retroactive construction of the Oedipal object). The subject experiences this 
jouissance at a phenomenological level, but it can also not experience it since this experience 
precedes the entry of the subject into the circuit of love. At the level of the circuit of love, 
anxiety can only be logically reconstructed (just as in Freud’s text, “A Child is Being Beaten,” 
the masochist moment in the fantasy). As such, anxiety can either be felt, or reconstructed 
logically. Likewise, with desire, desire can either be repressed, as it appears in the metonymic 
process, or it can be put at the fore under the guise of the agalmatic object, that is, under the 
guise of a fascinating and attractive object. On the one hand, there is the metonymical status of 
desire (when desire is what runs in between the signifiers and under the signifying chain), and on 
the other the metaphorical status of desire, when the object of desire acquires an Imaginary 
status. On the metonymical side, desire has no object since its object is the metonymy of the 
“lack-in-being” itself. While when the metonymical desire encounters love, it means that it has 
suddenly met an object that is the perfect metaphor of its lack. Miller summarizes the whole 
movement of Lacan’s Seminar X thus:  
First Part Second Part
Jouissance Mythical Real
Anxiety Phenomenological Construted
Desire Fascinated Repressed
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Through this schema, what becomes clear is that up to Seminar X, Lacan had always conceived 
the object of desire through the concept of intentionality, which means that he had always 
positioned the object as the aim of desire, and not, as he did in the second part of Seminar X, as a 
cause of desire. In other words, up to Seminar X, Lacan always conceived the object as what was 
in front of the subject, or as what was the horizon of desire itself (as what was fascinating it)—
even though he had tried already to integrate this intentional object within the fantasy. Moving 
away from this phenomenological framework, Lacan substitutes for the concept of intentionality, 
the one of causality through the introduction of object a “cause of desire.” In other words, with 
Seminar X, the Real object of desire stopped being placed in front or ahead of the subject, but is 
being relocated before the emergence of desire, as what gives to desire its orientation, its proper 
aim. Consequently, at the end of Seminar X, it becomes possible to distinguish between the 
object that desire aims at (the object of love - agalma), and the object that is causing desire 
(object a - palea).  The anal object is what represents best object a as palea and its link to the 119
remainder that needs to be excreted. The Phallus, on the contrary, is what represents best the 
object of love as agalma, and its link to the idea of authority, power and perfection.  
And it is also why, when Lacan defines anew the end of the analytic process, he 
associates it with the “detumescence” of desire and love, that is to say, to the reduction of what 
misleads within the object of desire. This “detumescence” of desire is not the result of the 
analyst’s interpretation of the desire of the analysand, but the result of interpretation/construction 
of his or her hidden object a.  It is, indeed, through the construction and the interpretation of the 
object a that an analysis can produce some effects at the level of desire.  This effect is produced 
 More details on this question in the Epilogue, in the last section on “Kant with Sade.” 119
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insofar as object a is precisely what conditions desire, what orients it toward a specific object. 
Object a is the hidden object of desire. It is what governs and orients desire without being known 
by the one who desires. In this sense, the most authentic desire is a desire that ignores completely 
its cause, a desire that has no knowledge about what causes it, that is, a desire that has no 
conscious link to its object a. In other words, one can distinguish between the object-cause 
(object a), which is always the unknowable object, and the object-aim (agalma), which is always 
a false object a.  
 It is this strict opposition that enables Lacan, in chapter IV of Seminar X, to make a 
distinction between the fantasy of the pervert, and the fantasy of the neurotic. On the side of the 
pervert, object a remains at its original place, i.e., in the subject as a hidden and unknowable 
object. This position is illustrated by Sade himself who ignored, until the very end of his life, that 
he was, in fact, in the position of the object a that his victims were supposed to occupy too (the 
question of perversion will be at the center of the Epilogue of this dissertation). On the side of 
the neurotic, in contrast, object a is integrated into the Other, that is, integrated within the 
fantasy. Consequently, the object a of the neurotic is not a real object a, but a false object a 
tainted by its integration into the field of the Other. But it is insofar as the neurotics integrates 
object a into the Other that object a becomes accessible to psychoanalysis, and the neurotic can 
be treated through free association and speech. The mistake of the neurotic is that he tries to 
make of object a as object cause of desire the same as the object of desire (agalma). In other 
words, the neurotics want to turn object a into something visible, something that belongs to the 
realm of the Imaginary. This is why the fantasy of the neurotic is said to be inauthentic, and the 
object a that is presented in his (or her) fantasy, a fallacy. Opposed to such a reduction of object a 
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to the realm of the specular and the Other, Lacan wants to posit, in Seminar X, in a kind of queer 
way, I would say, object a as what is outside the grasp of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. Object 
a, strictly speaking, is not only on the side of the subject, but on the side of what the subject will 
never know about itself. As such, object a cannot be grasped within the Other and its procedures 
of representation, even if object a remains, nonetheless, the product, or the remainder of the 
Symbolic order as its waste.  
Lacan said, “The object defined as a remainder, irreducible to the symbolization of the 
Other, depends nonetheless on the Other” (Seminar X, 382). Object a is thus the irrepresentable 
relation of the subject to the Other. This amphiboly of object a is what makes it difficult to 
localize it. And it is also what leads the neurotics to try to blur the distinct structures of 
jouissance and desire within his fantasy. While the structure of jouissance is related to object a, 
and is reducible to a jouissance of the proper body, the structure of desire implies the existence of 
a subject in relation to the Other.  
The Difference between Love and Anxiety 
Normally, the mediation between jouissance and desire is what love is supposed to enable within 
the early Lacan. Love, indeed, is what falsifies object a (palea) into an object of desire (agalma) 
by integrating it into the realm of the Other. Anxiety, on the other hand, does not enable a 
mediation between jouissance and desire but rather, establishes a disjunction between the two 
and, also, as Miller puts it, “anxiety is what transform jouissance into an object cause of 
desire.” (Miller, Seminar 2003-2004, Lesson 18) In other words, while love transforms 
jouissance into desire, anxiety is what transform jouissance into object a.   
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 Anxiety is what produces object a as the object cause of desire. This is why anxiety is, 
first and foremost in this Seminar, reducible to a logical moment that does not need to be felt. 
Anxiety, to be more precise, is the logical (as well as effective) result of the discrepancy between 
the demands of the drives (the demand for absolute jouissance) and the level of the ego (and its 
ideals and values). It is thus the signal, or the index that points towards Das Ding, that is to say, 
toward the absolute object a. Lacan gives a representation of the possible confusion between Das 
Ding and the object of love (agalma), at the opening of the Seminar, through the image of the 
blinded man and the praying mantis. Through this representation, what Lacan wants to highlight 
is the link between the optical illusion on which love is resting, and the possibility that under this 
veil lies a creature ready to devour her lover. In other words, anxiety emerges as a consequence 
of this possible discrepancy between the Imaginary dimension of the object of love, and the 
“real” nature of the jouissance of this object. Anxiety is the signal that the object is taking over 
the lack that the object was supposed to cork. Anxiety is thus the signal that the presence of the 
object is threatening the possibility of the lack itself, i.e., the very empty place (-φ) that was 
supposed to protect the subject from being completely at the mercy of the Other. In other words, 
anxiety emerges each time something of the object a starts to appear in the field of the Other and 
introduces a perturbation in the Imaginary that starts, in turns, to threaten the specular image 
(which Lacan writes I(a)) that supports the formation of the ego as well as the construction of 
“Reality.” The uncanniness (unheimlichkeit) described by Freud refers exactly to this 
phenomenon of strangeness or discordance introduced in the Imaginary by the emergence, within 
its field, of object a—which is, strictly speaking, an object impossible to represent.  120
 See Freud, Sigmund. “The Uncanny,” Standard. Ed, Vol. 17 (1917-1919), Translated by James Strachey, London: 120
Hogarth Press, 1955, 217-252.
!90
 The phenomenon of aggressiveness that Lacan described in his text “Aggressiveness in 
Psychoanalysis” (1948) comes from this specific situation, that is to say, from the fact that as 
soon as the subject identifies himself completely with his specular image, he immediately 
becomes entirely in the power of the Other.  Consequently, anxiety starts to emerge in the 121
subject as he starts to realize that he could be destroyed by this Other onto which his ego is 
grounded. As such, one could conclude that anxiety is the exact opposite of love, since love 
always preserves the lack within the Other—while anxiety does not. 
From the Theory of the Subject to the Production of Object a 
But Lacan does not only define anxiety in this first sense. During the second half of his Seminar, 
he focuses on a different kind of anxiety—an anxiety that is not produced by the object, but an 
anxiety that produces the object a itself, that is to say, an anxiety that produces object a as object-
cause-of-desire. In other words, Lacan’s approach to anxiety, in the second part, is not centered 
on the Freudian approach of the phenomenon (as we can find it in Freud's text “Unheimlich”) but 
on its reverse. Object a, in this second part, becomes the paradigm of what cannot be integrated 
in the specular field. It becomes, as such, the non-specularizable.  The movement of the whole 
Seminar could thus be described as a movement going from the description of the intrusion of 
object a into the specular field that cannot represent it, to the movement of separation of object a 
from the Real body in the second movement. In other words, while the first part of the seminar is 
concerned with the Imaginary body of the mirror stage, as well as with the Imaginary dimension 
of the ego, the second half is more concerned about the Real body of jouissance and the question 
 Lacan, Jacques. “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” in Ecrits, Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton & 121
Company, 2002, 82-101. 
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of the detumescence of the organ.  
 It is as if Lacan introduced for the first time in his theory of the subject the presence of 
the “Real body,” that is to say, the presence of a body that has no unified Imaginary form 
inasmuch as its separation from the Other has not yet taken place. It is as if the Real body were 
expanding beyond the limits of the body itself, as if the Real body were also a part of the Other 
itself. And it is those particularities about the limits of the Real body—which leaves it entangled 
in the Other—that will enable Lacan to elaborate, in his next Seminar on The Four fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, his renewed approach to the unconscious  (I will come back at 122
length to the question in Chapter Five).     
 To understand the slippery nature of the articulation between the Real body, the Other and 
object a, Lacan introduces a new formalization. Instead of using his old schema of the image of 
the mirror and the inverted bouquet, as he did in the “Mirror Stage,” and in “Remarks on Daniel 
Lagache’s Presentation” (1960) he uses the image of Euler’s circles to make visible all the 
logical ways in which two circles can share a common part.  123
  
 See Jacques-Alain Miller reading of Seminar XI in his Seminar The Last Teaching of Lacan (2005-2006). 122
 Lacan, Jacques. “Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation: “Psychoanalysis and the Personality Structure,” in 123
Ecrits, Op. Cit. pp. 543-574. 
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Then, using this new schema to clarify certain clinical notions, Lacan deduces that in the case of 
anxiety, for example, object a belongs to the field of the Other. In the case of perversion, on the 
contrary, object a belongs to the field of the subject. But it is only in the case of love that the 
topological space where object a is inscribed belongs to neither of the two fields. Object a, in the 
case of love, belongs neither to the subject nor to the Other.  Object a is separated. It is what 124
cannot be known by the subject and what cannot be represented in the field of the Other. It is 
thus a topological space that should be detached from the rest of the theory of the subject. This is 
why object a cannot be integrated with the dialectic of symbolization, and why also object a has 
nothing to do with the Name-of-the-Father and its power of symbolization. Object a is more 
related to the power of the maternal imago and its connection to an unbridled jouissance that 
goes beyond the pleasure principle.  
In Seminar X, object a is not yet a pure product of logic. It does not have only, as it will 
have later, a purely logical consistency, but it still refers to the body and its affects, even though 
object a is already approached in a topological way (thanks to the Euler Circles). In other words, 
object a  is already located  as an “empty” topological place, but it is approached and described 
through what Lacan called “some episodical substances of representation,” i.e., through the 
description of the five forms of object a.  These five forms of the object a, which each in their 125
own way defy the power of representation of the Symbolic, are the reason why Lacan, at the end 
 See Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, “Position of the Unconscious,” 703-722 where Lacan gives the most developed 124
formalization of his clinical insight through the schema of the Euler Circles.  
 See Part IV of Seminar X, “Les cinq formes de l'object a,” 247-391. 125
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of his Seminar, moves beyond the notion of the Name-of-the-Father written in the singular to the 
notion of the Names-of-the-Father written in the plural. This move from the singular to the plural 
is Lacan's way to take into account his new discovery about castration and the Real body, and to 
apply it to his whole conceptual apparatus.  Through this pluralization of the Names-of-the-126
Father Lacan will also end up debasing the notion of the function of the paternal metaphor that 
was at the very core of the Name-of-the-Father's ability to give name to things, as well as to give 
the correct meaning or interpretation to things. Renouncing this function, which was central in 
Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex (and which made of Freud a defender of the figure of the 
father), will be at the origin of Lacan's exclusion from the I.P.A  (International Psychoanalytic 
Association) as well as the launching of Lacan's second teaching—which will start with Seminar 
XI (1964-1965) on the Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, and will end with 
Seminar XX, Encore (1972-1973).   
 It is as if Lacan, as early as 1963, had foreseen the decline of the figure as well as the 
function of the father coming; it is as if he had understood way ahead of his time, that the Name-
of-the-Father as well as the function of the paternal metaphor was nothing but a social 
construction that was about to be exposed as a pure construction by the discourse of gender and 
queer studies, and then left aside as an archaic symptom of a dated form of social bond. While 
the paternal metaphor, in the formalization of the early Lacan, was supposed to give a phallic 
meaning to the opaque Desire-of-the-Mother, its function finds its limits while opening up onto 
an even deeper and non-symbolizable opaqueness, i.e., the opaqueness of jouissance as linked to 
object a. As such, object a is the symbol of the failure of the paternal metaphor and marks the 
 See the last lesson of Seminar X, “Du a aux Noms-du-Père.” 375-391. 126
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limits of the power of the Symbolic itself. It represents, in this sense, the return within Lacan's 
theory of the Real of the drives. Object a, as the object of the drives, is what resists any form of 
symbolization, and what turns the Phallic order and its power into a pure construction, a pure 
“semblance,” as Lacan puts it. Consequently, one can conclude that from the point of view of 
object a, the power dynamic that gender and queer studies focus on does not belong to the field 
of the drives but to the Imaginary field of narcissism, which gives to the ego its Ego Ideal of 
absolute power. (Lacan goes as far as saying that the idea of God is anchored in male 
impotency).   
 Accordingly, the new figure of the father that Lacan will draw from this construction of 
object a will be a figure that is not itself the dupe of the paternal metaphor (in that it does not 
believe that object a can be integrally subsumed within the field of the Imaginary or the 
Symbolic), but that would constantly draw back desire towards its Real and unknowable cause—
object a. As such, the new figure of the father is one that puts the function of object a as cause-
of-desire at the fore and not, so to speak, the relation of object a to jouissance.  To sum up, one 127
could argue that even as early as the departure of his second teaching, Lacan's approach to 
psychoanalysis was already aligned with the goal of the feminist movement, and perhaps even 
more, with the non-normative goal of what will be developed, more than thirty years after, under 
the name of Queer theory.   
 See Seminar X, Lesson “Du Cosmos à l’Unheimlichkeit,” 39-55. 127
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CONCLUSION: JUDITH BUTLER MEETS LACAN 
To conclude this introductory chapter, and emphasize its relevance within the contemporary field 
of feminism and queer theory, I will compare the classical critique of gender normativity by 
queer relational theorists to the one put forth by Lacan through his invention of object a. In order 
to do so, I will use the work of Judith Butler who is without a doubt the most important relational 
theorist as well as the one who is known for having introduced into this field of study what 
Anne-Emmanuelle Berger called, in her last book, a queer turn in feminism.  128
Butler’s Queer Turn in Feminism 
Judith Butler wonders, at the opening of her famous book, Gender Trouble (1990), what does it 
mean to give the feminist movement the goal of promoting, or at least to defend, the category of 
“women”? Such a goal, replies Butler, aims at giving women, within a specific social context, a 
new political representation, and through this representation, new rights. But Butler argues that 
these representations are linked to a certain number of discursive practices that are themselves 
linked to certain uses of language and reason that are creating the very obstacles that have 
plagued the history of the feminist movement. It is, indeed, during the 80s and 90s that the 
feminist movement, through the development of Gender and Queer studies, started to question 
the universal status of the category women, and the dichotomy between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, inasmuch as those categories could not include many minorities that were 
 See, Anne-Emmanuelle Berger, The Queer Turn in Feminism, Identities, Sexualities and the Theatre of Gender, 128
Trans. Catherine Porter, Fordham University Press, 2014.  
!96
looking to be integrated into it.  As a result, Butler argued that the very notion of the subject, as 129
a coherent and stable entity, had to be abandoned if the feminist movement was to extract itself 
from such deadlock.  
The subject, for Butler, is not a transcendental structure but something that is created 
historically by a series of discourses and practices organized at a social level. As such, the 
subject is nothing but the end point of many discursive practices, i.e., a purely social construct. 
Reciprocally, argued Butler in a very Foucauldian way, what is generally located as the outside 
of such a cultural and social construct—the body and the drives—is also nothing but the negative 
fantasy generated by those discursive practices themselves. Furthermore, Butler argued that to 
equate, as Lacan supposedly did in his Seminar XX Encore,  the category of women to such 130
pre-discursive field was nothing but a way to reduce “women” to such a fantasy. Butler writes, 
“Within feminist political practice, a radical rethinking of the ontological construction of identity 
appears to be necessary in order to formulate a representational politics that might revive 
feminism on other ground” (7). 
 It is at that level—at the level of a radical rethinking of the ontological construction of 
identity—that Butler introduces what can be called “a queer turn in feminism,” a turn that has 
also triggered the passage from feminism to post-feminism, which is to say the passage from a 
feminism grounded on a transcendental conception of the subject to a post-feminism that takes as 
 See Annamarie Jagose, “Limits of Identity,” Queer Theory, An Introduction, NY: New York University Press, 129
1996, 58-72
 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XX, On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge (1972-1973), Edit. 130
Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans. Bruce Fink, New York: Norton & Company, 1999. 
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its point of departure the post-structuralist critique of the notion of identity.  It is thus possible 131
to argue that Butler, inspired by post-structuralist thinkers such as Louis Althusser, Jacques 
Derrida or Michel Foucault tried to extract feminism from its historical ground in order to make 
of it an instrument capable of proposing a radical critique of the category of identity as such.  132
This is why Butler ended up producing, with Gender Trouble, a critique that not only concerned 
the feminist movement, but the very definition of identity, and thus of identity politics, regardless 
of the question of sexual orientation per se.  
However, it is important to emphasize that Butler did not accomplish her “queer turn” by 
using psychoanalysis, and even less a Lacanian approach to psychoanalysis. On the contrary, she 
accused Lacan’s early teaching of remaining Phallocentric and even, as Derrida puts it, of 
remaining Pha-logo-centric. And Butler did so, I would argue, by not taking into account the 
shift that Lacan introduced in his teaching through his invention of object a. Butler, indeed, in 
Bodies that Matter (1993),  in the chapter “The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological 133
Imaginary,” argued against the early Lacan (through a double reading of “The Mirror Stage,” and 
“The Interpretation of the Phallus”) that Lacan's interpretation of the Phallus was, in fact, 
nothing more than a reification of a male Imaginary that was based, in turn, on the male anatomy, 
and thus bound to foreclose the possibility of moving concretely beyond the binary oppositions 
between “having the Phallus” (male side of sexuation), and “being the Phallus” (female side of 
 For an interesting Marxist oriented critique of such a move, see Teresa L. Ebert, Ludic Feminism and After, Post-131
Modernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism, University of Michigan Press, 1995. 
 See, in particular, Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire, Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France, New 132
York, Columbia University Press, 2012. 
 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matters: On the Discursive Limits of Sex,  New York: Routledge, 1993. 133
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sexuation) that structures patriarchy.  Butler writes,  134
 This Lacanian trajectory [from “The Mirror Stage” to “The Signification of the Phallus”] 
will be showed to become problematic on (at least) two accounts: (1) the morphological 
scheme which becomes the epistemic condition for the world of objects and others to 
appear is marked as masculine, and, hence, becomes the basis for an anthropocentric and 
androcentric epistemological imperialism (this is one criticism of Lacan offered by Luce 
Irigaray and supplies the compelling reason for her project to articulate a feminine 
Imaginary); and (2) the idealization of the body as a center of control sketched in “The 
Mirror Stage” and rearticulated in Lacan's notion of the Phallus as that which controls 
signification in discourse, in the “Signification of the Phallus.” (1958) 
 Instead of taking this division for granted, Butler argued that Lacan’s early conception of the 
Phallus (and of the Name-of-the-Father) made of it a transcendental structure imposing its 
abstract framework onto bodies that can never fully exemplify the position they are supposed to 
incarnate.   135
 Butler writes, “Although Lacan explicitly denounces the possibility that the phallus is a body part or an 134
imaginary effect that repudiation will be read as constitutive of the very symbolic status he confers on the phallus in 
the course of the later essay. As an idealization of a body part, the phantasmatic figure of the phallus within Lacan's 
essay undergoes a set of contradictions similar to those that unsettle Freud's analysis of erotogenic parts. The 
Lesbian phallus may be said to intervene as an unexpected consequence of the Lacanian scheme, an apparently 
contradictory signifier which, through a critical mimesis, calls into question the ostensibly originating and 
controlling power of the Lacanian phallus, indeed, its installation as the privileged signifier of the symbolic order. 
The move emblematized by the lesbian phallus contests the relationship between the logic of non-contradiction and 
the legislation of a compulsory heterosexuality at the level of the symbolic and bodily morphogenesis.” (Gender 
Trouble, 73) 
 Butler’s critique of Lacan’s teaching is actually very similar to the one addressed to Lacan by Derrida in The 135
Post-Card. I will come back in detail to this critique in Chapter Two.  
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Butler’s Imaginary Notion of Identity  
To move beyond this transcendental structure, Butler proposed to trade the notion of identity for 
the one of performativity. To approach the notion of identity through the one of performativity 
enables Butler to no longer tie this notion to a certain set of fixed poles of imaginary 
identifications, nor to a certain set of Symbolic positions. Identity becomes, on the contrary, the 
expression of an ongoing process of performances that signals the end of the dictate of the 
compulsory binary heterosexual matrix. Identity becomes, once connected to the notion of 
performance, argues Butler, an empty category able to change according to the circumstances in 
which it is taking place.  
Jacques-Alain Miller, commenting on Butler’s notion of identity as performative in his 
Seminar Detached Pieces,  has said: “There is here something like a tipsiness around the 136
questioning of the concept of identity itself, and a substitution, a metaphor in which 
identifications takes over identity” (my translation).  The tipsiness that Miller is pointing at in 137
Butler’s reasoning relates to the fact that Butler, as I will try to show in the coming paragraphs, 
tries to bypass what is fixed and normative in identity by using the very instruments upon which 
the normative dimension of identity is grounded, i.e., the level of imaginary identifications. 
Butler, from a Lacanian point of view, wants to use the very imaginary mechanism of 
identification to break the logic of identification and reach the sphere of singular jouissance. But 
such a move from identification to jouissance is only possible at the condition of making a 
distinction between what Lacan calls “phallic jouissance,” which is related to identification, and 
 Jacques-Alain Miller, Séminaire, L’Orientation Lacanienne [2004-2005], Pièces Détachées, Unpublished 136
Seminar. 
 “Il y a là comme une ivresse de la mise en question même du concept d’identité, et cette substitution, cette 137
métaphore où l’identification vient prendre le dessus par-rapport à l’identité” (Miller, Detached Pieces).
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that has the meaningful structure of fiction and what he calls object a, which designates a 
jouissance that is related to a “jouissance outside meaning.” It is precisely this second form of 
jouissance, and not the broadening of the first kind that works at “undoing gender,” as Butler 
would say.  
When it comes to articulating the question of the identity and the unity of the subject to 
its mode of jouissance, the crux of the matter is not only, according to Lacan, to pluralizing the 
meaning of the Phallus, as Butler suggest in her chapter “The Lesbian Phallus,” but to access the 
level of a jouissance that is outside meaning. For it is only at that condition that the subject can 
access the very core of his/her identity, the one that does not lie, i.e., the core of its object a. In 
other words, if a relational queer thinker like Butler seems to agree with Lacan about the non-
fixed nature of identity, they disagree, nonetheless, about the ways in which such a non-fixed 
identity could be accessed and named. On the one hand, Butler feels that this move is only 
possible on the condition of substituting for the fixed and universal models of identification 
offered to a subject within a patriarchal system, a pluralization of transitional models of 
identification that could be performed by a subject at a certain moment. On the other hand, Lacan 
wants to help the subject to ground his/her identity through a re-appropriation of his (or her) 
“opaque jouissance” coming from object a—and not on any form of imaginary identifications. In 
other words, while most relational queer scholars hope that the construction of a new Imaginary 
(beyond the masculine one) could renew the very notion of identity politics, Lacan, for his part, 
advocates for the crossing of the Imaginary plane and the access to what he called object a. And 
object a, as Dean aptly pointed out, is something that is at the same time the product of the 
Symbolic (as it is the product of the relation of a human being to language) and what stands 
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beyond it, in the realm of the Lacanian Real (as what cannot be reduced to a meaningful 
fiction).   138
A Lacanian Critique of Butler’s Notion of Performativity  
The stakes of what separates Lacan’s from Butler’s approach is the weight given to the 
Imaginary, which is to say the kind of desire that is generally attached to any form of 
identification. Fabian Fajnwaks, in a text called “Lacan et les théories queer: malentendus et 
méconnaissances,”  writes, 139
The Other is being reduced to its cultural and language determinations that permit 
shaping the identity of the subject in terms of gender, while ignoring that this Other also 
incarnates itself in figures that convey a desire to the subject. Lacan gave to this desire 
the mark of a particular interest, which function is to articulate “the incarnation of the law 
within desire.” It is thus as if Butler emptied out this Other, which language and culture 
with its cliches about gender supposes, of its particular desire in regard to the subject. 
Although it is this particularity that enables the subject, in the use that he (or she) makes 
of it in his (or her) fantasmatic construction, to become singular. (my translation, 
29-30)  140
 See Dean, Tim, p. 92.138
 Fabian Fajnwaks, “Lacan et les théories queer : Malentendus et méconnaissance,” in Subversion Lacanienne des 139
théories du genre, Editors, Fabian Fajnwaks & Clothilde Leguil, Paris: Editions Michels, 2015, 19-46.
 The Original French versions goes, “L’Autre se trouve ainsi réduit aux déterminations culturelles et langagières 140
qui permettent de donner corps à l’identité en termes de genre d’un sujet, en ignorant que cet autre-là s’incarne aussi 
dans des figures qui véhiculent un désir à l’égard du sujet. Lacan donnait à ce désir la marque d’un intérêt 
particulier, intérêt qui permet d’articuler l’incarnation de la loi dans le désir. C’est donc comme si Butler vidait cet 
Autre, que le langage et la culture avec ses stéréotypes du genre supposent, de son désir particulier à l’égard du 
sujet, particularité qui permet dans l’équation qu’en fait le sujet dans sa construction fantasmatique, de se 
singulariser” (29-30).
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The problem that needs to be explored is thus the one of the desire of the Other, which is to say 
not only the limitation at an Imaginary level of the available models of identifications, but the 
affective and unconscious weight that is attached to all these imaginary representations. In other 
words, what is needed, from a Lacanian point of view, is not a new “Lesbian Phallus” but an 
understanding of the impact of the desire of the Other on the claim of gender and queer theory.  
Butler herself tried to answer the question when she first elaborated, in the conclusion 
“From parody to politics” of her book Gender Trouble, her theory of subversive parody. 
However, Butler's theory, I would argue, is quite ambivalent as it reveals her misapprehension of 
the problematic of desire, and perhaps even more, as Dean argues too, a complete 
misapprehension of the Lacanian Real and its links to object a. Thinking the problematic of 
desire through the Hegelian framework of the dialectic of the master and slave, Butler actually 
reduces desire to an Imaginary phenomenon (that could be subverted at an Imaginary level) 
while equating, in turn, the Lacanian Real to a pre-discursive notion (that would deprive the 
subject of any form of agency). On the one hand, indeed, Butler argues that a parodic enactment 
of gender norms can provide a good strategy to subvert the pretension of those models to be 
“real” or natural. On the other hand, she seems aware that such parodic strategies can also be the 
expression of a certain despair in front of such models. In other words, it seems to me that 
Butler’s theory of parody is facing a sort of dilemma where parody can either be the expression 
of a subversive laughter, or the expression of a deep despair, 
Parody, by itself, is not subversive, and there must be a way to understand what make 
certain kinds of parodic repetitions effectively disruptive, truly troubling, and which 
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repetitions become domesticated and recirculated as instruments of cultural 
hegemony. A typology of actions would clearly not suffice, for parodic displacement, 
indeed, parodic laughter, depends on the context and reception in which subversive 
confusion can be fostered. What performance will invert the inner/outer distinction 
and compel a radical rethinking of the psychological presupposition of gender 
identity and sexuality? What performance where will compel a reconsideration of the 
place and stability of the masculine and the feminine? And what kind of gender 
performance will enact and reveal the performativity of gender itself in a way that 
destabilizes the naturalized categories of identity and desire?” (189)   
Unfortunately, what could properly ground a “subversive performance,” i.e., a performance that 
would be truly troubling, cannot be of the same order as what it is supposed to ground. 
Otherwise, as Butler is lucidly pointing at, such a performance would run the constant risk of 
being as empty and deprived of meaning as the norms and models that the performance was 
supposed to subvert.  It is as if Butler tried to deconstruct the transcendental subject by 141
reducing it to a succession of false identifications, and then mourned the fact that such 
deconstructed subject—reduced to an imaginary effect—had no place left to ground his/her 
agency. Quite on the contrary, if such a performance were to be grounded in what Lacan called 
object a, then the question of the agency and the “authenticity" of the subject would no longer be 
a problem. The only problem left would be how to gain an access to this mode of jouissance (that 
is generally repressed by the desire of the Other), and how to gain a form of control over it (since 
 I undertake a deeper exploration of this problem in chapter Four, where I confront Lacan and Georges Bataille on 141
the question of the relation of the Real and knowledge. 
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jouissance is always excessive and about to turn into the death drive)?  
This is why one could conclude that for Lacan the very notion of power that so occupies 
Judith Butler does not, in fact, belong to the field of the drives but to the Imaginary field of 
narcissism, since it is narcissism that gives to the ego its illusion of absolute power. 
Consequently, the whole issue of identity for Lacan is, unlike for a Queer relational such as 
Butler, not a question of Imaginary identification nor of Symbolic construction but related to the 
relationship of each subject to its singular mode of jouissance. It is because each subject, for very 
contingent reasons, develops a singular mode of jouissance (as a Real) that such a thing as a 
queer subject exists for Lacan. But what is queer in the Lacanian subject, contrary to what is 
generally being said, should not be reduced to the Imaginary body of the “Mirror stage” nor to 
the Symbolic structures of language but precisely conceived as what is Real, and thus 
disconnected from these registers. And it is precisely this new conception of jouissance as Real 
that Lacan developed during the second half of his “Return to Freud,” and that is generally 
known as his “structuralist period.” 
However, as the next chapter demonstrates, this period of Lacan’s teaching, far from 
being reducible to the critique of structuralism put forth by Derrida and Foucault, was actually 
laying the foundation of a theory of the subject that is, at the same time, the product of the most 
famous post-structuralist critique of the humanist subject, but also a unique form of post-
structuralism that remains to be known and used by gender and queer scholars.  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CHAPTER TWO: THE PURLOINED LACAN 
Or How Derrida Ousted Lacan During the 1966 John Hopkins Conference 
“Pre-structuralism is before the signifier, and post-
structuralism, the good one, that is to say the only 
one, Lacan’s, is beyond the signifier: it is the 
consideration of the beyond of the signifier.  
The only poststructuralism is that of the object, that 
which leads us “beyond the signifier,” to a new 
form, hitherto unpublished, of objective deficiency.” 
Jacques-Alain Miller 
“What I have inscribed, with the help of letters, of 
the formations of the unconscious to recuperate 
them from that of which Freud formulates them, as 
being what they are, effects of the signifier, does not 
authorize us to make of the letter a signifier, nor to 
affect for it, which is more, a primacy in regard to 
the signifier.”  
Jacques Derrida 
Lacan in the Midst of the Post-Structuralist Controversy 
It was during the famous conference organized by René Girard at the John Hopkins University, 
entitled The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: 
Symposium on the Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (1966),  that the notion of 142
post-structuralism emerged for the very first time. The word post-structuralism was invented, as 
 See, “Preface,” in The Structuralist Controversy. Ed. by Macksey, Richard and Eugenio Donato, Baltimore, The 142
John Hopkins University Press, 1970. Print.
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François Cusset suggests in French Theory (2008), in haste.  Something like an event or a 143
trauma had happened to the notion of structuralism during the Baltimore conference and had to 
be registered, and thus to be named. Post-structuralism it was. Simple. Vague. Delimited neither 
by a content nor by a time. Post as what comes after, but nothing else. No indication about the 
link between the before and the after, nor a suggestion about a new direction. A simple and vague 
after. In other words, while the Baltimore conference had been organized at first with the 
intention of helping American scholars (trained in different conceptual frameworks such as 
archetypal, gestaltist, contextualist, functionalist, etc.) to understand better the new language of 
criticism that was used by French scholars (like Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Lacan, Foucault or 
Althusser, etc.), it ended up becoming the landmark of the end of structuralism as well as the 
date of birth of its American afterlife under the name of post-structuralism. 
The controversy arose from the fact that most French thinkers who had been invited to 
represent “structuralism” during the conference did not feel so attached to the term, nor to a so-
called unified structuralist theory.  Macksey and Denato, in the introduction to their 1970 book 144
on the conference, wrote, “With the exception of Lévi-Strauss, all those whose names have come 
to be associated with structural theory—Foucault, Lacan, Derrida—, have felt obliged 
programmatically to take their distance with relation to the term” (ix). To make sense of this 
intellectual turnaround, one has to go back, first, to what was happening at that time in the Ecole 
 See Cusset, François. French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life 143
of the United States. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Print.  
 Far from being “structuralist,” what united all these authors, according to Gilles Deleuze in “The New 144
Archivist,” Critiques (the only one who declined Girard’s invitation), was something much vaguer and, more 
importantly, something much more “subversive,” something like “A cold and concerted destruction of the subject, a 
lively distaste for notions of origin, of lost origin, of recovered origin, a dismantling of unifying pseudo-synthesis of 
consciousness, a denunciation of all the mystifications of history performed in the name of progress, consciousness, 
and of the future of reason” (17).
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Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris, where all the thinkers invited—Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, 
Barthes & co.—were all dealing with Althusser’s philosophical agenda, at the time the “head” of 
the ENS. To put it simply, Althusser’s ambition was to rethink Marxism by using structuralism as 
his theoretical framework. As such, Althusser emphasized, on the one hand, the importance of 
the notion of structure as a unilateral causal power over the existentialist approach of the subject 
that was still prevailing at that time. But on the other hand, Althusser forged, with the help of 
Lacan, a new conception of the subject that was, at the same time, the effect of the structure, and 
the point of departure of its potential subversion. As a consequence of this double ambition, an 
intense polemic among Althusser’s students and colleagues started around the year 1964, and 
gave birth to a Journal called Les Cahiers pour l’Analyse.   145
The stakes of the polemic revolved, first, around the status that needed to be given to the 
use of mathematical models in “Structuralism” and, second, around the relationship that the old 
notion of the subject was entertaining with the structure that was supposed to rule it. What was in 
question was the capacity of science to penetrate the imaginary or ideological illusion that 
governs the human mind and, reciprocally, the capacity of the human mind to be shaped by 
external structures. While, for a humanist philosopher like Sartre, what was needed was the 
subject’s clarity of consciousness, for the younger generation of anti-humanist philosophers of 
 For a very good history of this polemic see, Hallward, Peter. “Introduction: Theoretical Training,” in Concept 145
and Form, Volume 1, Selections from THE CAHIERS POUR L’ANALYSE, Ed. by Peter Hallward and Knox Peden. 
New York: Verso, 2012. pp. 1-55. Halward writes, “The Cahiers pour l'Analyse was a journal edited by a small 
group of philosophy students at the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) in Paris. Ten issues of the journal appeared 
between 1966 and 1969, arguably the most fertile and productive years in French philosophy during the whole of the 
twentieth century. The Cahiers published major articles by many of the most significant thinkers of the period, 
including Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, and Jacques Lacan, and many of the 
young ENS students and graduates involved in the production of the journal (notably Jacques-Alain Miller, 
JeanClaude Milner, Alain Badiou, Francois Regnault, Yves Duroux and Jacques Bouveresse) were soon to become 
major figures in French intellectual life” (Introduction, 1). 
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the ENS, what was needed was a theory of the subject that could acknowledge the primacy of 
science while enabling the inclusion, within science, of the subjective dimension that science 
was supposed to exclude. As Foucault put it in an interview with Madeleine Chapsale, the 
theoretical ambition of the moment was “to liberate ourselves definitively from humanism, and 
to embrace our own passion, the passion of the concept” (514).   
To Embrace the Passion of the Concept as an Anti-Humanist 
To embrace the passion of concept as an anti-humanist while trying to make room for the subject 
is far from being an easy task. It is almost an impossible task since the concept excludes, by 
definition, the notion of the subject. While a concept always remains identical to itself, a subject 
is something that never coincides with itself. A subject is an “object” that has no stable 
relationship to itself since its identity is still in progress. As such, in between the concept and the 
subject there is an unavoidable gap. And it is precisely this gap, according to Derrida, that 
structuralism has been denying since its inception. Derrida, in the paper that he presented during 
the Baltimore conference pointed in Saussure’s model to all the metaphysical propositions 
implicit in much of his linguistic thinking, making of them the correlate of a humanist subject 
implying certain concepts of presence and identity. In the name of Nietzsche, Freud and 
Heidegger, Derrida accused Saussure, and thus all the other “structuralists,” despite their claim 
of being no longer humanist, of perpetuating the legacy of the philosophy of Modernity and its 
naive definition of the humanist subject. To overcome this perpetuation, Derrida proposed to 
invent a new science, the science Of Grammatology; a science that soon became, at least in the 
United-States, the point of departure of a movement of deconstruction of most humanist 
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discourses that culminated in the creation of the post-colonial studies.   
 In agreement with Derrida’s critique of the humanist subject, but opposed to his 
conception of Granmatology, Lacan proposed, during the same conference, in his presentation 
“Of Structure as an Immixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to any Subject Whatever,” to push 
structuralism further—through the use of new mathematical concepts—in order to make room 
for what Lacan called, in his presentation published in The Structuralist Controvery, “the subject 
of jouissance.” The subject of jouissance is the name that Lacan gave, at that time, to the 
affective part of the subject of the unconscious, since, as Miller aptly puts it, Lacan’s subject of 
the unconscious, for its part, “has no body.”  The subject of jouissance, to put it differently, is 146
what happens to the subject of the unconscious once it is connected to object a.  It is, in sum, 147
the speaking body, the affective result of the contingent and traumatic impact of an “immixing of 
an Otherness” onto a body that speaks. Lacan said,  
It is, of course, absolutely essential to understand how the symbolic order can enter inside 
the vécu, lived experience, of mental life, but I cannot put forth tonight such an 
explanation. Consider, however, that which is at the same time the least known and the 
most certain fact about this mythical subject which is the sensible phase of the living 
being: this fathomless thing capable of experiencing something between birth and death, 
capable of covering the whole spectrum of pain and pleasure in a word, what in French 
we call the sujet de la Jouissance. (194) 
 Miller, Jacques-Alain. The Speaking Being. Presentation given in April 2016, at the XI congress of the WAP, in 146
Rio, Brazil.
 For a fuller definition of object a, see Chapter One, III, “Queer Theory Meets Lacan.” 147
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What is at stake for Lacan is thus not the deconstructive analysis of the structure itself, but the 
ways in which this structure is impacting a body and, reciprocally, how this impacted body 
interprets at an affective level the impact of the structure. In other words, what is at stake is not 
only a theoretical question but also a question that has to do with what is the most opposed to 
any concept, i.e., the contingent affects that traverse a body and that Lacan named, during the 
Baltimore conference, the subject of jouissance.  
Unfortunately, Lacan’s position, compared to Derrida or Foucault’s positions, never 
attracted much attention in the United-States. Quite the contrary, Lacan was reduced by most 
American Feminist, Gender and Queer Scholars, as we have seen in Chapter One, to his 
structuralist definition of the subject of the unconscious, and was thus considered less critical and 
cutting edge than Derrida’s deconstructive Grammatology or Foucault genealogical analysis of 
discourse of power.  
In this chapter, I challenge this idea by arguing that Lacan’s position was, from the 
beginning and all the more after the elaboration of object a, in agreement with the critical goal of 
post-structuralism, as well as ahead of it when it comes to understanding the relationships 
between a body that speaks, and discourses of power that are supposed to shape it. To do so, I 
start by giving a definition to the word structuralism by putting the term in contraposition with 
the history of Grammar and Linguistics, and then in contraposition to the broader field of the 
Human Sciences. Second, I analyze the way in which structuralism became enmeshed with 
Marxism and Freudianism under the patronage of Louis Althusser, and how this new form of 
structuralism became for a whole new generation of anti-humanist philosophers the starting point 
!116
of a quarrel over the notion of science and its relation to the old notion of the subject. Third, I 
present Derrida’s critical position in the debate before confronting it with the one defended by 
Lacan. Then, I put in dialogue the two thinkers through their different reading of Poe’s novella 
The Purloined Letter. Finally, I end the chapter with a reading of Lituraterre (1975), a text in 
which Lacan connects the notion of the subject of jouissance to his late teaching while answering 
Derrida’s critique of his early definition of the subject of the unconscious.    148
I. STRUCTURALISM AND THE DEATH OF THE HUMANIST SUBJECT 
What does the term “structuralism” mean? Francois Whal raises the question in his introduction 
to the collective book Qu’est-ce que le structuralisme ? published in France a year after the 
Baltimore’s conference.  Whal writes, “Let's push the question to the point of becoming 149
paradoxical: does structuralism exists? The answer used to be self-evident; today, one may like to 
be more cautious with his answer” (my translation).  The previous answer to the question “what 150
is structuralism?” the one that was supposed to be so self-evident prior to the conference, was the 
one forged by Ferdinand de Saussure in his Cours de Linguistique Générale (1913), and then the 
one that Lévi-Strauss gave to it in his famous collection of essays Structural Anthropology 
 Lacan, Jacques. “Lituraterre,” in Autres Ecrits, pp. 11-22. For a non-official English Translation, see Jack W. 148
Stone, http://web.missouri.edu/~stonej/Lituraterre.pdf
 See, Qu’est-ce que le structuralisme ? Ducrot, Oswald, Moustafa Safouan, Dan Sperber, Francois Whal, Paris: 149
Edition du Seuil, 1968.
 “Poussons notre question jusqu’au paradoxe; le structuralisme existe-t-il? La réponse paraissait naguère 150
évidente ; aujourd’hui, il ne nous déplait pas de faire passer notre réponse par un temps de prudence.” (8)
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(1958).  A brief survey of these two definitions, as well as their main implications in the field 151
of linguistic and human sciences will thus be helpful to understand what later came to pose a 
problem in “structuralism.” 
The Notion of Structure in Grammar 
 The idea that language is structured is as old as the creation of the first Grammar by the ancient 
Greeks.  Aristotle, for example, in his Organon I & II defines the sounds produced by the 152
human voice as symbols of the soul, words as the written symbols of the symbols emitted by the 
voice, and Grammar as the system of conventions that regulates the usage and the articulations of 
those symbols. Grammar is a set of structural rules governing the composition of phrases 
(subject, verb, complement), clauses (first, second, third, etc.), and words in a given language. 
These rules, in turn, correspond to the cognitive information underlying what is expressed in 
language. In other words, for a grammarian, language is nothing but a tool that represents 
thought, and grammar rules the attempt to make sure that language is used properly. Within this 
perspective, the idea of structure is linked, first, to the idea of language as a medium that 
represents something else. Second, it implies the idea that there exists a correspondence between 
things in the world and the “thoughts” expressed in language. Aristotle writes, “Just as all men 
have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental 
 See, Saussure, Ferdinand , Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, Jean-Didier Urbain, and Albert Riedlinger. Cours De 151
Linguistique Générale. Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 2016. Print. And see, Lévi-Strauss. Structural 
Anthropology, Translated by Jacobson Claire and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, New York: Anchor Book, Garden City, 
1967.
 See, for example, Aristotle. Categories de l’interpretation, Organon I & II, Trans. by J. Tricot, Paris: Edition 152
Vrin, 2004. 
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experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of 
which our experiences are the images” (On Interpretation, 1, 16a). This fundamental idea—that 
“mental experiences are the same for all” is what will support all the theorization on language 
and Grammar up until Saussure’s invention of linguistics. It is, to give but one example, the idea 
that supports the General grammar published by the Academy of Port Royal in 1660.  Largely 153
inspired by Descartes’s idea about the existence of a “mathesis universalis” present in nature, 
these authors tried to prove that grammar was universal inasmuch as it was reducible to a set of 
structures that were themselves the product of universal mental processes.   154
Wilhelm von Humboldt picked up the idea two centuries later in a conference called 
“Uber das entstehen des grammatishen Formen and ihren Einfluss aud die Ideen” (1822) “On the 
Origin of Grammatical Forms and their Influence on the Development of Ideas,” and argued that 
language was a ruled-based system thanks to which a pre-existing thought could represent 
itself.   In this classical framework, the construction of a sentence imitates the construction of 155
thought, which itself is supposed to represent accurately the world. There is, to put it simply, the 
idea of a correspondence between the structures of thought and the structures of the world, and 
these structures are themselves reflected in the structure of language. If a sentence is always 
 Arnauld, Antoine & Claude Lancelot. General and Rational Grammar: The Port Royal Grammar. Trans. by 153
Rieux Jacques & Bernard E. Rollin, The Hague: Mouton, 1975. 
 The concept of mathesis universalis was mentioned by Descartes in the rule IV of his Regulae ad directionem 154
ingenii (Rules for the Direction of the Mind) as the ideal way one could articulate together the formal and logical 
models developed by mathematics, and the ambition of experimental science to develop a knowledge about Nature. 
Descartes writes, anticipating in many ways Lévi-Strauss’ definition of structuralism, “There must be a certain 
general science which explains everything which can be asked about order and measure, and which is concerned 
with no particular subject matter, and that this very thing is called pure mathematic [mathesis universalis] (161). See, 
Descartes, René. “Rules for the Direction of the Mind,” in Descartes, Philosophical Essays, Translation by For more 
details on this idea, see Chomsky, Noam. Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rational Thought, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009.  
 See Humboldt (Von), Wilhelm. Sprachphilisophischen Werke, Berlin: Steinthal, 1833, 61-101.155
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composed of, at least, a subject, a verb and a complement, it is inasmuch as the world itself is 
supposed to be made of substances linked to qualities by a copula (since the verb to be represents 
the fundamentally affirmative structure of all the other verbs). Wittgenstein, a century after 
Humboldt, tried to use this idea to redefine in his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1922) the 
conditions under which an agreement between thoughts (expressed in language) and the world 
(as a totality of facts) was possible.  Wittgenstein created logical tools such as “truth tables” 156
and “truth conditions” to formalize his ideas, and these tools became, soon after, the foundation 
of modern semantics.   157
However, when one adopts such a point of view on language, what becomes difficult is to 
account for the multiple grammar structures that exist in different languages and, reciprocally, 
what make disciplines like “Philology” or “Comparative Grammar” necessary. For a linguist and 
philologist like Humboldt, for example, the simplest way to resolve this problem was to imagine 
that differences between languages were the result of “local practices” of speech, i.e. the result of 
the fact that people are using language mostly to communicate, and not to represent ideas. In 
other words, for Humboldt, it is because people speak to communicate and not to express clear 
ideas that the “primitive” and “universal” structure of thought, carried by a pure and primitive 
grammar, slowly fade from the surface, and that the multiplicity of languages was born. 
However, for comparatist such as the French Encyclopedists of the XVIIIth century, the problem 
 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher, specialist in logic, philosophy of 156
mathematics, and philosophy of language. He worked under the supervision of Bertrand Russell. He is famous for 
having completely changed his mind during his lifetime about language, and what he considered to be the essence of 
it. See, for the “first” Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Translated by Pears David & 
McGuiness Brian, New York: Routledge, 1961. 
 Semantics is the linguistic and philosophical study of meaning. It is, as the “first” Wittgenstein defined it, a 157
search for the correct “denotation” of a given word, since language, in semantics, is supposed to represent the world, 
which is to say the “totality of facts, and not of things” (Tractatus, 1.2).
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led them to argue that the structure of the French language was supposed to be closer to the 
original structure of thought than the German, since the German grammar was supposed to be 
further removed form a simple description of the world than French! This incapacity of the 
Grammarian approach to explain the diversity of language is, without a doubt, what triggered a 
revolution in the field of language; a revolution carried by Ferdinand de Saussure in his famous 
Cours de linguistique générale (1916).   158
Saussure’s Notion of Structure: The Linguistic Turn  
To go beyond the correspondence hypothesis and the kind of metaphysical conception about the 
relations between the structure of language and the structures of the world that it implies, 
Saussure took a completely different point of departure from his predecessors. Contrary to them, 
Saussure considered language as a medium of communication and not as the written form of a 
mental process. This new point of departure, then, forced him to give a new definition to the 
most basic unit of language—the word—and then to the relations that unite these basic elements 
of language to one another in order to create meaning. If one does not take as its point of 
departure written language but speech, the task of delimiting what constitutes the simplest unit of 
language becomes, in fact, more difficult. Far from being able to find these units already formed 
and delimited within language, as a collection of words corresponding to a collection of ideas, 
Saussure thought that the proper task of a linguist was actually to find out how these units could 
be isolated during an act of speech. However, in order to find them, argued Saussure, the linguist 
has to presuppose the existence, in language, of a structure that forms a system. If language is 
 Saussure (de), Ferdinand, Cours de linguistique générale, Paris: Edition Scientifique Payot, 1985. 158
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first a continuous flow of speech in which it is impossible to establish non-arbitrary cuts, and if 
ideas, in turn, are in the same state of confusion and continuity, how could language still perform 
its function if it were not for a structure that gives to this mess some coherence and order? It is to 
give an answer to this question that Saussure suggested that to find such a structure, one has to 
focus on the way in which the two dimensions of langue—its materiality and its meaning—are 
interconnected to one another. 
For Saussure, this connection is comparable to the one that happens between water and 
air, which by themselves are both continuous even though they produce at their edges isolated 
elements. Likewise, the encounter between the realm of thought and the one of sounds is what 
produces, for Saussure, the cuts in language. It is inasmuch as someone “understands” a 
statement and is capable of anticipating its global meaning that this person is capable, in turn, of 
introducing the right cuts in the sounds that form a sentence. In other words, the process of 
cutting to isolate words is already the result of a movement of understanding, which is itself the 
result of a prior cutting. What is thus essential, for Saussure, is to understand how language 
works when it is actually spoken, and when its process of signification happens in a linear 
temporality (diachronically). Ideally, one should be able to identify, within the seamless 
materiality of sounds, all the correct linguistic elements that “correspond” to the thought 
expressed in language. Saussure calls these linguistic elements, made of sounds, “signifiers,” and 
he calls the most basic element of meaning attached to them “signified.” The study of the 
signifier is related to phonology, and the one of the signified to semantics (in a classical context) 
or pragmatics. Saussure famously represented them in the form of a mathematical schema where 
the signifier, marked S, is placed under the signified, marked s: s/S. Moreover, Saussure called 
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the unity of the signifier and the signified the sign, and language in general the synchronic or 
structural totality of all the signs that compose a given language. However, to re-define the 
smallest linguistic unit the signifier, and the semantic unit, the signified, leaves one problem 
ahead. Indeed, since the meaning of a sentence is always hinging on the last word pronounced, 
how could someone isolate the correct signifier before the end of the sentence? This 
phenomenon is what makes it impossible, strictly speaking, to be sure that the correct linguistic 
element has been isolated with its correct signified, and thus that the correct sign has been 
understood, if there is not, at some point, an element that puts an end to this virtually endless 
process.  (it is thanks to this phenomenon that Lacan will forge his concepts of lalangue.) 159
To extract oneself from this difficulty, one has to abandon the classical idea about what 
constitutes the identity of a linguistic element, as well as the identity of a thought or an idea.  160
The identity of a signifier, for Saussure, is not like the one of a word, resting on a direct 
correspondence with an idea. It is thus not what one calls generally a material identity. On the 
contrary, a signifier acquires its identity in relation to the others that are directly next to it in the 
sentence, or similar to it in the system of language. In other words, signifiers, unlike words, do 
not have a stable identity, which means, an identity that would be independent and absolute. 
Signifiers, for Saussure, have a relational identity since they are always the result of a system of 
differences, of small variations between other signifiers (like the signifier “de” in the series of 
 I will come back to this question in the third part of this chapter, when I will explain Lacan’a notion of the 159
quilting point, as he developed it in his Seminar III, On Psychosis. 
 Saussure wrote, in a preparatory manuscript for his course, cited by R. Godel in his commentary of Saussure’s 160
Course: “Il est vraisemblable qu’en allant au fond des choses, on s’aperçoit dans ce domaine, comme dans le 
domaine parent de la langue, que toutes les incongruités de la pensée proviennent d’une insuffisante réflexion sur ce 
qu’est l’identité ou le caractère de l’identité, lorsqu’il s’agit d’un être inexistant comme le mot ou la personne 
mythique, ou une lettre de l’alphabet, qui ne sont que différente forme du SIGNE au sens philosophique.” See 
Godel, Robert. Les sources manuscrites du « cours de linguistique générale, Genève: Droz, 1957, p. 136. 
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words deconstruction, demolition, debasement, etc.). Likewise, the signified, for Saussure, is not 
comparable to a signification that would subsist as a pure thought outside of the network of 
signifiers that have circumscribed it. Unlike meaning, the signified, for Saussure, is always the 
result of a fragile and localized construction that is comparable to the one of the signifier. There 
is thus no absolute signified, but only moments of agreement between a signifier and a signified, 
which produce, together, a sign. In Saussure's conception of language, words are thus not 
acoustic images representing abstract and well-defined ideas, or things localizable in the world, 
but the precarious result of a cutting that is itself the result of a very precarious process of 
understanding. 
However, when the relational identity of a signifier is attached to the relational identity of 
a signified, it finally forms a sign, which constitutes, one may say, Saussure’s way to return to a 
more classical approach to identity. Indeed, by describing the functioning of language as the 
functioning of a system made up of several elements (signifiers) that generates meaning 
exclusively through the relationship of one signifier to another (signified), Saussure did not 
destroy the concept of identity as such, and thus the concept of the subject of speech that 
supported it, but he gave to it a new scientific status. This status consisted in introducing new 
mathematical models to deal with the construction of the sign and of meaning, and thus of the 
notion of identity, at the strict level of speech. And it is this renewed approach to the identity of 
the sign, through the detour of mathematical models that ended up transforming one of the oldest 
Sciences of Man, namely Rhetoric, into a scientific discipline which soon became a scientific 
model for all the other Sciences of Man.   
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 Lévi-Strauss’ Notion of Structure: The Anthropological Turn 
 The most important thinker who found a direct source of inspiration in Saussure’s method was 
Claude Lévi-Strauss. It is thanks to him, indeed, that Saussure’s method showed how powerful it 
could become when applied to analyzing complex anthropological objects such as, for example, 
the structure of kinship.  In The Elementary Forms of Kinship (1949), Lévi-Strauss did not use, 161
however, Saussure’s linguistic models to explain the functioning of these basic social structures 
but, instead, the concept of the Klein four-group invented by the mathematician Felix Klein.  In 162
other words, what Lévi-Strauss did was not exactly applying linguistic concepts developed by 
Saussure to his own field, but experimenting in the field of anthropology in the same way 
Saussure did in the field of linguistics. Neville Dyson-Hudson alluded to this problem at the 
beginning of his presentation “Structure and Infrastructure in Primitive Society: Lévi-Strauss and 
Radcliffe-Brown,” when he said, for instance, that “anthropology has today a wider audience 
than ever before because of Lévi-Strauss’ writings; yet those writings have drawn greater 
enthusiasm from outsiders than from anthropologists and have so far had greater impact on other 
fields than on his own” (219).  
Like Saussure, who started by discarding the classical idea according to which language 
was just a representation of thought, Lévi-Strauss started his own investigation by discarding the 
dominant explanation of the structure of kinship, namely the functionalist hypothesis, rebaptized 
for the occasion by Lévi-Strauss as “the naturalist fallacy.” In the Argonauts of the Western 
Pacific (1922) Bronislaw Malinowski suggested that every social practice could be explained by 
 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. 161
 Christian Felix Klein (1849 – 1925) was a German mathematician. He is mostly famous for having invented the 162
notion of group theory, and for having worked intensively on complex analysis and non-Euclidean geometry. 
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its ability to satisfy basic biological needs.  Likewise, Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown 163
argued, although in a slightly different manner than Malinowski that all the social practices were 
actually the result of a natural process of coadaptation without which social interaction would be 
left in a state of continuous chaos.  In other words, it is the idea of function that was supposed 164
to explain the existence of social structure, up to the “structuralist” intervention of Lévi-Strauss. 
To put it otherwise, human society as a whole was conceived as an organism, and each social 
phenomenon was associated with a natural function. This is why, for Lévi-Strauss, all these 
explanations were nothing but “naturalistic fallacy” since to attribute a function to an object or a 
phenomenon always implies to submit it to a form of teleological mode of thinking, and thus to 
submit it to a false natural development. 
To oppose this “naturalistic fallacy,” Lévi-Strauss proposed, in the chapter XV of his 
Structural Anthropology (1958), a structuralist definition of the notion of “social structure.” In it, 
he makes clear that the notion of structure, in anthropology just as in Saussurian linguistics, is 
nothing but the attempt to approach, using mathematical models, the “invisible” and immaterial 
structures that the notion of function were hiding so far. Lévi-Strauss writes, “the term ‘social 
structure’ has nothing to do with empirical reality, but with models which are built up after 
it.” (271) In other words, to approach the social as a structuralist is to approach it beyond its 
empirical reality, just like for Saussure, to approach scientifically language was to approach it 
beyond its reduction to a materialization of thought. To sum it up, structuralism was for Lévi 
 Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Waveland Press, 1984. 163
 Radcliffe-Brown, Reginald & Evan Evans-Pritchard, Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and 164
Addresses. New York: Free Press, 1965. 
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Strauss a method of analyzing and grouping data beyond their immediate meaning, rather than a 
new way to study specific interactions or particular social phenomenon.  
“Structuralism” after Lévi-Strauss was thus nothing but a method to analyze any kind of 
social object that offers a systematic or structural character. By systematic or structural character, 
Lévi-Strauss means any ensemble of elements articulated to one another in such a way that the 
modification of one element entails the topological modification of all the others.  This 165
systematic character, already crucial for Saussure, is what gave Lévi-Strauss the possibility of 
forming, from any given structure, a series of transformations that keep expressing the same type 
of order throughout its multiple deformations.  It is also these series of transformations, once 166
established, that can serve as a predictive model regarding the changes affecting all the elements 
of the structure once one is moving.  To summarize Lévi-Strauss’ definition of the term “social 167
structure,” and by implication, of the term structuralism, one could say that structuralism is the 
name of the attempt to use mathematical models to study and understand social phenomena 
beyond any naturalistic intuition.   
More than a unique approach or methodology, what the term structuralism referred to, 
prior to the Baltimore conference, was thus something like a shared hope. The hope was that 
thanks to Saussure’s scientific approach to language, and Lévi-Strauss’ effort to extend 
Saussure’s method to other objects, the old and mostly metaphysical “Sciences of Man” could 
 Lévi-Strauss writes, “First, the structure exhibits the characteristic of a system. It is made up of several elements, 165
none of which can undergo a change without affecting changes in all the other elements” (271).
 Lévi-Strauss writes, “Second, for any given model there should be a possibility of ordering a series of 166
transformations resulting in a group of models of the same type” (272).
 Lévi-Strauss writes, “Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will react if one of its 167
elements are submitted to certain modifications” (272).
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finally achieve a stage of “real” scientificity and a unified science of signs could emerge. In other 
words, one could say that structuralism was the name of the idea according to which any human 
phenomenon, inasmuch as it involves the use of language, was potentially analyzable in the same 
scientific manner as the one practiced by Saussure. To illustrate this point, one could mention, 
here, the case of Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who “revolutionized” the field of 
classical studies by applying linguistic models to the study of ancient Greece.  But it is without 168
a doubt Roland Barthes who gave to the “structuralist” dream its best expression. It is he who 
described in his inaugural lecture at the College de France on Semiology, what such a science 
could be.  In his presentation “To Write: an intransitive Verb?” during the Baltimore’s 169
conference, Barthes proposed a description of the kind of imperialist position that linguistics 
came to occupy in the French intellectual world of the 60s. He writes,  
We see culture more and more as a general system of symbols, governed by the same 
operations. There is unity in this symbolic field: culture in all its aspects, is a language. 
Therefore, it is possible today to anticipate the creation of a single, unified science of 
culture, which will depend on diverse disciplines, all devoted to analyzing, on different 
levels of description, culture as language. (136) 
One can legitimately wonder, however, faced with Barthes’ dream, if the kind of systematic 
structure that “structuralism” presupposes in any social phenomenon is actually present in 
 Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914-2007) developed a structuralist approach of Greek mythology, tragedy and society. 168
See, in particular, Vernant, Jean-Pierre. Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs: Etude de psychologie historique, Paris, La 
Découverte, 2005.  
 See, Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology, Trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith, NY: Hill and Wang, 169
2009.
!128
culture, or if it is simply superimposed onto it. In other words, one can wonder wether the 
“unified science of culture” that Barthes talks about is but a convenient hypothesis to organize at 
a supposedly neutral and scientific level what would otherwise present itself, strictly speaking, as 
the pure expression of a certain state of power, or a particular subject, contingently impacted by a 
given culture.  
  
II. STRUCTURALISM MEETS MARXISM & PSYCHOANALYSIS 
For the Marxist philosopher and sociologist Lucien Goldmann, present as a keynote speaker at 
the Baltimore conference, the problem with structuralism was not so much a problem of 
choosing between linguistic models, and more complex and elaborated mathematical models, but 
an ideological problem.  For Goldmann, the problem with structuralism was, primarily, one of 170
disavowal of subjectivity and history. Structuralism was guilty, for Goldmann, of reducing 
“Man” to an animal that speaks, while “Man” does not speak in a void but in a historical context 
and through its body. Goldmann said, during the discussion of Barthes’ paper, “For me, what is 
interesting about this scientific perspective is to see what is ideological about it. The sociologist 
must analyze this current of thought which tries to eliminate the psychological and sociological 
subject, to see if it isn’t a way for a collective subject to view the status of man in terms of a 
certain ideology.” (148) 
 Lucien Goldman (1913-1970) was a French philosopher and sociologist. Born in Romania, of Jewish parents, 170
Goldman remained famous for his critique of the structural Marxist movement led, at that time, by Althusser. See, 
Goldman, Lucien. Sciences humaines et philosophie. Suivi de Structuralisme génétique et création littéraire. Paris: 
Gonthier, 1966.  
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Althusser’s Notion of Structure: The Marxist Turn 
The word ideology, of course, was a very important one in 1966. To explain its importance, and 
the role that it came to play in “the structuralist controversy,” it is useful to evoke here the figure 
of Louis Althusser. During the 60s Althusser was a very influential philosopher for whom the 
notion of ideology was of crucial importance to understand the concept of alienation and “false 
consciousness” in Marx’s Capital.  Althusser was also the one ruling over the prestigious 171
Parisian institution of the Ecole Normale Supérieure. In this context, Althusser organized, 
between 1961 and 1964 a series of three Seminars in which he proposed to study The Young 
Marx (1961-1962), The Origin of Structuralism (1962-1963), and finally The Relations Between 
Lacan and Psychoanalysis (1963-1964), a series of Seminars that lead to the publication of 
Althusser’s famous book, co-authored with Etienne Balibar, Lire le Capital (1965).  
The reason why Althusser had organized all these conferences was quite ambitious. 
Althusser wanted to change the intellectual climate of the time, a climate still dominated by 
various combinations of phenomenology and existentialism, and thus by an emphasis on the 
‘concrete’ or lived dimension of experience. For intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault, all the Human Sciences were, at best, the servant of 
metaphysical or ethical values, and not the contrary. As such, the Human Sciences were not 
proper candidates to become real sciences.  On the contrary, for philosophers like Sartre and 172
 See Althusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar. Reading the Capital, Paris, Librairie Francoise Maspero, 1968. 171
Althusser writes, “The concept of ‘men’ thus constitutes a real point where the utterance slips away towards the 
regions of philosophical commonplace ideology. The task of epistemology here is to stop the utterance slipping 
away by fixing the meaning of the concept.” (Introduction, Part III, The Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism). 
See also, for a definition of the word ideology itself, Althusser, Louis. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. 
Translated by Ben Brewster, New York: Monthly Review, 2001.
 See Foucault, Michel. Les mots et les choses. In this book, Foucault writes the history of the epistemology of the 172
Western Social Sciences, which he calls the ethnology of Western culture. 
!130
Merleau-Ponty, what was at stake in the wake of the Second World War and the rapid 
development of imperialism was, as Merleau-Ponty had it in Humanism and Terror (1947), “the 
realization of Man,” i.e., a return to humanist values, and not a turn towards a scientific approach 
of social and cultural phenomenon.  For Althusser, on the contrary, the problem with the 173
Human Sciences was the one of their scientific status. Althusser denounced, in a conference 
called “Philosophy and the Human Sciences,” the ideological alliance that was still prevailing, in 
1964 in France between a certain kind of classical philosophy, supporting the idea of a self-
centered subject, and the development of Social Sciences such as psychology, sociology or 
education.  For Althusser most of the Human Sciences of his time were still techniques for 174
gaining social control over individuals and not yet proper sciences.   175
In contrast, Althusser wanted to forge a new approach to philosophy that could help the 
Human Sciences to become scientific. He argued in favor of a philosophy that would be based 
upon the rejection of all the ideological components generally attached to philosophy, i.e., 
“positivism,” “empiricism,” “psychologism,” and “pragmatism.” For Althusser, it was a question 
of raising philosophy to the level of a theoretical philosophy (in opposition to all the other 
ideological philosophies), in order to assign to philosophy itself a new task: the task of reflecting 
 See Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Humanism and Terror (1945), Trans. John O’Neill, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 173
101-102. 
 During that time, in France, it is, most definitely, the existentialist philosophy of Sartre, with its transcendental 174
subject and its metaphysical conception of freedom, and the one of Merleau-Ponty, with its phenomenological 
approach to consciousness, which represented the classical position described by Althusser in his conference. 
Foucault too, in an interview on Les mots et les choses, in 1966, names Sartre as the last philosopher who incarnated 
a “classical” position, which meant, a position where the status of the transcendental subject is not put into question. 
See, www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UhdLjKYonE.
 See, for more details, Althusser, Louis. Psychoanalysis and the Human Sciences. Trans. by Steven Rendall, NY: 175
Columbia University Press, 2016. 
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on the reality of the scientific practices. In other words, Althusser thought that the role of 
philosophy was not to turn social sciences into techniques of adaptation disguised as sciences, 
but to help them acquiring a status comparable to the one achieved by Saussure with linguistics. 
But how did Althusser manage to extract philosophy from its old ideological ground and to raise 
it to the level of a theoretical philosophy?  
Lacan’s Structuralism: The Psychoanalytic Turn 
To answer this question, it is now necessary to turn to Althusser’s relationship to Lacan. 
Althusser ties to Lacan are numerous. Althusser, for example, is the one who agreed to host 
Lacan’s Seminar at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, in 1964, and who found in Lacan’s teaching 
tools to elaborate his concept of ideology. Althusser’s debt to Lacan revolves around the 
following points. First, Lacan represents, for Althusser, the only psychoanalyst who tried to 
separate radically the discipline of psychoanalysis from any other form of psychology.  During 176
his famous “return to Freud,” which started in 1953 and ended in 1964, Lacan criticized most of 
the Freudian and Post-Freudians psychoanalysts, such as Anna Freud or Heinz Hartmann, for 
having betrayed Freud’s discovery of the unconscious. While Freud, indeed, discovered, beyond 
the subject of consciousness, the subject of the unconscious, his followers did everything they 
could to minimize his discovery by reducing the possible influence of the unconscious on the 
subject of consciousness, which is to say, on the ego. Althusser writes, summarizing Lacan’s 
“Return to Freud,”  
 Althusser writes, in his conference, “The Place of Psychoanalysis in the Human Sciences,” “… all the 176
descriptions of therapy, that currently exist, are absolutely incapable of taking the place of theoretical concepts that 
would actually make it possible to have access not only to what analytic practice is—which is only part of what is 
involved—but to that of which it is the concrete substance, namely its own theory” (10).
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If, in fact, the reality principle is only an intervention made on the individual by social 
norms that operate though the mediation of the proximate family milieu and that are 
assumed by the individual himself in the form of the superego, then analytic therapy 
becomes simply a negotiation between the individual and society, a negotiation that, like 
all delicate negotiations, needs the good office of the psychoanalyst who will fix things, 
and who will fix them, of course, by saying: this poor boy, his ego has been crushed by 
his superego. The ego was too weak; we’re going to strengthen it: it is the whole 
psychoanalysis of the ego defense systems, whose great theoretician is Anna Freud, who 
is one of Lacan’s personal enemies. (27) 
Anna Freud’s effort mostly consisted in conceiving psychoanalysis as the science of the 
biological (the drives) or the psychological (the superego) in order to make it fit the demands of 
the social.   In this sense, one could say that the position defended by Anna Freud is the 177
equivalent, in the realm of psychology, to the position defended by Sartre in moral philosophy. It 
is a position that implies the presence of a moral subject standing in a position of mastery in 
regard to his unconscious. This is why, for Lacan, the Freudian and the Post-Freudian have 
 Anna Freud, in her most famous book, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1936), made of the Ego the 177
cornerstone of the child psychic ability to adjust itself to reality. By doing so, Anna lost sight of Freud’s most 
important discovery: the underlying unconscious Id determining the ego itself. The ego, indeed, became for Anna 
the only psychic faculty that had the ability to use and channel the unconscious conflicts constitutive of the human 
psyche—i.e., the conflicts between sexual drives (Id), aggressive drives (Super-ego), and moral ideals (ego). This is 
why Anna Freud went even as far as making of the ego the source of valuable and useful modes of repressions and 
sublimations. She proposed to isolate, within the ego-defenses, the ones that were socially valuable, and those that 
only represented an impediment for the person, or a direct threat for society. By doing so, she emphasized the reality 
based ego (the part of the ego working in agreement with the reality principle), and downplayed the ego’s 
involvement in the constitution of the fantasy (the part of the ego working in agreement with the pleasure principle). 
Consequently, Anna Freud thought that development essentially involved the gradual mastery of the id by the ego, 
what she called “the education, or perhaps better, the socialization of the drives” (32). And it is with this goal in 
mind that her group (the “B” group) took control of the I.P.A. and that she trained many of the analysts that were 
about to immigrate to the United States and who would become, like Hartmann, Ernst Kris and Rudolph 
Loewenstein, the new figures of psychoanalysis in America after the Second World War.
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betrayed the original desire of Freud, and this is why, also, psychoanalysis has become, since the 
Second World War, especially in America, a technique of adaptation at the service of the social. 
Contrary to this reduction of psychoanalysis to a vulgar technique of adaptation, Lacan, 
according to Althusser, wanted to make of psychoanalysis a true science of the subject of the 
unconscious. To do so, Lacan famously applied to Freud’s concept of the unconscious, as he 
described it in texts such as the Science of Dreams (1900-1901), Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life (1901), or Jokes and their Interpretations (1905), the linguistic concepts developed by 
Saussure and Roman Jakobson. Turning away from the classical interpretation of the Freudian 
unconscious as a reserve of libido, Lacan proposed in his “Discours de Rome” (1953), in a 
gesture similar in its radicalism to the gesture accomplished by Saussure with language, to define 
the subject of the unconscious as a chain of signifiers structured like a language.  He then used 178
Jakobson’s notion of metaphor and metonymy to describe all the unconscious operations that 
Freud had identified through his own biological framework. Lacan re-described Freud’s notion 
of displacement with Jakobson’s notion of metaphor, and the operation of condensation with the 
one of metonymy. In other words, Lacan managed to formalize what Freud had only described at 
a biological and anthropological level. By doing so, Lacan managed to give to Freud’s 
unconscious a scientific writing that enabled him, in turn, to separate the subject of 
consciousness, which is the ego, from the subject of the unconscious, represented by a chain of 
signifiers structured like a language. This is why, for Althusser, Lacan represents the one and 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “Discours de Rome,” in Autres Ecrits, pp. 133-164. Commenting on Lacan’s discourse in 178
his conference “Psychoanalysis and Psychology,” Althusser writes, “As soon as we try to reduce psychoanalysis to 
psychology, the unconscious becomes the interior of consciousness; either biological id, something that falls short of 
the ungraspable subject interior to the subject, or simply the experienced but occulted sense, the nonsense that is 
always the risk taken by meaning experienced in the intentionality of consciousness” (71).
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only psychoanalyst who has managed to disentangle the structure of the subject of the 
unconscious from its imaginary subordination, in psychology, to the structure of the ego. This is, 
for Althusser, the kernel of Lacan’s work, and the point of departure that he took to think anew 
the concept of ideology, and also the Lacan that many Anglo-American gender and queer scholar 
have retained from Lacan’s work in order to think, through Althusser’s concept of ideology, the 
relationship of the subject to power.   
Althusser’s Appropriation of Lacan’s Structuralism 
For Althusser, the notion of ideology functions as an equivalent of the word “reality” in Lacan’s 
early works.  Human “reality,” for the early Lacan of the “Mirror Stage,” (1936) unlike the 179
“reality” that the animal inhabits, is never “natural” but always the result of a cultural 
construction that relies mostly on imaginary processes of identification.  To summarize Lacan’s 180
argument, one could say that it is because humans are born in a state of deficiency that they 
identify, at an imaginary level, to one another. And it is because humans identify to one another 
that their ego is precarious and, more problematically, that the ultimate source of conflict in 
between them is not different from what bound them together at an imaginary level. There is 
thus, in Lacan’s “Mirror Stage,” a connection between human deficiency, identification as the 
source of the ego identity, and the construction of reality as an imaginary artefact. This why 
 See Lacan, Jacques. Beyond the “Reality Principle,” (1936) in Ecrits, 58-74. Lacan writes, at the end of this 179
article “Two questions arise here: how is the reality to which man’s knowledge is universally attuned constituted by 
these images, these objects of interests? And how is the I constituted, in which the subject recognizes itself, by his 
typical identifications? Freud answers these two questions by again moving on metapsychological ground. He posits 
a “Reality Principle” whose role in his theory I propose to critique.” (74) This critique of Freud’s “Reality Principle” 
is what Lacan will do in his famous article “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience,” in Ecrits, 75-81.  
 Lacan, Jacques. “Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je.” in Ecrits I-II, pp. 93-101. See, for 180
the English transl. “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalysis,” in Ecrits,
75-81. 
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Althusser thought that Lacan’s theory of the “Mirror Stage” was actually perfect to describe, at a 
psychoanalytical level, what Marx had described at the level of the social under the term 
ideology. Althusser writes in his book on Lenin, “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship 
of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (109). Now, faced with this imaginary 
construction, the task of philosophy, and all the more of human sciences is, according to 
Althusser, not to build linguistic models of a given ideological “reality,” but to invent theoretical 
concepts that could theorize the condition under which “reality” functions and at the same time 
hides itself in complex processes of recognition. In other words, the question is, for Althusser, to 
produce a series of concepts, or mathematical writings capable of going beyond the imaginary 
mask that hides the symbolic structures that are actually supporting the “real condition of 
existence,” which means reality.  
With Althusser, the question about structuralism becomes thus a question about the nature 
of “reality,” and the impact that structuralism, as a new approach to structure, beyond the 
imaginary, could have on its definition. If it is true to say that there is no human reality outside 
the social structure that causes it, them how can one still hope to change anything in these 
structures? For it is one thing to be able to use mathematical model to describe the structure that 
governs and shapes the human experience, and yet another one to understand how these 
structures are being incorporated by a living creature, and perhaps even modified by this same 
creature. In other words, how shall one conceive the relations between the subject of the 
unconscious and the ideological structures that subject him? How much freedom and agency can 
a Lacano-Althusserian subjected subject have, once it has been admitted that it is entirely shaped 
by the social structures that surround him?   
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III. DERRIDA’S ANTI-HUMANIST TURN 
It is, one could say, in order to apply the program put forth by Althusser while pointing at its 
limits that Derrida wrote, in the name of a new theoretical philosophy to come, his critique of the 
language of the Human Sciences. In his presentation “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse 
of the Human Sciences” during the Baltimore conference, Derrida placed the very concept of 
“structure” used by Saussure first, and then by Lévi-Strauss and other structuralists, under 
critical scrutiny.  Derrida argued that “something has occurred in the history of the concept of 181
structure that could be called an “event” (247). This “event,” however, did not happen in 
opposition to the repetitive character of the structure, but it happened to the notion of structure 
itself. In other words, Derrida’s thesis is that something had happened in the history of the 
concept of structure to the “structurality of the structure” (247) itself, which means that 
something had happened to what was grounding, so far, the very concept structure. 
A Structuralism without a Center  
In of Grammatology (1967) Derrida defines this event with the utmost precision.  His 182
argument, to put it simply, consists in saying that the very idea of system that Saussure 
associated with language is actually a metaphysical invention that is about to come to an end. 
This metaphysical invention is what supported, since the Greeks and the invention of phonology, 
the very idea of logos. Logos is, for Derrida, the name of the original ordering of language by a 
 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in The Structuralist Controversy, 181
247-273.
 Derrida, Jacques. De la Grammatologie. Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1967. For the English version, see Of 182
Grammatology, Transl. Gayatri Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2016. 
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metaphysical desire.  This ordering is also at work in every other discipline that is using, as its 183
framework, the idea of system. Thus, the profusion of words in Derrida’s discourse that ends 
with the word “centrism,” like logo-centrism, phallo-centrism, ethno-centrism, pha-logo-
centrism, etc. In each of these seemingly barbarian terms, the same critique is actually repeated 
and systematized by Derrida. It is always a question of pointing, in each discourse, to what 
constitutes, in it, its principle of organization, its meta-discourse. What function of the law, of 
order, plays in a given discourse? What organizes it? And how shall we evaluate the 
metaphysical status of this principle? 
This ground, argues Derrida, is related to the notion of center, as well as to the two other 
metaphysical notions that derive from it: the notion of presence and the notion of origin. And, 
through the crisis of these three notions, it is nothing less than the whole edifice of western 
epistemology that comes undone, since it was thanks to these basal concepts that the notion of 
structure received its order, as well as the limits of the “free” movements of its elements. To put 
it differently, it was the idea of center that rendered the idea of structure possible. Likewise, it 
was the idea of presence that was grounding the idea of a self-centered subject, and it was the 
idea of origin, united to the idea of destination (telos and arche) that was grounding the idea of a 
 In a similar manner, Lacan will say, five years later, in his Seminar XX, Encore, that language is an elucubration 183
of knowledge over an original form of language called by Lacan, lalangue. Lalangue, to put it more clearly, is the 
language as spoken by a little kid, thus a language containing all the possible mistakes and confusion due to 
homophony. Jean-Michel Rabate, in Lacan and the Subject of Literature, proposes to translate the word lalangue in 
English by the expression Lalalangage. I will come back to this definition of language, in opposition lalangue, in 
Chapter Five, Psychoanalysis against Psychoanalysis. 
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closed and meaningful universe.  Derrida writes,  184
If this is so, the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of which we 
are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a 
linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the 
center receives different forms or names. The history of Metaphysics, like the history of 
the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix—If you will 
pardon me for demonstrating so little and for being so elliptical in order to come more 
quickly to my principal theme—is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of 
this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or 
to the center have always designated an invariable presence—eidos, arche, telos, 
energeia, ousia, (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, 
consciousness, God, man, and so forth.” (Writing and Difference, 279-280)  185
With the disappearance of the idea of center, it is the very organizing principle of any type of 
human knowledge that crumbles, i.e., the very concept of presence. But what happened to the 
notion of center? And more importantly, what happened to the notion of presence that was 
 Derrida writes, “The thematic of historicity, although it seems a somewhat late arrival in philosophy, has always 184
been required by the determination of being as presence. With or without etymology, and in spite of the classic 
antagonism which opposes these significations throughout all of classical thought, it could be shown that the concept 
of episteme has always called forth that of historia, if history is always the unity of a becoming, as tradition of truth 
or development of science or knowledge oriented toward the appropriation of truth in presence and self-presence, 
toward knowledge in consciousness-of-self” (Writing and Difference, 291).
 “S’il en est bien ainsi, toute l’histoire du concept de structure, avant la rupture dont nous parlons, doit être pensé 185
comme une série de substitutions de centre à centre, un enchainement de déterminations du centre. Le centre reçoit, 
successivement et de manière réglée, des formes ou des noms différents. L’histoire de la métaphysique, comme 
l’histoire de l’occident serait l’histoire de ces métaphores et de ces métonymies. La forme matricielle en serait—
qu’on me pardonne d’être aussi peu démonstratif et aussi elliptique, c’est pour en venir plus vite à mon thème 
principal— à la détermination de l’être comme présence à tous les sens de ce mot. On pourrait montrer que tous les 
noms du fondement, du principe ou du centre ont toujours désigne l’invariant d’une présence (eidos, arche, telos, 
energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, sujet) aletheia, transcendantalité, conscience, Dieu, homme, 
etc.)” (411).
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supporting the very idea of the center? 
Derrida, in his presentation, refuses at first to associate this event to specific authors, but 
prefers describing it as the result of a historical context, of a collective effort. However, out of 
convenience, he ends up citing three names belonging to the history of philosophy, and to whom 
he attributes the merit of expressing better than the rest of their generation, what was at stake 
with this “event.” The first proper name cited by Derrida is Nietzsche. It is thanks to Nietzsche’s 
critique of metaphysics that the very idea of truth was replaced by the idea of interpretation. 
Second, it is thanks to Freud’s critique of consciousness and identity that the very idea of 
presence as the foundation of consciousness was exchanged for the one of the unconscious. And 
third, it is thanks to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysic and onto-theology that the very notion of 
being emerged as a renewed question, namely as a question involving the existence of the one 
who is this being, and not only as a question involving the essence of that being.  186
However, Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger’s critiques share in common one major 
limitation. They are all trapped in a circle that consists in criticizing metaphysics by using the 
very concepts that the history of metaphysics has generated. Derrida summarizes this vicious 
circle thus: “We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; 
we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the 
form, the logic and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest” (280). To 
illustrate his point, Derrida uses the concept of sign. This concept, which is also at the center of 
Saussure’s linguistic, is precisely the concept that is supposed to operate, in classical thinking, as 
 See, for Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Case of Wagner,:Nietzsche Contra Wagner; The Twilight of the 186
Idols ; The Antichrist, S.C: BiblioLife, Charleston, 2009. For Heidegger, see Heidegger, Martin, and David F. Krell. 
Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964). London: Routledge Classics, 2011. 
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the junction between the sensible and the intelligible. It is the concept of sign, indeed, that 
stabilizes the whole system of language in Saussure’s linguistic, and that guarantees the very 
possibility of meaning. Without it, the signifier and the signified would be condemned to an 
endless movement of substitution that would, eventually, cancel their opposition by making of 
language itself a non-systematic structure, and thus incapable of generating stable meanings. As 
such, if one wants to criticize this concept, one is caught in a circle since to perform this critique, 
one still has to make sense, and thus one still has to use the concept of sign in a pre-critical 
manner.   187
A Structuralism without Science  
Given this vicious circle, however, all critical discourses are not equal. Their difference in value, 
argues Derrida, “can be measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the history of 
metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought” (282). In the particular case of Lévi-Strauss, 
remarks Derrida, one can observe at work this difficulty in the ways in which the classical 
opposition between nature and culture is at the same time being denounced as a metaphysical 
construct, but nonetheless posited in order to be disclaimed. What is considered natural, for Lévi-
Strauss, is what is universal and spontaneous. What is of the order of culture is, on the contrary, 
what can vary between one culture and the other. However, as early as the opening of his first 
book, The Elementary Forms of Kinship (1949), Lévi-Strauss admits that what he considers the 
building block of every human society—the prohibition of incest—is neither on the side of 
 Here again, one can suggest that what Derrida describes here, in his own conceptual framework, is the famous 187
Lacanian principle according to which “there is no Other of the Other,” as well as its scientific corollary, “there is no 
meta-language.” 
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nature (since it is a system of norms and interdictions), nor on the side of culture since it is 
universal. This is why, concludes Derrida, with certain basal concepts that ground the very 
distinctions upon which their own intelligibility depends, there are only two ways to proceed. 
The first one consists in conducting, in a philosophical manner, a critique of the language used 
by philosophy to think this very concept. One could call this approach a critique of the language 
of philosophy by philosophy itself, which is, for Derrida, “the most daring way of making the 
beginning of a step outside of philosophy” (284). The second, more pragmatic, consist in 
agreeing to keep using these concepts for the sake of a local analysis, while denouncing, when 
pertinent, their metaphysical limits. This second option is, remarks Derrida, the one chosen by 
Lévi-Strauss. Derrida writes, “Lévi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention: 
to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value is criticized” (284).  
To supplement his position, Lévi-Strauss, in his book La pensée sauvage (1962), 
proposed the model of the bricoleur.  The bricoleur is someone that uses, in order to build 188
something, the materials that are surrounding him, and not materials that have been designed 
exclusively for their project. The bricoleur is thus the one who knows how to tweak, bend, and 
modify what already exists in order to make it useful to another purpose. It is, conceptually 
speaking, the one who knows how to use metaphysical concepts in order to make them perform a 
different task from the one they were originally made for. More problematically, Derrida argues 
that what is opposed to the bricoleur, namely the engineer, is actually a mythical figure too for 
Lévi-Strauss, since it presupposes the idea that someone could create an entire language that 
 Lévi-Strauss. La pensée sauvage (1963), Paris: Edition Pocket, 1990. For the English trans, see, Lévi-Strauss, 188
The Savage Mind, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
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would be very appropriate to the task. Consequently, if the figure of the engineer is a myth, and 
the one of the bricoleur the only one at hand, it means that the only discourse accessible is a 
mythological discourse that can only have the form of that which it describes. Commenting on 
this problematic consequence of Lévi-Strauss’ method, Derrida writes, “It is there that we 
rediscover the mythopoetical virtue of bricolage. In effect, what appears most fascinating in this 
critical search for a new status of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a center, 
to a subject, to the privileged reference, to an origin, or to an absolute archia” (286).   
With bricolage, what becomes evident is, underscores Derrida, that language excludes 
totalization inasmuch as it relies on a system in which what occupies the center is itself subjected 
to an infinite number of substitutions. It is because the system of language, in the discourse of 
the bricoleur, has put, at the place its former center what Lévi-Strauss has called, in his 
Introduction à l’œuvre de Marcel Mauss (1950), “this floating signifier, which is the servitude of 
all finite thought” (‑ ). Commenting on this “floating signifier,” through the example of the 189
word “mana” used by Mauss, Lévi-Strauss writes,  
… mana is a simple form, or more exactly, a symbol in the pure state, and therefore 
capable of becoming charged with any sort of symbolic content whatever? In the system 
of symbols constituted by all cosmologies, mana would simply be a zero symbolic value, 
that is to say, a sign marking the necessity of a symbolic content supplementary to that 
which the signified is already loaded, but which can take on any value required, provided 
only that this value still remains part of the available reserve and is not, as phonologists 
!  Lévi-Strauss, “Introduction à l’œuvre de Marcel Mauss,” in Sociologie et anthropologie (1973), Paris: Presse 189
Universitaire de France, 1997. 
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put it, a group term. (290) 
If something like a floating signifier is necessary, it is because there is, at a fundamental level, a 
lack in any system of language. Stated more clearly, it is because language cannot totalize itself, 
because it cannot completely stabilize the meaning of its terms that such a thing as a “floating 
signifier,” representing in its overabundance of meaning the actual lack of meaning that grounds 
the system of language itself, is necessary. However, to acknowledge the presence of such a 
“floating signifier,” such as the one of Mana, does not suffice to account for the passage, within 
the history of a culture, from one “floating signifier” to the other. It is, even, what “structuralism” 
can only think of as the model of catastrophe, or brutal change brought forth by chance.  
 There is thus, according to Derrida, a tension in Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism, concerning 
the notion of center as a floating signifier. While Lévi-Strauss acknowledges, on the one hand, 
the absence of center in any symbolic system, he nonetheless accepts, on the other, to suspend 
this “acknowledgement” in order to be able to excavate the structure grounded by a given 
“floating signifier.” This why, for Derrida, the work of Lévi-Strauss, despite all of its efforts, 
remains, for a large part, imbedded in “a sort of ethic of presence, an ethic of nostalgia for origin, 
an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of presence and self-presence in 
speech” (292). This “ethic of presence” corresponds, in Lévi-Strauss’ work, to a “restricted” 
form of play, grounded on a nostalgia for the center, corresponding to all the possible 
permutations authorized, within a given system, between all its elements. But there is also, for 
Derrida, another way to look at the absence of center in any given symbolic system, and it is the 
one put forth by Nietzsche first, and then explored by Georges Bataille in his Summa 
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Atheologica.  This second position, which affirms joyfully the absence of center, Derrida 190
associates it to a “general” form of play that corresponds with the possibility of playing with the 
very “floating signifier” that functions as the temporary and empty principle of totalization of a 
given symbolic system.  
 Derrida named this possible exploration Grammatology, and associated it with the concept 
of writing, which he opposed to the concept of language. Derrida argues that “everything that for 
at least some twenty centuries tended toward and finally succeeded in being gathered under the 
name of language is beginning to let itself be transferred to, or at least summarized under, the 
name of writing” (Spivak 6).  While the concept of language, taken in its traditional 191
understanding, reduces “writing” to a secondary position, making of it a simple instrument at the 
service of a thought (as it is the case, for example, in Aristotle’s approach of language and 
writing), Derrida wants to make of language a moment, and thus a reduced version of a vaster 
concept of writing. Derrida says, in Of Grammatology (1967), “Either writing was never a 
simple ‘supplement,’ or it is urgently necessary to construct a new logic of the supplement” (Of 
Grammatology, 7).  This logic of the ‘supplement,’ which makes of “language” a species of 192
writing as a genre, is precisely why Derrida invented Grammatology as a new discipline. 
Grammatology is the study of “writing” as soon as writing is no longer submitted to the logos, 
which is to say to the metaphysic of presence that the notion of language implies.  
 See, Bataille, Georges. On Nietzsche: Sur Nietzsche. Trans. Stuart Kendall, Suny Press, Albany, 2015. 190
 “Tout ce qui, depuis au moins quelques vingt siècles, tendait et parvenait enfin à se rassembler sous le nom de 191
langage commence à se laisser déporter ou du moins résumer sous le nom d’écriture.” (16)
 “Ou bien l’écriture n’a jamais été un simple “supplément,” ou bien il est urgent de construire une nouvelle 192
logique du supplément.” (17)
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Writing the Disappearance of the Subject 
To support his conception of Grammatology, while extending his notion of general writing, 
Derrida argued, in “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” that Freud’s most important merit is to have 
developed, through his theory of the unconscious, an unprecedented conception of writing. He 
proposed the metaphor of the Wunderblock (i.e., the “mystic pad,” see definition on page 151) as 
a non-phonetic type of writing.  This concept of trace and archi-trace, found by Derrida in 193
Freud’s Esquisse…, and in his letter to Fliess, should not be confused—it is important to 
emphasize this from the start—with the classical notion of trace, which suggests the idea of a 
mark that is inscribed on a surface and that can be retrieved through memory.  On the contrary, 194
the concept of trace is a concept that suggests that the trace is nothing but a play of differences 
between many forces that are impacted or traversing, at any given moment, the mental psyche of 
an individual. Derrida writes, “Trace as memory is not a pure breaching that might be 
 Derrida writes, in “Freud and the Scene of Writing”: “Depuis Platon et Aristote, on n’a cessé d’illustrer par des 193
images graphiques les rapports de la raison et de l’expérience, de la perception et de la mémoire. Mais une confiance 
n’a jamais cessé de s’y rassurer dans le sens du terme connu et familier, à savoir de l’écriture. Le geste esquissé par 
Freud interrompt cette assurance et ouvre un nouveau type de question sur la métaphoricité, l’écriture et 
l’espacement en général.” (L’écriture et la différence, 296-297)
 See, Freud, Sigmund. The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Draft and Notes 1887-1902, ed. 194
By M. Bonaparte, A. Freud and E. Kris, New York, Basic Books, 1954. Freud writes, “As you know, I am working 
on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come about by a process of stratification: the material present 
in the shape of memory traces is from time to time subjected to a rearrangment in accordance with fresh 
circumstances –is, as it were, transcribed. Thus, what is essentially new in my theory is the thesis that memory is 
present not once but several times over, that it is registered in various species of signs.” (173) That is the perception 
neurons, which register consciousness without keeping a memory of it, then the neurons (Pcpt. I)  that register 
perception, then the reelaboraion of these traces at an unconscious level, and finally the neurons of the pre-
conscious, linked to the ego, that reorganize at a third level the elements registered by the second set of neurons. 
Commenting on this description, Jean-Michel Rabaté, in Jacques Lacan: Psychoanalysis and the Subject of 
Literature, writes, “It is indeed Freud's most materialist text, since he hoped to fund psychology upon a theory of 
purely quantitative process based on differences between what he called the “Φ neurons” and the “Ψ neurons.” The 
Φ neurons are permeable neurons that perceive the external world, while the Ψ neurons retain traces of these 
perceptions. Memory is presented by “Pa” process of Bahnung—literally 'opening up the path' and 'linking'--which 
connects certain types of Ψ neurons” (175).
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reappropriated at any time as simple presence; it is rather the ungraspable and invisible 
difference between breaches” (WD, 201).  As such, what disappears with the concept of trace 195
as the origin of the process of memory is the very notion of “first time,” and thus of origin.  
 If the trace is not a mark, it is because it has no origin, and if it has no origin, it can neither 
have a stable identity. This is why, concludes Derrida, “It is a non-origin which is 
originary” (WD, 203). To this conception of the trace Freud will add, in his letter 52 to Fliess, a 
type of writing that would be like a “lithography before words” (307). This very peculiar type of 
writing, which Freud posits at the very foundation of the human psyche, is not a writing that can 
be deciphered like any other type of writing. On the contrary, such a primary writing is a writing 
that no code, whatsoever, can decipher. As such, concludes Derrida, “in psychic writing, which 
thus prefigures the meaning of writing in general, the difference between signifier and signified 
is never radical” (WD, 209). In other words, if the primary writing is a writing in which there is 
no stable sign, and thus no stable meaning, it implies also that the very concept of secondary 
writing (as a simple representation of words) is impossible too.  
 If there is no such thing as an original trace, or an original text, it means also that there is 
no writing that could be its faithful transcription. Derrida writes, “The conscious text is thus not a 
transcription, because there is no text present elsewhere as an unconscious one to be transposed 
or transported” (WD, 211). Or, “The unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces, 
differences in which meaning and force are united-a text nowhere present, consisting of archives 
which are always already transcriptions. Originary prints. Everything begins with 
 “La trace comme mémoire n’est pas un frayage pur qu’on pourrait toujours récupérer comme présence simple, 195
c’est la différence insaisissable et invisible entre les frayages” (WD, 299).
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reproduction” (WD, 211). In other words, for Derrida, if there is no original to be transcribed, it 
means also that any conception of writing that pretends to be the faithful transcription of an 
“original” trace is but a lie, or at least an original construction that needs to be taken as such.  196
This original construction, in turn, is always-already a re-construction (après-coup) of an archi-
trace that left no solid traces in the psyche itself. This is why, for Derrida, “The overall writing of 
dreams exceeds phonetic writing and puts speech back in its place. As in hieroglyphics or 
rebuses, voice is circumvented” (WD, 218). 
 This is why, also, Derrida thinks that linguistics, inasmuch as it is submitted to phonology, 
cannot be the right tool to approach Freud’s unconscious.  This is why Derrida argues that, “It 197
is with a graphematics still to come, rather than with a linguistics dominated by an ancient 
phonologism, that psychoanalysis sees itself as destined to collaborate” (WD, 220). Or, a couple 
of lines later, that “The interest which psychoanalysis brings to linguistics presupposes an 
overstepping of the habitual meaning of the word speech” (WD, 220). And perhaps even more 
than transgressing the meaning of the word language, what one needs to do is to subvert the very 
meaning of the subject that was supporting this old conception of language, since “the ‘subject' 
of writing does not exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author. The subject of 
writing is a system of relations between strata: what Freud called the Mystic Pad, the psyche, 
society, the world. Within that scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical 
subject is not to be found” (WD, 226-227).   
 We encounter here, in Derrida's term, what Lacan calls, in his theory of the four discourses, developed in his 196
Seminar XVII, L’envers de la psychanalyse, a semblant. See, Lacan, Jacques. Séminaire XVII, L’envers de la 
psychanalyse. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1991. 
 This critique of linguistics will also be repeated by Lacan in his Séminaire XVIII, D’un discours qui ne serait 197
pas du semblant, through his use of the word linguisterie. 
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 With the concept of trace and archi-trace, and then with the concept of general writing, 
what Derrida is attacking, in the end, is nothing less than the very notion of the humanist subject, 
which is to say the very notion of the subject that has supported the whole history of western 
metaphysics. If there is no original trace, and thus no writing that could transcribe the trace 
faithfully, it means also that there is no subject in the classical sense of the term, but only the 
threat or the permanent anxiety of its disappearance. Derrida writes, “The trace is the erasure of 
selfhood, of one's own presence, and is constituted by the threat or anguish of its irremediable 
disappearance, of the disappearance of its disappearance” (WD, 230). Likewise, beyond the 
critique of the humanist subject, what Derrida attacks is the classical reduction of language to 
speech and, by implication of writing to speech. But if it is so, in what sense could one say that 
Derrida, by formulating such a critique of structuralism, produced also a critique of Lacan's 
reduction of the subject of the unconscious to the subject of speech? And, reciprocally, in which 
sense could one say that Derrida’s critique of structuralism was in fact largely inspired by Lacan? 
IV. LACAN’S 1966 SUBJECT OF JOUISSANCE 
It is during the Baltimore conference that Lacan and Derrida met for the first time.  Apparently, 198
Lacan tried during that conference to explain to Derrida why the Lacanian theory of the subject, 
as Lacan developed it during his “Return to Freud,” was not only in agreement with Derrida’s 
 Derrida talks about it in an interview that is now part of a DVD, produced by Zeitgeist Films, simply named 198
“Derrida.”
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critique of structuralism, but also anticipating it in many aspects.  Lacan declared, indeed, ten 199
years after the conference, during his Seminar XXIII on Joyce, that Derrida had neglected to 
acknowledge what the invention of Grammatology and archi-ecriture owed to his own teaching. 
While Jacques-Alain Miller, disciple of the two philosophers, suggested, in his note on Seminar 
XXIII, that “the topicality of the question of writing in the intellectual and literary context of the 
time was largely due to Derrida’s early articles, collected in Writing and Difference” (207).  200
However, as the next part of the chapter will show, Derrida refused to engage with Lacan or, 
rather, politely dismissed his invitation to talk about it. Eric Laurent, commenting on the 
anecdote in his book L’envers de la biopolitique (2016), suggested that Derrida, perhaps caught 
in a form of anxiety of reference, did everything he could during the Baltimore conference to 
avoid the confrontation. Let me try, then, to reconstruct this dialogue that never took place 
between the two men.  
The Humanist Subject Is an Archaic Illusion 
Lacan opens his conference by warning his audience about the growing confusion that will soon 
 Lacan wrote, in “La psychanalyse, raison d’un échec,”  “C'est pourquoi mon discours, si mince soit-il auprès 199
d'une œuvre comme celle de mon ami Claude Lévi-Strauss, fait balise autrement, dans ce flot montant de signifiant, 
de signifié, de « ça parle », de trace, de gramme, de leurre, de mythe, voire de manque, de la circulation desquels je 
me suis maintenant dessaisi. Aphrodite de cette écume, en a surgi au dernier temps la différance, avec un a. Ça laisse 
de l'espoir pour ce que Freud consigne comme le relais du catéchisme.” (346) See, Lacan, Jacques. “La 
psychanalyse, raison d’un échec,” in Autres Ecrits, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 341-350.  
For more details on the question, see, Laurent, Eric. “Le corps entre vide et excès,” in L’Envers de la biopolitique, 
une écriture pour la jouissance. Paris: Navarin, Le champ Freudien, 2016, p. 24-25.  
 Miller also writes, “These days we can scarcely imagine just how incongruous this orientation was in the 200
philosophical context of the time, and this played no small part in the fact that among all the teachers back then at 
the Sorbonne, I chose the young Derrida to become his student.” (210) For more details on this question, see, Miller, 
Jacques-Alain. “A Note Threaded Stich by Stich, #15 Derrida and the knot,” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 
XXIII, The Sinthome, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Transl. Adrian Price, Malden: Polity, 2016.
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surround the word structure.  Lacan writes, “It may happen that there will be mistakes, 201
confusion, more and more approximate uses of this notion, and I think that soon there will be 
some sort of fad about this word” (187). However, adds Lacan, these mistakes and confusions, 
which in turn generate misunderstanding, i.e., the misrecognition of the notion of structure itself 
is deeply linked to what is at stake with the notion of the subject in psychoanalysis. To justify 
this idea, Lacan alludes to the definition that he gave to the Freudian unconscious during his 
“Return to Freud,” which is to say, “the unconscious is structured like a language” (188). The 
language that gives its structure to the unconscious, however, is not a special kind of meta-
language, like the mathematical language, or the semantical language, or the cinematographical 
language, as Derrida implied it in of Grammatology, but language in its most simple and 
concrete form, namely the language that people talk to one another. In other words, if the 
unconscious is structured like a language, it means that it is structured like a language that does 
not pretend to be, in any form, a meta-language, but a language that is reduced to the level of 
speech.  
This is why, for Lacan, the structure of the unconscious is linked to the person who 
speaks this language, namely, the subject. Lacan writes, “the question that the unconscious raises 
for you is a problem that touches the most sensitive point of the nature of language, which is the 
question of the subject” (188). However, the subject for Lacan is not reducible to what linguists 
call the “shifter,” which is to say the personal pronoun in a sentence. Beyond the subject that 
consciously speaks, there is another “thing,” or something that is always thinking and that is 
 It is interesting to point out that Derrida makes the same remarks, in the opening chapter of De la 201
Grammatologie, regarding the word language. Derrida writes: “Cette inflation du signe langage est l’inflation du 
signe lui-même, l’inflation absolue, l’inflation elle-même. Pourtant, par une face ou une ombre d’elle-même, elle 
fait encore signe: cette crise est aussi un symptôme” (15).
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barred from consciousness. This “something” that thinks, which Lacan calls “the subject of 
jouissance,” is thus not reducible to any form of instinct or primitive knowledge that it would be 
possible to make conscious. It is, in fact, literally barred from consciousness and cannot be 
retrieved. If it is so, how does Lacan intend to articulate these two different subjects, i.e., the 
subject of the unconscious and the subject of jouissance? Normally, as Derrida suggested in his 
presentation, it is always through the idea of unity that the very possibility of deploying the 
structure of a phenomenon becomes possible. In the case of an organism, for example, it is 
inasmuch as its mature state is considered to represent a unity of functions that its very structure 
becomes understandable. Unfortunately, adds Lacan, such a unity, when it comes to the human 
being, is more difficult to isolate. Of course, the quest to find such unity have been at the center 
of all the philosophies of consciousness, and at the center of all the psychological concepts 
related to the idea of “total personality.” But it is precisely these two fundamental positions—the 
one of philosophy and the one of psychology—that Freud’s discovery about the unconscious 
have radically challenged. Lacan, commenting on this idea, writes,  
I am sure that of the people who are here—and if anybody is not of my opinion I hope 
that he will raise his hand—is that life is something that goes, as we say in French, à la 
dérive. Life goes down the river, from time to time touching a bank, staying for a while 
here and there, without understanding anything of what happens. The idea of the unifying 
unity of the human condition has always had on me the effect of a scandalous lie. (190)    
In his text “Science and Truth” (1966), Lacan qualifies the idea about the natural unity of the 
subject as “the archaic illusion—an illusion we can generalize with the expression 
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‘psychologization of the subject’” (729). Such a unity, indeed, approached from a psychoanalytic 
point of view, is nothing but an illusion that implies a form of rejection of the body that supports 
the unity of the subject, as well as a misrecognition of the fundamental inconsistency of the 
phenomenon implied in consciousness. The only “unity” that psychoanalysis can admit is, in the 
end, the unity that the imaginary introduces in a being, and that Lacan described in his “Mirror 
Stage” (1936) as being a lure, which is to say a false unity superimposed on an organism that is, 
at a fundamental level, constantly changing.  This is why Lacan concludes, in agreement with 202
Derrida, that to attribute to the phenomenon of consciousness an idealistic unity is not only a 
conceptual mistake. But it is also the sign that philosophy and psychology, as academic 
disciplines, are still secretly at the service of social ideals.   203
However, if Lacan contests the unity of consciousness, he does not do it, unlike Derrida, 
in the name of a Nietzschean approach of the unconscious, which is to say in the name of a 
“psychology of depth.”  For Lacan, indeed, to do so would amount to fall into the parallel 204
illusion that consists in making of Freud’s unconscious the product of an inner nature removed 
 “La seule fonction homogène de la conscience est dans la capture imaginaire du moi par son reflet spéculaire et 202
dans la fonction de méconnaissance qui lui en reste attachée” (312).
 “La psychologie est véhicule d’idéaux : La psyché n’y représente plus que le parrainage qui la fait qualifier 203
d’académique. L’idéal est cerf de la société” (312).  
 See, for a very good analysis of Nietzsche’s definition of psychology, Wotling, Patrick. La Pensée du sous-sol: 204
Statut et structure de la psychologie dans la philosophie de Nietzsche. Paris: Editions Allia, 2016. 
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from any form of logic. Opposing such a tendency, what Lacan tried to achieve throughout his 205
“Return to Freud” was precisely to fight against this temptation by always showing how Freud’s 
notion of the unconscious was, in fact, reducible to a signifying chain, organized logically, and 
describable through the linguistic determinations developed by Saussure and Jacobson.  Lacan 206
went even further, in “Position of the Unconscious” (1964), by saying that Freud’s discovery of 
the unconscious was nothing but the effort to push away any form of reduction of the 
unconscious to any kind of metaphysical conception of the unconscious (either archetypal or 
instinctual or spiritualist) that would make it impossible to study it scientifically.  Likewise, in 207
“On Freud’s “Trieb” and the Psychoanalyst’s Desire” (1964) Lacan said also that “The drive, as 
it is constructed by Freud on the basis of the experience of the unconscious, prohibits 
psychologizing thought from resorting to ‘instinct,’ with which it masks its ignorance by 
assuming the existence of morals in nature” (851). This is why, if one wants to extract 
philosophy and psychology from their immemorial allegiance to the ideal of a given society, one 
needs to abandon the very notion of the humanist subject and replace it, not with an extended 
 For more details on this question see, Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire VI, Le désir et son interprétation, Edited by 205
Jacques-Alain Miller, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 2011. In this Seminar, Lacan writes, “En d’autres termes, la 
psychanalyse qui se soutient de son allégeance freudienne ne saurait en aucun cas se donner pour un rite de passage 
à une expérience archétypique ou d’aucune façon ineffable : le jour où quelqu’un y fera entendre quelque chose de 
cet ordre qui ne sera pas un minus, ce serait que toutes limites y auraient été abolie. Ce dont nous sommes encore 
loin” (277). Perhaps, it is Lacan himself, during his late teaching that tried to accomplish such a program through the 
invention of the real unconscious, the sinthome, the escabeau, the speaking being and the speaking body. It is a 
question that will be at the center of this dissertation, and more specifically, a question that I will address in Chapter 
Five.    
 “L’inconscient, à partir de Freud, est une chaine de signifiants qui quelque part (sur une autre scène écrit-il) se 206
répète et insiste pour interférer dans les coupures que lui offre le discours effectif et la cogitation qu’il 
informe” (279). The signifying chain, as well as its impact on the constitution of the subject, is what Lacan describes 
in great detail in his text on Poe’s Purloined Letter, and what Derrida critiques in “Le Facteur de la vérité.” in La 
carte Postale: de Socrate a Freud et au-dela. (1980). See, for more details, the next part of this chapter.
 See Lacan, Jacques. “Position de l’inconscient,” in Ecrits I-II, 829-850. For the English trans. see “Position of 207
the Unconscious,” in Ecrits, 703-721.   
!154
notion of writing, as Derrida proposed, but with the invention of a pure mathematical 
formalism.  Lacan declared, in his Seminar on the The Purloined Letter (1956), “The program 208
traced out for us is hence to figure out how a formal language determines the subject. But the 
interest of such a program is not simple, since it assumes that a subject will not fulfill it except 
by contributing something of his own to it” (31).  And he repeated the same statement at the 209
opening of his last teaching when he said, “Mathematical formalism is our aim, our ideal. Why? 
Because it alone is matheme., i.e., capable of being transmitted integrally”  (108). 210
The Subject of Science and the Subject of Jouissance 
Lacan’s hypothesis is that the very existence of Freud’s notion of the unconscious, as well as the 
very existence of psychoanalysis, is linked to the history of science. It is science, and perhaps 
even more the subject required by science, that has rendered possible the discovery of the 
unconscious by Freud.  The subject of science is a subject that implies a radical disjunction 211
between truth and knowledge. To illustrate this point, Lacan goes back to Descartes’s 
Metaphysical Meditations (1641).  For Descartes, indeed, there is a clear difference between 212
 “Une chose est sure: si le sujet est bien là, au nœud de la différence, toute référence humaniste y dévient 208
superflue, car c’est à elle qu’il coupe court” (337). 
 “Le programme qui se trace pour nous est dès lors de savoir comment un langage formel déterminé le 209
sujet” (42). See, Lacan, Jacques. “Le Séminaire sur la lettre volée.” In Ecrits I-II, 11-64. For the English version, see 
“Seminar on the Purloined Letter,” in Ecrits, 6-50. 
 Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire XX, Encore, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1999. 210
 “Il est indispensable que la psychanalyse comme pratique, que l’inconscient, celui de Freud comme découverte, 211
aient pris leur place avant la naissance, au siècle qu’on a appelé le siècle du génie, le XXVIIIème, de la 
science” (337).
 See, Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. Smk Books, 2018.212
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the notion of truth, which depends entirely on the Authority of Tradition, and the notion of 
knowledge, which relies exclusively on the notion of mathesis universalis (i.e., to what can be 
theorized about nature in a mathematical language). This division between truth and knowledge 
is also, argues Lacan, the division that distinguishes the subject of science from the subject of 
religion. To put it otherwise, it is to the extent that a subject is capable of distinguishing within 
itself what is of the order of truth (what is of the order of his relation to Tradition) and what is of 
the order of knowledge that a subject is properly considered a “modern subject.” Otherwise, if a 
subject refuses to make a distinction between these two orders, he is more likely to be considered 
“archaic” or traditionalist, but not modern. Commenting on this tension between truth and 
knowledge, through a rereading of Hegel’s notion of absolute knowledge, Lacan writes, in “The 
Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,”   
For let us reexamine from this angle the service we expect from Hegel's phenomenology: 
that of marking out an ideal solution—one that involves a permanent revisionism, so to 
speak, in which what is disturbing about truth is constantly being reabsorbed, truth being 
in itself but what is lacking in the realization of knowledge. The antinomy the Scholastic 
tradition posited as principal is here taken to be resolved by virtue of being imaginary. 
Truth is nothing but what knowledge can learn that it knows merely by putting its 
ignorance to work. This is a real crisis, in which the imaginary is eliminated in 
engendering a new symbolic form, to use my own categories. This dialectic is convergent 
and proceeds to the conjuncture defined as absolute knowledge. As it is deduced, this 
conjuncture can only be the conjunction of the symbolic with a real from which nothing 
more can be expected. What is this, if not a subject finalized in his self-identity? From 
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which one can conclude that this subject is already perfect(ed) here and is the 
fundamental hypothesis of the entire process. He is named, in effect, as the substratum of 
this process; he is called Selbstbewusstsein, the being of the conscious, wholly conscious 
self. (675)  213
For Lacan, what Descartes’s cogito implies is nothing less, in its hypothesis, than Hegel’s 
conception of absolute knowledge. The position of the cogito, and thus the position that science 
requires from its subject implies, if one takes its seriously, to go as far as Hegel’s hypothesis 
about absolute knowledge since it is only when there is a complete resorption of truth within 
knowledge that the unity and the transparency of the cogito (as an ego) is posited. But this 
transparency is also, for Lacan, the root of a laicization of the religious discourse that tends to 
normalize the unruliness of the subject, not in the name of God but, as in the case of ego-
psychology, in the name of its socialization. 
At the opposite of such a tendency, which aims at normalizing the relations between truth 
and knowledge, Lacan wants to resuscitate the radicalism of Freud’s vision of the drives in order 
to establish an unsurmountable distinction between truth and knowledge. This unsurmountable 
distinction between truth and knowledge is also what can guarantee, in turn, the impossible 
return of the humanist subject. Finally, it is what is bound to provoke the destitution of the old 
Sciences of Man, since the concept of man is also what renders the conciliation between truth 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” 213
in Ecrits, 671-702.  
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and knowledge impossible.  This is why Lacan, instead of following the epistemological model 214
of the Sciences of Man, proposes to use the epistemological model of the other Sciences to study 
scientifically the inner division of the subject. Lacan said, “One should descry therein the 
crucially important mark of structuralism. It ushers into every human science it conquers a very 
particular mode of the subject for which the only index I have found is topological: the 
generating sign of the Mobius strip that I call the inner eight. The subject is, as it were, internally 
excluded from its object” (731). In order to develop a purely scientific knowledge of the 
phenomenon it studies (i.e. disconnected from any “archaic illusion”) structuralism has to 
exclude from its very object what constitutes its truth, which is to say its relationship to his 
drives and his desire. This is why there is something that needs to be elucidated, for Lacan, about 
the “object” of the Human Sciences since this object becomes knowable to the exact extent that it 
disappears as a Real object, which is to say what Lacan calls, in his Seminar X on Anxiety, as an 
object a.  
Between the order of truth, and the one of knowledge, there is, in fact, an unsurmountable 
division. Lacan writes, “an inscription does not etch into the same side of the parchment when it 
comes from the printing-plate of truth and when it comes from that of knowledge” (734), even 
though these inscriptions are most often intertwined, since the parchment has the form of a 
Moebius stripe. There is, on “one side” of the Moebius stripe the subject that speaks, and on “the 
other,” even though they are one and the same, what causes the subject to speak. To say it 
another way, there is the order of desire, which is linked to the lack that the law introduces in the 
 “Il n’y a pas de science de l’homme, ce qu’il nous faut entendre au même temps qu’il n’y a pas de petites 214
économies. Il n’y a pas de science de l’homme, parce que l’homme de la science n’existe pas, mais seulement son 
sujet. On sait ma répugnance de toujours pour l’appellation de sciences humaines, qui me semble être l’appel même 
de la servitude” (339). 
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subject, and the order of jouissance, which corresponds to the level of the drives and which 
involves the relation to Das Ding, i.e., the primary lost object and the absolute satisfaction that it 
represents.  This is why the notion of truth, caught in between these two dimensions of the 215
subject, is necessarily incomplete, or impossible to say it all, since there is no meta-language, 
and thus no possibility to say the truth about the truth. However, it is not because there is no truth 
about the truth that the notion of truth should be discarded for Lacan. Quite the contrary, Lacan 
opposing Derrida argues that the notion of truth, itself inseparable from the notion of “Full 
Speech,” is needed to understand how the signifier affects, in its being, the person that speaks. 
Lacan writes, in “Science and Truth,” 
To lend my voice to support these intolerable words, "I, truth, speak...," goes beyond 
allegory. Which quite simply means everything that can be said of truth, of the only truth
—namely, that there is no such thing as a metalanguage (an assertion made so as to 
situate all of logical positivism), no language being able to say the truth about truth, since 
truth is grounded in the fact that truth speaks, and that it has no other means by which to 
become grounded. This is precisely why the unconscious, which tells the truth about 
truth, is structured like a language, and why I, in so teaching, tell the truth about Freud 
who knew how to let the truth—going by the name of the unconscious—speak. This lack 
of truth about truth—necessitating as it does all the traps that metalanguage, as sham and 
logic, falls into—is the rightful place of Urverdrangung, that is, of primal repression 
 “Les pulsions sont nos mythes, a dit Freud. Il ne faut pas l’entendre comme un renvoi à l’irréel. C’est le réel 215
qu’elles mythifient, à l’ordinaire des mythes : ici qui fait le désir en y reproduisant la relation du sujet à l’objet 
perdu. Les objets à passer par profits et pertes ne manquent pas pour en tenir la place. Mais c’est en nombre limite 
qu’ils peuvent tenir un rôle que symboliserait au mieux l’automutilation du lézard, sa queue larguée dans la détresse. 
Mésaventure du désir aux haies de la jouissance, que guette un dieu malin. Ce drame n’est pas l’accident que l’on 
croit. Il est d’essence : car le désir vient de l’Autre, et la jouissance est du côté de la Chose.” (333)
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which draws toward itself all the other repressions—not to mention other rhetorical 
effects that we can recognize only by means of the subject of science. (736-737) 
The truth that Freud discovered with the unconscious is thus a negative truth, a truth that turns 
truth into an impossible ideal. It is a truth, indeed, that pokes a hole at the very center of the 
classical notion of truth since it is a truth that speaks a language that is itself incomplete and 
lacking a meta-language that could say the truth about it. This is why Lacan can specify that to 
say that “the unconscious is structured like a language” does not mean that the unconscious has 
the structure of a closed system but, on the contrary, that the unconscious is structured like the 
open system that language is. The truth that ‘I’ speaks without knowing it is thus a truth that is 
grounded on a lack, or, perhaps even more so, a truth that is grounded on a logical impossibility 
that, in turn, produces at a subjective level, an Urverdrangung, that is, the primary repression of 
this very impossibility, and the affective effects linked to this impossibility. But how did Lacan 
manage to create a form of knowledge that could fit this incomplete truth, and how did he 
manage to articulate this knowledge to the notion of the subject?   
Suture: A New Alliance between Truth and Knowledge  
To bypass this difficulty, Lacan introduced in his Baltimore presentation a new concept of unity, 
not as a unifying principle, but as a countable unity that generates its own form of excess, as in 
the mathematical writing n+1. The formula, “n plus one,” indeed, is the key to the genesis of 
numbers as intrinsically calling for a “one more,” for a supplementary unit. Through this allusion 
to mathematics, Lacan wanted to compare the double structure of the subject (as the subject of 
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the unconscious and as the subject of jouissance) to the structure of numbers. The subject, like a 
number, keeps counting itself as one while this very counting is what generates its disappearance 
and, at the same time, its excess in the form of a +1. Lacan said during his Baltimore conference,  
The sameness is not in things but in the mark that makes it possible to add things with no 
consideration as to their differences. The mark has the effect of rubbing out the 
difference, and this is the key to what happens to the subject, the unconscious subject in 
the repetition; because you know that the subject repeats? something peculiarly 
significant, the subject is here, for instance, in this obscure thing that we call in some 
cases trauma, or exquisite pleasure. (Immixing, 192)  
Commenting on this idea, which at first sight is quite complex, Jacques-Alain Miller, in “Action 
of the Structure,” a text written in 1964 for the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, introduced the term 
“suture.” When Miller forged this concept he was, at the time, the editor of the first issue of Les 
Cahiers pour l'Analyse and, it is important to note, one of Derrida's students too.  As such, one 216
could argue that Miller’s concept of Suture was, in a way, the result of these two influences. 
Taking up Derrida's reflection on The Origin of Geometry and Lacan’s concept of numeral unity, 
Miller proposed a complete “logic of the signifier” that could account, at once, for the subject of 
the unconscious (and thus for the order of the signifier), and for the subject of jouissance (and its 
 For more detail on this question, see, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “A Note Threaded Stich by Stich, # Derrida and the 216
knot, in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans. Adrian 
Price, Polity, Malden, 2016. Miller writes, “I tribute to the memory of the philosopher who was one of my mentors 
of my youth, I shall develop further the detail conjured up by the mention of Derrida’s name on p. 124 on The 
Sinthome” (206). Or “By my reckoning, however, the debt that I had acquired with respect to the man who 
throughout my years at the École Normale had been my professor, my mentor, my friend, and even my confident (as 
the so called caimans of the ENS often are), forbade me from entering into this controversy by supporting Lacan’s 
colors against his, just as I deemed that I did not share Lacan’s declared contempt for Derrida” (207). 
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affective dimension).  While Derrida, for his part, made of the relation of the humanist subject 217
to logic a relation of exclusion, Miller, taking up Lacan’s insight about the subject of jouissance, 
proposed to see it more in the form of a repression.  According to Miller, the subject of 218
jouissance is not the opposite of the archi-trace upon which his presence is made possible, but 
the subject of jouissance is the repressed of the very structure that makes it possible. This is why 
the subject of jouissance is fundamentally absent. It is what lacks, what stands for the lack, in the 
very structure that supports it. It is the missing element. It is, as Miller proposed it in his famous 
article on “Suture: Elements of the Logic of the Signifier,” in a relation of internal exclusion 
with the structure that governs it.  Miller writes, “Suture names the relation of the subject to the 219
chain of its discourse, we shall see that it figures there as the element that which is lacking, in the 
form of a stand-in” (93).  
To explain this internal exclusion, Miller goes back to Lacan's definition of the subject as 
a number, and uses to explore it Frege's conception of the zero, of number and successor.  220
Miller’s idea is that in Lacan’s definition, the subject occupies, in regards to the progression of 
 Derrida, Jacques. Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, Trans.  John P. Leavey. University of 217
Nebraska Press, 1974.  See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier),” in Concept and 
Form, Volume 1, Selections From the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, Edited by Peter Hallward and Knox Peden, New 
York: Verso, 2012, 91-101.
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier),” in Concept and Form, Volume 1, 218
Selections From the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, Edited by Peter Hallward and Knox Peden, Verso, New York, 2012. pp. 
91-101. Miller writes, “Ce que cette démarche répète de celle que Jacques Derrida nous a appris être exemplaire de 
la phénoménologie (1) ne dissimulera qu'aux gens pressés cette différence cruciale que la méconnaissance ici prend 
son départ de la production du sens. Disons qu'elle n'est pas constituée comme un oubli, mais comme un 
refoulement” (Miller, Suture, Cahier pour l'Analyse, I, 39). 
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier),” in Concept and Form, Volume 1, 219
Selections From the Cahiers pour l’Analyse, Edited by Peter Hallward and Knox Peden, Verso, New York, 2012. pp. 
91-101. 
 See, Frege, Gottlob. The Frege Reader. Edited by Beaney, Michael, Malden: Mass Blackwell, 2008.220
!162
natural numbers, the very function to which can be assigned their progression, even though the 
subject accomplishes this function without even knowing it. To demonstrate this idea, Miller 
argues that what supports the original unity of numbers is the very concept of zero. Zero, indeed, 
in Frege’s theory of numbers, is not the synonym of an infinite void, but the original container, 
the original empty set upon which all the other numbers are made. This is why Frege can built 
upon this definition of the zero as an empty set all the other numbers, since the zero can either be 
the empty set containing zero element, or the container that will serve to build all the other 
numbers. In other words, zero is what represents, as a pure set, what is at the same time 
necessary to build numbers, and what is constantly erased by the very progression that it 
supports. Zero as a set is either erased by the fact that it is first and foremost an empty set, or by 
the fact that, in every other number, it is the number of elements that are in a set that catches our 
attention, and not the empty set that supports their gathering.  
But in order to obtain such a concept of zero, underlines Miller, Frege had to posit the 
existence of truth as what is identical to itself, and of what is not true as what is non-identical to 
itself, and then defined the number zero by attributing to it the concept of “non-identical to itself. 
Miller writes, “It is this decisive proposition that the concept of non-identical with itself is 
assigned by the number zero which suture logical discourse” (97). Indeed, if zero is the set to 
which has been assigned the concept of 'non-identical to itself,” and if truth is defined as what is 
“identical to itself,” then it can be concluded that zero is, at the same time, a set (and thus 
something identical to itself) that contains no elements (and thus something that is non-identical 
to itself). Likewise, if one applies this reasoning to the definition of the subject, one can conclude 
that the subject is, in in relation to his identity, like the zero in relation to the progression of 
!163
number. It is what makes it possible, what supports it, when it is on the side of the empty set, but 
it is also what is repressed from its definition when it is on the side of the “non-identical to 
itself.” In other word, the subject is either, as the subject of the unconscious, the support of the 
very principle of his unity or, as the subject of jouissance, the very notion that makes this unity 
impossible. Miller writes,  
The impossible object , which the discourse of logic summons as the not-identical with 
itself and then rejects as the pure negative, which it summons and rejects wanting to know 
nothing of it, we name this object, insofar as it function as the excess which operates in 
the series of numbers, the subject. Its exclusion form the discourse which internally it 
intimates is suture. If we now determine the trait as the signifier, and ascribe to the 
number the position of signified, the relation of lack to the trait should be considered as 
the logic of the signifier. (Concept and Form, 1, 99)   221
In regard to this logic of the signifier, the psychoanalytical goal is to help the subject of the 
unconscious to become aware of his fundamental state of alienation in order to enable him, 
afterwards, to make room for the subject of jouissance. As Miller puts it, “This will provide the 
occasion to note that which people believe they can attack Lacan with, in the literary 
Departments of America, namely the superiority of grammatologic analysis, or deconstruction. If 
this grammatological analysis is perhaps justified — and it certainly is — as regards the 
fabrication of theses, it is not as evident with regard to the status attributed to it in literature” (“A 
Reading of The Family complex,” Miller). To illustrate this idea and connect it, later, to Derrida’s 
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Suture,” in Cahiers Pour L'analyse, Etc. No. 1/2, Etc. 1966, Etc. Paris, 1966. Print. 221
For a complete edition in English of the texts published in Les Cahiers pour l’analyse, see Hallward, Peter, and 
Knox Peden. Concept and Form. London: Verso Books, 2012. 
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critique of Lacan’s position, I will turn now to Lacan’s reading of The Purloined Letter.  
V. LACAN, DERRIDA AND THE PURLOINED SUB JECT OF JOUISSANCE 
It is in his text on Poe’s The Purloined Letter, a text that opens the Ecrits (published the same 
year as the Baltimore’s conference), that Lacan found the best literary image to illustrate his idea 
about the ways in which the symbolic structure is constantly impacting the subject at the level of 
his unconscious and at the level of his jouissance.  For Lacan, one can make of the letter that 222
circulates in Poe’s story a metaphor of the unconscious, and of the ways in which the letter 
affects the behaviors and the personalities of those who are in contact with it, a metaphor of the 
impact of the signifier on the subjective formation of the ego, as well as on the subject of 
jouissance.  Likewise, it is also through the study of Lacan’s “Seminar on the Purloined Letter” 223
(1956) that Derrida, in The Post Card (1980), explained with the outmost precision why he 
considered Lacan’s logic of the signifier false and, more importantly, enmeshed with a 
conception of truth and power that made it a conservative theory. But did Lacan really produce, 
as Derrida argued, and as most Anglo-American Feminist, Gender and Queer scholars still think, 
 “If what Freud discovered and rediscovered with perpetually increasing sense of shock has a meaning, it is that 222
the displacement of the signifier determines the subjects in their acts, in their destiny, in their refusals, in their 
blindness, in their end and in their fate, their innate gifts and social acquisitions notwithstanding, without regard for 
character or sex, and that, willingly or not, everything that might be considered the stuff of psychology, kit and 
caboodle, will follow the path of the signifier” (60).
 Isabelle Alfarady writes, “Pour Lacan comme pour Freud, la contrainte de répétition, la ronde du signifiant, 223
touchent à l’éthique de la psychanalyse, interroge la psychanalyse sur ses fins et ses limites. Freud se voit dans 
l’obligation de reconnaitre la primauté de l’instinct de mort sur le principe de plaisir, principe qu’il tenait jusque-là 
pour la cause première, l’instance primordiale et dont il est forcé de concéder qu’il est à son service. Lacan, lecteur 
de « La lettre Volée, » prend acte, non sans gravité, de la logique implacable et presque inhumaine du déterminisme 
de la lettre. (…) La manière dont Freud a de traiter la source que représente la clinique sur un pied d’égalité avec la 
fiction au regard de la contrainte de répétition n’est pas indifférente : l’œuvre littéraire aurait le pouvoir de consigner 
les effets de répétition et de retour du refoule. La littérature en tant qu’œuvre de la lettre serait mieux placée que 
toute autre pour répondre d’une telle loi” (Derrida – Lacan, 97).
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a Pha-logo-centric theory reproducing at a theoretical level all the humanist values and ideals 
that it is was supposed to debunk. What shall we make of this critique? Does it aim only at 
critique Lacan’s subject of the unconscious, or does it includes also Lacan’s subject of 
jouissance?  
The Trajectory of the Letter and its Effect on the Character of the Story 
In “The Purloined Letter,” indeed, one can isolate two scenes that are the repetitions of one 
another and that illustrate perfectly Lacan’s idea. During the first scene, which takes place in the 
Queen’s boudoir, her Minister sees that the Queen is hiding from the King (who does not see it) a 
letter that could compromise her and the King. Defying the authority of the Queen, while making 
sure that she sees him doing it, the Minister steals the letter from the Queen while the King 
remains blind to this action. In the second scene, which takes place in the Minister’s office, a 
private detective named Dupin steals from the Minister the letter he stole from the Queen while 
the Minister himself remains unaware of the theft. In regard to these two scenes, Lacan argues 
that each of the scenes reproduces the same structure, while simply changing the place that each 
character occupies in them. While, in the first scene, the King (as the representative of the law) 
does not see that the Queen hides a compromising letter from him, in the second scene it is the 
police hired by the Queen that become incapable of seeing the letter that the Minister is hiding 
from them. Likewise, while in the first scene the Queen is the one who sees that the King does 
not see the letter, in the second scene, Dupin, having realized that the police have not seen the 
letter lying in plain sight in the Minister’s home, ensures that the Minister does not see that he 
takes the letter. Finally, while in the first scene, the Minister is the one that sees the letter and that 
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steals it, in the second scene, Dupin is the one that sees the letter and that steals it from the 
Minister. As such, “The Purloined Letter” argues Lacan, is structured by three subjective 
positions that are articulated to one another in a manner that leaves no ambiguity about the 
hidden presence of a Symbolic order in relation to which each character receives its identity. 
Lacan writes, 
Thus, three moments, ordering three glances, sustained by three subjects, incarnated in 
each case by different people. The first is based on a glance that sees nothing: The King 
and then the police. The second is based on a glance which sees that the first sees nothing 
and deceives itself into thereby believing to be covered what it hides: The Queen and then 
the Minister. The third is based on a glance which sees that the first two glances leave what 
must be hidden uncovered to whomever would seize it: The Minister and finally Dupin. 
(Ecrits, 10)  224
What is at stake in this description is the possibility to prove that each character, in its most 
subjective dimension, is the product of the position he occupies in regard to the letter, which is to 
say in regard to the signifier that determines his unconscious, that he (or she) is blind to the very 
presence of this signifier. This is why there are three different types of subjects (those who see 
nothing, those who see that others see nothing, and finally those who see what the two others 
leave uncovered, i.e. the letter). But this is why, also, the type of subject that a character is also 
changes according to the position the character occupies vis-a-vis the letter. For example, the 
 “Donc trois temps, ordonnant trois regards, supportés par trois sujets, à chaque fois incarnés par des personnages 224
différents. Le premier est d’un regard qui ne voit rien : c’est le roi et c’est la police. Le second d’un regard qui voit 
que le premier ne voit rien et se leurre d’en voir couvert ce qu’il cache : c’est la reine puis le ministre. Le troisième 
qui de ces deux regards voit qu’ils laissent ce qui est à cacher à découvert pour qui voudra s’en emparer : c’est le 
ministre, et c’est Dupin enfin” (15). 
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personality of the minister changes once he is in possession of the letter. Likewise, the 
personality of the Queen changes too when she enters in possession of the letter. Lacan writes, 
“We shall see that their displacement is determined by the place that a pure signifier—the 
purloined letter—comes to occupy in their trio” (Ecrits, 10).  Or, to put it differently, “While the 
letter may be en souffrance, they are the ones who shall suffer from it. By passing beneath its 
shadow, they become its reflection. By coming into the letter's possession— an admirably 
ambiguous bit of language—its meaning possesses them” (Ecrits, 21). In other words, what 
represents the unconscious of the character, in Poe’s story, is nothing but the relation that each 
character has with the purloined letter, which is to say the relation that each character has with a 
pure signifier (since we never know the nature nor the content of the letter). Lacan writes, “what 
could be a better example of the fact that man is inhabited by the signifier, than the one Poe 
forged himself to help us understand Dupin’s feat?” (34). 
The Signifier as the Instance of Death 
The order of the signifier, in Poe’s story, is organized around the position of the King, and the 
authority and legitimacy he incarnates. In regard to this authority, which is blind to what does not 
constitute its structure, the purloined letter incarnates what could potentially disrupt the authority 
of this position, and thus the whole organization it represents. In turn, to possess the letter is to 
become a clandestine, forced to live in secrecy. This is why, for Lacan, the signifier of the 
purloined letter is what represents the presence of “death” in the story, and thus what triggers in 
each character that possesses it an automatism of repetition. Lacan writes, “the signifier—you 
are perhaps starting to catch my drift—materializes the instance of death” (Ecrits, 16). This is 
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why Lacan concludes that  
If what Freud discovered, and rediscovers ever more abruptly, has a meaning, it is that the 
signifier's displacement determines subjects' acts, destiny, refusals, blindness’s, success, 
and fate, regardless of their innate gifts and instruction, and regardless of their character 
or sex; and that everything pertaining to the psychological pregiven follows willy-nilly 
the signifier's train, like weapons and baggage. (Ecrits, 21) 
To be in possession of the purloined letter is to become its dupe. In the case of the Minister, for 
example, it is quite clear that it is because the Minister stole the letter from the Queen that he 
becomes himself like the Queen, which is to say a character living in secrecy, forced to ground 
his being in a realm that is not, unlike the one of the King, exclusively the one of the law. Lacan 
writes, prefiguring in a way his late analysis on femininity as not-all caught in the phallic 
function,  
A man who is man enough to brave, and even scorn, a woman's dreaded ire suffers the 
curse of the sign of which he has dispossessed her so greatly as to undergo 
metamorphosis. For this sign is clearly that of woman, because she brings out her very 
being therein by founding it outside the law, which ever contains her—due to the effect of 
origins—in a position as signifier, nay, as fetish. In order to be worthy of the power of 
this sign she need but remain immobile in its shadow, man aging thereby, moreover, like 
the Queen, to simulate mastery of non-action that the Minister's ‘lynx eye’ alone was able 
!169
to see through. (Ecrits, 43)  225
The letter is, through its relation to the authority of the King, what reduces the being of the 
Queen to a fetish; it is also, as a sign of her secret lover, what enables her to ground her being 
beyond the law that fetishizes her. However, this beyond is only accessible for the Queen 
inasmuch as she remains quietly hidden in the shadow of the law that forbids such a beyond. In 
other words, the power that the purloined letter holds is either a power that forces the one that 
uses it to remain quiet and hidden in the shadow of the law that it secretly transgresses; or a 
power that destroys itself the minute it reveals the inner contradiction it shelters. Lacan writes, 
“the fact that its author remains on the sidelines reveals the extent to which guilt and blame are 
not at stake here, but rather the sign of contradiction and scandal constituted by the letter, in the 
sense in which the Gospel says that the sign must come regardless of the misfortune of he who 
serves as its bearer” (Ecrits, 23). Thus, if the Minister were to use the letter and reveal its 
content, it would imply that he would become the one by whom the scandal comes, and thus also 
the one that has to accept the full consequences of its gesture. It would imply that the Minister 
agrees to place himself in the position of full mastery, which is a purely imaginary position for 
Lacan. Lacan says, indeed, “For what matters to the robber is not only that the said person know 
who robbed her, but that she know what kind of robber she is dealing with; the fact is that she 
believes him capable of anything, which should be understood as follows: she confers upon him 
a position that no one can really assume, because it is imaginary, that of absolute master” (Ecrits, 
 “L’homme assez homme pour braver jusqu’au mépris l’ire redoutée de la femme, subit jusqu’à la métamorphose 225
la malédiction du signe dont il l’a dépossédée. Car ce signe est bien celui de la femme, pour ce qu’elle y fait valoir 
son être, en le fondant hors de la loi, qui la contient toujours, de par l’effet des origines, en position de signifiant, 
voire de fétiche. Pour être à la hauteur du pouvoir de ce signe, elle n’a qu’à se tenir immobile a son ombre, y 
trouvant de surcroit, telle la reine, cette simulation de la maitrise du non-agir que seul « l’œil de lynx » du ministre 
pu percer” (31).
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24).  226
Lacan as the Postman of Truth 
However, since the Minister is not completely crazy, i.e., since he does not believe in his 
absolute mastery, he behaves as a neurotic, i.e. as someone who pretends that he does not have 
the letter (denegation), just as the Queen did when she tried to hide the letter from the King. 
However, it is precisely because the Minister starts to behave like the Queen that, in turn, Dupin 
is able to steal the letter from him. But Dupin, unlike the Queen or the Minister, does not want to 
keep the letter for himself but, very much like a psychoanalyst wants to return the letter to its 
destination in exchange for money.  Lacan writes,  227
Are we not, in fact, justified in feeling implicated when Dupin is perhaps about to 
withdraw from the letter's symbolic circuit—we who make ourselves the emissaries of all 
the purloined letters which, at least for a while, remain en souffrance with us in the 
transference? And is it not the responsibility their transference entails that we neutralize 
by equating it with the signifier that most thoroughly annihilates every signification—
namely, money?” (Ecrits, 27)  228
 “Car ce qui importe au voleur, ce n’est pas seulement que ladite personne sache qui l’a volé, mais bien à qui elle 226
a affaire en fait de voleur; c’est qu’elle le croit capable de tout, ce qu’il faut entendre: qu’elle lui confère la position 
qu’il n’est à la mesure de personne d’assumer réellement parce qu’elle est imaginaire, celle du maître absolu” (33).
 Lacan nuanced his judgment on Dupin when he wrotes, “Ce petit poulet [Dupin], il jubile à la pensée de ce qui se 227
passera quand l’intéressé –devant qui ?, à quelle fin ?, aura à en faire usage. Ce que l’on peut dire, c’est que Dupin 
jouit” (104). 
 “Il s’agit peut-être pour Dupin de se retirer lui-même du circuit symbolique de la lettre, -- nous qui nous faisons 228
aussi les émissaires de toutes les lettres volées qui pour un temps au moins seront chez nous en souffrance dans le 
transfert. Et n’est-ce pas la responsabilité que leur transfert comporte, que nous neutralisons en la faisant équivaloir 
au signifiant le plus annihilant qui soit de toute signification, à savoir l’argent” (37). 
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In other words, it is in as much as Dupin did not want the power that the letter could have 
granted him, but only the monetary reward, that he was able to return it to the Queen, while 
avenging her honor by leaving the Minister unaware of his loss of power. What is thus essential 
in Lacan's reading of “The Purloined Letter” is not only his use of the letter as a metaphor for the 
signifier, and through the signifier, as a metaphor for the phallus, and his use of the two scenes to 
show the impact of the signifier on the characters, but also his emphasis on Dupin's faithfulness 
to the King and to the Queen, and more importantly; his emphasis on Dupin's faithfulness to the 
law that binds him to the power and the authority of the Queen and the King.  But in which sense 
can one conclude from this that Lacan, because he compared Dupin to a psychoanalyst, 
subordinated psychoanalysis to the service of Law, and made of it, as Derrida claimed it in The 
Purveyor of Truth, a pha-logo-centered practice? To this question, as Lacan himself suggested at 
the end of his Seminar on The Purloined Letter, “the burden of proof rests, rather, with those 
who argue that the constitutive order of the symbolic does not suffice to explain everything 
here.” (31) So, let’s see how Derrida carries the burden of such proof. 
  
Derrida’s Critique of Lacan’s Conception of the Letter 
Derrida, in “The Purveyor of Truth,” (or differently translated, “The Postman of Truth”) attacked 
Lacan’s reading of Poe’s story and, through it, Lacan’s conception of the unconscious, as well as 
Lacan's conception of truth and of the signifier.  However, and before entering into the details, 229
it is important to highlight that Derrida wrote his critique in 1975, which is to say at the very 
 See Derrida, Jacques. “The Purveyor of Truth,” in Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Trans. Alan 229
Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987. 
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moment when Lacan was already moving away from his early teaching and deploying his late 
teaching on Joyce.  As such, Derrida wrote it as if Lacan's teaching formed a coherent system 230
supported by a single truth, and not a teaching in a constant evolution. Himself aware of this 
limitation, Derrida wrote, as a warning note for a possible reader who would have contested his 
critique on such ground, the following statement,  
It remains that a certain type of statement on the truth has been made, and enlarged, at a 
certain specific moment, in the form of a system. And it bears all the characteristics 
necessary for this effect. Since the Seminar [on The Purloined Letter] belongs to this 
system (such, at least, is my hypothesis), as do a certain number of other essays to which 
I will refer (in order not, in turn, to enclose the Ecrits in the Seminar), it must be 
demarcated if one wishes to understand the reading of “The Purloined Letter.” One can 
and must do this, even if after 1966, in a transformed theoretical field, the Lacanian 
discourse of the truth, the text, and literature lent itself to a certain number of major 
rearrangements or decisive reworking, although this is not certain. (192)  
Derrida, in the footnote that ends this sentence, defines the system of truth, to which he attaches 
the early teaching of Lacan thus:  
The doctrine of truth as cause (Ursache), as well as the expression “effects of truth,” can 
be aligned with the system we are about to examine. The effects of truth are the effects of 
the truth, as “The Direction of the Treatment” (in which it is a question of  “directing the 
subject towards 'full' speech,” or in any event of leaving him “free to try it,” Ecrits [1977, 
 See Chapter Five for a full analysis of Lacan’s very last teaching. 230
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275], has already said: “it is a question of truth, of the only truth, of the truth about the 
effects of truth” (ibid). Circulation will be always circulation about the truth: toward the 
truth. Cause and effect of the circle, causa sui, proper course and destiny of the letter. 
(207) 
In regard to this definition of truth, I will now analyze Derrida's critique of Lacan in order to 
measure, afterwards, how Lacan's late teaching escapes—or not—what Derrida called himself 
the works of the young Lacan. Derrida writes, of the “(…) works of the young Lacan, as will 
perhaps be said one day, and once more, by the academics who are always in a hurry to cut to the 
quick that which does not bear partition” (192). 
According to Derrida, if Lacan’s letter always arrives at its destination, it is because the 
letter, as an empty signifier, has a pre-assigned place within Lacan’s conception of the symbolic 
order. It is in as much as Lacan uses Poe’s text to illustrate a “truth”—the truth about the nature 
of Freud’s unconscious—that Poe’s The Purloined Letter can arrive at its destination. It is, to put 
it simply, because Lacan subordinates Poe’s text to a framework that is external to it that it can 
serve as the “perfect” illustration of Lacan’s idea about the nature of the signifier, and thus about 
the correct definition that should be given to the Freudian unconscious. For Derrida, this nature 
is to be found in the place of the lack, the place of what is missing at the center of every system, 
and without which there would be no circulation, no movement possible of the letter, and thus no 
possibility to purloin it and neither to return it to its proper destination. Derrida writes,  
Question of the letter, question of the materiality of the signifier: perhaps it will suffice to 
change a letter, perhaps even less than a letter, in the expression “le manque à sa 
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place” (Lacan, 1972). If the lack has its place [le manque a sa place] perhaps it will 
suffice to introduce into this expression a written a, that is, a a without an accent mark, in 
order to make apparent that if the lack has its place [le manque a sa place] in this 
atomistic topology of the signifier, if it occupies a determined place with defined 
contours, then the existing order will not have been upset: the letter will always refine its 
proper place, a circumvented lack (certainly not an empirical, but a transcendental one, 
which is better yet, and more certain), the letter will be where it always will have been, 
always should have been, intangible and indestructible via the detour of the proper, and 
properly circular, itinerary.” (The Purloined Poe, 177)  
If the letter can be purloined, it is because it is lacking somewhere. And if it is lacking 
somewhere, it is because lack as such has its place in Lacan’s structuralist conception of 
language as a system. More problematically, even, it is not only because Lacan applied to Poe’s 
text this specific conception of the signifier that he was able to use it to illustrate this “truth,” but 
because Lacan considered that this “truth” was not external to Poe’s fiction, but equivalent to the 
truth that grounds the very possibility of fiction itself. Indeed, Lacan said, during his Seminar on 
The Purloined Letter, “it is this truth, let’s point it out, that makes possible the existence of 
fiction”(12). It is thus the nature of what is a fiction that is not questioned by Lacan or, rather the 
possibility that other kinds of fictions resisting the kind of “truth” that supports Lacan's reading 
could exist.  Derrida writes, “what Lacan analyzes, decomposing it into its elements, its origin, 231
and its destination, uncovering it in its truth, is a story [histoire]” (179). And this story, adds 
 Julia Kristeva will precisely use this idea to frame the kind of fiction created by French Avant-Garde writers such 231
as Georges Bataille, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, etc. See, in particular, Kristeva, Julia, Histoires D'amour. 
Paris: Denoël, 2007. Print. And Kristeva, Polylogue. Paris: Seuil, 1977. Print. 
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Derrida, is a story that does not take into account the way in which the story is written, which is 
to say its narrating form and, thus, the function that the narrator occupies in the story. In other 
words, what Lacan’s truth forecloses, by focusing exclusively on the meaning of the story, is the 
distinction between fiction and narration. Derrida writes, “Without ever saying a word about it, 
Lacan excludes the textual fiction from within which he has extracted the so-called general 
narration” (180). As a result, Lacan reduced Poe’s fiction to its overall meaning, its signified, by 
leaving out of his analysis what Derrida calls the frame of the story, i.e., its mode of narration. 
And it is this reduction that enabled Lacan to argue that once the letter has been put back at its 
right place, it can find, once again, its proper meaning. Of course, underlines Derrida, the letter is 
said to have no meaning in Poe’s story, as well as in Lacan’s analysis, but this lack of meaning is 
directly limited by the fact that the letter, as part of the symbolic order, has a proper place. And it 
is this place, argues Derrida, which eventually ends up representing the “truth” of the letter, and 
thus its ultimate meaning. Derrida writes,  
But when Lacan says that the letter has no proper place, this must be understood 
henceforth as no objective place, a place determinable in an empirical and naïve 
topology. When he says that it has no proper meaning, this must henceforth be 
understood as the exhaustible content of what is written in the note. For the signifier-
letter, in the topology and psychoanalytical-transcendental semantic with which we are 
dealing, has a proper place and meaning which comes from the condition, origin and 
destination of the entire circulation, as of the entire logic of the signifier. (182)   
The letter, indeed, has a place of origin (the duc…) and a place of destination (the Queen). 
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Likewise, in the structure of the unconscious, the signifier has a place of origin, and a place of 
destination, which is the lack or the hole that constitutes the subject of the unconscious as such. 
This is why the meaning of the letter, just like the meaning of the signifier, argues Derrida, 
coincide with the very circular trajectory of the letter itself. This circular trajectory, in turn, is 
linked to the acceptance of the contract that links the Queen to the King. In other words, the 
meaning of the letter is linked to the fundamental state of subjection of the subject, i.e., to its 
subjection to “the phallic law represented by the King and guarded by the Queen, the law that 
she should share with him according to the pact, and that she threatens to divide, to dissociate, 
and to betray” (183). For Derrida, the true meaning of the letter in Lacan’s teaching is linked to 
the place of castration since what the purloined letter could unveil, if its content were to be 
revealed, is precisely the lack of authority of the King, and by implication the very hole (the 
utopic point, as Miller describes it in “The logic of the Signifier”) upon which its symbolic 
power is grounded.  This is why, concludes Derrida, Lacan’s analysis of the circulation of the 232
purloined letter could be accused of implying a form of idealism, since none of the protagonists 
of the story desire to break the limit of the phallic law. On the contrary, all of them want to 
maintain what Derrida calls, borrowing the term from Bataille's The Accursed Share, a restricted 
 Derrida writes, “Le phallus grâce à la castration reste toujours à sa place grâce à la topologie transcendantale 232
dont nous parlions plus haut. Il y est indivisible, et donc indestructible, comme la lettre qui en tient lieu. Et c’est 
pourquoi la présupposition intéressée, jamais démontrée, de la matérialité de la lette comme indivisibilité était 
indispensable a cette économie restreinte, a cette circulation du propre” (Derrida, La carte Postale, 469). 
Commenting on this idea, Isabelle Alfarandy writes, in Derrida – Lacan, L’écriture entre psychanalyse et 
déconstruction, “De manière constante, Derrida axe sa critique sur l’économie du manque, qui repose selon lui sur le 
postulat de la castration comme vérité. Insistant sur l’identification de la lettre au féminin, et sur les effets de 
féminisation que provoque la lettre sur ses destinataires, il y voit une figure de la castration et de la vérité” (93).
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economy, which is to say a closed system grounded on the respect of the phallic law.  Such 233
idealism, argues Derrida, is also visible in the notion of “quilting point” that Lacan developed in 
his Seminar III on Psychosis to guarantee the proper connection between the signifier with its 
signified.  Derrida, concluding his critique of Lacan, writes, “The agency of the Lacanian letter 234
is the relève of writing in the system of speech” (195). 
Going beyond Lacan’s Pha-logo-centrism 
To escape this restricted economy, Derrida suggested that it would suffice to take seriously into 
account the idea (rejected by Lacan) that the Queen, or the Minister, or Dupin could actually be 
willing to break the contract that link them to the King, for the letter to never arrive at its 
destination.  Derrida writes,  235
Contrary to what the Seminar says in its last words (“What the 'Purloined letter,' that is 
the not delivered letter [lettre en souffrance], means is that a letter always arrives at its 
destination [1972b, 72])—a letter can always not arrive at its destination. (…) It can 
always be fragmented without return, and the system of the symbolic, of castration, of the 
 See, Bataille, The Accursed Share: 1/2 and 2/3. New York: Zone Books, 1991. Derrida, commenting on 233
Bataille’s work, writes, “This system is in fact the system of the ideality of the signifier. The idealism lodged within 
it is not a theoretical position of the analyst; it is a structural effect of signification in general, to whatever 
transformations or adjustments one subjects the space of semiosis” (194).
 The quilting point is the point in the signifying chain at which “the signifier stops the otherwise endless 234
movement of the signification” and produces the necessary illusion of a fixed meaning.” See, Lacan, Jacques. Le 
Séminaire III, Les psychoses, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1990, See in particular, p. 268. 
 Commenting on this idea, Isabelle Alfandary writes, “L’enjeu de l’interpellation de Lacan par Derrida tourne 235
autour du statut du hasard. Au destin réglé de la lettre lacanienne, il oppose depuis le principe d’itérabilité et de 
divisibilité de la marque, l’oxymore de la destinerrance.” (90) And, a page later, “A la loi implacable du signifiant, 
Derrida oppose la logique différentielle et indécidable de l’écriture depuis une conception de la structure de la 
marque ou le principe d’itérabilité ne tombe pas simplement sous le coup de la compulsion de répétition” (91).
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signifier, of the truth, of the contract, etc., always attempt to protect the letter from this 
fragmentation: this is the point of view of the King or the Queen, which are the same 
here, they are bound by contract to reappropriate the bit. (…) And without this threat 
(breach of contract, division or multiplication, the separation without return from the 
phallus which was begun for a moment by the Queen, that is by every 'subject'), the 
circuit of the letter would not even have begun. (187)      
What threatens the arrival of the letter, and thus the very system that supports its circulation is, 
paradoxically, what makes this system possible in the first place.  It is, to put it differently, 236
because the phallic law is not an unbreakable law, like the law of nature, but a human law 
grounded on a contract that its foundation coincides with what threatens its very possibility. This 
very paradox, in turn, is what reveals the contingent nature of the foundation of what presents 
itself, at a social level, as a universal law. And it is in regard to this paradox, and to the position 
that Lacanian psychoanalysis entertains with it, that Derrida's critique needs to be understood. In 
what sense it is true to say that Lacan, by encoding Dupin as a psychoanalyst in charge of 
returning the letter to its proper place, submits psychoanalysis to the service of the phallic law, 
and not to the possibility of its subversion? With this question, what is at stake, for Derrida, is 
not only the question of the foundation of the law, but the relation of the feminine position to the 
law, and perhaps even more, the relation of the feminine position to the one of absolute mastery, 
occupied momentarily, and at a strictly imaginary level, by the Minister, and then, perhaps also 
by Dupin. How shall one understand Lacan's comment of the relation between the possession of 
 Derrida writes at the end of La carte Postale, “Une lettre n’arrive pas toujours a destination et dès lors que cela 236
appartient à sa structure, on peut dire qu’elle n’y arrive jamais vraiment, que quand elle arrive, son pouvoir ne 
jamais y arriver la tourmente d’une dérive interne” (517).
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the letter and the effect of femininization that its possession triggers in the one that possesses it? 
Should one relate this understanding to Lacan's negative reading of the position of absolute 
mastery that the position of the Minister implies but that he fails to occupy the minute he starts to 
be feminized by the possession of the letter? Commenting on Lacan's reading of Dupin as a 
psychoanalyst trying to return the letter to its proper place, Derrida writes, 
As soon as one interprets the retribution demanded by Dupin as an analytic procedure in 
order to withdraw from the circuit thanks to “the signifier most destructive of all 
signification, namely money,” it is difficult to account for all the signs of non-neutrality 
multiplied at the end the “Purloined Letter.” Is it not a paradox? … And Dupin's 
“explosion of feelings at the end of the story” [1972b, 68], his rage of manifestly 
feminine nature” [1972b, 71] when he claims to be settling his account with the Minister 
by signing his own maneuver, must be pointed out. (190) 
To go beyond this paradoxical reading of Dupin’s “explosion of feelings at the end of the story,” 
Derrida re-contextualizes his character by using Poe’s other short stories that feature Dupin. By 
doing so, Derrida shows that Dupin is not occupying the position of the psychoanalyst, as Lacan 
claims he does, but that he is actually much closer to occupying the imaginary position of 
absolute mastery that Lacan would have ever been willing to admit. First, Poe describes him, in 
the opening lines of “The Murder in the Rue Morgue,” as a young gentleman of an excellent and 
illustrious family, reduced to poverty, and who was no longer caring for “the retrieval of his 
fortunes” (142).  Moreover, Dupin is also described as someone who still has enough money to 237
 See, Poe, Edgar A, and Gary R. Thompson. The Selected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe: Authoritative Texts, 237
Backgrounds and Contexts, Criticism. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. 
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live without working, and to buy as many books as he wants. As such, Dupin represents, argues 
Derrida, the luxuriousness of literature itself, which is to say the pure luxuriousness of the 
intertextual plays that Poe uses to frame his fictions.  
Second, Dupin is also directly described by the narrator of Poe’s short stories—a narrator 
who identifies with Dupin’s “peculiar analytic ability” as well as with Dupin’s “gloomy 
(melancholic) fantastics”—as a “madman.” This is why Derrida concludes his critique by 
arguing that if Dupin is the one who brings the letter to its destination, he is also the one who 
threatens, from an imaginary and literary outside, the very symbolic order that he is supposed to 
guard. In other words, while Lacan used “The Purloined Letter” to prove the superiority and the 
anteriority of the symbolic order over the mere shadows of the imaginary, Derrida concluded his 
critique by showing that Poe’s story, as soon as one takes into account its literary dimension, 
proves exactly the contrary, i.e. the superiority of the imaginary over the symbolic. Or even 
worse, the guarding of the symbolic by the absolute mastery of a purely literary and thus 
imaginary character.    
CONCLUSION: LACAN’S ANSWER TO DERRIDA IN LITURATERRE 
Lacan's answer to Derrida's critique is contained in “Lituraterre,” a text that Lacan published in 
1971 in a new quarterly journal called “Literature.”  Lacan's text opens the journal. It is thus 238
the one that sets the tone of the issue that is devoted to the question of the relation between 
 It is interesting to underline that Lacan published his text “Lituraterre” in the same Journal and issue in which 238
Cixous published her commentary on Dora’s case in which she attacks the early Lacan and his conception of the 
letter in a manner close to that of Derrida. I will come back to this in Chapter Three.
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Literature and Psychoanalysis. The whole piece, which is highly literary in itself for a theoretical 
text (since it uses many puns and verbal creations), is a commentary by the author himself of 
“The Seminar on The Purloined Letter.” It is also a text that Jacques-Alain Miller has decided to 
place as the opening text of Lacan's Autres Ecrits, which is to say at the opening of the collection 
of texts that represent the late teaching of Lacan. As such, one could argue that “Lituraterre” is a 
rereading of the early Lacan by the late Lacan. 
From the Signifier to the Letter 
The common point between the early Lacan and the late Lacan is to be found in a famous pun, 
repeated many times in James Joyce's Finnegans Wake, “a letter, a litter,” a pun that Lacan 
mentioned during his Seminar on “The Purloined Letter,” and that he quotes once again in 
“Lituraterre.”  The main goal of this text is to take a position against the way in which 239
literature is generally being used by psychoanalysts. Lacan’s basic thesis is that literary criticism 
has not received “any fresh air from psychoanalysis” (3-4).  By submitting a literary text to an 240
Oedipal analysis, most psychoanalytic readings are blind to the riddle of literature itself. As such, 
one could argue that Lacan is taking the side of Derrida on the question. However, it remains to 
be understood how Lacan defends his own reading of Poe against Derrida's attack on it.  
 Lacan writes, “In what they turned between their fingers what did they hold but what did not answer to their 239
description “A letter, a litter”: in Joyce' circle, they played on the homophony of the two words in English” (40). 
See, also, Our Examination round His Factification for Incamination of Works in Progress, Paris: Shakespeare & 
Co., 1929. 
 See Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire XVIII, D’un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant. Edited by Jacques-Alain 240
Miller, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 2007. Lacan writes, “Je vous parle de La lettre volée telle que je l’ai articulé moi-
même. C’est la une illustration que je peux donner à la question que j’ai posé la dernière fois. Est-ce que ce n’est pas 
radicalement différent celui qui écrit, et celui qui parle en son nom au titre du narrateur dans un écrit ? A ce niveau 
c’est sensible. En effet, ce qui se passe au niveau du narrateur, c’est en fin de compte ce que je pourrais appeler – je 
m’excuse d’insister sur le caractère démonstratif de ce petit essai – la plus parfaite castration, qui est là 
démontrée. Tout le monde est également cocu et personne n’en sait rien” (104). 
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 To do so, Lacan argues in “Lituraterre” that one needs to distinguish the letter from the 
signifier it carries.  In the case of The Purloined Letter, it is quite simple, since we never know 
the signifier that the letter is carrying, but that we know what effect the letter is producing on the 
person that possess it (an effect of femininization).  The letter, as an epistle, is the equivalent of 241
the phallus. Lacan leaves no ambiguity about it. Lacan said, when he made a comment about it 
during his Seminar XVIII, “I specifically speak exclusively in these pages of the function of the 
phallus inasmuch as it is articulated in a certain discourse” (my translation).  The function of 242
the Phallus is illustrated, first, by the character of the Minister, who is a character known for a 
certain fantasy about himself, which is the fantasy “of a man who dares anything.” 
At a more abstract level, what does the notion of letter mean? The letter, for Lacan, is 
what is capable of producing subjective effects beyond any form of meaning, and the signifier, 
what is reducible to what carries meaning. This is why, on a more abstract level, the letter 
designates, for Lacan, the structure of language inasmuch as the subject is involved in it. When 
Lacan wrote “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud” he used the 
word letter to talk about the way in which the subject and language although two separate 
entities, are also fundamentally connected to one another through a “littoral.” In other words, the 
subject does not use language as an external tool to express his needs, and language, in turn, is 
not reducible to a set of grammatical and syntactic structures. When a subject speaks, he is 
 Commenting of the homophony between the word letter in The Purloined Letter, which refers to an epistle, and 241
the word letter, in “Instance of the letter…,” which refers to the alphabetic letter, Lacan writes, in Seminar XVIII, 
“(…) ce n’est pas absolument pour rien que mes Ecrits commençaient par Le séminaire sur “La Lettre Volee ». La 
lettre est prise là dans un autre sens que celui de L’Instance de lettre dans l’inconscient, qui est celui de 
l’epistole” (92).  
 “Je ne parle très précisément dans ces pages que de la fonction du phallus en tant qu’elle s’articule dans un 242
certain discours” (94).
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directly affected, and to a certain point spoken by the language he is using, and the very nature of 
the system of signs that the subject is using is also affected by the fact that it is being used by a 
living being.  This is why Lacan, in “Lituraterre,” says that the letter is also a “littoral,” which 243
is to say a point of contact between two realities that have nothing in common but the fact that 
their very nature changes when they encounter the “other.”  
The Letter: a Shore Between the Body and the Signifier 
Language, as such, has its own matter and structure. The subject, as subject of jouissance, also 
has its own matter and structure. But the nature of the two is altered as soon as they get in 
contact with one another. Lacan writes, “The letter is it not . . . littoral more properly, that is, 
figuring as a domain entirely made for the other frontier, in that they are strangers, to the extent 
of not being reciprocal (my translation).”  In other words, between the subject of jouissance 244
and language exists a strange shore that Lacan named the letter (or litter), which is to say the 
littoral between language as a system of signs, and the living beings as subject of jouissance. But 
how does Lacan articulate the two? Opposing here, without mentioning him, Derrida, Lacan 
writes, “What I have inscribed, with the help of letters, of the formations of the unconscious to 
recuperate them from that of which Freud formulates them, as being what they are, effects of the 
signifier, does not authorize us to make of the letter a signifier, nor to affect for it, which is more, 
 Commenting on this idea, Alfarandy writes, “La parole n’est pas l’attribut du sujet comme le prétend la 243
linguistique, ni même sa prérogative, c’est au contraire, le sujet, singulièrement bien nommé puisqu’il s’entend 
comme assujetti à un ordre qui le dépasse, qui est l’effet de cette cause de laquelle il participe mais qui lui 
échappe” (163).
 “La lettre n’est-elle pas… littorale plus proprement, soit figurant qu’un domaine tout entier fait pour l’autre 244
frontière, de ce qu’ils sont étrangers, jusqu’à n’être pas réciproque” (14). 
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a primacy in regard to the signifier” (14). If the letter designates a shore (a littoral) between 
language as such and the subject of jouissance, it also means that the letter is not, as Derrida 
thought, primary in regard to language itself. On the contrary, for Lacan the letter has to be 
conceived as a “ruissèlement,” i.e. as a streaming down of water (or a streaming down of 
signifiers) that comes to mark the ground (the body of the speaking being).  
This image of the streaming down of water is, in some sense, not that far from the image 
that Saussure uses to understand the articulation between a signifier and its signified, since 
Saussure used the metaphor of condensation to demonstrate their junction.  Lacan, however, 245
unlike Saussure, uses the metaphor of the streaming down of water to make more complex the 
articulation between the signifier and its signified by adding to it the idea of the ground onto 
which the condensation of water leaves its marks. The letter, contrary to the Saussurian sign, is 
not the harmonious junction between a signifier and its signified but the contingent and real 
effect produced by a signifier, not yet stabilized into a sign, on a body that erases its signified as 
much as it embodies it. Lacan writes, “The streaming is the bouquet of a first stroke (trait) and of 
what effaces it. I have said it: it is from their conjunction that the subject is made, but in that two 
times are marked there. It is necessary then that the erasure be distinguished there” (16). The 
“first trait” that Lacan mentions here is the « unary trait » through which a subject identifies with 
a signifier that will serve him, afterwards, to represent himself in relation to other signifiers (and 
thus to other subjects). This first moment is, of course, a well-known reference to Lacan’s early 
 See Chapter Two, Part I, Saussure: The Linguistic Turn. 245
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definition of the signifier as “what represents a subject for another signifier” (819).  In a second 246
moment, however, what erases this first identification to a signifier, or rather what makes this 
kind of identification precarious is the way in which it resonates at a body level in the subject 
that has identified with it. In other words, a signifier becomes a letter, for Lacan, as soon as it 
touches the body of a subject and loses any possibility of forming a stable sign. It functions 
exactly like the mathematical formula that Lacan gave during his Baltimore conference. 
When a signifier touches a subject, it loses its possible universal signified in order to 
become, instead, a letter, that is, what turns the abstract concept of shore (of littoral) into a “litura 
pure,” which means into something “literal.” This pure letter, that emerges once the “first trait” 
of identification has been crossed out, is thus not what carries meaning in Lacan, and thus neither 
what is related to the order of the Phallus as Derrida suggests in The Factor of Truth. On the 
contrary, the letter is what literally represents what is the most opposed to such order, i.e. the  
unbridled jouissance of the subject. It is, indeed, the jouissance of the body of the subject that 
breaks the order of the signifier, what Lacan calls also the order of semblance—and thus the 
order of the Phallus—by destabilizing the system of signified that articulates such order at a 
universal level. As such, one could argue that the letter is comparable to Derrida’s concept of 
archi-trace, even if the concept of the letter implies, in Lacan, the presence of a fixated 
 See Lacan, “Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient,” in Ecrits I-II, 793-828. For the 246
English version see “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” in 
Ecrits, 671-702. 
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jouissance that is absent from Derrida’s concept.  Lacan writes, “What is evoked of jouissance 247
insofar as a semblant is broken, this is what in the real presents itself as a furrowing” (my 
translation).   248
The Jouissance of the Letter 
What leaves its marks on the body, what makes furrowed erosions on it, is the way in which the 
jouissance of the body crosses out the signifiers to which the subject is identified. As a 
consequence, the letter is also, for Lacan, what produces holes in the order of knowledge, since 
its very presence is what disrupts the normal functioning of the order of the signifier, and thus 
the normal functioning of knowledge. Lacan writes, “The edge of the hole in knowledge, is that 
not what it sketches” (my translation)?  Likewise, the notion of writing attached to the notion 249
of the letter works also as an erosion of the signified. As such, writing is not primarily 
subordinated to meaning, and thus to phonology, as it is for Derrida, but directly connected to the 
subject of jouissance. Lacan will even end up saying, in his Seminar XX Encore, that language 
(as structured) is an elucubration of knowledge on a more primitive language made of letters. In 
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XVIIII, “Quelqu’un a écrit un jour que le phallus serait le signifiant qui désignerait le 247
manque de signifiant. C’est absurde, je n’ai jamais articulé une chose pareille. Le phallus est très proprement le 
jouissance sexuelle en tant qu’elle est coordonnée à un semblant, qu’elle est solidaire d’un semblant” (34). “La 
fonction dite du phallus – qui est, à vrai dire, la plus maladroitement maniée, mais qui est là et qui fonctionne dans 
ce qu’il en est d’une expérience, qui n’est pas seulement liée à je ne sais quoi qui serait à considérer comme déviant, 
pathologique, mais qui est essentiel comme tel à l’institution du discours analytique, -- cette fonction du phallus rend 
désormais intenable la bipolarité sexuelle, et intenable d’une façon qui volatilise littéralement ce qu’il en est de ce 
qui peut s’écrire de ce rapport” (67). “Le phallus c’est l’organe en tant qu’il est la jouissance féminine” (67). 
“L’instrument phallus, je vous ai déjà dit qu’il n’est pas à confondre avec le pénis. Le pénis, lui, se règle sur la loi, 
c’est-à-dire sur le désir, c’est-à-dire sur le plus-de-jouir, c’est-à-dire sur la cause du désir, c’est-à-dire sur le 
fantasme” (70). “Voila l’instrument phallique posé, avec des guillemets, comme cause du langage, je n’ai pas dit 
origine” (71).
 “ce qui de jouissance s’évoque à ce que se rompe un semblant, voilà dans le réel ce qui se présente comme 248
ravinement” (17).
 “Le bord du trou dans le savoir, voilà-t-il pas ce qu’elle [la lettre] dessine” (14).249
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this sense, one could argue that writing, for Lacan, is similar to Derrida’s concept of general 
writing, which is to say equivalent to Derrida’s notions of grammatology. However, in contrast 
with Derrida, Lacan tried to invent a discourse that could take its departure from the littoral of 
the letter, but that would not reduce it to the order of the signifier, and nor to a purely 
meaningless productions of letters. Lacan writes, “Is it possible from the littoral to constitute a 
discourse such as characterizes itself as not being emitted from the semblant? There is the 
question only proposed by the literature called avant-garde, which is itself made of the littoral: 
and thus, does not sustain itself by the semblant, but for all that proves nothing but the breakage, 
which only a discourse can produce, with an impact of production” (my translation).  It is 250
precisely this question that Lacan explored through the study of feminine jouissance, and that he 
conceptualized, as the next chapter will show, thanks to the logical quantifier of the “not-
all” (which Lacan opposes to the more familiar notion of the “for all.”), and that Hélène Cixous, 
with the help of Derrida and Georges Bataille, turned into a new form of feminine writing.  
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CHAPTER THREE: TO BELIEVE WEEPING 
Cixous's 'Feminine Writing' in Relation to Lacan, Bataille and Derrida 
Either we believe weeping, and then we can 
inhabit the world where the feminine being 
and the masculine being come into contact, 
exchange with each other, caress each other, 
respect each other, or quite incapable of 
maintaining a discourse as to their exact 
differences, but live them, these differences, 
and where – as the opening to the text tells 
us – if masculine and feminine agree with 
each other (I cannot say understand each 
other) it is because there is feminine, there 
is masculine, in the one and in the 
other. There are obviously points of 
conjunction–which does not mean 
identification. 
Hélène Cixous 
The Feminist Critiques of Lacan’s Return to Freud 
Largely inspired by Derrida’s critique of Lacan’s pha-logo-centrism, many feminists, gender and 
queer scholars have argued that Lacan’s “Return to Freud” did nothing more than turn the value 
attributed by Freud to the male penis into a Phallic function. Lacan, they argued, remained 
faithful to Freud’s Phallo-centrism (as Ernest Jones coined it ) and  thus to his unconscious 251
 Jones accused Freud, in “The early Development of Female Sexuality” (1927), of having adopted regarding 251
female sexuality an “unduly phallo-centric view of the problem in question” (439). Jones argued that the “phallic 
phase” (during which the “penis envy” is supposed to emerge in the mental life of the little girl) represented a 
secondary defensive solution to a psychic conflict that had its roots not in the traumatic discovery of the anatomical 
difference between the two sexes (and the kind of trauma that it can trigger in both sexes), but in the 
privilegeaccorded to the boy’s penis in Freud’s theory. Jones himself had actually stumbled on this “unduly phallo-
centric” privilege in “The theory of Symbolism” (1916), a paper in which he had “discovered,” to his own 
astonishment, that most symbols were not only of a sexual nature but, in one way or another, connected to the male 
organ, i.e., the Phallus. Jones writes: “The field of sexual symbolism is an outstandingly rich and varied one, and the 
vast majority of symbols belongs to this category. There are probably more symbols of the male organ itself than all 
other symbols put together. This is a totally unexpected finding, even more so of the paucity of symbolized ideas in 
general, and is so difficult to reconcile with our sense of proportion that it needs an effort to refuse the easy escape 
of simply denying the facts, a feat which is greatly facilitated by the circumstance that, thanks to our education, the 
facts are not very accessible” (103).
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misogyny.  However, as this chapter will show, the position of Lacan on the question of the 252
Phallus, and then on the question of femininity, is not only complex, but also multilayered. My 
thesis is that Lacan’s trajectory, in regard to these question, has been directly opposed to Freud’s. 
Freud, for his part, paid more and more attention to the Oedipus complex and the place that the 
male organ played in it while he was paying less and less attention to the question of infantile 
sexuality. On the contrary, as this chapter will show, Lacan attributed less and less importance to 
the figure of the father as he paid more and more attention to the question of femininity, and with 
femininity to the question of singularity. It is, to put it differently,  thanks to his late conception 
of femininity (developed in his Seminar XX Encore)—as being “not all” submitted to the Phallic 
function—that Lacan was able to explore further the connections between object a, the subject of 
jouissance and the notion of the letter.  
 Such complexity, I believe, could explain why, as Elisabeth Grosz puts it in her Feminist 
Introduction to Jacques Lacan “The relations between his [Lacan] version of psychoanalysis and 
feminism remain ambivalent. It is never entirely clear whether he is simply a subtler misogynist 
than Freud, or whether his reading of Freud constitutes a ‘feminist’ breakthrough” (148).  For 253
many Anglo-American feminists Lacan’s merit is very limited since he kept using words that are 
clearly privileging men when it comes to power, and words that are clearly referring to women 
when he talks about bodily pleasure, masquerade, and motherhood.  Lacan used during the 254
"Return to Freud" the expression the Name-of-the-Father to talk about the inscription, at a 
 See, for example, Braidotti, Rosi. “In Lacan’s Shadow,” Patterns of Dissonance, New York: Routledge, 1991, 252
224-38.
 Grosz, Elizabeth. Jacques Lacan, a Feminist Introduction, New York: Routledge, 1990.253
 See, in particular, Wright, Elizabeth. Lacan and Postfeminism, Cambridge: Totem Books, 2000. 254
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singular level, of the Symbolic law. He used the word Phallus to think about sexual difference. 
He invented, also, the notion of feminine jouissance to talk about a form of pleasure that escapes 
the logic of castration. Thus, one could easily argue (without taking the pains to read him) Lacan 
did nothing more than turn Freud’s myth of the Oedipus complex into a logical function and thus 
remained faithful to Freud’s Phallo-centrism (as Ernest Jones coined it). 
However, to take Lacan’s concepts out of their more nuanced context, and to judge them 
according to what they mean only in a patriarchal context is not only intellectually dishonest, but 
also, as the famous feminist psychoanalyst who defended the legacy of Freud and Lacan, Juliet 
Mitchell, claimed, false. In her Lacan’s Reader on Feminine Sexuality, Mitchell suggested that 
most feminists have not properly understood Freud and Lacan since “Freud, and Lacan after him, 
are both accused of producing phallocentric theories–of taking man as the norm and woman as 
what is different therefrom” (8). According to Mitchell, Freud and Lacan’s Phallocentrism, 
contrary to what most feminists claim, is not the sign of their misogyny but, on the contrary, the 
logical consequence of the effort they made to extract sexuality from any form of biological 
determinism. The logic of the Phallus is, primarily, a logic of the cultural production of sexual 
difference, and not a theory that aims at reinforcing the unconscious logic that supports 
patriarchy. To put it differently, the logic of the Phallus is a way to explain sexual difference 
when such a difference has no biological foundation. In this view, for both sexes the Phallus 
represents a lack and, at the same time, what can fulfil it. Consequently, Freud, and even more 
so, Lacan’s Phallo-centrism should not be seen as a way to reinforce a given social order, but as a 
way to describe its current functioning, and thus as a potential tool, for feminists, to subvert it. 
Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, another important feminist supporter of Lacan writes, in Jacques Lacan 
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and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (1986):  
By equating Lacan’s phallic signifier with patriarchy, she [Luce Irigaray, but also most 
feminists who criticize Lacan] substantivizes the concept biologically so that Phallus = 
Penis = male. Her views therefore imply that males and females have natural psychic 
attributes in keeping with gender. By failing to accept the structural effect and symbolic 
nature of the Lacanian phallic signifier—neutral in its own right—Irigaray’s assessment 
of Lacan as a phallocrat is wrong. (Lacan and Philosophy, 273)  
If most feminists accused Freud, and even more Lacan, for being misogynist, it is because they 
have reduced the concept of the Phallus, developed by Freud, and then reread by Lacan, to its 
biological origin, and thus reduced it to the male’s penis, and to men in general. Likewise, for 
many Anglo-American feminists, Cixous’ definition of the “feminine,” has been accused of 
essentialism inasmuch as they are both supposed to reproduce, although in an inverted way, all 
the clichés around which patriarchy has defined the “feminine.” 
Opposing such a reading, I argue, in this chapter, that Lacan’s approach of the “feminine” 
shifted when he developed his later teaching beyond the Oedipus complex. Second, the argument 
ventures the hypothesis that once reread through the framework of the later Lacan, Cixous’ 
approach of the “feminine,” far from being reducible to a form of essentialism, offers a very 
intriguing way to posit the “feminine” without having to define it through its negative relation to 
the Phallus. In the first part of this chapter, I thus re-inscribe Cixous’ concept and practice of the 
“feminine” within the feminist and psychoanalytical context in which it emerged. Building on 
!196
this context, I then show  how Cixous’ notion of the feminine takes its departure from Lacan’s 
later elaboration on the feminine while going beyond it through a re-appropriation of Bataille’s 
notion of general economy, and Derrida’s notion of writing. 
I. THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX RELOADED 
To understand what Cixous means when she talks about “feminine writing”  in “The Laugh of 255
the Medusa,” or when she argues in favor of a “feminine economy” in “Castration or 
Decapitation,” one has to understand, first, how the notion of the feminine had been defined by 
Freud, and by the early Lacan in his famous text, “The Signification of the Phallus”; and how 
Lacan, in his later teaching, re-problematized his own definition of the feminine in terms of 
jouissance. For it is as an answer to the problems and paradoxes that Lacan's teaching creates 
around the notion of the feminine and its relation (and non-relation) to the Phallus that Cixous’ 
own notion of the feminine acquires its full pertinence.  In order to present Freud’s theory of 
femininity, I have chosen to divide the first part of this chapter into three parts. In the first, I 
present Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality and its relation to Freud’s theory of the drives. In the 
second, I discuss Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex and its relation to Freud’s theory of 
psychosexual development. In the third, I present Freud’s theory of femininity within the context 
of Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality, and Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex.     
 “Woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women to writing” (875).255
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Freud’s Theory of Infantile Sexuality 
To understand Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality, one has to understand the reason why Freud 
himself was led to such a groundbreaking theory. At first Freud simply thought that most 
symptoms of his hysterical patient’s symptoms had their roots in an early sexual trauma. This 
trauma, in turn, was supposed to have been repressed in the unconscious and returned in the form 
of the hysterical symptoms. Consequently, the young Freud argued that all mental illness were 
due to an early sexual encounter with an adult (most of the time the father) that had been found 
by the ego of the child incompatible with its own values, or the values of society. The child’s 
ego, in order to cope with the anxiety generated by the incompatible experience, put in place 
mechanisms of defense that aim at keeping the trauma away from consciousness. And it is out of 
these defense mechanisms that the child starts developing neurotic symptoms that are the indirect 
expression of what has been repressed. This was the basis of Freud’s infantile seduction theory, a 
theory that he developed in 1896.  This theory provided the explanation for the origin of neurosis 
(hysteria and obsessional). The theory also oriented psychoanalytic cure: to help the patient 
remember the trauma in order to lift the defense mechanisms that were preventing the conscious 
processing of the repressed materials.  However, after having tried to locate in the past of his 256
patients the actual sexual trauma which could have caused their symptoms, Freud came to the 
 For more details on Freud's seduction theory, see Schimek J. G. “Fact and Fantasy in the Seduction Theory: a 256
Historical Review.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 35, 1987, pp. 937-65; and see also 
McCullough, M.L. “Freud's seduction theory and its rehabilitation: A saga of one mistake after another. Review of 
General Psychology, vol. 5, no. 1: 3-22, 2001. 
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conclusion that, in many cases, the sexual trauma had not really happened.  Freud consequently 257
renounced his infantile seduction theory and proposed, instead, that most traumas were of the 
order of a fantasy, and thus not real. Consequently, Freud moved from a trauma based theory to a 
fantasy based theory, and by doing so, stopped paying so much attention to the ego and its 
defense mechanisms, and started to look for the cause of the fantasy at an unconscious level.  258
And it is this move away from the ego and the reality of the trauma that pushed Freud to 
articulate his groundbreaking theory of infantile sexuality. His theory was strongly rejected by 
his medical colleagues as well as by the Good Society of Vienna who took for granted Krafft-
Ebing's Psychopathia Sexualis (1893) or Havelock Ellis's Studies in the Psychology of Sex 
(1897) view that sexuality was absent in childhood, and only revealed during puberty through the 
manifestation of an irresistible attraction exercised by one sex upon the other.   259
 Freud, Sigmund. The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1888-1904. Translation and Edition 257
J. Masson, Harvard University Press, 1985. See, in particular pp. 264-266. In this letter, Freud explains to Fliess that 
to maintain his seduction theory would amount to accusing most fathers of being perverts, and to accuse almost all 
of them of being responsible for the neurosis of their children. He also emphasized the fact that the remembering of 
the trauma was most of the time not enough to cure the symptom of his patient. The war neurosis that Freud studied 
at the end of the First World War actually confirmed this hypothesis since in the case of this neurosis, it is the trauma 
itself that becomes the center of the compulsion to repeat.  
This move from a trauma based theory to a fantasy based theory triggered many discussions in the psychoanalytic 258
community. The subject is still sensitive nowadays, especially when it comes to questions of rape. Of course, Freud 
never dismissed the possibility of an actual trauma as being the real cause of a mental illness, but he nonetheless 
underlined the crucial importance played by the role of a fantasy in any form of experience. For more information 
about this important debate, see Moussaieff Masson, Jeffrey. The Assault on Truth. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1984. 
In this book Masson argues that Freud changed his theory because he refused to believe that so many children had 
actually been abused by parents. In a feminist manner, Masson accused Freud of depriving his women patients (such 
as Dora for example) of voicing their legitimate discontent against their oppressor, since the cause of the trauma is 
no longer said to be real, but internal. Consequently, while in the first theory, patients were seen as the victims of 
real aggressions, they became, within the second theory, fantastically responsible of their own misery. Kate Millet, 
in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, writes: “Freud often dealt with children, especially females, 
who had been sexually abused; he resolved the entire problem by deciding that it was an Oedipal fantasy on their 
part. So female children were not only sexually abused, they had to assent that they imagined it. This process 
undermines sanity, since if what takes place isn’t real but imaginary, then you are at fault: you are illogical, as well 
as naughty, to have imagined an unimaginable act: incest. You ascribe guilt to your father, and you are also a very 
guilty, sexy little creature yourself. So much for you (222).
 For more details on this point, see Sulloway, Frank J. “Freud and the Sexologists,” in Freud Biologist of the 259
Mind, Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend, New York: Basic Book, 1979. 
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Opposing this simplistic (and almost angelical) view, Freud argued, in Three Essays on 
the Theory of Sexuality (1905), that sexuality was something more diffuse (present in many 
different parts of the body), and that made itself felt from the first years of life. Thus, instead of 
considering children as little angels, Freud proposed to see them as having to deal with the 
delicate, and most of the time overwhelming task of discharging excitations (coming from within 
and from without) impinging upon them. Freud went even as far as describing the infant, 
regardless of his sexed body, as a polymorphous perverse, i.e., as being capable of extracting 
sexual pleasure from virtually any erotogenic part of his body. Freud then concluded that what 
was held as the natural expression of human sexuality—the famous genital stage represented by 
heterosexual patriarchal family structure—was a construction to be explained rather than a 
biological ground upon which to build a theory of human development. On the contrary, Freud 
boldly declared that the object of the drives were variable, contingent and only chosen in their 
definitive form in consequence of the oddities of one's own life.  In other words, instead of 260
taking monogamous heterosexuality as a norm, and all deviations from this “norm” as 
perversions, Freud took perversion as the “normal” case, and made of genital sexuality the 
particular case to be explained.  
Of course, such a theory was not only shocking for the scientific and scholarly 
community of his time, but it also provoked a very strong rejection within psychoanalysis itself. 
 The word drive, in Freud’s theory, designates any form of biological or psychological need that has the power of 260
driving the behavior of an individual. Freud isolated four different kind of drives: the oral, the anal, the phallic and 
the genital drive. More importantly, Freud argued that each of these drives needed to be separated in four elements: 
the source of excitation, the pressure that it imposes on the organism, the object to which the excitation gets 
attached, and the aim, i.e., the way in which the satisfaction is obtained. In the case of the oral drive, for example, 
the drive arises from the cavity of the mouth (the source), creates the need for sucking activities (the aim), and gets 
attached to particular external objects, such as the mother's breast (the object).
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In the introduction to the fourth edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) 
Freud asserted that the reason why his theory of infantile sexuality was rejected was that it 
confronted humanity with the “ugly,” repressed truth that a realm of brute sexual corporality 
underlined the higher spheres of mental life. And that such confrontation triggered in those who 
hear his theory a form of defense mechanism that was correlated with the kind of resistance that 
his patients were opposing to the advancement of the cure. Applying to himself the formula of 
the poet Friedrich Hebbel, Freud suggested that by formulating his theory about infantile 
sexuality, he ended up “disturbing the sleep of the world,” which is to say that he had become 
someone who had put into question some of the most important and commonly accepted ideas 
about the human nature.   261
But Freud also connected his theory of infantile sexuality to a theory of psychosexual 
development; a theory that was supposed to map the different steps that a child is supposed to 
take in order to become a “normal” adult.  And, through this theory, I would suggest, Freud did 262
not try to disrupt once more “the sleep of the world” but, quite on the contrary, he tried to 
understand how the world had slept for so long. Indeed, Freud proposed a theory of 
psychosexual development that took as its model the patriarchal structure of the western family 
and the ways in which such structure organizes the relationship between the parents (as mother 
and father, but also as husband and wife) and the children. And it is only in connection to this 
 See, Hebbel, Friedrich. “Gyges and His Ring,” Three Plays by Hebbel. Transl. Marion W. Sonnenfeld, Bucknell: 261
Bucknell University Press, 1974,  213-271. Hebbel writes: “So, Gyges, if the wave of life moves you this way or 
that, it will raise you, and higher than you would think. But you must trust it, and not be repelled when the crown 
appears. Only make sure you don’t disturb the sleeping world!” (267-268)
 A libidinal stage marks a moment, in the development of a child, when the libido is organized under the primacy 262
of one erotogenic zone and the relinquishment of other erotogenic zones.
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second theory, as I will show, that the question of female sexuality and femininity became a 
properly psychoanalytic question for Freud.   
Freud’s Theory of Psychosexual Development.  
The theory of psychosexual development that Freud described in “Formulations Regarding the 
Two Principles in Mental Functioning” (1911) as well as in “Papers on 
Metapsychology” (1911-1917) is composed of five stages. First, the child goes through an oral 
phase (between 0 and 1), when it is being fed by the mother or the care-taker; then through an 
anal phase (around 2), when he is trained for toilet use, then through a phallic phase (around 3 to 
6), when it discovers its own sex, and enters the gendered dynamic of the Oedipus complex 
(within which the infant starts to desire his mother and have aggressive feelings towards his 
father), and then through a latent phase (during which sexuality is dormant in the child), and 
finally to a genital phase (which starts at puberty and lasts until the end of life), when the 
primary goal of sexuality is reproduction. However, Freud also stressed that the passage from 
one stage to the other was anything but automatic. He proposed, on the contrary, to see in the 
difficulties (mental and physical) implied in the passage from one stage to the other the very 
cause of all arrested developments in a child, and he made of them the most common cause of 
mental illness (being neurosis or psychosis).  
Freud, then, proposed, in “The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis” (1913), as well as in 
“On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1915), explanations for the child’s psychosexual difficulty 
moving from one stage to the other by introducing a distinction between two opposite kinds of 
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drives. Freud posited first a series of drives linked to sexuality per se—the sexual-drives, which 
he linked to primary narcissism, and a series of drives linked to self-preservation–the ego-drives, 
which he linked to secondary narcissism.  To posit this distinction, Freud pointed to the fact 263
that as soon as the infant passes his oral phase through his “weaning complex” and accesses the 
anal stage, its oral drive, for example, becomes charged with sexual drives that are in conflict 
with the new exigencies of the stage the infant is now in. In other words, Freud explained that the 
passing of each stages was responsible of imposing on the fragmented sexual drives of the infant 
an increased amount of repression, which, in turn, was responsible of creating, within the infant 
psyche, a series of unconscious psychical conflicts between what was required of it to survive, 
which was at the origin of its ego-drives, and what its sexual drives were requesting of it to 
obtain immediate satisfaction. Freud then used this inner conflict to explain the early formation 
of the ego of the child.  
According to Freud, the ego owes its birth and its derivative source of energy to the 
repression imposed by the self-preservation drives onto the sexual drives. As such, Freud 
conceptualized the ego as the representative of the social demands imposed on the infant, and 
thus as the main center of the defense mechanism put forth by the child to keep at bay the 
unworthy polymorphous perverse demands of its drives. This early conception of ego formation 
 The notion of narcissism in Freud’s theory is of a crucial importance. Freud argued that narcissism was a 263
necessary stage between the auto-eroticism of the sexual drives, and the capacity to turn such auto-eroticism 
outward, which is to say, to turn it into an object-love. By primary narcissism, Freud meant the self-love that an 
infant feels about its own body, and its preservation. It is, as he puts it in “On Narcissism: an Introduction”: “the 
libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation” (11). It is then out of this primary narcissism 
that the ego is formed as the consequence of parental control and social expectations. On the other hand, the notion 
of secondary narcissism is a notion that refers to a later period in life when the libido withdraws from object-love to 
choose as its new object the person itself. Consequently, this withdrawal implies, generally, a kind of megalomania 
on the behalf on the narcissistic person, or the possibility of constituting love-object relations of a narcissistic type.  
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is one that corresponds to Freud first topographical representation of the psychic apparatus.  264
Within this first topic, inspired by the scientific context of the time (models in neurology, 
physiology, psychopathology), Freud proposed, in a manner close to the one developed in 
Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) a representation of the human mind as the interaction 
of three subsystems, each of them occupying a certain place in relation to the other. Freud 
assigned to each of these subsystem a separate character and operational mode, and named them: 
the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious. While the unconscious system is in charge 
of keeping all the memory-traces, the one of consciousness supports the activity of perception 
(and the variety of its sensory qualities), and the preconscious system operates the mediation 
between the unconscious system of memory-trace and the purely perceptual system of 
consciousness according to either a diurnal progressive logic (which goes from unconscious to 
consciousness), or a regressive logic (which goes from consciousness to the unconscious) as it is 
visible in dreams formations.  
Through this topographical model of the psyche Freud was able to explain how 
something like the “Reality Principle” could be implemented within the psyche of the child. It 
also enabled him to explain how parts of the polymorphous perversity of the child were actually 
capable of surviving during adulthood at an unconscious level (in the form of neurotic 
symptoms), or even sometimes at a conscious level (sexual perversion), or more simply in 
dreams. Freud also associated the formulation of this topic with the idea that the analytic cure 
should aim at lifting all the defenses of the ego, and help the person reconnect with its sexuality, 
 See Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” in Standard Ed. Vol. 5 (1900-1991), Trans. by J. Strachey, London: 264
Hogarth Press, 1953, pp. 509-610.   
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beyond the barrier of the ego, and all its defense mechanism. Freud thus, one may conclude, 
proposed a theory of psychosexual development as a mix of biological non-essentialism, and 
cultural constructivism, and proposed as the appropriate role assigned to the psychoanalytic cure, 
a kind of undoing of his patient's defense mechanism.  
Freud’s Second Topic and the Death Drive 
Freud conception of the psychic apparatus changed radically in the 20s when he began to notice 
that his basic conception was not adequate to describe an increasing number of clinical cases 
(especially those related to war neurosis and masochism). Freud had argued in his Project for a 
Scientific Psychology (1895) that the psychic apparatus was a homeostatic system invested with 
quantities of energy and regulated by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. As such, 
the pleasure principle, according to Freud, was nothing more than a principle of consistency that 
was not fundamentally opposed to the reality principle inasmuch as the reality principle was only 
an external agency demanding a postponing of satisfaction, but not its renouncement. In other 
words, Freud thought, up until he wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), that the pleasure 
principle and the reality principle were not opposed to one another, but obeying the same logic. 
However, Freud encountered many clinical cases that seemed to prove exactly the opposite. In 
the case of war neurotics, for example, the recurrence of their nightmares as well as their 
inclination to keep remembering the trauma that they had experienced seemed to prove that 
something other than the pleasure principle was at play at the very core of the human psyche. 
Likewise, the joy taken by the masochist in his own mistreatment as well as the inner sense of 
guilt felt by neurotic people seemed also to be at odds with Freud’s pleasure principle. Finally, 
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the famous “fort-da” game that Freud witnessed in his little nephew’s playing, and the way he 
interpreted it as a ‘playful’ repetition of the traumatic experience of departure of the mother, 
seemed also to contradict his earlier theory. As a result, Freud concluded that beyond the life 
drive (and their division into ego-drives and sexual drives) that he had theorized so far, was 
existing a “death drive” that needed to be taken into account. The ‘death drive” became thus the 
drive impelling towards repetition and conservatism, and the “life drive” or “sexual drive” which 
pushed forwards to the creation of new forms. Summarizing his new vision of the psyche in 
“Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1938), Freud wrote: 
If we take into consideration the whole picture made up by the phenomena of masochism 
immanent in so many people, the negative therapeutic reaction of the sense of guilt found 
in so many neurotics, we shall no longer be able to adhere to the belief that mental events 
are exclusively governed by the desire for pleasure. These phenomena are unmistakable 
indications of the presence of a power in mental life which we call the instinct of 
aggression or of destruction according to its aims, and which we trace back to the original 
death instinct of living matter. (243) 
And it is through the recognition of this instinct of aggression that Freud was led to redefine 
entirely his model of the psychic apparatus. He argued that aggressiveness was to be understood 
neither as a reaction of self-defense nor as the result of a brutish disposition but rather as the 
expression of an internal conflict that was primarily expressing itself in the form of self-
destructiveness (masochism), and in the form of an aggressive behavior toward others (sadism) 
when allowed to.  
!206
This place attributed by Freud to aggressiveness and the death drive is, without a doubt, 
what triggered the most dissension within the psychoanalytic movement during Freud’s life time, 
and what continues to keep many thinkers distant from Freud’s late theory of the human 
psyche.  (see, for a full analysis of Freud’s notion of the death drive, the Epilogue, Part I). 265
Freud, in Civilization and its Discontent (1929), made of the desire for aggression a central 
element of the human psyche, and connected it to the presence of death and violence and every 
type of human society. And then he used such desire for aggression to dismiss any leftist political 
belief—generally held by Freudian leftist thinkers such as Wilhelm Reich and then Herbert 
Marcuse and the Frankfurt School—that associated a lifting of the social demands imposed on 
each individual with an increase of happiness.  Freud, to state it even more clearly, isolated in 266
the human experience the desire for aggression in order to justify, at a psychoanalytical level, his 
conservative political positions.   267
It is also because of his new emphasis on aggressivity that Freud revised his first 
topology and proposed a new one in The Ego and the Id (1923), which substituted for the triad 
 For more details on this debate, see, Boothby, Death and Desire, Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan’s Return to 265
Freud, New York:  Routledge, 1991.  
 Freud writes, in Civilization and its Discontent: “It was found that men become neurotic because they cannot 266
tolerate the degree of privation that society imposes on them in virtue of its cultural ideals, and it was supposed that 
a return to greater possibilities of happiness would ensue if these standards were abolished or greatly relaxed” (46). 
 Freud writes, “The bit of truth behind all this—one so eagerly denied—is that men are not gentle, friendly 267
creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are attacked, but that a powerful measure of desire 
for aggression has to be reckoned as part of their instinctual endowment. The result is that their neighbor is to them 
not only a possible helper or sexual object, but also a temptation to them to gratify their aggressiveness on him, to 
exploit his capacity for work without recompense, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, 
to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him” (Civilization 85).
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unconscious, pre-conscious, conscious,  the id, the ego and the super-ego.  The main difference 268
between the two models is that in the second topology the three components of the human 
psyche all have a part immerged within the unconscious.  As such, this second topology, unlike 
the first topology, does not borrow its model from the physical sciences but, as Pontalis and 
Laplanche emphasize in The Language of Psychoanalysis, it “is instead shot through with 
anthropomorphism; the intra-subjective fields tend to be conceived of after the fashion of 
intersubjective relations, and the systems are pictured as relatively autonomous persons-within-
the-person (the super-ego, for instance, is said to behave in a sadistic way toward the 
ego)” (452). And it is out of this new anthropocentric model of the human psyche that Freud 
made of the ego the instance in charge of dealing with the opposite claims of the id (the life-
drives) and the super-ego (the “moral conscious”), and that he was led, also, to formulate his 
conception of female sexuality and femininity.   
The Dark Continent of Female Sexuality  
It is, in fact, only as an old man suffering from cancer that Freud started to produce, under the 
pressure of many female analysts surrounding him, which included his own daughter Anna 
Freud, a psychoanalytic theory about female sexuality and femininity. Regarding such a topic, 
Freud assumed for a very long time the idea that male and female sexuality could be thought of 
as paralleling one another. Freud went even as far as suggesting in The Interpretation of Dreams 
 The notion of the super-ego is defined by Freud in his famous article on “The Uncanny” (1919) thus: “The idea 268
of the ‘double’ does not necessarily disappear with the passing of primary narcissism, for it can receive fresh 
meaning from the later stages of the ego’s development. A special agency is slowly formed there, which is able to 
stand over against the rest of the ego, which has the function of observing and criticizing the self and of exercising a 
censorship within the mind, and which we become aware of as our ‘conscience’” (234-235). 
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(1900) that the two positions, in regards to the Oedipus complex, were mirroring one another 
inasmuch as Freud thought that both sexes had a natural attraction for the opposite sex (attraction 
for the mother for the little boy, and attraction for the father for the little girl), as well as a natural 
form of aggressiveness and competition in regards to the same sex (competition with the father 
for the little boy, competition with the mother for the little girl). But it is precisely this ultimate 
trace of biological essentialism that Freud’s theory about gender difference and female sexuality 
will completely overthrow. Such a change in Freud’s theory, of course, did not happened over 
night. It is out of a gradual, and one could say “scientific” process of confronting his previous 
theory with new clinical materials that Freud undertook such a change. Although the precise 
description of this change would be of value, I will only mention here the three most important 
female clinical cases that have lead Freud to change his theory.  After having studied a case of 
female paranoia in “A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the 
Disease” (1915), Freud realized that women could be fixated to their mother, just as little boys 
were.  Then, through the case of “A Child is Being Beaten” (1919)—and perhaps even more 269
through the analysis of his own daughter Anna —Freud came to understand that the place and 270
 Freud, Sigmund. “A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease,” London: 269
Hogarth Press, Vol. 14, 263. In this paper, which deals with the case of a 30 year old woman who falsely accused her 
male lover of having taken nude photographs of her, Freud argues, first, against what he previously thought, that 
paranoia is not necessarily linked to a disavowal of homosexuality (cf. “The case of the President Schreber”), since 
the young women protected herself against her love for a man by developing a paranoiac delusion. However, 
through this paranoiac delusion, concludes Freud, she only exhibited her primary fixation to her mother as a love 
object, and thus to her non-resolved homosexual choice. 
 Freud’s idea about the importance of masochist fantasies in women’s development came to him after having 270
analyzed the “masochist” fantasy of his own daughter, Anna Freud, which she described in her unpublished novel 
Heinrich Musham. Thanks to the analysis of this fantasy, Freud came to the conclusion that masochist fantasies were 
not only typically feminine, but also the very root of women’s “penis envy.”  One could also add, here, that Anna 
Freud started a therapy with her own “sick” father in 1925, the very same year that Freud wrote his first paper on 
feminine sexuality, a paper that Anna Freud read on the behalf of her father (who was too sick to read it himself) 
during the Homburg international Psycho-Analytical Congress, in 1925. For more details on this, see Sayers, Janet, 
“Anna Freud, Father’s child,” in Mothers of Psychoanalysis, Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, Melanie 
Klein, New York: Norton & Company, 1991, 145-151.
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the function of masochist fantasy in women’s sexual development were of a crucial importance 
in order to understand their possible access (or denial) to “normal femininity.”   And finally, in 271
“The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality”  (1920), Freud arrived at the 272
conclusion that “the expectation of there being a complete parallel [between the sexes] was 
mistaken.”  For a very long time, then, Freud kept repeating that the sexual life of women, 273
compared to the one of men, remained for psychoanalysis in complete obscurity.  He even went 274
as far as saying, in his essay “The Question of Lay Analysis” (1926) that “we know less about 
the sexual life of little girls than of boys. But we need not feel ashamed of this distinction; after 
all, the sexual life of adult women is a ‘dark continent’ for psychology.”  However, Freud, 275
despite this seemingly desperate conclusion, started to build, in a series of three conferences 
given between 1925 and 1933, a theory about this “dark continent” by suggesting—even though 
still lacking the proper amount of clinical materials to draw a properly scientific conclusion—
that differing from little boys, little girls were suffering, at an unconscious level, from a “penis 
envy.”  
Regarding this “penis envy”—and before entering into the details of it—one could 
 Freud, “A Child is Being Beaten,” London: Hogarth Press, Standard. Ed, Vol. 17, 177. In this paper, Freud 271
argues that the very common fantasy of being beaten by the father, among little girls, is a way to turn away from 
their mother, and to become the subservient object of the father, that is to say, the object that the father loves the 
most. 
 Freud, “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexualitym,” London: Hogarth, Standard Ed., Vol. 18, 272
147. In this paper, Freud argues that homosexuality, on the side of women, is to be understood as the result of the 
impossibility to win the love of the father when facing a mother who is craving too much male attention.  
 Freud, 197.  273
 See, Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), where Freud argues that “the sexual life of 274
men alone has become accessible to research. That of women, still veiled in an incomprehensible obscurity” (151).
 Freud, 212. 275
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legitimately wonder, as Sarah Kaufman did at the opening of her book The Enigma of Woman, 
Woman in Freud’s Writings (1985), if the reason why Freud waited so long to render this idea 
public was to be found in the fact that he was clearly anticipating that the publication of his 
theory would trigger very negative reactions among women, and perhaps even more among 
women analysts or male analysts with feminist views. Nonetheless, Freud did eventually publish 
his theory, although not without warning his readers about the uncertainty of it.  Freud wrote, 276
in “Some Anatomical Differences Between the Sexes”:  
But now everything has changed. The time before me is limited. The whole of it is no 
longer spent in working, so that my opportunities for making fresh observations are not 
so numerous. If I think I see something new, I am uncertain whether I can wait for it to be 
confirmed. And further, everything that is to be seen upon the surface has already been 
exhausted; what remains has to be slowly and laboriously dragged up from the depths. 
Finally, I am no longer alone. An eager crowd of fellow-workers is ready to make use of 
what is unfinished or doubtful, and I can leave to them that part of the work which I 
should otherwise have done myself. On this occasion, therefore, I feel justified in 
publishing something which stands in urgent need of confirmation before its value or lack 
of value can be decided. (242) 
One could legitimately wonder wether, from the start, the question of female sexuality was at the 
same time the one upon which Freud had been able, through the study of women hysterics, to 
make his major discovery—the unconscious—and also the one around which the very future of 
 See Freud, “Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes,” 243. 276
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psychoanalysis would be at stake. As the rest of this chapter will show, it is, indeed, around the 
question of female sexuality, and particularly around the challenges that this question poses to 
the conceptual apparatus deployed by Freud—especially the Oedipus complex—that most 
critiques of Freudian psychoanalysis started in the early 20s. It is on the same question that the 
split between orthodox and non-orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis happened in 1946. But what 
is Freud’s theory of female sexuality and femininity?  
Freud’s Theory of Femininity  
Freud devoted three papers to the question of female sexuality. The first one was called “Some 
Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes” (1925), the 
second “Female Sexuality” (1931), and the third one “Femininity” (1933).  The common point 277
of departure of these papers is Freud’s theory of early childhood sexuality as he developed it in 
his Three Essays on Sexuality (1905). In this book, Freud argued that during the stage of early 
infancy, little boys and little girls were actually similar. From a biological perspective, little boys 
are said to possess within themselves to a greater or lesser extent, the presence of the sexual 
apparatus of the little girl, and vice versa. In other words, little boys and little girls, as regards to 
their biological constitution, can be said to be potentially bisexual, “as though an individual is 
not a man or a woman but always both” (139). As such, concludes Freud, what distinguishes 
female sexuality from male sexuality cannot be found at a biological level. But Freud also argues 
that this difference can neither be reduced to the psychological one which associates masculinity 
 See Freud, “Female Sexuality,” London: Hogarth Press, Standard Ed., Vol. 21, 223. And for the reference to 277
Freud’s text on “Femininity,” see Freud, “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” London: Hogarth Press, 
Standard Ed., Vol. 22, 3.
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with activity, and femininity with passivity. Even though such an association can be supported by 
biological evidence, it can also be easily refuted by means of counter biological evidence and, 
more importantly, it leaves ultimately the one who uses it with the same consequence: if 
masculinity is defined by activity, and femininity with passivity, then it means that both male and 
female are psychological bisexual since active and passive behavior can be observed on both 
sides of the sexual difference. But if the difference between masculinity and femininity cannot be 
defined at a biological or a psychological level, it means that it has to be defined in relation to 
something that is external to it.  
In the case of little boys, the external element that comes to shape their sexuality is the 
Oedipus complex. The Oedipus complex is the name that Freud gave to the libidinal stage—the 
phallic one—during which the little boy starts desiring his mother as his love object, and regards 
his father as his rival. To escape this complex, Freud argued in “The Dissolution Of the Oedipus 
Complex” (1924) that the little boy had to be dragged out of it through his fear of castration, a 
fear imposed on him by the threatening presence of his father, or any other authoritative 
figure.  Now, unlike little boys, the encountering of the Oedipus complex by little girls during 278
the phallic phase (the phallic phase that little girls share with boys) raises one more problem 
according to Freud: “How does it happen,” writes Freud, “that girls abandon it [their first love 
object, which is the mother] and instead take their fathers as an object?” (Some Psychological… 
248) To answer this question Freud argued, in “Femininity,” that the whole psychological and 
 See, for example, Freud, “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Years old Boy,” London: Hogarth, Vol. 10, 1-148. In 278
this clinical case, Freud describes the difficulties that a five years old boy named Hans had going through his own 
Oedipus complex, that is to say the difficulties he had to overcome his castration complex (and the way in which the 
little Hans developed a phobia in order to materialize and contain his otherwise unmanageable anxiety). The case 
also highlights the difficulty that triggered, for a little boy, the discovery of the anatomical difference between the 
sexes. 
!213
sexual development of women was actually dependent on the little girl’s discovery about the 
anatomical difference between boys and girls. In comparison to little boys, little girls recognize 
the ostensibly visible organ of little boys “as being the superior counterpart of their own small 
and inconspicuous organ, and from that time forward fall a victim to envy for the penis” (249). In 
other words, it is inasmuch as little girls suffer from ‘penis envy’ that their psychological 
evolution differs from the one of men (men are anxious about losing their penis). Freud writes,  
One cannot very well doubt the importance of envy for the penis. You may take it as an 
instance of male injustice if I assert that envy and jealousy play an even greater part in the 
mental life of a woman than of men. It is not that I think these characteristics are absent 
in men or that I think they have no other roots in women than envy for the penis, but I am 
inclined to attribute their greater amount in women to this latter influence. Some analysts, 
however, have shown an inclination to depreciate the importance of this first installment 
of penis envy in the phallic phase. (125)   
 Thanks to this “penis envy,” Freud then proceeded to explain many “oddities” of the little girls’ 
sexual and emotional development. For example, it is because little girls hold their mother 
responsible for their lack of penis that they turn away from their mother. “Girls hold their mother 
responsible for their lack of penis and do not forgive her for their being thus put at a 
disadvantage” (Femininity 124). But it is also thanks to their “penis envy” that little girls take 
their father as their new love object. Freud writes: “the wish with which the girl turns to her 
father is no doubt originally the wish for the penis which her mother has refused her and which 
she now expects from the father” (128). But it is only at the condition that the little girl manages 
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to repress her “penis envy” and exchange it for the desire to receive a baby from the father that 
she can properly enter into the Oedipus complex. Freud writes: “the feminine situation is only 
established, however, if the wish for a penis is replaced by one for a baby, if, that is, a baby takes 
the place of a penis in accordance with an ancient symbolic equivalence.” (128). If, however, the 
little girl refuses to let go of her “penis envy,” she is then bound to fall prey of a “masculinity 
complex.”  
The Masculinity Complex  
The “masculinity complex” is the name that Freud gave to the little girl’s refusal to let go of her 
“penis envy,” as well her potential future denial, disavowal or foreclosure of her very condition 
as a “feminine” woman. She may even, adds Freud, start to develop a of form of contempt for 
her own sex. “Thus,” writes Freud, “a girl may refuse to accept the fact of being castrated, may 
harden herself in the conviction that she does possess a penis, and may subsequently be 
compelled to behave as though she were a man” (Some Psychological…, 244). And even if a 
little girl accepts, at a conscious level, her castrated condition, she may still express her repressed 
“penis envy” in a form of jealousy that, stresses Freud, is not strictly speaking the property of 
womanhood, but nonetheless more frequent among women than men. Finally, the last but not 
least consequence of the little girl’s “penis envy” is to be located in her relationship to her 
clitoris. If, indeed, the clitoris is comparable to a penis in the sense that it can be actively 
masturbated (just as little boy can actively masturbate his), the little girl has to let go of this 
activity in order to access a “proper” feminine sexuality, i.e., to switch from the active pleasure 
that she can give to herself through the masturbation of her clitoris to the pleasure that she can 
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receive from the penis of a man.   279
This is why Freud underscores the fact that the situation of little girls and little boys, with 
regard to the Oedipus complex and its articulation with the castration complex, is almost the 
opposite. While the little boy finds in the fear of castration the motor that will enable him, 
through the development of a strong super-ego, to overcome his Oedipus complex, the little girl 
is pushed into the Oedipus complex thanks to her primordial castration and the transformation of 
her “penis envy” into the desire to receive a child from her father. Unlike little boys, then, the 
little girl is maintained indefinitely in a form of rivalry with the mother over the love of the 
father up until she can learn, at puberty, to transfer this love for the father onto another man. As 
such, the Oedipus complex is only a “secondary formation” for little girls, which means, for 
Freud, that it cannot be resolved through the fear of castration, and thus though the creation of a 
strong super-ego, but through love for the father first, and then love for the man who will give to 
the woman a child. Freud writes: “in these circumstances the formation of the super-ego must 
suffer, it cannot attain the strength and independence which give it its cultural significance, and 
feminists are not pleased when we point out to them the effects of this factor upon the average 
feminine character” (Femininity, 129).  
But despite this obviously anti-feminist conclusion, Freud added that it is inasmuch as a 
woman denies or disavows in herself her “penis envy,” or refuses to trade it for a baby in her 
relation to the man she loves, her maturation as an average feminine character can become 
problematic. Freud writes: “The discovery that she is castrated is a turning point in a girl’s 
 One can now understand why Marie Bonaparte became so interested in Freud’s work, and why she decided to go 279
to Vienna to start an analysis with Freud. 
!216
growth. Three possible lines of development starts from it: one leads to sexual inhibition or 
neurosis, the second to change in character in the sense of a masculinity complex, the third, 
finally, to normal femininity” (126). In other words, women have no other choice, according to 
Freud, than to follow the path of their “penis envy” if they want to achieve a mature female 
sexuality (i.e., a sexuality centered on the passivity of the vagina, and not on the activity of the 
clitoris) as well as a “normal” gender identity, i.e., the sexuality and the gender identity of a 
bourgeoise and not the one of an hysteric, a lesbian or a psychotic.  For if a little girl is not 280
capable of repressing her “penis envy” by sublimating it through an attachment to the father, then 
only two other roads are opened to her: the one where she develops a “masculinity complex,” 
where she clings to clitoral masturbation, non-passivity, and which leads to lesbianism; and the 
one where she represses her “penis envy” without managing to sublimate it, and which leads to 
sexual inhibition, frigidity.  
Of course, Freud himself was aware that his approach of “femininity” through the 
concept of “penis envy’ was bound to offend feminists and women psychoanalysts of all kinds. 
In his paper on “Female Sexuality,” (1931) Freud wrote, in the first footnote: “It is to be 
anticipated that men analysts with feminist views, as well as our women analysts, will disagree 
with what I have said here.”  Freud was completely correct in that assessment.  281
 See, Miller, “Of Distribution Between the sexes,” trans. by Philip Dravers in Psychoanalytic Notebooks 11, 280
2003, 9-26. In this text, Jacques-Alain Miller describes the “Freudian Woman” as coinciding with the profile of the 
“bourgeoise,” which is to say with the image of what a woman is supposed to be within the configuration of a 
patriarchal and bourgeois family. 
For a full account of those disagreements about Freud’s theory of “Femininity” within the psychoanalytic 281
movement, see Z. O. Fliegel, “Woman’s Development in Analytic Theory.” in Psychoanalysis and Women: 
Contemporary Reappraisals, Ed. J.L. Alpert Hillsdale, New Jersey: Analytic Press, 3-31
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In Freud’s theory on femininity, the question of the feminine is inseparable from the 
question of the castration complex. For a little boy, it is always the fear of being castrated and, 
for a little girl, the desire to overcome her actual castration that creates a difference between the 
two sexes, which, at a libidinal level, are equivalent. While the little boy, for Freud, represses his 
desire for his mother and endorses his father’s law out of this fear (which is why the castration 
complex marks the exit from the Oedipus complex for boys); the little girl, on the other hand, 
resolves the conflict by accepting her actual castration on the condition that she will retrieve her 
missing penis through the man who will love her, and who will give her a child (which is why 
the castration complex marks the entrance of the little girl into the Oedipus complex). As such, 
many feminists have charged Freud’s theory of femininity with perpetuating a form of 
essentialism at biological and cultural levels. 
II. EARLY PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCONTENTS WITH FEMININITY 
An intense debate around the question of female sexuality took place between 1920 and the 
mid-1930s, and ended in 1946 with the divide of the British Association of Psychoanalysis in 
three different groups of psychoanalysts defending three different conceptions of 
psychoanalysis.  This debate, as the last part of this chapter will show, consisted not only in a 282
critique of Freud’s theory of “femininity,” but it also triggered a critique of the whole orientation 
of Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis. 
 The best account of this debate, as well as the most sophisticated critique of Freud’s view on women can be 282
found in Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender, Berkley: 
University of California, 1978. 
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The Early Feminist Critique of “Penis Envy”  
The first woman analyst who dared to disagree with Freud was the German psychiatrist and 
psychoanalyst Karen Horney.  Trained as an analyst in Berlin by Karl Abraham , she entered 283 284
the debate by answering Abraham’s influential article “Manifestation of the Female Castration 
Complex” (1922). In this article, Abraham dismisses the feminist idea that Freud’s “penis envy” 
was actually not referring to a masculine penis, nor to an anatomical difference between the 
sexes, but to a legitimate political claim in face of all the existing inequalities that impacted the 
possibilities offered to the two sexes. Opposed to this feminist critique of Freud, Abraham argued 
that such a rereading was, in fact, the result of a political process of rationalization over an 
unresolved unconscious “masculinity complex.” Abraham wrote: 
For instance, it is said that girls even in childhood are at a disadvantage to boys because 
boys are allowed greater freedom; or, in later life, men are permitted to choose their 
profession and can extend their sphere of activity in many directions, and especially that 
they are subjected to far fewer restrictions in their sexual life. Psycho-analysis, however, 
 Karen Horney (1885 – 1952) was one of the first woman to receive a medical degree in Germany. She became, 283
under the supervision of Karl Abraham, a Freudian psychoanalyst. She then moved to the United States in 1932 after 
having been rejected by the Freudian orthodox for her heretical views on Freud’s conception of female sexuality. 
She first worked at the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis before moving to Brooklyn where she worked for The 
New School for Social Research and for the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. As a consequence of her many 
disagreements with Freud, and Freudian orthodoxy, she founded her own organization, the Association for the 
Advancement of Psychoanalysis. A psychoanalytic center devoted to Karen Horney's approach of analysis still exists 
today in New York. It offers a feminist approach to analysis.  
 Karl Abraham (1877-1925) was an influential German psychoanalyst, a very close collaborator of Freud who 284
called him his “best pupil.” First introduced to psychoanalysis by Carl Gustav Jung, he met Freud in 1907 in Vienna, 
and returned to Berlin in 1910 where he founded the Berliner Society of Psychoanalysis. He was also the president 
of the International Psychoanalytical Association from 1914 to 1918. He was the analyst of Melanie Klein, Edward 
Glover, Alix Strachey, and the mentor of the Berlin group, which included Karen Horney, Helene Deutsch, and 
Franz Alexander. He was also the first one to underline the importance of the role played by the mother during the 
pre-Oedipal phase. He developed the concept of the “bad” pre-oedipal mother, which  paved the way for Melanie 
Klein's emphasis on the pre-Oedipal phase, as well as  the relationship between the infant and the mother. 
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shows that conscious arguments of this sort are of limited value, and are the result of 
rationalization— a process which veils the motives lying deeper. (467) 
In other words, Abraham, in his paper, reduced the feminist claim about “penis envy” to the 
expression of a rationalization of a hysterical neurosis manifesting itself in a fierce resentment 
over men or, in the best case, in a desire to sublimate a “masculinity complex” through the 
pursuit of an intellectual career—as Abraham thought was the case with most women analysts 
that he was training and supervising (Abraham was also, as we will see, Melanie Klein’s 
analyst).  
Displeased with Abraham’s answer to the early feminist critique of Freud, and more 
broadly with Freud’s theory about female sexuality and femininity, Horney joined, in 1922, a 
politically more progressive branch of psychoanalysis founded by the psychoanalyst Alfred 
Adler.  Adler, although a very close collaborator of Freud, withdrew from Freud’s circle in 285
1911, only a year only after having been appointed at the head of the “Internationale 
Psychoanalytische Vereinigung” (The International Psychoanalytic Association, I.P.A.) that 
Freud had created in 1910 to provide a formal institution for the psychoanalytic movement. 
Adler argued that the creation of such an institution was bound to generate a “censorship of 
scientific freedom.”  And Adler was actually quite right. His eviction from the I.P.A was only 286
 Alfred Adler (1870 – 1937) was an Austrian medical doctor and psychotherapist who created the school of 285
individual psychology, a branch of psychoanalysis that emphasizes the fact that the social realm is as important as 
the internal realm in the analysis of a human psyche. Although a very close collaborator of Freud up until 1910, he 
was nonetheless the first one to leave Freud’s Wednesday evening’s group, and to create an alternative 
psychoanalytic group in Vienna, influenced by Nietzschean and socialist ideas. For more information, see, The 
Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, Ed. Heinz L. Ansbacher & Rowena R. Ansbacher, New York: Basic Books, 
1956. And see also, Hoffman, The Drive for Self: Alfred Adler and the Founding of Individual Psychology, Addison-
Welsey Publishing Company, 1994. 
 Quoted by Freud in “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement.” (50)286
!220
the first of a long list.  Adler left his position in Freud’s movement and created his own 287
psychoanalytic association: The Society for Individual Psychology. The society was centered on a 
Marxist as well as a cultural approach to the social, and a Nietzschean approach to the psyche. 
For Adler, the effects of culture on the development of the psyche, as well as on the construction 
and the definition of “masculinity” and “femininity” were to be placed at the center of 
psychoanalytic concern, and not to be dismissed as mere “rationalization” of any unconscious 
“masculinity complex.”   288
Likewise, the very notion of “masculinity complex,” according to Adler, was not to be 
seen as the result of resistance coming from the ego against an unconscious truth but, on the 
contrary, the healthy expression of a Nietzschean “will to power,” i.e., a conscious desire 
emanating from the individual, and not, as Freud had argued in his theory about femininity, as 
the expression of an unconscious “masculinity complex.” As such, Adler made of the “masculine 
protestation,” which Freud held as the most essential resistance that had to be overcome in each 
of his patients through patient analytic work, the kernel of his Individual Psychology. Freud 
actually wrote a very severe critique of Adler’s psychoanalytical position in “On the History of 
the Psychoanalytic Movement” (1914). Freud argued that Adler, through his theory, had actually 
reduced human behavior to the expression of a single aggressive drive, and that he had thus 
 Although slightly off the topic of this chapter, it is nonetheless important to say that Karl Gustav Jung, whom 287
Freud held as the most intelligent and capable of his disciples, was also invited to withdrew from the I.P.A in 1914 
when Freud realized that Jung was no longer respecting his most fundamental concepts, but that he was creating his 
own approach of the unconscious, as well as assigning a new direction to psychoanalytic treatment. For more detail 
on the difference between Freud and Jung, see, Freud, Sigmund, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic 
Movement,”  60-66. 
 Adler, Alfred. Understanding Human Nature. Trans. Walter B. Wolf, New York: Allen and Unwin, 1928. 288
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forgotten about the other fundamental drive of human nature, which is love.  Consequently, 289
Freud accused Adler of having disposed, within his own theory, of his most important discovery, 
the unconscious. And through this disposal Adler had created a psychology of the “will to 
power” that was perhaps interesting (but not bound to disrupt, as Freud’s theory did, the “sleep of 
the world”), however, that was completely different from what Freud himself had in mind. Freud, 
indeed, thought that the origin of all mental illness was to be found exclusively at a sexual and 
unconscious level, and that the role played by consciousness in regard to those unconscious 
processes was always on the side of defense mechanism, and not on the side of any “will to 
power.” 
Using Adler’s cultural approach as her framework, while substituting for his single 
“aggressive drive,” the dualism of a “female drive,” Horney developed, in a series of 14 papers 
written between 1922 and 1937—collected and published after her death under the title Feminine 
Psychology (1967)—the idea that Freud’s conception of psychoanalysis was suffering from a 
masculine bias that was itself the product and the expression of a misogynist culture. This is 
why, according to Horney, Freud’s conception of “Femininity," as well as the so called normal 
resolution of the “masculinity complex” into a desire for a baby, was nothing but a male fantasy, 
and certainly not an objective description of the condition of women. Horney wrote, in her essay 
“The Flight from Womanhood” (1927), 
Historically the relation of the sexes may be crudely described as that of master and 
 It is interesting to note, here, that Freud criticized Adler for having given too much attention to the aggressive 289
drive, while Freud himself eventually did the same 6 years later when he wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and 
argued in favor of the primordial importance of the aggressive drive within the whole economy of the psychic 
apparatus. Likewise, Freud refused the idea of the existence of an aggressive drive when Sabina Spielrein, in 
“Destruction as the Cause of Becoming” (1912) argued in favor of the existence of an aggressive drive.  
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slave… Here we probably have the explanation also of the underestimation of this factor 
in analytical literature. In actual fact a girl is exposed from birth onward to the 
suggestion… of her inferiority, an experience which must constantly stimulate her 
masculinity complex. (338)  
Reversing Abraham’s argument, and anticipating Simone de Beauvoir application of Hegel’s 
dialectic of the master and the slave to the relation of men and women in patriarchal society, 
Horney showed how woman’s so called “masculinity complex” was nothing but the result of a 
social construction that was aiming at maintaining women in a state of subordination in regards 
to men. Horney went even as far as saying that Freud’s conception of “penis envy” was in fact a 
secondary formation created by culture, and not a primary formation triggered by the discovery 
of the anatomical difference between the sexes.  But to ground her position, Horney had to 290
contest, in her paper “The Masculinity Complex in Women” (1927), one of the most fundamental 
concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis: the existence of a single-masculine libido. Against Freud’s 
monism, Horney argued for the presence, within women, of a specific feminine libido. Horney 
writes: “We have seen that the principle of attraction to the opposite sex, which is at work 
everywhere in nature, makes itself felt from the first years on” (33). In other words, Horney 
thought, against the late Freud (but aligned with the early Freud), that little girls were naturally 
more attracted to the other sex, and thus to their father, and that it was not necessary to elaborate 
a theory about the changing of object, as well as the changing of organ and aim (from the clitoris 
 Following the same lines of reasoning, the psychoanalyst Clara Thompson, a couple of years after Horney, 290
argued in “Cultural Pressure in the Psychology of Women” (1940) that Freud's “penis envy” was not to be 
understood as the psychological expression of an inevitable feeling of inferiority, triggered in the little girl by the 
discovery of the anatomical difference between the sex, but as a demand to be treated as a symbolic and social equal 
to a man.
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to the vagina) to explain women’s attraction to men, and the possibility of vaginal pleasure.  
Horney’s Critique of Female Masochism  
Horney’s essentialist move, however, enabled her to produce the most convincing critique of 
Freud’s conception of female masochism, a concept that was playing such an important role in 
Freud’s developmental theory of femininity. Horney formulated her critique in “The Problem of 
Feminine Masochism” (1935), a paper that she also wrote to oppose the paper of another female 
analyst, Helene Deutsch.  In “The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of 291
Women” (1930), Deutsch had argued in agreement with Freud that clitoral pleasure was to be 
renounced and masochistic impulse accepted in order to access a properly feminine sexuality, 
i.e., a female sexuality centered on vaginal sensations.  Opposing such a reductive view, 292
Horney showed in her paper that it was not in the biological constitution of women to be 
masochistic, but that such masochism was in fact a direct consequence of the place and the 
function that was attributed to women in western culture—a place that was forcing them to adopt 
a submissive posture towards men as regards to love and power. Horney also pointed in “The 
Dread of Woman” (1932) that the concept of the “penis envy,” as well as the dogma of female 
inferiority were nothing but a male fantasy, and that both of them were in fact the expression of a 
 Helene Deutsch was a Polish-American psychoanalyst. She was analyzed first by Freud, and then by Karl 291
Abraham. She helped to create the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute by formulating its training program and serving 
as its director for ten years. She remained a Freudian orthodox her whole life—even when she moved to England in 
1938, and then to the United States to work at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute. And even though Helene Deutsch 
became famous in the field of psychoanalysis for her work on female sexuality, her work has been criticized by 
feminists for her insistence on narcissism, masochism, and passivity as the essential traits of femininity. Her most 
important two volume book is, Deutsch, Helene. The Psychology of Women, A Psychoanalytic Interpretation. New 
York: Grune & Stratton, 1944. For more information on Helene Deutsche, see Roazen, Helene Deutsch. New York: 
Anchor Book, 1985. See also Webster, Benda S, “Helene Deutsch: a New Look,” Signs, 10, 1985, 553-571.
 See also Deutsch,“Feminine Masochism,” in The Psychology of Women, 239-279. 292
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masculine unconscious fear about a woman’s vagina and its power to absorb or to devour the 
male penis.  Horney writes:  293
I think it is probable that the masculine dread of the woman (the mother) or of the female 
genital is more deep seated, weighs more heavily and is usually more energetically 
repressed than the dread of the man (father), and that the endeavor to find the penis in 
women represent first and foremost a convulsive attempt to deny the existence of the 
sinister female genitalia. (352)  
By describing Freud’s masculine anxiety of castration as a secondary reaction, and by opposing 
it to a more primitive one—the dread of the mother, or of the female genitalia—Horney actually 
attacked one of the most important feature of Freud’s Oedipus complex: the complex of 
castration. She flipped Freud’s argument over by saying that it is not women who are castrated 
from the start, since they cannot lose what they don’t have, but men who are actually always-
already on the verge of losing their masculinity if they cannot be potent. In other words, women 
can simply “be,” while men have to “perform” their masculinity, to show it, to prove it. And it is, 
according to Horney, because of this physical inferiority, and because of the anxiety that is 
attached to it that men, as a way to compensate for this difference, have managed to impose on 
women the two male fantasies that structure Freud’s understanding of female sexuality: the 
fantasy of “penis envy,” and its supposedly lesbian denial named “masculinity complex,” and 
 For a very thorough development of this idea in more recent branch of psychoanalysis, see Chassequet-Smirgel, 293
Female Sexuality, University of Michigan Press, 1988. In this book, Chassequet argues that Freud's phallo-centrism 
was not wrong per se, but more like a motivated error defending against a deeper universal truth: the dread of the 
pre-oedipal mother as a devouring vagina. It is this dread—the dread of being engulfed and absorbed in the vagina, 
and not the discovery of the anatomical difference that is at the basis of the structure of the Oedipus complex, that is 
to say, at the basis of the need to operate a cut, at a symbolic level, between the infant and the mother. It is also an 
idea that will be of a central importance in the work of Hélène Cixous, and especially in her most famous text, “The 
Laugh of the Medusa.” 
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more importantly, the fantasy of “feminine masochism” without which no properly “feminine” 
sexuality could be achieved.   
Freud did not welcome well all the critiques that Horney was addressing to him. He 
dismissed in “Female Sexuality” her view on the question of a specific feminine libidinal drive, 
and disagreed with her cultural explanation of the “penis envy.” Freud argued that Horney’s 
culturalist approach of female sexuality, as well as her emphasis on the existence of a “primary 
femininity” was, in fact, a way to anchor heterosexuality into biology, and to bypass the 
difficulty of accounting for the cultural construction of “masculinity” and “femininity” out of a 
purely perverse and polymorphous human being.   294
Ernest Jones Critique of Freud’s Phallo-centrism  
Largely inspired by Horney’s critique of Freud’s theory of female sexuality, Ernest Jones, one of 
the closest collaborators of Freud, and without a doubt the most active British psychoanalyst at 
the time, accused Freud, in his paper “The early Development of Female Sexuality” (1927), of 
having adopted, regarding female sexuality, an “unduly phallo-centric view of the problem in 
question” (439).  Jones argued, indeed, that the “phallic phase” (during which the “penis envy” 295
 For a very interesting account of the Freud-Horney controversy, see Grossman, William. “Freud and Horney: A 294
Study of Psychoanalytical Models via the Analysis of a Controversy.” Psychoanalysis: The Science of Mental 
Conflict: Essays in Honor of Charles Brenner, Ed. Richards & M. Willick, New York: The Analytic Press, 1986.
 Ernest Jones (1879 – 1958) was a British neurologist and a psychoanalyst. He met Freud in 1908, in Vienna, and 295
became his lifelong friend as well as his biographer. Jones moved to the United States from 1908 to 1913, where he 
co-founded the American Psychopathological Association, and the American Psychoanalytic Association. Jones also 
became the president of the International Psychoanalytic Association from 1920 to 1924, and then from 1932 to 
1939. In 1920 he founded the International Journal of Psychoanalysis. He worked also on the first English Edition 
of Freud’s work, with the help of Joan Riviere, his former analysand. Jones also helped Freud’s family to escape 
Nazis Germany right before the Second World War. He was also involved in the famous “Jones-Freud” controversy 
which eventually lead to the “Controversial Discussion” of 1946, which  triggered the first split of the British 
Society of Psychoanalysis. These two controversies will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
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is supposed to emerge in the mental life of the little girl) represented a secondary defensive 
solution to a psychic conflict that had its roots not in the traumatic discovery of the anatomical 
difference between the two sexes (and the kind of trauma that it can trigger in both sexes), but in 
the privilege accorded to the boy’s penis in Freud’s theory. Jones himself had actually stumbled 
on this “unduly phallo-centric” privilege in “The Theory of Symbolism” (1916), a paper in which 
he had “discovered,” to his own astonishment, that most symbols were not only of a sexual 
nature but, in one way or another, connected to the male organ, i.e., the phallus. Jones writes,  
The field of sexual symbolism is an outstandingly rich and varied one, and the vast 
majority of symbols belongs to this category. There are probably more symbols of the 
male organ itself than all other symbols put together. This is a totally unexpected finding, 
even more so of the paucity of symbolized ideas in general, and is so difficult to reconcile 
with our sense of proportion that it needs an effort to refuse the easy escape of simply 
denying the facts, a feat which is greatly facilitated by the circumstance that, thanks to 
our education, the facts are not very accessible (103).  
It is as a reaction to this “unexpected finding,” as well as an attempt to not taking the “easy 
escape of simply denying the facts,” that Jones developed, from 1927 to 1935, in a series of three 
papers devoted to the question of the early development of female sexuality, the idea that Freud’s 
complex of castration (and its female counter part, the “penis envy”) was actually the very 
expression of his “phallo-centrism.”  Jones writes, “I came to the conclusion that the concept of 296
 See Jones, “The Early Development of Female Sexuality,” and “The Phallic Phase,” in International Journal of 296
Psycho-Analysis, Vol. XIV, 1933; See also, “Early Female Sexuality,” in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 
Vol. XVI, 1935. All three articles have been republished in Jones, Papers on Psychoanalysis, New York: Karnac 
Book, 1977. 
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‘castration’ has in some respects hindered our appreciation of the fundamental conflicts. We have 
here an example of what Horney has indicated as an unconscious bias from approaching such 
studies too much from a male point of view” (459).  
 It is precisely not to fall into the same unconscious bias that Jones proposed to substitute 
to the word castration—which is always referring, directly or indirectly, to the presence or the 
absence of the boy’s penis—the one of aphanasis.'The word aphanasis, in ancient Greek, evokes 
the idea of disappearance. But, unlike the word castration, which always evokes the real loss of 
the male organ, what disappears in the case of aphanasis is not an organ, but sexual desire. In 
other words, what both sexes dread disappearing is not, as Freud thought, their organ but their 
sexual desire. And it is this fear, commonly shared by both sexes, which is at the root of every 
neurosis, at every unconscious psychical conflict. Jones writes: “If we pursue to its roots the 
fundamental fear which lies at the basis of all neurosis we are driven, in my opinion, to the 
conclusion that what it really signifies is the aphanasis, the total, and of course permanent, 
extinction of the capacity (including opportunity) for sexual enjoyment” (460). In other words, 
aphanasis is the name of the possibility, for men and women, of seeing their desire disappearing. 
This is why Jones could write that “both sexes ultimately dread exactly the same thing, 
aphanasis” (462). In doing so, Jones produced an apparently pro-feminist theory of female 
sexuality, since he did not think female sexuality directly in relation to a phallic symbol.  
However, through his theory of aphanasis Jones also restored the sense of proportion 
between the two sexes that his British and humanist education had previously implanted in him, 
and thus took, to a certain extent, the “easy way out of simply denying the facts.” And he did it 
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by positing a “feminine instinct,” making thus of “femininity” the end result of a biological 
process—more or less distorted or interrupted by external factors, and not the strange product of 
phallo-centrism itself. In his paper “Early Female Sexuality” (1935), Jones wrote, “to my mind 
(…) femininity develops progressively from the prompting of an instinctual constitution. In 
short, I do not see a woman—in the way feminists do—as un homme manqué, as a permanently 
disappointed creature struggling to console herself with secondary substitutes alien to her nature” 
(495). But what does it mean to refuse to see a woman as “un homme manqué” and, at the same 
time, to propose anchoring femininity into a biological process? Or, to put it differently, what 
does it mean to rescue women from their “penis envy” by granting them instead a “feminine 
instinct”? To answer those questions, one could argue, as Jane Gallop did in The Daughter’s 
Seduction, that it would actually be a mistake to see in Jones’s aphanasis a way to champion the 
right of female sexuality, instead of seeing in it a way to disavow his own finding about the 
preeminence of the Phallus as a symbol through the elaboration of a theory that would be more 
aligned with Jones sense of proportion.  It is also, I would suggest, the way Jones took his 297
distance from the radicalism of Freud’s theory of the unconscious. Jones made psychoanalysis 
more palatable to a broader audience by re-transforming it into a theory of consciousness in 
which the question of gender was either reduced to the expression of a “feminine drive,” or to a 
conscious political fight for economic equalities—but not a question of unconscious conflicts 
related to an anatomical difference.   
 See Gallop, “Of Phallic Proportions: Lacanian Conceit,” in The Daughter’s Seduction, Feminism and 297
Psychoanalysis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982, 15-32. In this chapter, Jane Gallop argues that “As tempting 
as it might be to applaud Jones’ championing the rights of female sexuality to an equal place in psychoanalytic 
theory, it is important to read his partisanship as a repetition of his move in 1916, to an escape, a denial of the fact of 
symbolic phallo-centrism” (17).
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III. RETHINKING FEMININITY WITH LACAN’S NOTION OF  “NOT-ALL”  
For the early Lacan as well, femininity needs to be theorized in relation to the castration 
complex.  But, unlike Freud, Lacan does not think that the idea of castration has to be related to 298
the actual penis. Instead, Lacan substitutes for the penis the idea that it is language itself, and 
more importantly, a very special signifier–the Phallus–that produces a logical effect of castration 
in every subject. The notion of the Phallus, which is all too often reduced to the reality of the 
penis is, on the contrary, an imaginary and symbolic notion for Lacan. First, the Phallus refers to 
the imaginary phallus (written φ) of the mother, and then, to the symbolic Phallus (written Φ), 
once the function of the castration complex (written: – φ) has been put into place by the paternal 
Law. The imaginary phallus designates, in Lacan's theory, the object that the mother desires 
beyond the child (or what seems to escape, from the child's point of view, from the mother’s 
desire) and, by implication, the fact that the child is always trying to become that object, that is 
to say, that the child is always trying to be the imaginary phallus of the mother. To counter this 
phenomenon, which makes the child the puppet of the mother’s desire, the aim of the castration 
complex in Lacan’s theory is to deprive every subject, regardless of his or her gender, of the 
possibility of being the “imaginary phallus” of the mother (for a full description of this logic, see 
Chapter One, Part II). It is only when this possibility has been disabled that the symbolic Phallus 
(Φ) is discovered as what it really is: a void within the Other (written Ⱥ).  
See Lacan’s “Du Complexe de Castration,” and his “The Subversion of the Subject and The Dialectic of Desire in 298
the Freudian Unconscious.”
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The Imaginary and Symbolic Phallus 
Thus the symbolic Phallus is not the mark of a presence for Lacan, as the penis is in Freud, but 
the symbol of the lost Imaginary phallus (as the product of castration: – φ), and the symbol of the 
void that appears in the Other as a consequence of the acceptance of this loss. In other words, the 
Symbolic Phallus is at the same time what will force the child to renounce the fusional 
relationship with the mother (and the dream of an absolute satisfaction that goes with it), and 
what enables the child to regain what has been lost at an imaginary level in terms of symbolic 
power. The implication of this reformulation of the castration complex is that it is only when the 
child has renounced being the imaginary phallus of the mother that the question of sexual 
difference can be raised for Lacan. Sexual difference is not a question of biological difference, 
but a question of how a subject relates to his or her own castration. Or, to put it differently, it is a 
question of how a subject can sustain (or not) the lack that his or her own castration has unveiled 
within the Other. As such, sexual difference presents the ways in which the lack produced by the 
castration complex can be veiled and warded off through the cork of the fantasy.  On the male 299
side of the fantasy, Lacan finds a fetishistic logic that consists of reducing the sexual partner to 
an image that does not speak. On the female side of the fantasy, Lacan finds an erotomaniac 
logic that consists of giving to the partner who is loved, the plenitude of which one was deprived. 
Thus, when Lacan argues that men are said to have the Phallus, and women to be the Phallus, he 
means that men can only have the symbolic Phallus inasmuch as women accept to be their 
Phallus, and that women can be the Phallus inasmuch as men accept to have the Phallus. Both of 
 For a very detailed analysis of these formulas of sexuation, see Ragland, The Logic of Sexuation: From Aristotle 299
to Lacan, New York, Routeldge, 2004. 
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them, through their sexual relationship, “cork”  the void of their castration with a fantasy  – a 300
fetishistic fantasy on the male side of “having,” and an erotomaniac fantasy on the female side of 
“being.”  
Consequently, Lacan's early logical rewriting of Freud’s castration complex, seen from a 
feminist point of view, is not that different from Freud’s definition of the feminine position.  301
Although more refined, Lacan’s definition still approaches the feminine through its relation to 
the masculine, and both positions through their relation to the symbolic Phallus. The Phallus in 
Lacan's “early” teaching is still a Phallus that carries, through its relation to the Name-of-the-
Father, all the values that are attached to patriarchy. This is why, for many feminists, the “early” 
Lacan is not much better than the late Freud when it comes to understanding femininity. But it 
would be unfair to limit Lacan’s insight on the feminine to his “early” teaching.  
Lacan’s teaching shifted drastically in the early 70's when he began a movement beyond 
the Oedipus through a re-elaboration of the “feminine position.” Lacan started to elaborate this 
new position in his Séminaire, Livre XIX:…Ou Pire (1971-1972), where he established, contrary 
to what Freud’s Oedipus complex presupposes, that the two sexual positions are not 
complementary to one another but, on the contrary, in a state of profound dissymmetry – the 
dissymmetry that Lacan summarized in this formula: “there is no sexual relationship between the 
sexes.” With this new axiom, Lacan invented in his Seminar, Book XX: Encore (1972-1973), a 
 For a full analysis of this logic of the fantasy, Miller, “Of the Distribution Between the Sexes.”300
 See Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference, New York: Routledge, 1990; and Gallop, The 301
Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. See also Wright, 
Lacan and Postfeminism, New York: Totem Books, USA, 1996. See also Braidotti, “In Lacan’s Shadow,” in 
Patterns of Dissonance, New York: Routledge, 1991, 224-38.
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logical table of sexuation in which the feminine was no longer reduced to the "negative" side of a 
logical binarism, but posited beyond it through a new relationship to jouissance.  Lacan writes, 302
“There is a jouissance, since I am confining myself here to jouissance, a jouissance of the body 
that is, if I may express myself thus – why not make a book title out of this, it’ll be the next book 
in the Galilée  collection – ‘beyond the phallus,’ that would be cute, huh? And it would give 
another consistency to the women’s liberation movement. A jouissance beyond the 
phallus…” (74). And to approach this jouissance beyond the Phallus, Lacan invented a new 
logical quantifier – the "not all," and argued that the singularity of the feminine position, contrary 
to the masculine position defined by a universal acceptation of castration (the quantifier “for 
all”), was to be "not-all" submitted to the Phallic function. 
The Jouissance of the Urfather  
The word jouissance appeared for the first time during the XVth century to designate the action 
of using something in order to obtain from it the kind of satisfaction that it was designed for. As 
such, the word had a juridical dimension and was linked to the word “usufruct,” which 
designates the right to use or to enjoy a thing possessed, directly or indirectly (from the latin 
usus); or in the figurative sense (from the latin fructus), the right to derive profit from a thing 
possessed. During the XVI century, the word received a new hedonistic twist, and became the 
synonym of pleasure, enjoyment, joy and voluptuousness. There is thus at least two important 
 When Lacan talks about jouissance from a masculine perspective, he reduces it to sexual enjoyment, and aligns it 302
with the satisfaction of the drives. As such, jouissance designates, also, any form of painful symptoms, psychic pain, 
as well as any form of excessive pleasure inasmuch as those phenomena are related to sexuality. But when Lacan 
talks about “feminine” jouissance, he makes of this other jouissance a supplementary one, that it to say, a jouissance 
that is not related to sexuality per se, but to the body and its relation to the Other.
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dimensions to the word jouissance. The first one is the one of pleasure and enjoyment. The 
second, generally forgotten, is legal, and implies a connection between the law and the 
possibility of enjoyment. Now, if we apply this structure to the situation of the animal, one can 
say that there is a form of harmony between what the instinct of an animal prescribes and what 
the experience of satisfaction is. However, if we apply this structure to the speakingbeing, one 
can see that there is, on the contrary, a kind disharmony between the two. Lacan made this 
disharmony evident in his article “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in 
the Freudian Unconscious,” (1966) where he grounded his Graph of desire on a distinction 
between the notion of needs, demand and desire (see chapter One, Part III). Lacan argued that the 
effect of language on the speakingbeing was to split the satisfaction into a satisfaction that is 
forbidden (the one that has to be repressed and that gives rise to desire), and a satisfaction that is 
authorized (the one that can be turned into a demand). Lacan named the first one “the jouissance 
of the Other,” and the second one the “Phallic jouissance.”  
Lacan named the satisfaction that language forbids “the jouissance of the Other” in 
reference to Freud’s theory of the Urfather developed in Totem and Taboo. In this book, Freud 
argued that prior to the creation of the human law there existed a dominant male who enjoyed all 
the women for himself. This primitive man, uncastrated, became then the symbol, once killed by 
the horde of sons (all brothers) of the now dead father, which is to say of the one and only male 
who had access to a form of unlimited satisfaction. Likewise, Lacan named the satisfaction 
authorized by the law the “Phallic jouissance” in reference to the horde of brothers who, in 
Freud’s theory, killed the father and then decided to forbid to themselves the unlimited 
jouissance that the primitive father enjoyed. In other words, the notion of jouissance, for Lacan, 
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is not only traversed by a tension between the one that is authorized, and the one that is 
forbidden, but it is also a notion that gets even more complex to handle when connected to the 
question of sexual difference. 
In the scenario described by Freud in Totem and Taboo, it is, indeed, only the jouissance 
of the Urfather and the jouissance of the brothers that is at stake. It is only insofar as the brothers 
fear the castration of the Urfather, or the castration of the Totem that represents it, that they 
accept renouncing a part of their jouissance. However, on the side of women, the question of 
jouissance becomes quite different. Women, indeed, in Freud’s text, are simply the object of 
exchange of the brothers. Moreover, women, because of their anatomical constitution, cannot 
fear castration. Consequently, women do not relate to jouissance the same way as men. While 
men, in order to become a proper member of the horde of the brothers, have to accept castration, 
and thus  limit their jouissance to the one that is socially acceptable, women, according to Lacan, 
are not subordinated structurally to the same constraint. However, such a difference does not 
imply either that women can have a full access to the jouissance of the Other since there does not 
exist, for women, such a thing as a Urmother who would have enjoyed all the men. It is such a 
complex situation that Lacan tried to formalize in the multiple formula of sexuation that he 
invented during his Seminar XIX … Ou Pire (1971-1972), and his Seminar XX, Encore 
(1972-1973).  
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       Masculine Side             Feminine Side   
 
Lacan’s Formula of Sexuation 
To summarize these formulas briefly, one can say that while it is possible to write, on the male 
side of sexuation, the function “all the men are subordinated to castration, except the Urfather,” it 
is not possible to write such a function on the female side of sexuation. Since there is no such a 
thing as a primitive figure that would incarnate the possibility of a full satisfaction, on the female 
side of sexuation, the necessity to subordinate “all the women” to a form of limitation of their 
jouissance does not exist in the same way either. There is thus only the possibility of writing two 
negative functions on the female side of sexuation for Lacan. One can write, first, that The 
Woman, as the equivalent of the Urfather, does not exist. Second, as an implication of the first 
function, one can write that there is no such thing, on the female side of sexuation, as “all the 
women”, since the exception without which the function “all” cannot be written is lacking. 
Consequently, one can infer from these two negative functions that “not all” women (in the 
double sense of not all of them, and not all of their jouissance) is subordinate to castration. In 
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other words, on the female side of sexuation, there is, of course, a Phallic jouissance inasmuch as 
women want to be in relation to “castrated” men. However, there is another form of jouissance 
that goes beyond the Phallic one, but that is not the equivalent of the jouissance of the Other (the 
Urfather). It is this third jouissance that Lacan called, in his Seminar XX, feminine jouissance, 
and about which he found the best example in the sculpted face of Saint Theresa of Avila.  
It is because of the radical gap that exists between male and female speaking beings that 
psychoanalysis, for Lacan, regardless of its efforts, will never be able to produce a proper 
knowledge about the Real. In other words, it is at the level of sexual difference that the negative 
effects of language are the most blinding. And it is also at the level of sexual difference that, 
since the dawn of humans, every religion, every myth, and every ideology has tried to come up 
with a solution that could create harmony between the sexes. One could allude, here, to Plato’s 
Symposium, for example, and to the famous fable about the beast with two backs, or about the 
myth of the androgynous, or about the religious myth in Genesis. However, all these myths, or 
religious discourses about sexual difference are, in the end, nothing but lies, which is to say, 
simple acts of faith. This is why Lacan, to finalize his critique of religion, makes a pun on the 
French word Faith, “foi,” which he turns into “la foire”, which means, at the same time, what 
fails (from the word “foirer”) and the market place. In other words, faith is a failed attempt to 
resolve, for everyone and in a simple way, what cannot be resolved at a logical level. This is 
why, for the late Lacan, to think that psychoanalysis could produce through the use of letters and 
logical signs a proper knowledge of this Real —that as previous Lacan had tried so hard to do—
is no less a kind of act of faith than the one required by the religious discourse. Lacan writes:  
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Le réel réel, si je puis dire, le vrai réel, en ce qui nous concerne, nous en sommes tout a 
fait sépare, à cause d’une chose tout à fait précise dont je crois quant à moi, encore que je 
n’ai jamais pu absolument le démontrer, que nous n’en viendrons jamais à bout; nous ne 
viendrons jamais à bout du rapport entre ces parlêtres que nous sexuons de mâle et ces 
parlêtres que nous sexuons de la femme. Là, les pédales sont radicalement perdues ; c’est 
même ce qui spécifie généralement l’être humain ; sur ce point il n’y a aucune chance que 
ça réussisse jamais, c’est-à-dire que nous en ayons la formule, une chose qui s’écrive 
scientifiquement. (32)    
Lacan pointed to the fact, in a very feminist way, that to reduce the feminine position to the 
symmetrical opposite of the masculine position was, in fact, a very “masculine” fantasy: The 
Woman being the fantasy called forth by the masculine position and its specific desire towards 
the Other sex.  This is why Lacan, in order to counter such a fantasy, barred the signifier The 303
Woman, hoping to make clear that The Woman (as a universal) does not exist except as the 
product of a masculine fantasy. Lacan writes in Encore, “There is no such thing as The Woman, 
The Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There’s no such thing as The Woman 
because, in her essence – I’ve already risked using that term, so why should I think twice about 
using it again?  – she is not-all” (72-73). But let's be very careful here, and clarify a possible 
misunderstanding.  
 A woman, a lesbian, or a gay can also be situated on the masculine side of sexuation. Commenting on this 303
situation, Elizabeth Wright reminds us, “This search for a fantasy in the woman can take place equally between a 
biological man and a biological woman, between two biological men or between two biological women”(30). 
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The Difference between the Not-All and Psychosis 
If The Woman does not exist, if she is not-all included in the masculine set marked by its 
universal relation to the castration complex, it does not mean that the feminine position, for 
Lacan, has no relation to castration, and through castration to the Phallus. Contrary to the 
position developed by Deleuze and Guattari in The Anti-Oedipus (1972), Lacan never equates the 
feminine position of the “not-all” with the one of psychosis. While the psychotic position implies 
foreclosure of the Phallic function, the feminine position, precisely because she is “not all” 
caught up in the phallic function, something of herself remains in it. Describing this double 
nature of the “not all,” Lacan said: “She is not not at all there, she is there in full. But there is 
something more” (74). This is why the feminine position in the late Lacan does not go against 
the Oedipus complex, but traverses it, while adding to it a supplementary jouissance, a 
jouissance that goes beyond the masculine one, which is eventually reducible to the autistic 
jouissance of the drives Jacques-Alain Miller describes in his very last Seminar, The One All 
Alone (2010-2011).  Rather, the jouissance Lacan adds is a jouissance that would stand beyond 304
the masculine one, in the realm of what certain mystics have called Pure Love.  Lacan writes in 305
Encore,  
I don’t use the word ‘mystic’ as Peguy did. Mysticism isn’t everything that isn’t politics. 
It is something serious, about which several people inform us – most often women, or 
 Miller, Jacques-Alain. L’Un Tout Seul, (2010-2011), as yet unpublished in French, and untranslated in English. A 304
non-edited version of the Seminar can be found here: http://jonathanleroy.be/2016/02/orientation-lacanienne-
jacques-alain-miller.
 See, on this specific question, the admirable book of Jacques Le Brun, Le Pur Amour de Platon à Lacan, and 305
Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2006. And, finally, see Renshaw, The Subject of Love: Hélène Cixous and the Feminine Divine, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2009. 
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bright people like Saint John of the Cross, because one is not obliged, when one is male, 
to situate oneself on the side of ∀x Φx. One can also situate oneself on the side of the 
“not all”. There are men who are just as good as women. It happens. And who also feel 
just fine about it. Despite – I won’t say their phallus – despite what encumbers them that 
goes by that name, they get the idea or sense that there must be a jouissance that is 
beyond. Those are the ones we call mystics. (76) 
What escapes the Phallic function within the feminine position, what is “not all” inscribable in 
this function is thus not for Lacan what comes before the Oedipus, but what stands beyond it 
(because it presupposes the crossing of the fantasy of The Woman) and, more importantly, it is 
also a beyond that is not reserved to biological women, but also open to biological men. Finally, 
it is a beyond that is related to the question of love and mysticism insofar as it implicates a form 
of jouissance that is not reducible to sexual jouissance, but is related to a joui-sens (enjoyment-
of-meaning), that is to say, to a jouissance which implicates language as what produces it – 
although those who are experiencing it, in turn, cannot talk about it. It is, in this sense, a literary 
theme – the theme of divine love – and cannot be talked about as such. Lacan writes in Encore, 
“In all the time that people have been begging them, begging them on their hands and knees – I 
spoke last time of women psychoanalysts – to try to tell us, not a word” (75).   
But isn't it precisely to counter this statement, and one could add, to go beyond Lacan (at 
least at this moment of his teaching), that Cixous, along with other feminists belonging to the 
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MLF  (Mouvement de Libération des Femmes) invented a “feminine economy” and a 306
“feminine writing”? And by doing so – this will be the thesis that I will explore in the last part of 
this chapter – Cixous did not simply reduce the “feminine” to a maternal metaphor,  but she 307
laid down the foundations of what her daughter Anne-Emmanuelle Berger has called in her last 
book, a queer turn in feminism.  Cixous has not only invented a way to inscribe within 308
language the supplementary jouissance that Lacan posited in Encore, but she has also invented a 
new form of economy that explores what, in the postmodern subject, is “not all” caught up in the 
universal of the social bond. It is this exploration that Cixous called “feminine writing”, even 
though the word “feminine” is the one that should be abandoned as soon as the deconstruction of 
its meaning will have finished its work.  
IV. CIXOUS’ FEMININE ECONOMY AND ITS RELATION TO THE NOT-ALL 
Cixous' notion of “feminine economy,” as she developed it in her text “Castration or 
Decapitation,” is Cixous’ way to elaborate the condition under which Lacan’s notion of the not-
all could be capable of inscribing itself within language. To do so, Cixous remapped onto Lacan's 
formulas of sexuation the dichotomy that Georges Bataille established between a restricted 
economy (a masculine economy for Cixous), and a general economy (a feminine economy for 
Cixous), and then used Derrida’s reformulation of Bataille's propositions on writing in Writing 
 For a full explanation of what the MLF is, see chapter One, 58-59. 306
 For a very convincing version of this argument, see Stanton, “Difference on Trial: a Critique of the Maternal 307
Metaphor in Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva,” in Poestics of Gender, Ed. Nancy Miller, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. 
 Anne-Emmanuelle Berger, The Queer Turn in Feminism: Identities, Sexualities and the Theatre of Gender, 308
Trans. Catherine Porter, New York: Fordham University Press, 2014. 
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and Difference to elaborate her own notion of “feminine writing.”  Through this montage, 309
Cixous managed to go beyond Lacan’s affirmation about the feminine position’s inability to talk 
about its supplementary jouissance by inventing a new mode of writing, which would be no 
longer subordinated to the universality of the castration complex (and its restricted economy of 
meaning).  
Bataille's Notion of General Economy  
What is the definition that Bataille gives to the notion of general economy and to the practice of 
sovereign writing that is attached to it? And how have those notions been used by Cixous to re-
articulate the relation of Lacan’s feminine position to the question of writing? The existence of a 
general economy can be inferred, as Bataille argues in the Accursed Share, Volume I,  from the 310
fact that any organism has at its disposal more energy resources than it needs to sustain its own 
living (the sun being the ultimate model of what gives without getting anything back). The 
application of this principle can be found in two basic life phenomena: growth and sexual 
practices. For example, because trees receive more energy from the sun than the amount they 
need to simply survive they keep growing. It is when particular organisms reach their limit of 
personal growth that they start to spend the extra-amount of energy they receive in non-useful 
activities—these activities being either related to pure squandering of energy (as is the case in 
 This hypothesis has already been briefly sketched by Verena Conley in her “Libidinal Economies: Freud and 309
Marx:” “In Bataille Cixous finds the notion of a general economy of loss and spending rather than appropriation. 
Through the work of Jacques Derrida, she constructs the mix of spending (or dispensation) and writing to be an 
ongoing quest for meaning” (32). 
 See also Stoekl, Bataille's Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability. Minneapolis: University of Minesota 310
Press, 2007. 
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aggressive behaviors), or to productive-expenditure, as is the case in sexual reproduction where 
the excess of energy is no longer used for the growth of the organism itself, but for the growth of 
the species in general. “Hence,” concludes Bataille, “the real excess does not begin until the 
growth of the individual or group has reached its limits” (“Consumption” 29). Once the limits of 
growth have been reached (for the individual as well as for the group to which he belongs), life 
enters a state of ebullition, a state of extreme exuberance that requires the individual or the group 
in this situation to think about the best way, or perhaps even more, the most acceptable way, to 
get rid of this excess. In other words, the notion of general economy is defined as the counterpart 
of what Bataille calls a restricted economy. While the restricted economy is an economy 
grounded in lack, scarcity, and in the idea of a closed group, or a closed subject, the idea of a 
general economy is grounded in excess, expenditure, and in the idea of the non-closure of the 
subject.  
As such, the question that a general economy deals with is no longer a question of utility 
within the framework of a restricted economy, but rather an ethical question, a question of 
acceptability – what is the best way to squander excess – and not: how can we use this energy in 
the most productive way?  Unfortunately, adds Bataille, the ethic that supports the capitalist 311
system is totally opposed to such a squandering of wealth. Entirely focused on the idea of 
 Bataille writes in The Accursed Share, Volume I, “Changing from the perspectives of restrictive economy to 311
those of general economy actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking – and of ethics. 
If a part of wealth (subject to a rough estimate) is doomed to destruction or at least to unproductive use without any 
possible profit, it is logical, even inescapable, to surrender commodities without return. Henceforth, leaving aside 
pure and simple dissipation, analogous to the construction of the Pyramids, the possibility of pursuing growth is 
itself subordinated to giving: The industrial development of the entire world demands of Americans that they lucidly 
grasp the necessity, for an economy such as theirs, of having a margin of profitless operations. An immense 
industrial network cannot be managed in the same way that one changes a tire... It expresses a circuit of cosmic 
energy on which it depends, which it cannot limit, and whose laws it cannot ignore without consequences. Woe to 
those who, to the very end, insist on regulating the movement that exceeds them with the narrow mind of the 
mechanic who changes a tire” (25-26). 
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accumulation, the capitalist system is reducible to the point of view that represents a restricted 
economy, for its constant goal is to appropriate the excess and to put it at the service of a few 
people, maintaining thus the possibility of growth for them (or for their group), but at the 
expense of the death or the starvation of others. Of course, pointing to this fact does not mean 
that all energy needs to be squandered in luxurious and useless endeavor, quite the contrary. But 
it does mean that in order to avoid being the unconscious victim of a movement of excessive 
energy, mankind as a whole needs to take into consideration what should be done with the excess 
that circulates on the planet at both a general level and a singular level, and more importantly, 
what should be done with this excess at the level of the individual.  
Cixous' General Economy of the Feminine  
Taking up this opposition, and then applying it to Lacan’s opposition between the masculine 
position and feminine position, Cixous makes the claim that the feminine position in Lacan’s 
theory is what can embody excess and what needs, from a masculine point of view, to be re-
inscribed in the useful limits of a restricted economy. Cixous writes:  
It's a question of submitting feminine disorder, its laughter, its inability to take the 
drumbeats seriously, to the threat of decapitation. If man operates under the threat of 
castration, if masculinity is culturally ordered by the castration complex, it might be said 
that the backlash, the return, on women of this castration anxiety is its displacement as 
decapitation, execution, of woman, as loss of her head. (Castration or Decapitation, 43)  
If the feminine position is “not all” subordinated to the logic of castration, it does not mean that 
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the feminine position is simply free from castration; rather, it implies that it runs the risk of death 
the minute its supplementary jouissance starts to threaten the values and the sustainability of the 
restricted system within which it is otherwise inscribed. In other words, the feminine position for 
Cixous, just as the position that stands on the side of Bataille’s general economy, is not only a 
position that carries with it an anxiety of castration (like the masculine position in its relation to 
castration), but also a position that runs a constant risk of death. Once again borrowing an image 
from Bataille’s universe, Cixous suggests that the feminine, like the figure of the Acephalic 
sovereign  (the figure of the headless), exceeds the figure of the Hegelian master in the exact 312
measure that the feminine does not want to enjoy her position of mastery once she has faced 
death.  In other words, in Cixous’ economy the feminine is said to risk decapitation not because 313
it is refusing to submit to the anxiety of castration like the figure of the primal and un-castrated 
father in Freud’s Totem and Taboo, nor because the feminine refuses to participate to the tragi-
comedy of sexual difference, but rather because the feminine position refuses to subordinate its 
confrontation with death to an external goal, to a future benefit.  
And it is precisely because the feminine position is ready to risk decapitation that Cixous 
can ground in it a new feminine economy through a renewed relation to giving, like the Bataillean 
figure of the sovereign.  From a masculine/restricted point of view, indeed, a man gives in 314
 Bataille founded a journal called Acéphale. The figure of the “Acéphale” was supposed to represent, according 312
to Bataille, the figure of a human that would no longer be reduced to its head but who, on the contrary, would have 
made of his body and its sexuality the heterogeneous ground of its sovereign existence. See Hollier, “The Pineal 
Eye,” in Against Architecture, Boston: MIT Press, 1992. 
 For a full analysis of what separates the figure of the Master from the figure of the Sovereign in Bataille’s 313
thinking, see Derrida, Writing and Difference, New York: Routledge, 2001. See also Baitinger, “Je ris donc je pense : 
Rire et souveraineté dans l'œuvre de Georges Bataille,” Humoresques, 2015. 
 See Georges Bataille’s article on “Sovereignty.”314
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order to get back a profit, i.e., more masculinity, a plus-value of virility, of authority, of power, of 
money, of pleasure, “all of which reinforce his phallocentric narcissism,” states Cixous (The 
Newly Born Woman 96). A gift in the masculine sense is always a gift made to oneself. However, 
in its feminine articulation, the structure of the gift is also oriented toward a “for” (a woman, like 
a man, is giving in order to get pleasure, to increase her value, and enhance her happiness); but 
unlike men, women do not attempt to recover what they have lost for the simple reason that their 
“self” is not stable (as it is always in relation to another) and could thus not be reinforced in the 
same way as the “self” of man. The point here is to think of an openness that would not be the 
expression of submission but an emanation of confidence and comprehension, or, to put it 
differently, a non-closure that would be detached from any self-sacrifice or masochism. For in a 
feminine/sovereign relation to giving, the masculine economy of self-assertion (at the expense of 
the other) is replaced by an economy of openness. And this economy of openness relies in turn 
on the fading of the masculine “I” that normally gives and looks for its own profit.  Woman, in 315
Cixous’ work, is thus the metaphor of a self, endlessly engaged in a process of becoming that 
escapes the telos of masculinity. “She [woman] is not able to return to herself, never settling 
down, pouring out, and going everywhere to the other. She does not flee extremes; she is not the 
being-of-the-end (the goal), but she is how-far-being-reaches” (The Newly Born Woman 87).  
Cixous with Bataille: Feminine Writing as Sovereign Writing 
 Circling around these issues, Bataille writes, “I do not think, as a matter of fact, that we can 
 Bataille writes in “Nietzsche’s Laughter,” “The impossible is the loss of the self. How can one obtain that which 315
is being lost, if not for compensation for gain. It matters little that the gain is illusory or smaller than the loss: 
deceiver or not, gain is the bait that makes loss accessible” (24).
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touch upon the underlying meaning of political problems, where horror is always in the 
background, unless we consider the connection between work and eroticism, eroticism and 
war” (The Accursed Share, I, 17). Indeed, between the world of work (the masculine world of a 
restricted economy) and the world of eroticism (the feminine position of a general economy), 
there is now no connection. All the behaviors that eroticism involves are strictly prohibited 
within the orderly world of work (or at least should be, as the movement #MeToo and La ligue 
du LOL show). In the same way, the values and behaviors that characterize daily life are 
completely removed and alienated from erotic behaviors or from the debauchery of cruelty that 
happens during war. On a strange level, and up to a certain point, erotic behaviors and warlike 
behaviors could be taken as involving the same kind of bestial instincts. What is grounding and 
rendering possible the coexistence of these opposite and irreconcilable worlds within one 
individual or within one group of people is, according to Bataille, the very nature of thinking. 
Even the discourse of psychoanalysis, argues Bataille, is forced to name the accursed domain of 
eroticism from the outside, and it tends to subordinate this accursed domain to the domain of 
thought with all its strength. That is to say that psychoanalysis, like every other science, tends to 
keep the question of sexuality separate from every other problem, in order to be able to define it 
and to operate on it. By doing so, psychoanalysis maintains the privilege of abstract thought in 
front of its object. As a consequence, instead of resorbing the split, psychoanalysis is simply 
theorizing it.  
On a different note, what Bataille and Cixous want to achieve is a kind of thinking that is 
no longer separated from its object, but lost within it. In other words, Bataille and Cixous want 
not only to think sexuality as psychoanalysis does, but they also want to think it in its concrete 
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and integral reality, which means that they want to make sexuality and thinking complementary 
to one another. As such, one could even say that Bataille paved the way for Cixous to sexualize 
thought, i.e., to make thinking and sexuality the product of one another, not the product of their 
separation, for thought is normally considered asexual. Bataille writes, “Thought is asexual: one 
will see this limitation—antithetical to sovereignty, to every sovereign attitude—make of the 
intellectual world the flat and subordinate world that we know, this world of useful and isolated 
things, in which laborious activity is the rule, in which it is implied that each one of us should 
keep his place in a mechanical order” (The Accursed Share, I, 24). A sexualized thought would 
not be a thought that would be marked by the gender or the sex of the thinking person, but by the 
constant effort of this thought to include in its operations of thinking the heterogeneous worlds 
that such an operation would normally tend to cast away as gross, trivial or foul. A sexualized 
thought would then be a kind of thought that would be able to build a general economy of multi-
leveled mind. Commenting on Bataille’s new approach to writing, Derrida in his article  “From 
Restricted to General Economy, a Hegelianism Without Reserve” (1967) describes it as an 
articulation between a “Major” form of writing that exceeds the boundaries of meaning (and all 
the “masculine” values that are attached to it), and a “Minor” form of writing that is grounded on 
meaning.  
Subverting the closed system of the restricted economy of meaning, Bataille's “Major” 
writing inscribes negativity within language itself. By instilling in all the words and concepts that 
his “Major” writing is using a certain slippage, he forces those words, notions and concepts to 
lose some of their meaning. Likewise, Cixous' feminine writing wants to accomplish the same 
kind of operation on all the words surrounding the notion of sexual difference. It wants to 
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destabilize all the concepts and notions that involve the feminine in order to make apparent the 
precariousness of their meaning, and by implication, to make visible the network of 
significations that supports their meaning. For an example of this, one may look into Cixous' 
“Extreme Fidelity,” in which she writes, “An economy said to be F., “an economy said to be M.” 
—why distinguish between them? Why keep words which are so entirely treacherous, fearful, 
and war-mongering? This is where all the traps are set. I give myself a poet’s right, otherwise I 
would not dare to speak” (15). But this poet's right is not a right to reduce women to the status of 
a metaphor; it is a right to write about what could make the Medusa a laughing figure, a figure of 
femininity that does not paralyzes men, that does not become the very source of the anxiety of 
castration.  
Of a Certain Laughter to Become Feminine  
To write in a feminine mode, just as to write in a sovereign mode, one has to learn a certain form 
of tragic laughter first, a laughter that Bataille defined for the first time in an article called 
“Nietzsche’s Laughter.” It is a laughter that does not rise from a position of superiority of the one 
who is laughing. Just as in Cixous' laugh of the Medusa, it is a phenomenon that implicates in its 
laughter the one who is laughing. Derrida situates Bataille's laughter as the most important 
feature of his writing. He defines it as what enables the figure of the master to slide into the 
figure of the sovereign. Laughter is the very function that permits Bataille’s writing to truly go 
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beyond the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the slave.   Bataille's sovereign form of writing 316
represents a true subversion of the philosophical discourse and its pretension to achieve a 
position of full mastery. Derrida writes,  
To laugh at philosophy (at Hegelianism)—such in effect, is the form of the awakening – 
henceforth calls for an entire ‘discipline,’ an entire ‘method of meditation’ that 
acknowledges the philosopher’s byways, understands his techniques, makes use of his 
ruses, manipulates his cards, let him deploy his strategy, appropriate his texts. Then, 
thanks to this work which has prepared it—and philosophy is work itself according to 
Bataille – but quickly, furtively, and unforeseeably breaking with it, as betrayal or 
detachment, dryly, laughter bursts out. (“From Restricted to General Economy, a 
Hegelianism Without Reserve,” 252) 
Cixous’ “laugh” of the Medusa, just like “Nietzsche’s laughter” in Bataille’s thinking, is what 
renders the feminine able to be a part of the restricted economy and a part of the general 
economy at the same time, because such a laughter is what enables the simultaneous presence of 
the two economies in the person who laughs. The laugh of the Medusa, just like Nietzsche’s 
laughter, is a laughter that laughs at the male's fantasy regarding The Woman, and also at the 
temptation that this fantasy represents for women who would like to gain power through it. It is 
thus a laughter that laughs at the very nature of men's thinking, and also a laughter that attacks or 
 Bataille’s definition of Nietzsche's Laughter states, “In principle, laughing is the reaction the impossible offers 316
when sympathy isn’t personally at stake. Either the impossible overcomes indifferent people, or it overcomes beings 
to whom I am bound by sympathy. But without really putting them at risk, I can laugh at the impossible in humanity: 
the impossible leaves the essence of the possible intact. Laughing at the impossible as it overcomes me, laughing 
knowing I am thinking, I am a God who mocks the possible that he is. I no longer hold life to the standard of the 
impossible in order to escape it, as nature does in tragedy, in Aristotle’s theory of catharsis. Zarathustra made 
laughter sacred” (“Nietzsche’s Laughter” 23). 
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exposes all the individuals who are trapped in this fantasy and have built their identity on it. And 
it is this specific laughter that makes Cixous’ conception of a feminine economy not a farfetched 
idea, but an idea that is in direct dialogue with Bataille and, even more, with Derrida’s 
reconstruction of the “system of Bataille’s proposition on writing” (“From Restricted to General 
Economy, a Hegelianism Without Reserve” 261). Derrida summarizes this system thus: “to say 
in language—the language of servility—that which is not servile” (262).  
Beyond the Master: “To Believe Weeping” 
 Cixous' way to put in practice such a sovereign mode of writing is, as she borrows the 
expression from Clarice Lispector’s last novella The Hour of the Star: “to believe weeping.”  317
To “believe weeping” is neither to weep nor to reject weeping. It is to stand outside weeping (and 
thus to stand on the masculine side) while accepting that there exists “weeping” (the feminine 
side) outside such a bloodless point of view. And, reciprocally, if one is weeping, somewhere 
there must exist a point of view that is capable of describing and structuring this weeping. In 
other words, “to believe weeping” is to put in contact the masculine and the feminine while 
being careful not to dissolve their differences. Cixous writes,  
Either we believe weeping, and then we can inhabit the world where the feminine being 
and the masculine being come into contact, exchange with each other, caress each other, 
respect each other, or quite incapable of maintaining a discourse as to their exact 
 In Lispector’s The Hour of the Star, the male narrator (named Rodrigo S.M.) gives himself the mission to write, 317
in a cold and impartial manner, the heartbreaking story of a little girl from the North-East of Brazil. And, in order to 
do so, the narrator says that he has to believe in the existence of what he cannot see: “I am aware of the existence of 
many things I have never seen. And you too. One cannot prove the existence of what is most real but the essential 
thing is to believe. To weep and believe” (8).
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differences, but live them, these differences, and where—as the opening to the text tells 
us—if masculine and feminine agree with each other (I cannot say understand each other) 
it is because there is feminine, there is masculine, in the one and in the other. There are 
obviously points of conjunction – which does not mean identification. (Extreme Fidelity, 
14) 
Approached from this angle, it is clear that Cixous’ use of the word feminine is neither related to 
the sexed body (the female body) of the person who is claiming to be part of the feminine 
economy, nor related to the gender of this person (as we can imagine a woman, a man, a gay, a 
lesbian, or a trans-person belonging to both economies). This is why the adjective “feminine” is 
not something that can be attributed to women because of the sexed body, or because of their 
gender orientation—even if, historically speaking, every human being can be called either a 
descendant of Eve, or a descendant of Adam.  
What I call “feminine” and “masculine” is the relationship to pleasure, the relationship to 
spending, because we are born into language, and I cannot do otherwise than to find 
myself before words; we cannot get rid of them, they are there. We could change them, 
we could put signs in their place, but they would become just as closed, just as immobile 
and petrifying as the word “masculine” and “feminine” and would lay down the law to 
us. (Extreme Fidelity, 15)  
If there is no such thing as a strict opposition between the masculine and the feminine in real life, 
it is because such a strict opposition is only true at the level of structures. This means that the 
masculine and the feminine are only distinguishable at the level of the symbolic, and not at the 
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level of the individual. Indeed, at the level of the individual the notion of the masculine and the 
feminine are not defining two separate substances but, more simply, two possible ways to 
position oneself towards pleasure and knowledge. Cixous writes: “The stakes are extremely 
simple; it is a question of the apple: does one eat it or not? Will one enter into contact with the 
intimate inside of the fruit or not?” (Extreme Fidelity, 15) Those who eat the apple ase Eve fall 
on the feminine side, while those who refuse to eat the apple remain on the masculine side. It is 
thus the question of the relationship between pleasure and the law that is at stake. What should 
prevail? Is it the quest for pleasure? Or is it the respect of the law?  
 What is at stake between a “feminine” and a “masculine” economy is thus not an 
essential difference between men and women, but a certain relationship to the law and to 
pleasure. It is, as Cixous reminds us, the difference between the temptation of the apple and the 
respect due to the law. It is, in this sense, the difference between the figure of Eve (the mother of 
temptation) and the one of Abraham (the father of faith). Eve receives the incomprehensible 
order (incomprehensible because Eve does not know what death or knowledge is) not to eat the 
apple, and she decides to eat it; Abraham receives the incomprehensible order to kill his son 
Isaac and decides to follow it. On the one hand, we have a “feminine” figure who transgresses 
the law in order to eat the fruit (which brings her in exchange pleasure and knowledge); on the 
other hand we have a “masculine” figure, Abraham, who is ready to sacrifice all his pleasure in 
order to follow the law. It is thus also a difference between what is always absent, which takes 
the form of an interdiction (the law), and what is always present, which takes the form of 
something that can be experienced with some form of pleasure (the apple).  
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The relationship to pleasure and the law, the individual’s response to this strange, 
antagonistic relationship indicates, whether we are men or women, different paths 
through life. It is not anatomical sex that determines anything here. It is, on the contrary, 
history from which one never escapes, individual and collective history, the cultural 
schema and the way the individual negotiates with these schema, with this data, adapts to 
them and reproduces them, or else gets round them, overcomes them, goes beyond them, 
gets through them – there are a thousand formulae – and joins up with or never joins up 
with a universe which I would call “without fear or reproach.” (Extreme Fidelity, 18)  
The opposition between masculine and feminine is thus not an opposition that can be taken at 
face value. It exists only insofar as, historically speaking, certain cultural formations have ended 
up dividing this double approach to pleasure and the law into genders, and genders themselves 
into what supports biological differences, that is to say the sexed bodies. This is why Cixous 
writes, “If we resign ourselves to keeping words like ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ it is because 
there is an anchoring point somewhere in a far distant reality. But I believe we must do our 
utmost to reduce this heritage. Let us try, as quickly as possible, to abandon these binary 
distinctions which never make any sense” (Extreme Fidelity, 18). To this specific extent, the 
word “masculine” and “feminine” can help us to become more self-aware of the two routes that 
can be taken in front of the commandment of the law and the exploration of pleasure. But, on the 
other hand, they should be abandoned as soon as values attached to their opposition are extracted 
from the historical formation that gave birth to them.   
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CONCLUSION: HELENE CIXOUS AND THE JOUISSANCE OF THE TEXT 
If to write in the feminine is “to believe weeping,” and if to “believe weeping” is to be able to 
constantly use and displace the limits and points of contact of what is “masculine” and what is 
“feminine” within oneself, it is then clear that the notion of the feminine is not an essentialist one 
in Cixous’ work.  First, the notion of the feminine, differing from the notion of the masculine 318
(where all the members of the set are said to be castrated) in Lacan’s later teaching, is “not all” 
submitted to the phallic function for Cixous. And this notion makes of each “feminine” position a 
singular one. It is from this singularity that the idea of a supplementary jouissance, a form of 
jouissance that goes beyond the castration complex, needs to be approached. Regarding the ways 
in which this supplementary jouissance can be taken as a point of departure for a new form of 
economy and a new form of writing, Cixous’ work does not owe so much a debt to Lacan (who 
will develop his own answer to these questions in his Seminar XXIII, see Chapter Five), but to 
Derrida, and all the more to Bataille (see Chapter Four). Cixous’ “feminine writing” is not so 
much a way to write the feminine per se than the constant effort to re-articulate the co-presence 
within one speaking being of both the masculine position and the feminine position through a 
certain laughter. And this constant re-articulation is, I would argue, what makes of Cixous’ 
feminine writing a practice not only relevant to biological women, but also to all speaking beings 
who are suffocated within the restricted economy of the masculine position. It is thus a notion 
and a practice that do not fight for the equality of rights between men and women (which is, 
needless to say, a very legitimate fight), but rather a notion and a practice that lay out the 
conditions under which it would become possible to go beyond the Oedipus, i.e., to go beyond 
 For a complete overview of the most common critiques of Cixous’ conception of feminine writing, see Diana 318
Holmes’s “Ecriture Féminine: The Theory of a Feminine Writing.” 
!255
the values that the restricted economy of men have imposed upon the whole world, and that are 
currently preventing our civilization from moving toward a more livable future. Bataille 
summarized it perfectly in the introduction of The Accursed Share, Volume I when he wrote: “All 
the same, two things are equally clear: no one has been able to contest the right of SERVILE 
MAN to be in power – and yet his failure is monstrous!” (5) 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A REMAINDER OF NON-KNOWLEDGE 
Bataille, Lacan: A difficult Case 
The positive fruit of the revelation of 
ignorance is non-knowledge, which is not 
a negation of knowledge but rather its 
most elaborated form. (…) The fact is 
that psychoanalysis, since it progresses in 
non-knowledge, is tied in the history of 
science to a state prior to Aristotelian 
definition, which is known as dialectic. 
Freud’s work bears witness to this in its 
reference to Plato and even to the pre-
Socratics.  
Jacques Lacan 
Even if it is a short cut, one can say 
already, from the point that we have 
reached, that psychoanalysis is not a 
mystique of non-knowledge, and that in 
this disposition one makes room for non-
knowledge of the analyst at the 
beginning, but one does not consider for 
that reason that non-knowledge is the 
culmen of experience. 
Jacques-Alain Miller 
Bataille as the Urfather of Deconstruction and Feminine Writing 
Historians generally place Bataille and Lacan in different categories. While Lacan is considered 
a structuralist, Bataille has never been considered one and this for a simple reason: he never used 
Saussure and linguistics as one of his modes of analysis, nor believed in any systematic form of 
thinking. Paradoxically, even, Bataille was framed by Jürgen Habermas as a “proto-post 
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structuralist,” when he placed him, in his study of Modernity, in a line that goes from “Bataille, 
via Foucault, to Derrida.” And some other contemporary critics, one of the most important being 
Allan Stoekl,  have gone as far as saying that Bataille’s work constitutes an “urtext for 319
deconstruction.”  And Queer scholars such as Tim Dean,  Amy Hollywood  or Shannon 320 321 322
Winnubst  state that the study of Bataille’s influence on Lacan could help develop a “queer” 323
approach to psychoanalysis. By developing his concepts of “inner experience,” “non-
knowledge,” “tragic laughter,” “luck,” “the impossible,” or “sovereignty,” etc. Bataille provided 
to Lacan—it will be the hypothesis of this chapter—a point of orientation to approach the Real, 
as well as the occasion to distinguish himself from Bataille.   
 But how can one articulate Lacan's notion of the Real, or Lacan’s notions of object a, the 
impossible, or feminine jouissance,  to the notions that Bataille developed in relation to his 
conception of inner experience? In which sense is it possible to say, as Georges Didi-Huberman 
suggests in La Ressemblance informe, that Bataille's notion of inner experience and non-
knowledge had a strong influence on Lacan's late thinking, and even more so on his conception 
 Stoekl, Bataille's Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 319
2007.
 See Stoekl, “Derrida, Foucault and their Precursors,” in Politics, Writing, Mutilation: The Case of Bataille, 320
Blanchot, Roussel, Leiris, and Ponge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.  
Dean, Beyond Sexuality, Chicago: Chicago, 2006. 321
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of feminine jouissance?  And to which extent can one argue that Lacan’s definition of the Real 324
is actually radically different from the one of Bataille, and thus from the position developed by 
Derrida in Writing and Difference (1967), and then by Cixous in The Laugh of the Medusa 
(1975)?  
Bataille's Influence on Lacan's Late Teaching 
First, one has to acknowledge that Lacan was careful enough, in his Ecrits, “On a question prior 
to the treatment of psychosis,” to position himself against Bataille by identifying Schreber's 
psychotic episode with Bataille’s inner experience. Lacan said in the last footnote of his text: 
The last word with which our century’s “inner experience” has yielded us its computation 
was thus articulated fifty years ahead of its time by the theodicy to which Schreber was 
exposed: “God is a whore.” This is the term in which the process by which the signifier 
was “unleashed” in the Real culminates, after the Name-of-the-Father began to collapse
—the latter being the signifier which, in the other, qua locus of the signifier, is the 
signifier of the Other qua locus of the law. (583) 
And to make sure that his critique of “inner-experience” could not be associated with the wrong 
person, Lacan added, right after: "The inner experience I am speaking here is a reference to 
Georges Bataille's work. In Madame Edwarda, he describes the odd extremity of this experience" 
 See Did-Huberman, La ressemblance informe ou le gai savoir visuel selon Georges Bataille, Paris: Edition 324
Macula, 1995. Didi-Hurberman writes, “On notera que, outre un certain nombre de thèmes, l’iconographie même de 
la couverture  — la  Transverbération de Sainte Thérèse, par le Bernin — reprend silencieusement ce que Bataille 
présentait dans nombre de ses livres, notamment dans L’Érotisme” (190). Or, “Bataille, anticipant sur de fameux 
énonces lacaniens, récusait dans chaque fleur particulière, et à plus forte raison dans chaque femme particulière, 
l’idée ou l’idéal de la fleur, le “genre” de la femme, compris comme totalités insécables. La présence pour Bataille 
n’était donc réel que dans la mesure où, “impossible”, impossiblement singulière, elle se révélait être incompossible 
à l’idée en tant que telle” (190).
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(584). We could then conclude that Lacan identifies Bataille's position with the one of strict 
psychosis, and that he refuses to embrace Bataille's work for this reason since, as we will see in 
Chapter Five, the aim of psychoanalysis for the late Lacan is no longer the traversal of the 
fantasy but, as he put it in Seminar XXI, an “ethics of the refusal to be non-dupe” (First Lesson, 
Unpublished). For the non-dupe, as Lacan keeps repeating, wonders. This is why Lacan is afraid 
of Bataille's inner experience and, even more so, of Bataille’s notion of non-knowledge. And this 
is why also, I would argue, one could say that Lacan is also afraid of Derrida’s notion of 
deconstruction, since such gesture implies, as we saw in Derrida’s critique of Lacan’s reading of 
Poe’s Purloined Letter, to endorse Bataille’s radical refusal to respect the order of the letter.    
 Lacan, in his conference “I Speak to the Wall,”  that Lacan gave at the same time as his 325
Seminar XIX, … or worse [1971-1972], said the following, regarding Bataille’s position, to his 
students,  
Those who [the good students] have heard me quite well – or at least as best as they could 
– when I talked about knowledge as being the correlate of ignorance, and this idea 
tormented them a little. And there are some among them that have been poked by God 
knows which fly, a literary fly of course, things that can be found in Georges Bataille’s 
writings, because, otherwise, I don’t think they would have thought about it. I am talking 
about non- knowledge. 
Georges Bataille gave a conference on non-knowledge one day, it might be found in two 
or three different places in his writings. God knows that he did not make a fuss of it. And 
 Lacan, Je parle aux murs, Editor Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 2011. This conference is still 325
unpublished in English, although its translation is in the making thanks to Adrian Price. 
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especially the day he gave his conference in the Salle de Géographie de Saint-Germain-
des-Prés, which you must know because it is a renowned place of culture, he did not utter 
a word, which was not a bad way to show his own non-knowledge.  
People laughed, but they were wrong because now, it is very fancy, the non-knowledge. It 
can be found all over the place in the mystics, it is even from them that the notion comes 
from, it is with them that the notion has a meaning. And also, people know that I have 
insisted on the difference between knowledge and truth. Thus, if truth is not knowledge, it 
must then be non-knowledge. Aristotelian logic: everything that is not black is the non-
black. (16)  
It is a discovery this non-knowledge. One could not find a better way to introduce a 
definitive confusion on a delicate subject matter, the point in question in psychoanalysis 
being what I called the sensible frontier between truth and knowledge. (16-17) 
Before entering in any precise argument, it is important to sketch briefly what non-knowledge is 
for Bataille, and designate who could be the “good students” who may have followed Bataille in 
his heresy. Non-knowledge names the ultimate point human experience can achieve. It is what is 
left of human experience when there is no longer any Other of the Other to guarantee any form 
of truth. The night of non-knowledge then appears and, with it, the dislocated remainder of a 
language, of a signifying chain ripped apart, undone, unfinished. (During an interview with 
Madeleine Chapsal, Bataille asked: was my last sentence finished? I think so said Chapsal. And 
Bataille to reply, if it was not, that would be a good image of what I wanted to express). A 
writing thus discontinued, disrupted, left unfinished. A writing moved by anxiety, ecstasy and 
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guilt. A writing filled with eroticism and perversion, a writing using language to destroy 
language itself.  
 Philippe Sollers, in the text he devoted to Bataille's style of writing, “Le Toit”  said that 326
Bataille's writing was aiming at opening a hole at the top of the roof of the temple, at opening at 
the center of language itself, a dark hole. That's the beyond that  Bataille offers. That's the 
beyond that inner experience leads to. The erasure of the signifier through the progressive 
erasure of all the master signifiers that were organizing discourse. The letter, with Bataille, fades 
in the night of non-knowledge. Non-knowledge is the accomplishment of the death of the 
signifier—of the God hypothesis—in its two faces. The death of the moral God, and the death of 
the God of science, i.e. the non-deceiving God.  
 This is why many recent scholars have argued that Bataille’s conception of inner 
experience and non-knowledge should be placed at the origin of the branch of post-structuralism 
that came out of the group Tel Quel  lead by Philippe Sollers and the young Foucault of 327
Preface à la transgression,  then broadened by Julia Kristeva through her concept of the 328
semiotic,  then generalized through the lineage of Derrida’s approach of deconstruction (and 329
the key position that Bataille occupies in the dispositive deployed in Writing and Difference ); 330
and then elaborated by women writers to give birth to the notion of écriture féminine developed 
 Philippe Sollers, “Le Toit,” in L’experience des limites, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1968. See also, Logiques, Paris: 326
Edition du Seuil, 1968. 
 Tel Quel was a literary journal founded by Philippe Sollers and Jean Herdern Hallier in 1960. 327
 Michel Foucault, Préface a la transgression, Paris: Edition Lignes, 2000. 328
 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetical Language, Trans. Margaret Waller, Columbia University Press, New York, 329
1984. 
 Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy, a Hegelianism Without Reserve,” Writing and 330
Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1978. 251-277.  
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by Hélène Cixous and the MLF,  or the conception of a feminine Imaginary developed by Luce 331
Irigaray. Thus, the debate that Lacan is engaging with his old friend Bataille at the opening of his 
late teaching is not only interesting at the “hagiographical” level, but also as a tool to shed some 
light on the debate that has opposed, from the start, the French branch of feminism, entrenched in 
conflicted relationships with psychoanalysis, and the Anglo-American gender and queer theorists 
who have tended to reject psychoanalysis.  
I. BEYOND THE SUBJECT OF SCIENCE: BATAILLE’S INNER EXPERIENCE  
Bataille’s elaboration of inner experience can be divided in two parts. The first is composed of 
two books, Inner Experience and Guilty, and of a series of papers and conferences, all given 
during the Second World War. The second part is composed of a series of four conferences that 
Bataille gave between 1951 and 1953 as an answer to all the critiques that had been addressed to 
his notion of inner experience (and all the concepts that are related to it) after his first attempt to 
define and communicate it. For these reasons I have decided to address those two moments 
separately and in chronological order. From a methodological perspective, I chose to present 
Bataille’s thinking mostly through the reading of his articles and conferences and not through the 
study of his books. The reason for this choice is to be found in the difference of style that 
distinguishes Bataille’s books (very literary and aphoristic) from Bataille articles and 
conferences (very well constructed and argued). Contrary to his books, his conferences are 
“sober” and, as such, deprived of any literary effect. They are better documents to reconstruct, 
 Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa.” Signs Vol. 1, no. 4, (Summer, 1976), 875-893. See also Hélène 331
Cixous and Catherine Clement, The Newly Born Woman, trans. Wing, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1986.
!265
from a purely rational ground, Bataille’s thinking. Additionally, and as we will see, the very 
critique of Bataille’s style, when it comes to Inner Experience and Guilty will be part of what is 
at issue at the end of this chapter.   
 It is during the second world war, while Bataille could no longer be directly engaged 
politically (as he was during the pre-war time), that he wrote his first book Inner Experience 
(1943). This book became then the first part of a bigger unpublished project, The Atheological 
Summa.  Through this Summa, which aims at reversing Thomas Aquinas’ Theological Summa, 332
Bataille wanted to create a new form of mysticism that could do away with any form of 
dogmatism, or any form of submission to a given authority.  Bataille wanted to describe a 333
spiritual experience, an inner experience, that would not be triggered and subsumed by any 
desire for salvation, but that would be capable of exploring, in its full extension, the domain of 
the sacred, i.e. the domain where life does not shy away from what threatens it, but affirms itself 
all the way into death. In this sense, one could say that Bataille tried to explore the Real by 
facing its truth completely staring in the eye the blinding presence of jouissance at the heart of 
every human beings. And that the result of such a “sovereign desire,” was to place at the culmen 
of human experience an ecstatic moment of non-knowledge.  
 The Atheological Summa is an unfinished project. Only parts of it were actually published during Bataille’s life 332
time. All the published and unpublished papers related to this Atheological Summa have been published in Bataille’s 
complete work V, VI. See “Annexe 6, Plan pour la Somme athéologique,” in OC, V, VI, Paris: Gallimard, 1976, 
360-374.   
 For a reading of Bataille’s Atheological Summa in relation to Thomas Aquinas Theological Summa, see 333
Holsinger, Bruce. The Pre-Modern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 2005. 
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There is No Other of the Other:  How to Embrace the Real?  
In a conference that Bataille gave in 1942,  a year prior to the publication of Inner Experience 334
and a couple of years after he founded the Socratic College  designed to study the nature and 335
the scope of various experiences of the sacred, of experiences where the fringe of non-
knowledge is directly visible in the human experience, Bataille wrote:  
My proposition rests on his [Socrates] two famous maxims: “know yourself” and “I know 
but one thing, that I know nothing.” For my part only a kind of happy irony, I believe, 
follows from these two maxims; however, they seem no less fundamental to me than they 
were for Socrates. The first is the principle of inner experience and the second that of 
non-knowledge, on which this experience rests as soon as it abandons the mystical 
presupposition (14).   
The principle of inner experience is thus attached, at first, to knowledge—it is attached to the 
famous commandment given to Socrates by the oracle of Delphi: gnautis eauton (“know 
yourself”). However, this knowledge is immediately undermined by a second one, the knowledge 
that one knows nothing. In other words, if to enter the domain of inner experience requires the 
knowledge of oneself, this knowledge in turn is but a purely negative one. It is the knowledge 
that one knows actually nothing. It is this articulation that gives to the notion of non-knowledge 
its complexity, and to inner experience its proper ground. If, indeed, Bataille's inner experience 
is, just like the Socratic experience, an experience that implies “to know oneself,” this 
 Bataille,“Socratic College,” in The Unfinished System of Non-knowledge, Minneapolis, Minnesota University 334
Press, 2001, 5-17.
 See The College of Sociology 1937-39, Editor, Denis Hollier, Trans. Betsy Wing, Minneapolis: University of 335
Minnesota Press, 1988.
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knowledge, in turn, is being constantly contested by what this experience gives access to, i.e., “I 
know nothing.” As such, and contrary to any form of spiritual life, which generally posits—in 
order to go beyond this non-knowledge—either the idea of an eternal truth (idealism) or the idea 
of salvation (transcendence) as the telos of the first maxim (“know yourself”), and the idea of an 
incomprehensible God as the proper name of the second one (“I know but one thing, that I know 
nothing”), Bataille wants to get rid of any telos and, consequently, of any form of idealism or 
religious salvation.   336
Summarizing his vision of inner experience, Bataille gave to it the following definition. 
First, inner experience needs to “only have its principle and end in the absence of salvation, in 
the renunciation of all hope” (15). Second, inner experience only affirms that experience itself is 
the authority, although all authority has to be expiated. And third, inner experience can “only be 
a contestation of itself and non-knowledge” (15), which means that the paradoxical goal of inner 
experience is to elaborate a paradoxical knowledge of an experience that ruins all other 
knowledge. In this sense, inner experience is not opposed to knowledge per se, but maintains 
knowledge not as its goals but as a necessary tool to access non-knowledge, just as knowledge is 
described as a tool to access the “learned ignorance” in Nicholas of Cusa’s De Docta 
Ignorancia.  In other words, inner experience is only opposed to the pretension of knowledge 337
to assign to human life certain goals and limits. It is thus only opposed to knowledge when 
knowledge pretends to rule over experience, that is to say, when knowledge pretends to be in 
Such a desire implies the disposal of the metaphor of the Homo Viator, as Etienne Marcel described it in his book, 336
that the late Lacan, in his Seminar XXI, Les non-dupes errent, mentioned too, before disposing of his Christian 
spiritual itinerary towards illumination, like Bataille does in his inner experience. 
 Nicholas of Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, The Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis: Minnesota University 337
Press, 1981.
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possession of a truth that would impose its limits to inner experience. The crux of the matter, 
here, is thus the recognition of the limits that knowledge imposes on human behavior without 
any awareness of it. Bataille insists: “no inner experience is possible for those who allow 
themselves to be dominated by pleasure and pain.” For to be dominated by pleasure and pain is 
to be dominated by what Freud called the pleasure principle, that is to say, to be dominated by 
the commonly accepted knowledge about what is good and bad, about  conformity to a certain 
way of life.  338
Unbound from such knowledge, inner experience “naturally exceeds the subordination of 
human life to the search from pleasure, to the flight from pain. It postulates a positive value 
beyond pleasure” (14). But how shall we understand this “positive value” beyond pleasure? 
Wouldn’t it be more honest to say that beyond the pleasure principle stand no positive values, but 
what Freud named the death drive, that is to say, what Freud described as being entirely 
“negative”? Perhaps. But one could also argue here that by trying to give to the death drive a 
“positive value,” Bataille paved the way for Lacan to substitute for the Freudian death drive the 
much more ambiguous and complex notion of jouissance, a notion that encapsulates the one of 
pleasure as well as what goes beyond, and that turns the death drive into something “positive” in 
the sense of being impossible to negativized. Of course, to give a “positive value” to what stands 
beyond the pleasure principle is the “true” difficulty that weighs down the notion of inner 
experience, and the notion of non-knowledge that is attached to it. For if the very idea of 
“positivity” is always attached to a form of affirmation of life, or a form of usefulness that can 
comprehend a “negative” moment inasmuch as it can be “positivized” as a “negative” moment of 
 See the Epilogue for a full definition of Freud’s and Lacan’s death drive. 338
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an overall “positive” movement, how can we not reduce inner experience “positivity” to such 
values? Well aware of this situation, Bataille writes: “The essential difficulty begins here. The 
search for a beyond in relation to immediate interests appears from the beginning as a principle 
of contestation” (14).   
Luck as the Only Other of the Other 
How is it possible to find within a principle of contestation something that is not entirely 
“negative” but, on the contrary, something to which can be attached a “positive value”? Bataille's 
answer to this question goes as follows: “if inner experience affirms the existence of a beyond 
and establishes this existence as a principle, it cannot stop its contestation there: this principle 
itself must be contested in turn and experience appears in this movement as a contestation 
without limit” (15). In other words, the “positive value” that can be attached to a principle of 
contestation is related to the extension of this contestation to the principle itself. It is because the 
principle of contestation is not only a principle that orients and organizes thinking, but a 
principle that affects thinking itself, and thus changes its own nature, that the idea of contestation 
can acquire a proper “positive values,” the value of a “movement of contestation without 
limit” (15). If the movement of contestation that triggers inner experience is properly without 
limit, it also means that it will eventually attack the ultimate principle of authority that normally 
stands as the ultimate authority of any form of beyond, i.e., the authority of God as the Good 
God that gave us moral law, and as a non-deceiving God, i.e., as a God that keeps the law of 
science valid. Bataille writes,  
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At the end of the reduction, experience alone subsists and, beyond pleasure, is only able 
to find value in itself. If experience appeared at this moment as the poetic or as the sacred 
itself or even, why not, as God, these values would remain connected to the contestation 
that the experience has made of itself. It would be a question of poetry contesting itself, 
of the sacred contesting itself, of God contesting himself. The pause that allows these 
possibilities to affirm their authority, to install themselves into existence, would 
disappear. Everything, authority itself, would be caught in a movement of interrogation 
without limit. There would be no other authority than in this movement, in this 
interrogation. (15)   
The authority of God, within inner experience (as well as any other “transcendent” form of 
authority) is thus being contested by God itself. It is God as a principle of authority that contests 
his own privilege to rule. It is, even more to the point, the contestation of the idea of an 
organizing principle by the organizing principle itself. Such a contestation, it is worth noticing, is 
not without making reference to the Christian representation of the sacrifice of Christ on the 
cross.  For such a sacrifice could be seen as the contestation of God (as an angry God of 339
revenge) by God himself (as an impotent Christ nailed on the cross). Although this contestation 
needs now to go even further, adds Bataille, by contesting the authority of the cross; or rather, by 
extending this “authority” to any form of contingent encounter that could produce the same kind 
of reversal as the encounter of Christ with the moment of the crucifixion. Inner experience is 
thus, at a fundamental level, just like the Christian experience that depends on the intervention of 
See the Epilogue for an analysis of the function given by Bataille and Lacan to the sacrifice of Christ on the 339
Cross. 
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grace, an experience that depends on luck, that is to say, that depends on a contingent encounter 
without which its movement would stall. Without the presence of luck (or bad luck), indeed, the 
discovery of the impossible (in the case of Christ, the impossible of his crucifixion), upon which 
everything relies, would be closed off. Bataille writes, “Without luck, an access to the level of 
the impossible—the comprehension of a limitless fortune—would be quite closed off to the 
being. In other words, luck is necessary for the being to go to the end of its possibility and to 
support that which, without luck would be impossible—would not even be perceived” (17).   
Luck, within inner experience, is thus what stands as what can introduce, within 
experience, a connection to the unknown, the unforeseen, the radically contingent. And this 
radical contingency, in turn, is what uproots experience from any organizing principle. Normally, 
what rules over contingency is fundamentally what Bataille calls the possible. The possible is 
equated by Bataille to the realm of organic life and its development in a favorable setting. The 
impossible, on the contrary, is equated to the presence of death in life, and to the necessity of 
destruction for existence. This is why, generally speaking, man associates the possible with what 
is good, and the impossible with evil. As such one could say that there exists a profound 
agreement between man and the possible, and that this profound agreement is what fuels men's 
belief in an all-powerful and non-deceiving God thanks to whom the realm of evil and the 
impossible is turned into an illusion, and evil into a test imposed on men before eternal life. 
Bataille writes,“there is not an impossible if God exists, or at least the impossible is illusory: it is 
a test imposed on man while the triumph of the possible is given in advance” (Nietzsche's 
Laughter, 18). As soon as the idea of God is given existence, its existence casts away the very 
possibility of the impossible as the expression of contingency, and substitutes for it something 
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that has to do with man's guilt and misbehavior first, and then that has to do with the idea of 
salvation. Salvation is, according to Bataille, the element in every religious system that indicates 
the will to escape the confrontation with the impossible.  
To Deal with the Impossible as a Mystique 
There exists, of course, a mystical tradition, within Christianity that does not reduce God to the 
possible but which posits it as the unknowable par excellence.  This mystical tradition can be 340
associated with the names of Meister Eckhart, or the one of Angela of Foligno,  or Catherine of 341
Sienna  for example, both of whom experienced the presence of God as the presence of what 342
exceeds, at every level, the intellectual capacity of man.  They attributed to God the domain of 343
what stands beyond the possible and the impossible: the domain of negative theology. Going 
even further than this tradition of negative theology, Bataille's inner experience is the experience 
of the death of God itself and, by implication, an experience that has renounced any desire for 
salvation, and through salvation, an experience that allows one to renounce even the most 
laudable illusion—happiness. For happiness, just like salvation, is a way to reduce life to the 
realm of the possible and, consequently, a way to reject as evil the realm of the impossible. To 
affirm the possibility of inner experience is to affirm that the impossible cannot be completely 
 See Barbara Newman. From Virile Woman to Woman Christ: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature. 340
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. See also Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, 
and the Demands of History, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002. And finally, Jacques Le Brun, Le pur amour 
de Platon à Lacan, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2002.
Angela of Foligno (1248-1309). Complete Works. New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1993. 341
 Catherine of Sienna (1347-1380). The Dialogue. New Jersey: Paulist Press,1980.342
 Se Peter Tracey Connor, Georges Bataille and the Mysticism of Sin. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 343
Press, 2000. 
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overthrown. Even if we imagined, just like Hegel or Fukuyama, the end of history as a moment 
of complete victory of the possible over the impossible, a certain remainder of the impossible 
will persist. Perhaps not as a threat coming from the outside, but definitely as a threat coming 
from the inside of man. Bataille writes,  
An impossible exists in man that nothing will reduce, the same, in a fundamental way, for 
the happiest and for the most disinherited. The difference is in the illusion; happiness is 
no doubt a desirable form of illusion, but happiness can only defer the deadline. As we 
cannot limit ourselves to postponing the deadline, in the end, we can only face the 
impossible. (20) 
The deadline that happiness (as an illusion) is postponing is the one of becoming fully conscious 
of the fact that at the very core of life does not stand the Good and the possible, but the 
impossible and evil. The presence of the impossible within each human life can be witnessed 
through certain inner states like poetical state, tragic state, ecstatic state or, even more so, anxiety
—that it to say, through all the experiences that are marked by a certain presence of a beyond 
within everyday life. It is thus a question of not running away from those inner states (through 
apathy or salvation), and of consciously embracing them, i.e. “evading nothing, living the 
impossible” (20). And to fully embrace those states, one has to be able to put the possible and the 
impossible in proportion with one another, which is to say that one has to be able to become 
conscious of the impossible, while being able to place oneself at its level. For it is only when 
someone has fully placed himself at the level of the impossible that one can no longer limit 
himself from suffering the impossible in things, but becomes able to recognize it as such. In 
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other words, the impossible can only be recognized as such, according to Bataille (which makes 
his definition of the impossible very close to Lacan’s definition of the impossible) when the 
possible has also been recognized as such. For if the possible is not recognized as such first, it 
will tend to deny the very existence of the impossible through the concept of salvation, or 
through the concept of the good. And, reciprocally, the impossible, if not recognized as such, 
would be reduced to the domain of evil (from a religious point of view), or to the domain of the 
“death drive” (from a psychoanalytic/atheistic point of view). Bataille writes, 
The impossible needs the possible from which to be disengaged. Salvation is the possible 
required by the mind for a confrontation with the impossible: it is therefore the evasion of 
the impossible” (…) Every impossible is that by which a possible ceases to be possible 
(as I said, without the possible there wouldn’t be any impossible: the tragic is the attribute 
of the powerful); at the extreme limit of its power, every possible aspires to the 
impossible (to what destroys it as possible). (22)  
The impossible is thus something that is inconceivable without the possible that constantly 
strives to reduce it to its own domain. And, reciprocally, the possible is what produces logically 
the impossible each time its concept fails to embrace what goes beyond it, or each time its 
concept discovers elements that cannot be reintegrated in its larger “positive” narrative.  
Nietzsche’s Laughter 
What can give us a clue about how the possible and the impossible can be put in relation without 
canceling one another is Nietzsche’s famous laughter, “To see tragic characters founder and to be 
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able to laugh, despite the profound understanding, emotion and sympathy that we feel: this is 
divine.”  This very specific and “odd” laughter, as we will see, is what can help us to give a 344
more satisfying explanation to the otherwise paradoxical relationship that inner experience 
attempts to articulate between the possible and the impossible. For it is through Nietzsche’s 
laughter that Bataille found (thanks also to the help of his friend Maurice Blanchot) the solution 
to the apparent paradox of a principle having to contest itself (like God Contesting God, or 
poetry contesting poetry, etc.). Of course, in general, the experience of laughter implies no 
paradox. Laughing is a natural reaction in front of the apparition of the impossible when this 
impossible touches neither the person who laughs nor a person towards a person for whom 
laughs could have some sympathy. In other words, laughter is the reaction that the impossible 
triggers when the impossible has no tragic consequences. In addition, in the case of Nietzsche, 
the basic rule of laugher is broken. Nietzsche’s laughter, indeed, is a laughter that implies a tie of 
sympathy between the one who laughs, and the one who is experiencing the impossible. Even 
more so, it is a laughter that aims at laughing at the impossible as it overcomes the one who is 
laughing, or as the one who is laughing is, at the same time, laughing at the possible that he is.  
If Nietzsche’s laughter cannot be reduced to the possible laughing at the impossible (like 
the “normal phenomenon of laughter”), it cannot be attached to the idea that the impossible is 
laughing at the possible (like a desperate romantic kind of laugh). For “the impossible attained 
indolently through the neglect of the possible is an impossible eluded in advance: confronted 
without strength, it is only an obscene gesture” (24). More to the point, Nietzsche’s laughter is a 
laughter that mocks at the same time the possible that wants to do away with the impossible, as 
See Friedrich Nietzsche, La Volonté de Puissance, 2, #85, Paris: Tel Gallimard, 1995. 344
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much as a laughter that mocks the idea that the impossible could be used to judge and condemn 
the possible. It is thus a laughter that opens onto the “absence of God.” Bataille writes, “Man’s 
limit isn’t God, isn’t the possible, it is the impossible, the absence of God” (23). And the 
impossible, once unhooked from the possible, and the absence of God, once unhooked from 
negative theology, is “the possible holding itself to the standard of the impossible.”  
Inner experience becomes thus a kind of vertigo that affects man, or a kind of ecstatic 
revelation of the impossible. Bataille writes, as a sort of conclusion, “the virtue of non-avoidance 
consists in offering salvation at the beginning without making it an end but making it the 
trampoline of the impossible” (25). If salvation is, indeed, an attempt to connect the possible 
with the impossible, and if such connection entails the submission of the impossible to the 
possible (the second it is elevated to the status of a goal), to place it at the beginning prevents 
salvation from becoming the condemnation of the impossible. It makes of it what puts humans in 
touch with something that goes beyond the possible, without enslaving them to a pre-conceived 
idea of salvation.  To illustrate this point, I want to present, now, the way in which Bataille 345
tried to put in practice this approach of the impossible in a “science” called Heterology. This 
presentation will also highlight, when possible, what makes Bataille’s heterology, in many ways, 
the pre-figuration of what queer theory was about to become, i.e., a theory of what cannot be 
structurally represented.   
 Jacques Derrida, « De l’économie restreinte a l’économie générale, un hégélianisme sans réserve » in L’écriture 345
et la différence, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1967. pp. 369-408. In this text, Derrida is analyzing the function that 
Bataille’s laughter plays when it comes to distinguishing between the Hegelian figure of the Master, and its parodic 
subversion through the Bataillian’s figure of the sovereign. See also, for a reading of this text with Bataille’s own 
definition of laughter, Frederic-Charles Baitinger, “’Je ris, donc je pense’: Rire et souveraineté dans la pensée de 
Georges Bataille”, Revue Humoresques, #41, 2015, pp. 117-129.  
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II. HETEROLOGY: A PRE-QUEER ANTI-RELATIONAL THEORY 
Bataille, during the twenty and early thirties, while he was experimenting with the sacred 
through his esoteric group Acephale, and reflecting on it in his College of Sociology, invented a 
“science” called Heterology. Heterology is the science of what is “hetero,” of what is 
“completely other” (“ganz andere” said Bataille in German).  Bataille even considered giving 346
two other possible names to this science. The first one was Agiology, in order to refer to what is 
angelical (completely other as pure), as well as what is sacer (completely other as soiled). And 
the second one was Scatology, to point to what has been execreted as trash within a given social, 
biological, economical or intellectual system.  
The Paradox of Heterology 
The paradox of heterology is that the notion of “ganz andere,” of what is “completely other,” is, 
contrary to what the term heterology suggests, a notion impossible to define, impossible to 
reduce to a form of logos. If the “ganz andere” represents what cannot be integrated in a larger 
framework, it means that it exhibits precisely what is the most opposed to the movement of 
thought that would turn the “completely other” into the same. Robert Sasso, commenting on this 
impossibility in his book Georges Bataille: le système du non-savoir  (1978), writes: “Any 347
intellectual process, because it aims at a form of intelligibility that depends on a finite 
articulation of propositions, tends to be closed onto itself, leaving outside of itself what one has 
 See “Dossier Hétérologie” in Œuvre Complete, Tome II, Ecrits posthumes 1922-1940, Paris: Edition Gallimard, 346
1970, 167-178.  
 Robert Sasso, Georges Bataille : Le système du non-savoir, Une ontologie du jeu. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 347
Col. “Arguments,” 1978. 
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to call a residue or a left-over of the process itself” (my translation, 65). To go beyond this 
paradox, Bataille’s Heterology, rather than studying its object directly, is the study of the limit of 
the movement of appropriation that thinking represents, as well as the study of the movement of 
expulsion or excretion that the closure of knowledge produces. Heterology is not the study of 
what has been rejected—of the excreta per se, but the study of the relationship between the 
movement of appropriation that science and thinking represent and the movement of expulsion 
that their functioning put in motion without being conscious or aware of it. One could argue, 
then, that Heterology is the name of the first post-structuralist critique of knowledge and science 
made in the name of what Lacan called the Real, and Gender and Queer theory called, 
“queerness.” It is, to remain at a very general level, the first attempt made at localizing what, in 
the very functioning of knowledge, is generating its outside, and an outside most often judged 
queer, monstrous. One could also argue, here, that Bataille’s definition of Heterology, if one 
substitutes for the subject of science the “masculine subject” and for “excreta,” the “feminine 
subject,” is foreshadowing the definition that most post-feminists will give to the notion of the 
“feminine” as the repudiated, the excluded, the irrepresentable.  348
It is in his text “The Use-Value of D.A.F de Sade (An Open Letter to My Current 
Comrades)”  that Bataille assigns to Heterology its proper importance. In this text Bataille 349
argues that there are, at the very core of every human life, as well as at the core of every human 
society, two basics urges: an urge for appropriation (which is best represented by science), and 
 See Judith Butler, “Subject of Sex, Gender, Desire” in Gender Trouble, “(…) to theorize the feminine, not as an 348
expression of the metaphysic of substance, but as the irrepresentable absence effected by (masculine) denial that 
grounds the signifying economy through exclusion. The feminine as the repudiated/excluded within that system 
constitutes a critique and disruption of that hegemonic conceptual scheme,” New York: Routledge, 1993, 38-39   
 See “The Use-Value of D.A.F de Sade (An Open Letter to My Current Comrades)” in The Bataille Reader, Part 349
II, “Heterology,” Editor and Trans. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson. New York: Blackwell Publishing, 1997, 147-160. 
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an urge for excretion (which is best represented in the violent movement of racism and 
xenophobia and sexism).  The urge for appropriation is at the basis of our profane world, that is 350
to say, at the basis of the world of work organized by the values of reason. Such a world consists 
in an urge to make everything as homogenous as possible through the constant effort of 
integrating everything into a larger system of thought. The urge for excretion, on the contrary, is 
at the base of what anthropologists like Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss have called the 
sacred, and that is at the basis of the religious world with all its taboos, its sacrifices, its ritual, 
orgies, and so on.  Additionally, the urge for appropriation, argues Bataille, can itself be 351
appropriated by the urge for excretion when what is appropriated, in the form of an oral 
absorption for example, is considered taboo itself. When in a ritual, for example, people eat their 
own excrement, or part of a human body, or any type of forbidden food, it is a movement of 
excretion through improper appropriation.  In other words, excretion relies on heterogeneous 352
elements that are impossible to integrate in a larger system of thought without threatening the 
sustainability of the system itself. Consequently, what is heterogeneous–and thus excreted–is 
always what is impossible to incorporate in a larger system of thoughts.  
Faced with these two urges, the task of philosophy and religion is, normally, to make the 
heterogeneous elements as homogenous as possible with the rest of the system that generated and 
 For a very thoughtful summary of Bataille's notion of Heterology see Robert Sasso, « L'Hétérologie » in Georges 350
Bataille: le système du non-savoir, une ontologie du jeu. Les Edition du Minuit, Col. Arguments, Paris, 1978. See 
also Julian Pefanis, Heterology and the Postmodern, Bataille, Baudrillard, and Lyotard, Durahm: Duke University 
Press, 1991. In this book, Pefanis provides a very stimulating historicization and contextualization of Bataille’s 
notion of heterology. 
 See Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, Edition Puf, Paris, 2003. See also Emile Durkheim, The Elementary 351
Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain, New York: The Free Press, 1965. 
 See, also, the ethnographic movie from Jean Rouch “Les Maitres fous” where at the height of a ritual the 352
participants eat a dog in order to defy the values of the colonial empire they are living in. 
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expelled them in the first place. However, by trying to do so, argues Bataille, religion and 
philosophy create inside what is heterogeneous two kinds of heterogeneities (which correspond 
to the two faces of the Other in Lacan’s early teaching). A first one that is attached to the notion 
of good–it is the figure of a good God that is securing the morality and the rationality of a 
homogenous vision of the world; and one that is helplessly bad–it is the figure of Satan and all 
the bad things that threaten the sustainability of the homogenous world. In order to avoid such a 
division that, ultimately, reinforces the heterogeneity of certain elements, Bataille is proposing, 
with his Heterology, the first practical and a theoretical “science” of this paradox. The task of 
Heterology, at first glance, could be compared to the one of poetry as surrealism defines it. 
Indeed, surrealism’s poetry proposes to integrate in a large aesthetic framework all the 
heterogeneous elements that previous poetries were leaving out (free associations, etc.). 
Nonetheless, Bataille emphasized that surrealist poetry ended up creating a new form of 
homogeneity in which everything that were not judged properly surrealist (like simple vulgarity 
for example) became even more alienated. Thus, contrary to surrealist poetry, Bataille’s 
Heterology has to first avoid a systematic representation of the world. It must study the way in 
which any kind of philosophical or religious thoughts produce their own heterogeneous 
elements. Bataille writes, “In that way, Heterology leads to the complete reversal of the 
philosophical process, which ceased to be the instrument of appropriation, and now serves 
excretion; it introduces the demand for the violent gratifications implied by social life” (154). 
Such a study, of course, will not be made in the name of a more inclusive vision of the world – 
otherwise it would, again, make what is heterogeneous homogenous to a new system and, by 
doing so, it would hypocritically cancel the heterogeneous nature of what it studies.  
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To Laugh at Philosophy and Anthropology  
The origin of Bataille's notion of Heterology can be traced back to one of Bataille’s earliest text 
called “The Pineal Eye.”  Like most of Bataille's text, such as Inner Experience, My Mother, 353
and so many others, “The Pineal Eye” was an unfinished text that Bataille never published 
during his lifetime. Five different versions of the text exist. The question of unfinished texts is of 
central importance for Bataille. The failure of a project, indeed, represents the refutation of its 
origin. It is an outcome that should not have happened. A text like “The Pineal eye,” in this 
sense, should be approached as the refutation of its own aim, that is to say, as the refutation of 
any predictable outcome. Bataille wrote this text along with two others—Story of the Eye 
(1928)  and Solar Anus (1931) —while he was undergoing a psychoanalytic treatment with 354 355
doctor Borel during the year 1927. In this early text, which is a very strange mix of anthropology, 
mythology and philosophy, Bataille had “fun” with the seriousness of “science”. He engaged 
erotically and childishly with anthropology and philosophy, and more precisely, with one of the 
oddest concept of those two “scientific” disciplines: the concept of the Pineal gland.   356
The “Pineal Gland,” as an organ, represents an atrophied organ, or at least an organ that 
has lost its function, and which, additionally, is supposed to disappear as soon as the body dies. 
 Georges Bataille, “The Pineal Eye”, in Vision of Excess, Selected Writings, 1927-1939, Editor and Trans. Allan 353
Stoeckl, Theory and History of Literature, Volume 14, University of Minnesota Press, 1985. pp. 79-90. See also, for 
a very stimulating reading of the text Denis Hollier, « The Pineal Eye », in Against Architecture, The Writings of 
Georges Bataille. Trans. Betsy Wing, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989. pp. 115-129.
 Georges Bataille, Story of the Eye, Trans. Joachim Neugroschel, an Francisco: City Lights Books, 1987. 354
 Bataille, “Solar Anus” in Vision of Excess, Selected Writings, 1927-1939, Editor and Trans. Allan Stoekl, Theory 355
and History of Literature, Volume 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985, 5-9. 
 The pineal gland is a small gland located near the center of the brain. From the point of view of biological 356
evolution, the pineal gland represents a kind of atrophied photoreceptor. In some species of amphibians and reptiles, 
it is linked to a light sensing organ, known as the parietal eye, which is also call the pineal eye or third eye. 
Descartes believed that the Pineal gland was the principal site of the soul/mind. 
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The Pineal Gland, because of these odd properties, was given, since Descartes at least, the 
privilege of uniting the body and the soul. But this privilege, which is supposed to be, at the 
same time, a philosophical and a scientific privilege, turned out to be, as we know now, a 
completely peculiar metaphysical hypothesis with no real scientific or philosophical basis. As 
such, a concept like the one of the Pineal Gland shows for Bataille how scientific anthropology, 
just like philosophy, is subordinated to the idea of a goal or of a “harmonious development,” i.e., 
to what we call a “teleological process.” By teleological process, one has to understand that, 
according to the discourse of science and philosophy, everything, in order to be understandable, 
has to be oriented towards a goal. The becoming of something is, thus, never unpredictable, but 
subordinated to its end or final stage of development. For example, when we look at a seed, we 
can imagine the way in which it is about to turn into a flower or a tree. The tree and the flower, 
theologically speaking, mark the end of a harmonious development. They represent the endpoint 
of a teleological process. Similarly, humans always see themselves as the endpoint of nature. 
They see themselves as the crown of nature. Its best achievement. Contrary to this “harmonious” 
vision of human evolution and history, which is best represented in Hegel's dialectical conception 
of History, Bataille's mythical anthropology would like to help humanity to think about itself not 
as the flower coming out of a seed, but as “a new laceration within a lacerated nature.”  Within 357
this new “framework,” evolution and becoming are no longer subordinated to the idea of a goal, 
but to certain moments of “explosion” of forces, just like a volcano that erupts only when some 
excessive amounts of energies have been accumulated and are now in need to be released.  
 See, Bataille, “Un déchirement nouveau à l'intérieur d'une nature déchirée.” For a full deployment of Bataille's 357
notion of mythical anthropology, and its relation to Schelling’s notion of Katabole, see Rodolph Gasché, “Mythical 
Representation” in Georges Bataille: Phenomenology and Phantasmatology, trans. Roland Végsö, Standford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012, 27-111. See also, Shannon Winnubst’s brilliant review of the book on: http://
ndpr.nd.edu/news/39404-georges-bataille-phenomenology-and-phantasmatology/
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 Within this new framework, the only way to correctly represent the evolution of mankind 
is no longer the one of science or philosophy but the one described through what Bataille called 
the tension between “the virulence of phantasms” on the one hand, and the strength of repression 
through the complex of Castration on the other. What is at stake, then, in Bataille's early position, 
is the relationship between the “castration complex” and the “virulence of phantasms”: how can 
one avoid submitting the virulence of phantasm to the law of the castration complex, i.e., to 
submit his phantasms to rules and norms that are external to it? And Bataille’s answer: by placing 
oneself in “a certain inaccessibility to fear,” which is to say by reinforcing, within oneself, the 
capacity of undergoing the attraction of the most repulsive object without being overwhelmed. In 
other words, to go beyond the domain of philosophy and science implies to go beyond the 
domain delimited by Freud by the Pleasure Principle  and the so-called “seriousness of 358
science.” For it is only when such a pretension would have been put outside the realm of science 
that the virulence of phantasm will be explored and studied for itself, that is to say as a free 
dimension of the human psyche, and not reduced to nonsense, or childish speculations. 
 Opposed to such a mythical anthropology, science has received the task of dissipating and 
annihilating mythological phantasms. Science has substituted, for example, the theory of 
evolution for creationist theories. In general, science has always tried to substitute for magical or 
mythological explanations of phenomenon, a rational understanding of them. This is why, for 
Bataille, science is “blindly emptying the universe of its human contents.” As such, Bataille 
makes a distinction between the understanding that science gives us and the meaning that 
 See Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Ed. and trans. James Trachey, New York: Norton & 358
Company, 1961. See also, for a very stimulating reading of Freud’s notion of the death drive, see Boothby, Death 
and Desire, New York: Routledge, 1991.
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humans are looking to grasp from the universe. While science gives causal or logical 
explanations to the phenomenon it studies, science does so by emptying those phenomena of 
their human meaningfulness. Therefore, in order to have access to a mythological anthropology, 
one should not renounce science and dismiss it, but on the contrary, one should fully acquire it so 
to then turn science into a beast of burden, that is to say, reduce science to a state of 
subordination. Once science has been subordinated, it can be used to limit its own movement, 
and to situate in its proper place what stands beyond its realm. And what stands beyond its realm, 
because it has been cleaned up by science, is no longer subordinated to some religious or 
mythological agenda either. As such, it can thus be explored in its totality, without having to 
submit to external constraints. The whole domain of jouissance. The whole domain of phantasm. 
Open. This is why a text like “The Pineal eye” should be seen as a mythic description of the 
universe free from all kinds of external servitude.  
The Pineal Eye  
Through the “Third Eye” that the “Pineal Eye” represents, opposites coincide, the high and the 
low, good and evil, life and death. “The Pineal Eye,” within this “liberated context” (this non-
teleological context), is something that eats the head and makes the body Acephalic. The head no 
longer is what imprisons the human mind within reason, but what plunges human life into what 
stands beyond it, i.e., into what exceeds it. When the pineal eye connects the human body 
directly to the blinding light of the sun, life becomes a “durable orgasm.” The Third eye, in 
Bataille's mythological anthropology, is the eye of a tree. But this tree, because it is also an 
animal, should be seen as a giant penis too, and perhaps even more so, as a giant penis who has 
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the sickening despair of vertigo. Likewise, Bataille's text completely reverses the meaning of the 
symbol of the sun. Instead of representing something bright, high and giving life, the sun 
becomes a point far at the bottom of the sky that attracts everything into its darkness. Things 
from the earth grow high, but through this movement, they lose themselves in the immensity of 
the sky. The sun becomes then a site of decomposition and death, and not a site of cleansing and 
regeneration. Finally, Jesus himself stumbles by miracle on the Vesuve in Bataille's phantasm 
and ends up being renamed Jesuve, that is to say, the name of an explosive savior.   359
III. NON-KNOWLEDGE AND THE HISTORY OF LOGIC 
Bataille developed the consequences his heterological vision of history and knowledge in a series 
of four conferences that he gave between 1951 and 1953 on the theme of non-knowledge. Those 
conferences should have been published in a book that Bataille wanted to call Mourir de rire et 
rire de mourir (“To die of laughter and to laugh at dying”) or The unfinished system of non-
knowledge. Bataille, a year prior to his death, had agreed with Philippe Sollers and « Tel Quel » 
to publish the four conferences on non-knowledge under the title Conferences on non-knowledge. 
A book bearing the same title, with a content that is close from what Bataille had in mind, exists 
 For a lacanian reading of the name « Jesuve », see Albert Nguyên, “ 'Le Jésuve', son nom de guerre », in La 359
Perdi(c)tion de Georges Bataille, Essai de psychanalyse. Paris: Edition Stilus, Col. Résonances, 2016, 121-160. 
Albert Nguyen writes: “Lacan a donné la clé de lecture de la méthode Bataille : Bataille essaie de saisir comment on 
pourrait se passer du symbolique en s'en servant. “Se passer du père à condition de s'en servir”, la formule ne dit pas 
comment tel ou tel va s'en servir, et ne dit pas non plus les mutations qui s'en suivent dans la vie. (…). Se passer du 
symbolique : ainsi Bataille “se fait” classer comme fou (ce qui le rend “ombrageux” et qu'il conteste d'avoir avec 
son père et sa mère connu la folie), malade mental, pervers ; c'est oublier qu'il a construite de l'Erotisme la théorie, 
de l'Athéisme un discours, que ses critiques littéraires font autorité et que son charisme seul (cf. le conflit avec le 
père des Surréalistes André Breton) ne permet pas d'expliquer. Et oublier aussi le projecteur aveuglant qu'il a braqué 
sur l'expérience, et sur un tout autre mode, dans un tout autre style que le monologue intérieur de James Joyce : 
l'expérience intérieure va avec la construction de ce qu'il a appelé, tout de même pas par hasard, la Somme 
athéologique. On sait l'importance de l'athéisme pour l'expérience analytique, la lecture de Bataille va de pair avec la 
réflexion de Lacan sur ce point : si l'athée est pour Lacan celui qui est allé au bout de l'analyse, pour Bataille le vide 
de Dieu est un nom de l'impossible” (89-90). 
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now in English. It still does not exist in French.  The book was intended to study and present 360
the effects of non-knowledge on different aspects of life. More importantly, these conferences are 
the one that Lacan is referring to in his conference “Je parle aux murs”, and that we thus have to 
fully articulate them before turning to Lacan’s critique. 
A Contingent Encounter with Logical Formalism 
I think it is important, before entering into the analysis of Bataille's conferences, to underscore 
the fact that Bataille, right at the opening of his first conference, mentioned that he had, the night 
before, a very long conversation with the British analytic philosopher Ayer over the apparently 
simple question, “Was there a sun before man existed?” As we will see, this historical anecdote is 
conceptually important because it will help us to posit Bataille's concept of non-knowledge 
directly in relation to the question of logical formalism (influenced by Carnap, Schlik and 
Neurath), and then in the light of how Lacan made use of such a formalism in his own theory of 
psychoanalysis in order to go beyond Bataille’s non-knowledge. Ayer and Bataille met at the end 
of the Second World War, when Ayer came to Paris during his involvement with the British 
resistance.  Ayer met Bataille through one of Bataille's exes, Isabelle Delmer (it is thus thanks 361
to the contingency of love that an analytic philosopher and an anti-philosopher like Bataille 
 Georges Bataille, The Unfinished System of Non-knowledge. Editor Stuart Kendall, Trans. Stuart & Michelle 360
Kendall, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2001. Otherwise, the full cycle of conferences has been 
published in French in Oeuvres complete, tome VII, Paris: Gallimard, 1976. The list of conferences goes as follow: 
“Le sacré au XXème siècle,” 187-189, “Les conséquences du non-savoir,” 190-196, followed by a “Discussion,” 
197-198, “L’enseignement de la mort” [pp.199-209], “Le non-savoir et la révolte,” 210-213, “Non-savoir, rire et 
larmes,” 214-233.
 For more details on this encounter, see Andreas Vrahimis, “Was There a Sun before Men Existed?: Ayer, Sartre, 361
Bataille and Merleau-Ponty,” in Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy, New York: Palgrave 
Macmilan, 2013, 87-109.
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met!). But it was only six years later, in 1951, that the conversation took place between Bataille 
and Ayer, as well as with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ambrosino. This gap of six years is 
significant in the sense that it suggests that Bataille not only had many conversations about the 
concept of truth and scientific knowledge with a very renowned analytic philosopher (and we 
know this because of Ayers' autobiography), but it also tells us that Bataille's concept of non-
knowledge, far from being exclusively the product of his mystical tendencies, or a product of a 
facile inclination towards literature, also received  a very strong influence from the tradition that 
is the most opposed to mysticism: logical positivism. The encounter between Ayer and Bataille 
can also be seen as the first recorded observation of the split between “Continental” and Anglo-
American philosophy. Ayer reported in his autobiography A Life that during the first conversation 
he had with Bataille, he “vainly tried” to persuade Bataille that time was not merely a human 
invention.  362
A Logical Attack on the Word Nothing  
When the conversation took place, Ayer had already written his book on the circle of Vienna, 
Language, Truth and Logic (1936),  and knew the existentialist philosophy of Sartre and 363
Camus. Ayer's position, in agreement with the Vienna's circle,  was against any form of 364
metaphysical claim, that is to say, against the idea that there could be some Truth about the truth 
 See Ayer, A Life, New York: Grove Press, 1999, p. 287.362
  Ayer, Language, Truth & Logic, New York: Dover Publications, 1952, 160.363
 See Kraft, The Vienna Circle, the Origin of Neo-Positivism, A Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy. New 364
York: Greenwood Press,1953, 208. See also Logical Positivism, Editor A.J. Ayer, New York: The Free Press, 1959.
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beyond the one achievable by science.  Ayer was thus against the philosophy of Heidegger who 365
wanted to preserve, through his metaphysics of the Dasein some transcendent values, just as 
much as Carnap had been opposed to it. Siding with science, Carnap had been the first 
philosopher to state that metaphysical sentences like some used by Heidegger in his book What 
is Metaphysics? were just nonsensical. For example, in the sentence “Das Nichts selbst 
nichtet” (“Nothingness itself nothings), the word nothing is used in a non-logical syntactic way, 
which means that there is no possibility to translate such a sentence into a logically constructed 
language.  
 Generalizing such an argument, Carnap and the circle of Vienna accused the whole 
metaphysical discourse, which pretended to have the Truth about truths, or to be in possession of 
the Value about values or, to use Lacan’s language, to have discovered the Other of the Other,  366
of being exclusively made of pseudo-statements in no way different from the ones composing the 
 See Ayer, “The Elimination of Metaphysics” in Language, Truth and Logic, 33-46. In this chapter, Ayer, in the 365
name of the Vienna’s circle, writes, “What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejection of the metaphysical 
thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality. Kant also rejected metaphysics in this sense, 
but whereas he accused metaphysicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding, we accuse them of 
disobeying the rules with the significant use of language” (27). 
 See Jacques-Alain Miller, “Extimate Ennemies,” Trans. Frederic Baitinger & Azeen Khan, in The Lacanian 366
Review, #3. “This Other can be named by a word in the philosophy of logic, metalanguage. The Other of 
metalanguage gives to the Other of language its law. It stipulates its rules—rules for the formation of language, the 
conditions for the validity of its formulas, of what makes them acceptable or, on the contrary, unacceptable. This 
position thus affirms that there is the Other of the Other, the Other of the law as it is differentiated from the Other of 
language—which supposes that one can know what one says, and rightly so. Lacan himself opposed this position 
after he formulated it. Retreating from it, he refuted and contested it. This refutation goes with the devaluation of the 
Name-of-the-Father as the signifier of the Other of Law, which goes as far as making of it a cap, a cover for the fact 
that there is no Other of the Other in language. Therefore, there is no metalanguage insofar as it can only function 
and be communicated in language.”    
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discourse of religion.  The circle of Vienna wanted to identify all the metaphysical parts of the 367
philosophical discourse in order to dismiss them as secretly playing a conservative role.  Ayer's 368
reading and translation in English of Carnap's attack on metaphysics became even more violent. 
It is in this context that Ayer approached the philosophy of Sartre. He, of course, immediately 
saw in it a new form of metaphysics and declared it, particularly in his use of the word 
nothingness, nonsensical. Ayer's critic of existentialism played a very significant role in the 
reception of this philosophy in an Anglo-Saxon context. (Sartre said, famously, “Ayer est un con” 
[Ayer is an cunt])  
 Ayer evokes in his autobiography the disagreements he had with Merleau-Ponty on some 
fundamental principles, as well as the decision they took to keep their friendship despite their 
philosophical disagreements. Because Ayer was rejecting the use of the word nothingness in 
Heidegger and Sartre, he could not engage in the debate that Sartre and Heidegger had over 
humanism.  For Sartre, as we saw in the preceding chapter, nothingness was a characteristic of 369
 For a very good study of the debate between Carnap and Heidegger see Michael Friedman, “Overcoming 367
Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger,” in A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger. New York: Open 
Court, 2011, 11-23. “Carnap’s complaint is not that the sentence in question is unverifiable in terms of sense-data, 
nor is the most important problem that the sentence coins a bizarre new world and thus violates ordinary usage. The 
main problem is rather a violation of the logical form of the concept of nothing, Heidegger uses the concept both as 
a substantive and as a verb, whereas modern logic has shown that it is neither” (11). Heidegger, answering this 
attack in an introductory chapter to What is Metaphysics? wrote: “Here the most extreme flattening out and 
uprooting of the traditional theory of judgment is accomplished under the semblance of mathematical science. Here 
the last consequences of a mode of thinking which began with Descartes are brought to a conclusion: a mode of 
thinking according to which truth is no longer disclosedness of what is and thus accommodation and grounding of 
Dasein in the disclosing being. But truth is rather diverted into certainty—to the mere securing of thought, and in 
fact the securing of mathematical thought against all that is not thinkable by it” (Heidegger, 227-228).
 Neurath wrote: “Science and Art are today above all in the hands of the ruling classes and will also be used as 368
instruments in the class struggle against the proletariat. Only a small number of scholars and artists place themselves 
on the side of the coming order and set themselves up as protection against this form of reactionary thought. The 
idealistic school philosophers of our day from Span to Heidegger want to rule, as the theologians once ruled, but the 
scholastics could support themselves on the substructure of the feudal order of production, whereas our school 
philosophers do not notice that their substructure is being pulled out from beneath their feet” (quoted by Friedman, 
20). 
 A debate that also involved Bataille during his Discussion on Sin, see The Epilogue.369
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human existence. What is particular to humans is that they allow nothingness to enter their 
world. Nothingness is necessary to access human freedom outside being. Freedom is only 
possible through the potential of nothingness: the essence of freedom is negativity.  
The Abyss Between Continental and Analytic Philosophy  
It is around this disagreement on nothingness that the conversation between Bataille, Ayer, 
Ambrosino and Merleau-Ponty took place. Bataille wrote, at the opening of his conference:  “We 
finally fell to discussing the following very strange question, ‘Was there a sun before man 
existed?’ Ayer had uttered the very simple proposition: there was a sun before men existed. And 
he saw no reason to doubt it. Merleau-Ponty, Ambrosino, and I disagreed with this proposition, 
and Ambrosino said that the sun had certainly not existed before the world. I, for my part, do not 
see how one can say so” (Bataille, 1998). In Phenomenology of Perception (1945),  Merleau-370
Ponty takes a position directly opposed to the one of Ayer when he refutes the idea that the world 
could exist without man. This idea, which could sound at first idealistic, is actually a 
consequence of Merleau-Ponty's critique of idealism. If there is a world that exists prior to its 
scientific construction, and that is imbued with meaning, as Merleau-Ponty states it, it is thus a 
world that is only accessible to humans. Merleau-Ponty was placing the discussion not on the 
level of realism, and the first axiom of verification put at the fore by the circle of Vienna; neither 
of idealism, like the analytic philosophy, and the definition of truth as tautological by 
Wittgenstein; but at the level of the description of the phenomenological experience. What does 
 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Part Two: The World as perceived,” “The Thing and the Natural World,” in 370
Phenomenology of Perception, New York: Routledge, 1976, 299-335.  
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the word “objective” means? And to this question, Merleau-Ponty's answer was that a pre-
scientific realm exists in which meaning is already manifested. 
 As for Bataille, the debate gave him first the occasion to name, for the very first time in 
the history of philosophy, that gap that was about to take place between continental philosophy 
(which generally deals with topics such as ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics, etc.) and Anglo-
American philosophy (linguistics, analytic philosophy, philosophy of language, etc.). “I should 
say that yesterday's conversation produced an effect of shock. There exists between French and 
English philosophers a sort of abyss which we do not find between French and German 
philosophers” (Bataille, 80). Of course, one has to exclude from the German philosophers that 
Bataille is evoking the members of the circle of Vienna, which ironically could be held 
responsible of having nourished the trend of analytic philosophy in Oxford, and then of having 
spread it in the United Stated during the diaspora of German intellectuals during World War II.   371
Bataille's Ironical Objection to Logical Positivism  
Bataille's interpretation of the sentence “there was a sun before men existed,” was that it was 
neither true nor false, but simpler, meaningless since it posits the presence of the sun without 
positing the presence of man at the same time. In other words, it proposes positing an object in 
the world independently from the presence of a human that can perceive it. As a consequence, 
Ayer’s proposition is meaningless for Bataille because it is a proposition that is detached from 
what grounds meaning itself: the conjunction between a subject and an object. If one says, at the 
 See, for a full history of this movement, Andreas Vrahimis, “Questioning Metaphysics in Weimer Germany: 371
Carnap, Heidegger, Nonsense,” 31-86, and “Derrida and Searle, the Abyss Stares Back?,” 160-181.
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same time, “there is the sun” and “there is no men,” one detaches the subject from its object and 
vice versa. The sentence is thus neither true, as Ayer thinks, nor false as Merleau-Ponty thinks, 
but simply meaningless, i.e., detached from any subjective support. Bataille writes: 
This proposition is such as to indicate that total meaninglessness that can be taken on by 
rational statement. Common meaning should be very meaningful in the sense in which 
any proposition one utters theoretically implies both subject and object. In the 
proposition, there was the sun and there are no men, we have a subject and no object. 
(Bataille, 80)  
But is that to say that Bataille is taking a logical positivist position against Ayer himself here? 
One can at least say that Bataille is appropriating the language of logical positivism in an almost 
parodic way. His argument, indeed, from a positivist point of view, does not hold. It fails, even, 
to object to Ayer's proposition from Ayer's point of view. When Bataille says that Ayers sentence 
lack an object, or a subject, he does not mean it in the sense that the sentence would be 
grammatically or syntactically wrongly formed, but that there is something mentally troubling in 
the idea of the presence of the sun before the existence of men. And what is troubling, in a sense, 
is that it reveals the oddity that the subject of science represents, that is to say, that subjective 
oddity that the point of view of science places on what is represents. It is thus not a logical 
objection that Bataille is raising at first, but an emotional objection, which only indirectly comes 
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to have some repercussion at a logical level.  In the sentence “there was a sun before men 372
existed,” what is mentally disturbing is the presence of a subjectless sun, which is to say, the 
presence of a subjectless object. And then, Bataille proceeds to describe the “inner” reason why 
this “particular” sentence is making him so uncomfortable, projecting thus the meaninglessness 
of the sentence onto an unknowable origin, 
It is impossible to consider the sun's existence without men. When we state this we think 
we know, but we know nothing. This proposition was not an exception in this respect. I 
can talk of any object, whereas I confront the subject, I am positioned facing the object, 
as if confronting a foreign body which represents, somehow something scandalous for 
me, because objects are useful. A given object enters into me insofar as I become 
dependent on objects. One thing that I cannot doubt is that I know myself. Finally, I 
wondered why I blamed that phrase of Ayer's. There are all sorts of facts of existence 
which would not have seemed quite as debatable to me. Which means that this 
unknowing; whose consequences I seek out by talking to you, is to be found everywhere. 
(Bataille, 1986, 81).  
Beyond the truth value of the sentence, there is something that goes beyond it. A fringe of non-
knowledge. And Bataille generalizes his feeling about this fringe of non-knowledge by saying: 
“this non-knowledge, of which I am talking to you about in order to locate its consequences, is 
 One could also emphasize here the very special place that the figure of the sun occupies in Bataille’s work. The 372
sun, indeed, far from being reducible to a simple natural phenomenon for Bataille, is probably one of his most 
important obsessions. The sun, for example, is present in one of Bataille’s earliest texts, like “The Solar Anus” or 
“Pineal Eye,” where it is used to imagine a phantasmatic anthropology; but it is also at the center of his cycle of 
works on economy and expenditure called The Accursed Share (Volume I, II, and III), where the sun represents the 
ultimate example of excess, i.e., of what gives without receiving anything in return. It is thus understandable, from a 
psychoanalytic point of view, that Bataille felt reluctant to detach the perception of the sun from any anthropological 
stakes. 
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present everywhere. To be precise, what I mean by this non-knowledge: what results from every 
proposition when one tries to go at the bottom of its content, and one feels uneasy about it” (82). 
This presence, nonetheless, that goes beyond what scientific knowledge describes, should not be 
confused with the presence of a well-intentioned God, or the presence of a docile and loving 
“human nature” (as in the case of religion, or in the case of science), but as we have already seen 
in the preceding chapter, the presence of a certain evilness, of a certain aggressiveness, of a 
certain horror at the core of the human psyche. And this horror—that the knowledge of science is 
trying to hide—that Bataille has named the sacred  or the “ganz andere,” and that, through the 
elaboration of his inner experience, and later through its erotic extensions, he wanted to explore 
in its full extension.   373
This space of the sacred, once removed from its religious context (that is to say from the 
fear that pulls back people towards religion), is what gives its proper ground to Lacan’s notion of 
the Real as well as what will make visible the connection of the Real with jouissance in 
Bataille’s inner experience. Bataille writes, at the opening of his book Eroticism (1957),  “I 374
believe that eroticism has a significance for mankind that the scientific attitude cannot reach. 
Eroticism cannot be discussed unless man too is discussed in the process. In particular, it cannot 
be discussed independently of the history of religion” (8). In sum, if every scientific knowledge 
hides, at its core, a fringe of non-knowledge, and if this fringe of non-knowledge has always 
 See Georges Bataille, “Le sacré au XXe siècle,” 187-189. Bataille writes: “Dans l’isolement auquel me 373
condamne la pensée de ce monde immense auquel je m’adresse maintenant, qui n’a plus du sacre qu’une sorte de 
réminiscence, à la rigueur une nostalgie bien impuissante – je voudrais malgré tout ne pas me laisser enfermer. Il me 
semble possible de formuler du moins cette protestation” (187-188). 
 Georges Bataille, Eroticism, Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood, San Francisco: City Lights Books, 374
1986. 276.
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something to do with eroticism, it means that it is the very definition of what is the “truth” of 
man, and of what is the relation of scientific knowledge to this truth that needs to be re-
articulated for Bataille.   
IV. LACAN’S CRITIQUE OF NON-KNOWLEDGE 
Lacan gave at Saint Anne, on the 4th of November 1971, a conference called: “Knowledge, 
Ignorance, Truth and Jouissance.” This conference was the first one of a cycle devoted to the 
theme of “the knowledge of the Psychoanalyst” delivered to Saint Anne’s psychiatric interns. 
Lacan gave this series of lectures right before he started his Seminar XIX, … or worse (1972), 
which marks the beginning of the end of Lacan's second classicism, as Jean-Claud Milner has it, 
and thus also the threshold of Lacan’s very last teaching, which I will fully discuss in Chapter 
Five.   375
 Interestingly enough for our subject, Lacan’s editor, Jacques-Alain Miller, argues in his 
introduction to Lacan’s conference “I Speak to the Wall,” that he has decided to publish the 
series of conferences apart from the Seminar XIX … or Worse, because he thought that they 
 See, Milner, Jean-Claude. L’oeuvre claire: Lacan, la science, la philosophie. Col. L’ordre philosophique, Paris: 375
Edition du Seuil, 1995. In L’oeuvre Claire, Milner isolates a first Lacanian classicism, which goes from Seminar I to 
Seminar XVI, and which corresponds to Lacan’s construction of a complete logic of the signifier (described in 
Chapter Two, Part IV). This logic isolates the subject of jouissance as what is excluded from the discourse of 
science. The second classicism, which goes from Seminar XVIII to Seminar XX, coincides with Lacan’s re-
elaboration of the feminine position, and the deployment of the matheme (as what is exclusively made of letters, as 
described in Chapter III, Part IV), as well as the construction of the unorthodox quantifier “not all” (described in 
Chapter Three, Part III and IV), which defines feminine jouissance as what is “not all” subordinated to the law of the 
signifier. Finally, the very last teaching of Lacan, which goes from Seminar XXI, to Seminar XXV, marks what 
Milner describes as Lacan’s deconstructive moment (described in Chapter V). Milner writes, “Ainsi le second 
classicism a-t-il passé, à l’instant ou il paraissait s’accomplir. Lacan lui-même y a mis un terme. Le séminaire XX, 
qui en constitue le sommet, déclenche aussi le mécanisme de sa déconstruction. Tout est déj à mis en pieces lorsque 
Lacan choisit, aux approches de 1980, de se taire. Le noeud d’un côté, le poème de l’autre; la ficelle et la lettre; le 
silence et le calembour” (168).  
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would have created a diversion within the Seminar. But why was Lacan so afraid that his last 
teaching could be mixed with the work of Georges Bataille? And why was Jacques-Alain Miller 
reinforcing Lacan’s fear? In other word, why is Bataille’s notion of non-knowledge a notion that 
could be falsely mistaken for what Lacan wants to convey under the banner of the Real in his late 
and last teaching? What are the stakes of such a possible confusion? In which sense can 
Bataille’s non-knowledge threaten, in some ways, Lacan’s ambition in his late teaching?  
Bataille’s Style and the Risk of a Sliding into an Impotence of Thinking 
 To enter this question, I want to analyze, first, a preface never published to the second edition of 
Inner Experience, where Bataille formulates what could have irritated Lacan while reading his 
book. Bataille wrote the following lines: 
Speaking about Inner Experience and Guilty, someone whom I never caught being 
intellectually inconsequential told me that he did not like the books. They appeared to 
him as being dangerous, he said to me. On this point as—excluding one—on all the other 
points (at the condition that they matter), I agree with L.   (my translation, 583)  376
If we accept the idea that the L. mentioned here is Lacan,  this passage, as well as the rest of 377
the note, will give us a double clue to understand, 1) why Lacan does not like Bataille's concepts 
of inner experience and non-knowledge, and, 2) why despite this disagreement, and one 
 “Parlant de L'Exérience intérieure et du Coupable, quelqu'un dont je n'ai jamais pris la pensée en défaut, me dit 376
qu'il n'aimait pas ces livres. Ils lui semblaient dangereux, me disait-il. En ce point comme – à l'exception d'un seul – 
en tous les autres (à la condition qu'ils importent), je suis bien d'accord avec L” (OC VIII, 583).
 Which is, I would say, more than possible as we know it from Michel Surya's biography of Bataille, as well as 377
from Roudinesco's biography of Lacan, and as the judgment from L. expressed here is perfectly aligned with the 
critique that Lacan is addressing to Bataille's concept of non-knowledge in his conference  “I Speak to the Walls.”
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fundamental point that we will have to elucidate, Bataille and Lacan may agree, at a theoretical 
level, on everything else. But let's see, first, how Bataille agrees with L.’s judgment about his 
books Inner Experience and Guilty (1961).  To begin with, admits Bataille, Inner Experience 378
and Guilty are books that invite most of their readers—because of their apparent lack of 
composition, lack of rigor, their incompleteness, as well as their constant changing in style and 
subject matters—to a form of intellectual laziness. They attract, as such, readers who are on the 
lookout for a cheap literary experience that could sustain their desire for an easy way out of 
political responsibility. And although Bataille underlines the fact that he—himself—wrote them 
in that form for a very serious reason (in order to be faithful to the kind of awakening experience 
that he had prior to their execution), the use of such a form drove him to laziness too. Bataille 
writes, “I wrote without order, having to match a certain moral imperative, but the fatigue and 
the unhappy immorality that resulted from this awakening were inviting a sliding towards an 
impotence of thinking which turns it into a form of literature” (my translation).  Of course, 379
Bataille never grounded his thinking into a form of sentimentality, but he nonetheless adopted the 
mode of expression of those who do so, opening in his reader's mind a possible confusion 
between what Bataille tried to achieve as a thinker, and the concrete result he obtained as a 
 Georges Bataille, Guilty, trans. Stuart Kendall, New York: SUNY series on Contemporary French Thought, 378
2011.  
 “J'écrivais en désordre, ayant à répondre à une exigence morale, mais la fatigue et l'immoralité malheureuse qui 379
résultait de l'éveil engageait le glissement vers l'impuissance de la pensée qui tourne en littérature” (OC VIII, 583).
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writer.  Bataille wrote: “I did not really give in, I did not translate my fatigue into 380
presuppositions grounded on a facile sentimentally, but I did express myself using the same 
mode as those who give in” (my translation).  And, by doing so, Bataille invited the people 381
inclined to substitute for the operation of thinking a facile adhesion to their own passion, to read 
and love him, and to find in his work the best justification of their own position. He prostituted 
thinking in order to make it appealing to the lazy taste of his generation.   
 But beyond this critique of his own way of expressing his thoughts, Bataille emphasized 
also the paradoxical fact that there is, perhaps, a worst risk than the one of laziness, the risk of 
reducing the operation of thinking into a form of sleepiness. Bataille writes: “coherent thinking 
necessarily makes room for the necessity of sleeping” (my translation).  In other words, if it is 382
true to say that Bataille's mode of expression runs the constant risk of prostituting thinking by 
turning it into a depraved form of literature, the classical mode of philosophical inquiry, in turn, 
runs the constant risk of making thinking the pure auxiliary of sleeping.  Most of the time, 383
indeed, thinking can be reduced to a form of protection against a possible encounter with the 
Real. Thinking helps the subject to keep dreaming while being awake. Nonetheless, or 
 See also Georges Bataille, “Les conséquences du non-savoir,” in OC VII, where Bataille writes, “C’est la 380
position de celui qui ne sait pas ce qu’il y a dans une malle cadenassée qu’il n’a pas la possibilité d’ouvrir. C’est à ce 
moment que l’on emploie un langage littéraire ou il y a plus que ce qu’il est nécessaire de dire. Seul, le silence peut 
exprimer ce que l’on a à dire, donc dans un langage trouble, dans un état d’esprit de parfait désespoir, dans un sens 
au moins, non comparable à celui qui cherche quelque chose et qui ne l’a pas ; c’est un désespoir beaucoup plus 
profond, que nous avons toujours connu, qui tient à ceci que l’on a un projet en tête qui ne peut aboutir, que l’on est 
sur le point d’être frustré alors que l’on tient essentiellement à ce qui en est l’objet”  (192-193).    
 “Je ne cédais pas vraiment, je ne traduisais pas ma fatigue en présuppositions fondée sur une facilité 381
sentimentale, mais je m'exprimais sur le mode de ceux qui cèdent” (OC VIII, 583).
 “La pensée cohérente fait nécessairement la place à la nécessité de dormir” (OC VIII, 583).382
 “Rien ne me semble plus important que de ne séparer jamais la cohérence de cette discordance continuelle sans 383
laquelle la cohérence laisserait son objet au dehors” (584).
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paradoxically so, underlines Bataille, a true state of awakening can only be achieved as the result 
of a prior effort made to achieve a form of systematization. Otherwise, such a state goes right 
back to pure laziness. This is why Bataille adds, in his note, that Lacan's opinion condemning his 
book was agreeable to him.   And I shall add, perhaps, that Lacan also very much agreed with 384
Bataille when, years later, he gave to the Real the definition of the impossible, that is to say, that 
the Real as the point of impossibility of a given system of knowledge. What is “serious,” then, in 
Bataille's inner experience is not the thought expressed in it, but the truth about what makes 
thinking impossible, which is really not that far, as we will see in Chapter Five, from Lacan's 
definition of thinking as mental debility. But before being able to fully explain why Lacan and 
Bataille’s definition of thinking can be compared, let’s take a closer look at the way in which the 
conference “I Speak to the Wall” rearticulates the question of knowledge, non-knowledge, truth 
and jouissance.  
Ignorance and Knowledge  
Reversing Bataille’s definition of non-knowledge, Lacan opens his lecture I Speak to the Walls 
by asserting that ignorance is a passion that is linked to knowledge. Ignorance is defined by 
Lacan as the way in which a certain knowledge becomes established, that is to say, no longer 
questioned by the person who is learning it. By defining ignorance thus, Lacan is of course not 
 “Les conséquences du non-savoir” in OC VII. Bataille writes, “Pour cette raison, l'opinion de mon ami 384
condamnant mes livres m'agrée, et l'accueil qui leur est fait le plus souvent me serait odieux... si la cohérence de la 
pensée n'avait généralement pour objet ce qu'elle hait, qui pour autant cesse purement d'être détestable, que l’article 
de Sartre était une belle saloperie.” (OC VIII, 584)
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defining it as Nicholas of Cusa did it in his De Docta Ignorancia (1440),  which explicitly 385
made of ignorance the end result of a process of learning. Reversing even this definition, Lacan 
makes of ignorance, here, what prevents someone from questioning everything he knows and, 
perhaps even more, what prevents someone from learning or creating anything new. Psychiatrists 
from Saint-Anne, for example, as Lacan remembers them when he arrived for the first time in 
this institution, were full of themselves, and full of their knowledge. As a result, they were so 
passionate about what they thought they knew that they were incapable of remaining critical 
about their own knowledge. They were thus in a position of complete ignorance in relation to 
what they knew, and in a position of complete impotence with regard to the possibility of 
creating anything new. In other words, knowledge had been reduced, for them, to an act of 
memorization and repetition.   
Nowadays, it is unfortunately not that different, laments Lacan. Although the movement 
of antipsychiatry founded by David Cooper and described in his book Psychiatry and Anti-
Psychiatry (1967)  dared to criticize the psychiatric world for being cruel, archaic and, as such, 386
still ignorant of what mental illness is, such a movement did not really change the relationship 
between passion, knowledge and ignorance for Lacan. It just displaced the ignorance onto a 
different passion: a passion for freedom (mostly on the side of the psychiatrist, and not so much 
on the side of the patient). This is why Lacan ends up saying: “the question of mental madness 
or, to say it better, of psychosis, is not at all resolved by antipsychiatry.” (13) The antipsychiatry 
 See Nicholas of Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981, 205. See also, 385
for a good reading of Nicholas of Cusa’s Docta Ignorantia, Jasper Hopkins, A Concise Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1980, 185.
 See David Cooper, Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, New York: Routledge, Reprint 2013. 386
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movement, argues Lacan, was just a “revolution” within the field of psychiatric knowledge, 
simply a way to go back to a state of primitive ignorance regarding the links between madness 
and the needs of a certain social order. It is, as such, not that different from any other psychiatric 
knowledge developed before. It is even perfectly aligned with what Foucault described in his 
History of Madness (1967).   387
Faced with this situation, the knowledge of the psychoanalyst (as it is different from the 
knowledge of the psychiatrist), unfortunately, cannot be said to occupy, at first glance, a better 
position. Most psychoanalysts for Lacan are also caught in a form of automatism of repetition. 
They are not open to the future, not open to any changes for the simple reason that they are 
already caught up in a pre-existent knowledge that they keep repeating like automatons. Only 
Lacan’s students, Lacan dared to say, and not even all of them but only a few (not even 
Laplanche or Pontalis), will end up producing something that will not be the simple repetition of 
pre-existent knowledge.  The only problem is that those students have misunderstood Lacan on 388
a crucial point about his late teaching. They have equated what Lacan said about knowledge and 
ignorance to what Georges Bataille said about non-knowledge. Let‘s reread, for a second time, 
what Lacan said about Bataille during his conference I Speak to the Walls, 
Those who [the good students] have heard me quite well – or at least as best as they could 
—when I talked about knowledge as being the correlate of ignorance, and this idea 
tormented them a little. And there are some among them that have been poked by God 
 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, Transl. Jonathan Murphy, Routledge, New York, 2006. 387
 One could think, here, about Luce Irigaray, or about Felix Guattari, who both attended the Seminar of Lacan, and 388
who both created a completely new approach to psychoanalysis. 
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knows which fly, a literary fly of course, things that can be found in Georges Bataille’s 
writings, because, otherwise, I don’t think they would have thought about it. I am talking 
about non-knowledge. 
Georges Bataille gave a conference on non-knowledge one day, it might be found in two 
or three different places in his writings. God knows that he did not make a fuss of it. And 
especially the day he gave his conference in the Salle de Géographie de Saint-Germain-
des-Prés, which you must know because it is a renowned place of culture, he did not utter 
a word, which was not a bad way to show his own non-knowledge.  
People laughed, but they were wrong because now, it is very fancy, the non-knowledge. It 
can be found all over the place in the mystics, it is even from them that the notion comes 
from, it is with them that the notion has a meaning. And also, people know that I have 
insisted on the difference between knowledge and truth. Thus, if truth is not knowledge, it 
must then be non-knowledge. Aristotelian logic: everything that is not black is the non-
black. (16)  
It is a discovery this non-knowledge. One could not find a better way to introduce a 
definitive confusion on a delicate subject matter, the point in question in psychoanalysis 
being what I called the sensible frontier between truth and knowledge. (16-17) 
But what does the term non-knowledge mean within Lacan's teaching? How should it be 
situated, and its function described? To elucidate this question, I will make reference to an 
unpublished Seminar from Jacques-Alain Miller, “Le Banquet des analystes,” where Miller 
explains the evolution of the articulation of the notions of Truth and Knowledge within Lacan’s 
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entire teaching. More specifically, I will make reference to two excerpts from this Seminar that 
have been published in Lacanian Ink. The text is called “Logic of Non-Knowledge in 
Psychoanalysis.”   389
From Ignorance to Naivety: the Two Meanings of Zero 
To understand what the notion of non-knowledge means for Lacan, one has to interrogate the 
nature of the negation that is affecting the term knowledge in the signifier “non-knowledge.” 
What is the status and the function that determines the prefix non, in the notion of “non-
knowledge”? Lacan gave many different statuses and meanings to negation in his teaching. He 
constructed a table of three binaries oppositions to order them. The first opposition is the one that 
opposes ignorance to naivety. While ignorance is a lack of knowledge at a place where a specific 
knowledge should have been, naivety marks the absence of judgment upon an experience and 
thus a kind of lack of knowledge that opens onto the possible acquisition of new knowledge. In 
other words, if ignorance is the failed experience of acquiring a knowledge, naivety is the 
subjective position that is required to be taught by experience, and thus to be able to acquire a 
new knowledge. From this opposition it then becomes possible to understand the two statuses 
that Lacan gave to the notion of zero in mathematics.  
On the side of ignorance, zero is the mark of an incompetency, the mark of a privation, of 
an absence. Zero in this case indicates that the element that should have been marked into a 
certain set cannot be granted its entry into it for lack of conformity to the norms that defines that 
 See Jacques-Alain Miller, “Logic of Non-Knowledge in Psychoanalysis,” in La Cause Freudienne 75, 169-184.389
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set. On the side of naivety, the zero indicates a form of positivity. It is the mark of what is to 
come. Another way to distinguish these two kinds of zero is to say that zero, on the side of 
naivety, is a zero that is a relative zero. It is a zero that is initial and arbitrary, but it is also a zero 
from which it becomes possible to build in the sense that it introduces a difference between the 
Real as what is completely unmarked, and the Real as what can be marked. In this sense, the zero 
is like a point of orientation. It is a zero that opens up the rest of the procedure of knowledge to 
take place. On the contrary, on the side of ignorance, the zero is a neutral element, just like the 
zero in mathematical addition. One can add as many zeros to any number as he wants, no 
changes will happen to the original number. The zero is simply a neutral element, something that 
does not count, that has, strictly speaking, no impact whatsoever.   
 Expanding on this distinction, Miller then argues that it is from there that Lacan was able 
to make a distinction between the void and nothingness. The void, in Lacan's theory, is what can 
contain the empty locus that can receive something, while nothingness is the content of this 
primordial void. Nothingness is thus, one could argue, the equivalent of the neutral zero, while 
the void is the equivalent of the relative zero upon which everything else can be built. When the 
void is reified, when one refers to it as a something, it then becomes nothingness. And in order 
for it to become nothingness, it has to be localized. In other words, one has to be able to say, 
“There should have been roses,” as in the famous eponym short-story of Jacobsen, the Danish 
poet, in order to make nothingness appear.  Nothingness is the name of a localized lack, the 390
 Jens Peter Jacobsen, “There Should Have Been Roses” in Mogens and Other Stories, trans. Anna Grabow, New 390
York, Acterna Edition, 2011, 40-44. The short story starts thus: “There should have been roses of the large, pale 
yellow ones. And they should hang in abundant clusters over the garden-wall, scattering their tender leaves 
carelessly down into the wagon-tracks on the road: a distinguished glimmer of all the exuberant wealth of flowers 
within. And they should have the delicate, fleeting fragrance of roses, which cannot be seized and is like that of 
unknown fruits of which the senses tell legends in their dreams. Or should they have been red, the roses?” (40) 
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name of a place that can be filled with a presence, or hollowed out, like in the case of Jacobsen 
story.  Such an articulation of the two notions, nonetheless, cannot be considered a fully 
satisfying definition of the two terms, for it leaves outside of its scope the possibility that the 
void could be limitless. The void, indeed, in the previous articulation, is always already posited 
as a limited void that can be instantly converted into a container, that is to say, into a locus.  
 But the void can also be equated to the infinite, and the limitless. And it's the notion of 
the limitless void, one could say, that is at the root of the ambiguities that circulates around the 
notion of non-knowledge, and that is at the root, also, of the differend, in the sense that Lyotard 
gave to this word, between Bataille and Lacan. If one gives to the void the sense of the limitless, 
it then becomes the support of a limitless non-knowledge à la Bataille, while if one gives to the 
limitless void the meaning of the zero, as Frege did in his Begriffsschrift  (1879), it then 391
becomes possible to posit the relative zero, that is to say, the void as the primitive set, the very 
framework that will shelter the future development of the natural number, and by extension, the 
future development of knowledge (as explained in the Theory of the Subject in Chapter Two). In 
order for the void to become the support of knowledge, and not the justification of an ultimate 
and definitive non-knowledge, one has to reduce the limitless void to a limited void that can be 
equated to a concept once reduced to its very core, i.e, to the dimension of a mathematical set.  
The void becomes then the relative zero as it acquires the qualities of a locus, and through this 
quality, the mathematical properties of a set. This is why Miller can write, taking a stand against 
a possible confusion between Lacan's notion of non-knowledge, and Bataille definition of non-
 See Frege, “Begriffscchrift” (1879): Selections (Preface and Part I), The Frege Reader, Ed. by Michel Beaney, 391
Oxford: Blackwell Publishin, 1997, 47-79. 
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knowledge, 
Even if it is a short cut, one can say already, from the point that we have reached, that 
psychoanalysis is not a mystique of non-knowledge, and that in this disposition one 
makes room for non-knowledge of the analyst at the beginning, but one does not consider 
that for the reason non-knowledge is the culmen of experience.  (my translation, 171)  392
While, for Bataille, the movement goes from knowledge to non-knowledge, it goes from non-
knowledge to knowledge in Lacan.  
CONCLUSION: TO INVENT A KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NON-KNOWLEDGE 
It is precisely to go from non-knowledge to knowledge that Lacan invented all of his mathemes 
and, towards the end of his teaching, what he named the Pass. The Pass, as an analytic 
procedure, is the moment when an analysand, after having battled for years with his or her non-
knowledge (with his or her unconscious truth), proposes to transmit to others the knowledge that 
he has acquired about his or her own non-knowledge, that is to speak about his or her 
unconscious. As such, the end point of analysis is what makes  each unique case something that 
can be compared, from the point of view of the pass, to the others. Consequently, the notion of 
non-knowledge is not disconnected from the notion of knowledge in Lacan’s late apprehension 
of the end of the psychoanalytic treatment.  
 “Même si c'est un court-circuit, on peut donc déjà dire, au point où nous en sommes, que la psychanalyse n'est 392
pas une mystique du non-savoir, et que dans cette disposition on fait place au non-savoir de l'analyste au départ, on 
ne considère pas pour autant la non-savoir comme le culmen de l'expérience”  (171).
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The Opposition Between Bataille and Lacan 
There is, even, a strict articulation in between non-knowledge and knowledge in Lacan's late 
work. Lacan wrote, in his “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the school”  
What he has to come to know can be traced out upon the same relationship “in reserve” 
according to which all logic worthy of the name operates. This does not mean anything in 
“particular,” but it is articulated in chains of letters that are so rigorous that provided not 
one of them is left out, the un-known is arranged as the framework of knowledge. (trans. 
Russell Grigg).  
In this proposition, argues Miller, Lacan actually introduced a displacement in his definition of 
the unconscious. This proposition suggests, indeed, that the unconscious should no longer be 
considered as the “truth” about the truth of the subject—as it were in Freud’s work—but that it 
should be defined, on the contrary, in terms of knowledge. In other words, what is secretly at 
stake, in Lacan’s confrontation to Bataille’s notion of non-knowledge, is a shift of the definition 
that needs to be given to the unconscious, and the consequences that such a shift have on the 
relation between truth and knowledge. While, at first, Lacan defined the unconscious as what 
speaks, and what speaks as what is telling the truth without knowing it  (“ I, the Truth, speak” 393
Lacan famously said), the late Lacan redefined the truth as the “lying truth” (la varité), as I will 
explain in detail in Chapter Five, and redefined knowledge as something that would no longer be 
opposed to the truth of the unconscious, but as that which could give to such a truth a form of 
 Lacan, “Science and Truth”, in Ecrits, “This is precisely why the unconscious, which tells the truth about truth, 393
is structured like a language, and why I, in so teaching, tell the truth about Freud who knew how to let the truth—
going by the name of the unconscious—speak. This lack of truth about truth—necessitating as it does all the traps 
that metalanguage, as sham and logic, falls into—is the rightful place of Urverdrangung, that is, of primal repression 
which draws towards itself all the other repressions—not to mention other rhetorical effects that we can recognize 
only by means of the subject of science.” (737) 
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logical consistency.  Commenting on this shift, which goes from a definition of truth as a 394
pathetic non-knowledge, to the definition of truth as what can be structured logically, Miller 
writes, in “Le paradoxe d’un savoir sur la vérité”   395
It [the promotion of knowledge] proposes on the contrary, to order truth, to not take as a 
reference the dialectical progression of non-knowledge, to not take as a reference the 
interrogating Socrates or the pithy out of herself – all these admirable figures, ranked, and 
about which the pathetic effects no longer need to be demonstrated – but to take as a 
reference the logic of mathematic. The definition of the unconscious as a depathologized 
truth makes it shift on the side of the matheme and even, precisely, on the side of 
mathematics or, at least, of this mathematical effort to grasp and to empty out truth from 
its emotional charge. (my translation, 128)  
It is thus only when the pathological charge that is attached to the truth of the unconscious has 
been emptied out, which is to say detached from its link to jouissance (thanks to the catharsis 
that the analytical process is able to produce) that something like a mathematical knowledge of 
truth can be elaborated at the place where a prior pathetic non-knowledge was, and that a new 
conception of the truth and the unconscious can emerge.   
The above delineation of the confrontation between Bataille and Lacan on the question of 
 Such a movement, which brings knowledge where the truth was, is what will also be at the fore in Lacan’s 394
formalization of the discourse of the analyst since, in this discourse, what comes to occupy the place of truth is, 
precisely, the symbol of knowledge. In other words, it is only within the analytic discourse that a superposition of 
truth and knowledge can become possible. Otherwise, truth and knowledge remain apart from one another—even in 
the discourse of University, which places knowledge in the position of the Agent (who ignores, or has repressed the 
Truth that makes it speak). 
Miller, “Le paradoxe d’un savoir sur la vérité,” in La Cause Freudienne #76, 121-136. 395
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non-knowledge enables us to locate, with great precision, what separates the two thinkers. While 
the position of Bataille culminates in a form of ecstasy of non-knowledge, where the Real of 
jouissance emerges as the hidden truth of knowledge (and knowledge as the defense mechanism 
against the truth about jouissance), Lacan’s theorization of the end of analysis leads, on the 
contrary, to an ultimate rehabilitation of knowledge. To go even further, one could say that Lacan 
built his last teaching to fight against Bataille, as well as Cixous’ pathetic approach of the Real 
(through the patheme), an approach that not only valued jouissance over knowledge, but which 
also was about to become—through Bataille’s spiritual children —the new dominant way to 396
approach the Real. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DECONSTRUCTING PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Or the Late Lacan at Joyce’s School. 
The Real, I will say, is the mystery of 
the speaking body, the mystery of the 
unconscious.  
Jacques Lacan 
The last teaching starts when the 
formula that grounds the entire 
teaching of Lacan is denied, 
renounced, abjured. And that formula 
is being replaced by another formula, 
not said per se, but that goes as 
follow: the unconscious belongs to 
the speaking body.  
Jacques-Alain Miller 
Freud's Oedipus Complex is a Dream 
The late teaching of Lacan, which goes from Seminar XX, Encore (1971-1972) to Seminar XXV, 
Le moment de conclure (1977-1978) is, as much a destruction of the previous teaching of Lacan, 
as the destruction of psychoanalysis itself. While the early Lacan tried, through his “Return to 
Freud” (1953-1972) to give  psychoanalysis a scientific status by rewriting Freud’s Oedipus 
complex in linguistic terms, the late Lacan, following the literary path of James Joyce, declared 
that Freud’s Oedipus complex was nothing but a dream , and the practice of psychoanalysis 397
 See. Lacan, Jacques. “Beyond the Oedipus Complex” in Seminar XVII The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, transl. 397
Russell Grigg, New York: Norton & Company, 2007, 110-154. 
!315
nothing but a scam.   398
If the Oedipus complex is, for the late Lacan, nothing but “Freud’s dream,” it is because 
it reduces the unconscious to the analytic setting in which the analyst is placed in the position of 
a “subject supposed to know,” and the analysand in the position of the one believing in the 
analyst knowledge. And since the truth that is revealed about one’s unconscious in such a setting 
remains bound to the framework of the Oedipus complex, and since this setting is linked to the 
desire that Freud had to save the figure of the father, and thus the power structure of patriarchy, it 
is the practice of psychoanalysis that becomes, for the late Lacan, a scam. To put it differently, 
while the early Lacan took Freud’s structure of the Oedipus complex at face value and built on it 
his own version of the complex, it is the very function of Freud’s Oedipus complex that became 
the question for the late Lacan. Commenting on this idea in his Seminar XXII, RSI (1974-1975), 
Lacan said, 
In Freud there is an elision of my reduction of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, 
as all three of them knotted (or stitched) together. What Freud established with the Name-
of-the-father, which is identical to the psychic reality, to what he calls psychic reality (i.e. 
to the religious reality), it is through this function, through this dreamlike function, that 
Freud established the link between the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. (My 
Translation, 99)   399
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire XXV, Le moment de conclure (1977-1978), lesson one. Unpublished.398
 The French version goes, “Dans Freud il y a une élision de ma réduction de l’Imaginaire, au Symbolique, au 399
Réel, comme noués tous les trois entre eux, et que ce que Freud instaure avec son Nom-du-Père, identique à la 
réalité psychique, à ce qu’il appelle la réalité psychique, nommément à la réalité religieuse, c’est ainsi par cette 
fonction, par cette fonction de rêve que Freud instaure le lien du Symbolique de l’Imaginaire et du Réel” (99).
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Freud, indeed, made of the Oedipus complex the myth in charge of connecting, within his theory 
of the human psyche, the realm of nature to the one of culture.  On the side of nature, he 400
developed in his Three Essay of the Theory of Sexuality (1905) the idea of the polymorphous 
perverse sexuality of children.  On the side of culture, he took the form of the patriarchal 401
family, where men are supposed to be the head of the household, and women reduced to their 
role of mothers, and made of it the model in charge of explaining the precarious transformation 
of the polymorphous little infant into a “normal” heterosexual man or woman. In other words, 
while Freud spend the first half of his life de-constructing normativity, he spent the second half 
of his life re-constructing it through the elaboration of the Oedipus complex.  
Freud's Anthropological and Philosophical Mistake 
More problematically, Freud grounded his re-construction of normativity in a series of 
anthropological studies in which he tried to prove the universalism of the Oedipus complex.  In 402
the first of them, Totem and Taboo: Some points of Agreement between the Mental Life of 
 The first reference to the myth of Oedipus occurs in a letter to Fliess. In this letter, Freud writes, “A single idea 400
of general value dawned on me. I have found in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my 
mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood, even if not so early in 
children who have been made hysterical (similar to the invention of parentage [family romance] in paranoia – 
heroes, founder of religion). If this is so, we can understand the gripping power of Oedipus Rex, in spite of all the 
objections that reason raises against the presupposition of fate, and we can understand why the later “drama of fate” 
was bound to fail so miserably” (Letter to Fliess, 272). 
 Commenting on Freud’s theory about infantile sexuality, Lacan said, “All human sexuality is perverse, if we 401
carefully follow what Freud says. He never managed to conceive of sexuality except as something perverse, and this 
is precisely why I question the fruitlessness of psychoanalysis.” (132). 
 The Four texts that Freud devoted to anthropological questions are Totem and Taboo (1913); The Future of an 402
Illusion (1927); Civilization and its Discontents (1930); Moses and Monotheism (1939). The relation of Freud to 
anthropology is complex and crucial to understand the articulation between his theory of infantile sexuality and his 
theory of the Oedipus complex. For a very good introduction to the subject, see Wallace, Edwin R. “Freud and 
Anthropology: A history and reappraisal” (1983), Psychological issues, monograph 55. Freud and anthropology: A 
history and reappraisal. Madison, CT: International Universities Press, 1983.
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Savages and Neurotics (1913), Freud explained the origin of human society and religion through 
an analogy with the structure of the mental life of modern neurotics.  He took the model of the 403
Oedipus complex, where the father stands as the source of castration (and as the model of the one 
who is not castrated) and the mother as the primary sexual object (forbidden by the father), and 
imagined that the same complex could explain the birth of human society and religion. Freud 
argued that at the origin of human society there existed a horde governed by a single dominant 
male (the urfather) who was keeping all the females for himself, and who thus was leaving the 
other males frustrated.  As a result, Freud imagined that the sons united against this dominant 404
male (admired as much as feared) to kill him and liberate themselves from his tyranny. However, 
after having eaten their “father,” the brothers felt guilty and decided to make amends by ensuring 
that the same situation would not repeat itself through a series of preventative laws. This is how 
Freud imagined resolving the question of the passage from nature to culture, which is to say the 
birth of a society centered on a Totem (which represents the dead father, as well as the 
prohibition to kill him again), and organized by the rule of exogamy (through the prohibition of 
incest).  
What Freud attempted to prove in Totem and Taboo was that all the Symbolic structures 
at the root of human society and religion were, in fact, deducible from the two unconscious and 
repressed desires at the core of the Oedipus complex, i.e., the desire to kill the father, and the 
 See, Freud, Sigmund. “Totem and Taboo,” Standard Ed., Vol. 13 (1913-1914), trans. by James Strachey, London: 403
Hogarth Press, 1955, 1-162.
 It is interesting to point out, here, that Freud wrote Totem and Taboo right after the creation of the I.P.A, which 404
means right after the moment when Freud himself was no longer the Urfather of a primitive horde of analysts, but 
the father that had been already attacked and abandoned by Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, and soon by Gustave Jung. 
Freud wrote Totem and Taboo as an answer to Jung’s book The Psychology. For more details, see Roudinesco, 
“Totem et Tabou.” Dictionnaire de la psychanalyse. Paris: Fayard, 1997, 1057-1062.
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desire to sleep with the mother. Freud argued that it was in order to counter balance their desire 
to kill the father that the horde of sons invented the Totem and its laws. Likewise, Freud 
suggested that it was in order to counterbalance their desire to sleep with their mother that the 
horde of brothers invented the prohibition of incest. Freud’s theory, however, turned out to be not 
only wrong from an anthropological point of view, but also highly contestable in its 
psychoanalytical roots.  Indeed, by inventing such a myth, Freud did not only turn his own 405
neurotic structure (the one of an obsessive) into a universal one, but he also made of them the 
very root of human culture.  As such, he elevated the heterosexual male desire to the level of a 406
universal, and he reduced women to the status of objects of exchange between men.  
The Late Lacan Beyond Freud 
Lacan, it is well known, supposedly made the same mistake when he developed, in his Seminar 
III, On Psychosis (1955-1956) the concept of the Name-of-the-Father, or when he proposed a 
logical rereading of the structure of the Oedipus complex in his Seminar IV, La relation d’objet 
(1956-1957).  And it is true that the function of the Name-of-the-Father, for the early Lacan, 407
 Even though the anthropological critique of Totem and Taboo is not my primary goal in this chapter, it is 405
important to note that many anthropologists and ethnologists have criticized Freud’s theory. A very renowned 
scholar such as Alfred Kroeber in “Totem and Taboo, an ethnologic psychoanalysis” (1920) accused Freud of being 
in dialogue with dated evolutionist theories, and of having based his theory too heavily on myth and folklore tales, 
while the discipline of anthropology, at that time, was finally becoming more concerned with the scientific studies of 
real primitive cultures. It is also around the theory defended by Totem and Taboo that Malinowski, Ernest Jones and 
Karen Horney decided to create, perhaps in a more “feminist” manner, a new form of anthropological 
psychoanalysis. Finally, as Paul Laurent Assoun has argued, one could reproach Freud, from a strictly 
psychoanalytic point of view, of having taken the two male desires that structure the neurosis of an obsessional 
neurotic, and of having turned them into a universal structure. For more details on this question, see, Assoun, Paul-
Laurent. Freud et les sciences sociales : psychanalyse et théorie de la culture. Paris: Armand Collin, 2008. 
 For more details on this idea, see, Assoun, Freud et les Sciences Sociales : Psychanalyse et théorie de la culture. 406
Paris: Armand Collin, 2008.  
 See, Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III, The Psychosis 1955-1956, trans. Russell Grigg, Edited by 407
Jacques-Alain Miller, New York: Norton & Company, 1993. And see also, Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, 
La Relation d’objet 1956-1957, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1994.
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had the charge to secure, at the level of the Other, something non-deceptive, and thus reassuring 
and lovable.  As such, the Name-of-the-Father was what was linking, in Lacan’s early teaching, 408
Freud’s conception of the Oedipus to the Judeo-Christian tradition which posited, for the first 
time in history, not only a single God, but a single non-deceiving God as a foundation of the 
world.  Freud argued, indeed, in Moses and Monotheism (1939), that the Judeo-Christian 409
tradition not only implemented the belief in a single God, but also the belief that beyond all the 
evil in the world stands a non-deceiving God which obeys certain laws. Of course, the Judeo-
Christian tradition did not invent the idea of the non-deceiving Other as such, but it was the first 
tradition that detached this idea from any concrete reference to the external world. Unlike the 
empirical system of Aristotle, for example, where it is the concrete observation of the sky and the 
movement of the planets and suns that is guaranteeing such a possibility, the Judeo-Christian 
tradition was the first one to posit such guarantee as an abstract principle: the principle that God 
is not deceiving us. 
However, it is precisely this principle, as Chapters One, Two and Three demonstrated, 
that Lacan tirelessly questioned throughout his “Return to Freud,” and that he tried to bypass first 
with his conceptualization of the feminine not-all, and that he explored in a radically new manner 
during his last teaching, taking as high point of departure the work and the psychic structure of 
James Joyce, and more broadly of psychosis (which is why it is so important to approach the last  
teaching of Lacan having Lacan's confrontation with Bataille in mind). Lacan writes, in his 
Seminar XXIII,  
 See, in particular, “The Other and Psychosis,” in Book III on Psychosis, Op. Cit., pp. 29-43. 408
 See, in particular, “On a god who does not deceive and on one who does.” in Book III on Psychosis, Op. Cit., pp. 409
59-72. I will come back to this question in the Epilogue. 
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The hypothesis of the unconscious, and Freud underscores this, is something that can 
only hold up by presupposing the Name-of-the-Father. Presupposing the Name-of-the-
Father, which is certainly God, is how psychoanalysis, when it succeeds, proves that the 
Name-of-the-Father can just as well be bypassed. One can just as well bypass it, on the 
condition that one makes use of it. (116) 
Stated clearly, one could say that the question that Lacan raises in his late teaching is the one 
concerning the possibility of knotting the three registers of the Imaginary, the Real and the 
Symbolic without having to use, as Freud did, the myth of the Oedipus complex.  Lacan said 410
during his Seminar XXIII The Sinthome (1975-1976), “I will ask this year, if I may say so, the 
question about the knotting of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, in order to know if one 
needs this supplementary function of one more torus, the one about which the consistency is to 
be referred to the one of the Father” (102). For it is thanks to the function of the father, and even 
more so, thanks to the love perversely (père-versement) oriented toward the father as the bearer 
of castration that Freud intuitively resolved the mystery of the knotting of the three dimensions 
of the subject. But it is precisely this intuition, which Lacan judged to be perversely oriented 
towards the father that the late Lacan tried to bypass through his invention of the Borromean 
knots. Lacan said, at the end of his Seminar XXIII, “I’ve been trying to flesh out this intuition 
 See, for an early definition of the three registers, Lacan, Jacques. “The Symbolic, the Imaginary and the 410
Real” (1953) published in The Names-of-the-Father, trans. Bruce Fink, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013. And for a 
quick definition of them, see Jacques-Alain Miller “The Real is Without Law.” In this text, Miller writes, “What are 
these registers? One could say—to give an image—they are kinds of drawers, terms which Damourette and Pichon, 
who made a reading of Lacan concerning the structure of language, made use of in their inspired grammar. Let’s say 
that they are sets. Let’s suppose that they are sets and that there are a certain number of elements of which we 
consider a certain number to belong to R, other to I, and again others to S. Am I going to define these sets? I will 
content myself with saying of R, that it is always what is of the order of the given, which has a certain raw value, 
that I is what is represented, the representation being conceived as image, and that S is what is articulated and 
structured as a language” (55).
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[Freud’s intuition] in a different way with my Node Bo [Borromean knots], which is so very apt 
to evoke Mount Nebo or, as they say, the Law—Law which has absolutely nothing to do with the 
laws of the real world, these laws being moreover a matter that remains completely open. The 
law at issue on this occasion is simply the law of love, that is to say, père-version” (130). 
The Real as the Mystery of the Speaking Body 
What is at stake with Lacan’s late teaching is thus neither the problem of psychosis as such, nor 
the one of the critique of the Oedipus (as it was for the early Lacan) but, rather, what Lacan 
formulated in a closing sentence of his seminar XX, Encore when he said “The Real, I will say, is 
the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious” (Encore, 126). For if the 
knotting of the three registers represented a mystery, in Freud’s Oedipus complex and Lacan’s 
early teaching, it was only insofar as the knotting of the three registers had not yet emerged as a 
problem in and for itself. While in the early Lacan, the knotting of the three registers was 
described as a mystery that was engendered by the Paternal Metaphor, it is what became, for the 
late Lacan, a problem that needed to be studied for itself through the metaphor of the Borromean 
knot.  
To make understandable how Lacan managed to flesh out differently Freud’s intuition 
about the father, while giving to it a potentially very “queer turn,” this chapter proceeds as 
follows. First, I put forth all the Freudian concepts related to the Oedipus complex, as well as all 
the concepts of the early Lacan, in regard to the notion of the Real. I show how Lacan’s notion of 
the Real, in his late teaching, enables him to produce a radical critique of his early teaching, and 
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more broadly, of psychoanalysis itself. Next, I explain why Lacan invented, in order to go 
beyond this critique and the risk that it implies of turning psychoanalysis into an elegy of 
psychosis (as Deleuze and Guattari did in The Anti-Oedipus), instead, a new form of writing (the 
one of the Borromean knots) through which the knotting of the three dimensions of the speaking 
being becomes approachable beyond the limits assigned to their knotting by the Oedipus 
complex. Third, I discuss how Lacan used the case of James Joyce to develop his concept of the  
sinthome and the escabeau, which defines what makes possible, at the level of the individual, 
and through an invention, the stitching of the three dimensions outside any reference to the 
Oedipus complex. Finally, I present the series of paradoxes that the late Lacan produces in 
regards to the “normal” functioning of psychoanalysis, and the ways in which theses paradoxes 
can be surmounted through a new approach of interpretation, and more broadly, of writing and 
poetry.     
I. RETHINKING PSYCHOANALYSIS THROUGH THE REAL  
Miller, in the opening lesson of his Seminar, Le tout dernier Lacan, remarks that, during his 
Seminar XXIII, The Sinthome (1975-1976), Lacan said, that “it was inasmuch as Freud had really 
made a discovery–and to the extent that this discovery is true—that one can say that the Real is 
my symptomatic answer to it” (132). The category of the Real, as Lacan posited it at the very 
opening of his teaching is not, as one might think, a Freudian category, but Lacan’s own 
invention, which is to say Lacan’s symptomatic answer to Freud discovery of the unconscious. 
Commenting on this idea in his Seminar XXIII, Lacan said: 
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This is something which I can say I consider to be nothing more than my symptom. I 
mean that it is my own particular way of carrying Freud's lucubration to its degree of 
symbolism, to the second degree—if indeed there is such a thing as may be termed 
Freud's lucubration. Let's say that it is to the very extent that Freud articulated the 
unconscious that I react to it. (…) It is to the very extent that Freud made a discovery – 
supposing this discovery to be true—that it may be said that the real is my symptomatic 
response. (113)   411
The Real is thus, to put it simply, the product of Lacan’s reaction to Freud’s discovery and, one 
could even add, the product of the trauma that Freud’s discovery produced on Lacan himself. The 
trauma that Freud’s discovery provoked in Lacan is linked to the fact that Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious, in its most radical implications, produces a “hole” at the level of universal 
discourse inasmuch as it attacks, or puts in jeopardy the very notion of truth that supports it. But 
it is precisely this “attack” on the notion of truth, and the implications of such an “attack” that 
Lacan took seriously, while the rest of the psychoanalytical institution and especially the branch 
of ego-psychology that became, at the death of Freud, the dominant branch of psychoanalysis in 
 The French version states, “En d’autres termes, l’instance du savoir que Freud renouvelle, je veux dire rénove 411
sous la forme de l’inconscient, ne suppose pas du tout obligatoirement le réel dont je me sers” (132). “C’est là 
quelque chose dont je peux dire que je le considère comme n’étant rien de plus que mon symptôme. Je veux dire que 
c'est ma façon à moi de porter à son degré de symbolisme, au second degré, l’élucubration freudienne – si tenté qu’il 
y ait ce que l’on puisse appeler une élucubration Freudienne. Disons que c’est dans la mesure ou Freud a articulé 
l’inconscient que j’y réagis” (132).
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America, tried very hard not to take into account.   412
The Unconscious, the Truth and the Real  
In classical Freudian psychoanalysis, as well as for the early Lacan, there is a primordial 
connection between the unconscious and the possibility of its interpretation. It is inasmuch as the 
discourse of an analysand can be interpreted by the analyst that the unconscious of the analysand 
comes into existence.  This very process is itself rendered possible by the dynamic of 413
transference which established the analyst in the position of “the subject supposed to know,” 
which is to say in a position that makes of him (or her) a subject capable of interpreting 
“truthfully” the discourse of the analysand.  In other words, in classical Freudian 414
psychoanalysis, as in the early Lacan, the very existence of the unconscious is related to 
transference and the possibilities of interpretation that are attached to it. To put it in a formula: 
without transference, no unconscious. Lacan said, 
What Freud sustains as the unconscious always presupposes a knowledge, and a spoken 
knowledge as such. The unconscious is wholly reducible to a knowledge. This is the 
minimum that is presupposed by the fact that the unconscious may be interpreted. It is 
 As Mitchell and Black have it, in Freud and Beyond: a History of Psychoanalytic Modern Thought, “Prior to the 412
development of ego psychology, the clinical goal of psychoanalysis had been the release of trapped, unconscious 
energies. Freud had stressed a non-directive, non-suggestive approach. Removing the debris clogging the stream was 
the task, not strengthening the channel through which it flowed” (35). But it is according to this new orientation that 
psychoanalysis, under the guise of ego-psychology, took over the I.P.A after the Second World War and spread in 
America, under the influence of Hartmann, Ernst Kris and Rudolph Loewenstein, and then in France under the 
influence of Marie Bonaparte. And it is this highly conservative re-reading of Freud, which for example considered 
homosexuality as a perversion and femininity as an essence that the first generation of feminist thinkers like de 
Beauvoir, Friedan, Millet and Firestone criticized psychoanalysis so harshly, and rightly so.
 See, Lacan, “Intervention sur le transfert,” in Écrits I, 212-226.413
 See Lacan, Jacques. Seminar XXIII, The Sinthome (1975-1976). Lacan said, “the unconscious is wholly reducible 414
to a knowledge. This is the minimum that is presupposed by the fact that the unconscious may be interpreted” (112).
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quite clear that this knowledge has the minimum requirement of two supports, which are 
called terms and which are symbolized with letters, hence my way of writing knowledge 
as supported by S subscript 2, S2..(112)   415
Reversing this perspective on the relations between knowledge and the unconscious as always-
already interpretable, Lacan introduced, in “The Preface to the English Publication of Seminar 
XI,” the idea of a Real unconscious (opposed to the transferential unconscious) by saying: 
“When the space of a lapsus no longer carries any meaning (or interpretation), then only is one 
sure that one is in the unconscious. One knows” (vii).  The Real unconscious, opposed to the 416
transferential unconscious, implies a disjunction between the unconscious and its interpretation. 
While a lapsus usually implies, in order to be read as a lapsus, its connection to the signifier of 
its interpretation, it is here disconnected from any interpretation and remains thus as a detached 
signifier, which is to say as a signifier all alone. This disconnection of the unconscious and its 
interpretation, in turn, presupposes an absence of transference between the one who is producing 
the lapsus, and the one who is hearing it. And this absence of transference is precisely what is 
“known”—as an inner certitude—by the person who produces the lapsus. To put it otherwise, it 
is because one “knows” that his lapsus is not related to any possible transference between him 
and the one who is hearing it that such a thing as the Real unconscious can emerge. In other 
words, the Real unconscious is the product of a particular knowledge—the knowledge of what 
The French version goes, “(…) ce que Freud supporte comme l’inconscient suppose toujours un savoir, et un 415
savoir parlé. L’inconscient est entièrement réductible à un savoir. C’est le minimum que suppose le fait qu’il puisse 
être interprété. Il est clair que ce savoir exige au minimum deux supports, qu’on appelle des termes, en les 
symbolisant de lettres. D’où mon écriture du savoir comme se supportant de S indice d’un petit 2, S2” (131).
 Lacan,  “Preface to the English-Language Edition” in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. 416
Alan Sheridan. New York: Karnac, 1977. Lacan wrote this preface a week after the end of his Seminar XXIII on 
Joyce. 
!326
Jacques-Alain Miller calls, in his very last Seminar, the knowledge of “the one all alone.”  This 417
knowledge of the “one all alone” is a knowledge that is more of the register of an inner certitude 
than a knowledge as we usually define this term.   418
The notion of truth, in psychoanalysis, is generally defined as the harmonious 
conjunction between the process of free association (on the side of the analysand), and the 
process of interpretation (on the side of the analyst). It is also what Lacan, at the beginning of his 
teaching, called “parole pleine,” which is to say an utterance where the subject of the enunciation 
and the subject that supports the act of enunciation is but one thing.  This very conjunction, 419
however, is what Lacan defines as a “lying truth” insofar as it presupposes a form of “friendship” 
between the one that speaks and the other that listens and interprets. Miller, commenting on this 
idea in his Seminar, Choses de finesse en psychanalyse (2008-2009) writes,  
 When Freud and the post-Freudians spoke of defense and the need to analyze the 
defenses, they had the idea that one had to go beyond the lying truth, that there was 
something beyond the semblants of the signifier, that interpreting repression was not 
sufficient and that a function of another order was at stake, one that concerned the 
relation of the subject to jouissance—a certain relation of refusal, of rejection, of 
“obstaclisation” in relation to jouissance. One particular consequence of this reasoning is 
 See, Miller, L’Un tout seul. Unpublished.  417
 I have discussed this notion of inner certitude in Chapter Four when I compared Lacan’s late teaching to 418
Bataille’s notion of inner experience and non-knowledge. 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Séminaire I, Les Écrits Techniques de Freud, Paris, Le Seuil, 1975. During this seminar, 419
Lacan said: “La parole pleine est celle qui forme la vérité.” (125) See also, Lacan, Jacques. “Fonction et champ de la 
parole et du langage en psychanalyse,” in Écrits I, 235-321. See in particular Section I, “Parole vide et parole pleine 
dans la réalisation psychanalytique du sujet.,” 245-263. Lacan writes, “Qu’elle se veuille agent de guérison, de 
formation ou de sondage, la psychanalyse n’a qu’un medium : la parole du patient (245-246). For more details on 
this notion, see Chapter Two, when I compare Derrida’s notion of Writing, and Lacan’s definition of the Letter. 
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to make of the kind of speech that psychoanalysis authorizes and encourages what Lacan 
called a lying truth. This truth, I specify it—it is my own doing—I am trying it—is lying 
about jouissance. One cannot say the truth about jouissance. (my translation)   420
This is why Freud himself, suggests Lacan in “Preface to the English-Language Edition” (a text 
he wrote at the end of Seminar XXIII), aware of this conflicted relation between truth and 
jouissance, invented psychoanalysis as a solitary practice, even though now it is always practiced 
in pairs.  And this solitary practice (which does not presuppose a transferential link) is not 421
resting on transference, but on what Lacan calls a feeling of emergency. Such a feeling is what 
brings an analysand to therapy, and what pushes him (or her) to start talking before any 
transferential link has been established between the analyst and the analysand. This feeling of 
emergency is, one could say, the therapeutically oriented version of what Lacan called, during his 
early teaching, the function of the haste.  And it is always-already therapeutically oriented in 422
the sense that it generally leads to its own Aufhebung (sublation) into the process of speech and 
transference, which is to say into the process of the “lying truth” of the transferential 
unconscious.  
 The French version goes, ”Il est certain que quand Freud et les post-freudiens évoquaient la défense et qu’il 420
fallait finalement analyser les défenses, ils avaient bien idée en effet qu’il fallait passer au-delà de la vérité 
menteuse, qu’il y avait quelque chose au-delà des semblants du signifiant, qu’interpréter le refoulement ça ne 
suffisait pas, et qu’il y avait en jeu une fonction d’un autre ordre et qui tenait au rapport du sujet à la jouissance : un 
certain rapport de refus, de rejet, d’obstaculisation par rapport à la jouissance. (…) Une conséquence est en 
particulier que la parole, qu’autorise et qu’incite le discours analytique relève de ce que Lacan a appelé la vérité 
menteuse, la vérité, je précise – c’est de mon cru, je l’essaye – menteuse sur la jouissance. On ne peut pas dire vrai 
sur la jouissance. Si on ne peut pas dire toute la vérité, c’est parce qu’il y a une zone, un domaine, un registre – de 
quoi ? – de l’existence, où la vérité n’a pas cours, et ce registre serait celui de la jouissance, de ce qui satisfait. Et, si 
on suit Lacan là-dessus, la jouissance est ce qui satisfait un corps” (lesson XII, the 18th of March 2009).
 Lacan writes, “It should be noted that psycho-analysis has, since it has ex-sisted, changed. Invented by a solitary, 421
an incontestable theoretician of the unconscious (which is not what one imagines it to be—the unconscious, I would 
say, is Real), it is now practiced in couples. To be fair, the solitary was the first to set the example. Not without 
abusing his discipline (for they were disciples only because he knew not what he did)” (Seminar XI, vii).
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Séminaire XX, Encore, Paris: Le Seuil, 1975. In this Seminar Lacan theorized what he called 422
“the function of the haste.”
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As a result, one can say that when truth is related to the transferential unconscious 
through the act of interpretation, it condemns truth to be constantly changing. Lacan called this 
phenomenon in French “Varité,” which is the union of the word truth (vérité) and the word 
variety (variété). Lacan said, in his Seminar XXIV, L‘insu que sait de l‘un bevue s‘aile a mourre, 
“One should try to open himself (or herself) to the dimension of truth as variable, which is to say 
to what... by condensing the two words... I would call “varité” [the variable-truth], with a little 
“é” swallowed from ‘variété’” (my translation).   423
Through this notion of “lying truth,” Lacan wanted to make visible that truth, within the 
transferential unconscious, was reducible to a fictitious construction. Consequently, one could 
add that in the late Lacan the more the category of truth is being apprehended for what it is—a 
purely fictitious construction—the more the category of the Real is being elevated not only as 
what is opposed to truth, but also as what does not lie. And if the Real does not lie it is because it 
has nothing to do with truth, and thus with the variety of its lies. On the contrary, even, the Real 
is what has no meaning, what excludes meaning. Lacan said, in his Seminar XXIII, “If you look 
more deeply into what I mean by this notion of the Real, it appears that the Real is grounded in 
that it bears no meaning, in that it excludes meaning, or, more accurately, in that it settles in a 
 See Lacan Séminaire XXIV, L’insu que sait de l’une bévue s’aile à mourre, (1976-1977). Unpublished. Lacan 423
said: “Il faudrait voir, s’ouvrir à la dimension de la vérité comme variable, c’est-à-dire de ce que… en condensant 
comme ça les deux mots …j’appellerais la varité, avec un petit « é » avalé, la variété.” (Lesson of the 19th of April 
1977). 
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deposit on account of being excluded from meaning” (51).  This is why, also, concludes Miller 424
in “The Real Unconscious,” it is as if Lacan tried to do away with the category of truth in his late 
teaching, as if he tried to eradicate from the practice of psychoanalysis the need to believe in the 
idea of truth.  Because truth is what is common between Freud’s conception of psychoanalysis 425
and discourse of religion, and perhaps also to the discourse of philosophy, as Alain Badiou 
argues in his Seminar on Lacan.  It is, as Kierkegaard would say, either the path of religion, 426
philosophy and truth, since both of them imply believing in a certain ordering of the discourse, or 
the path of psychoanalysis and anti-philosophy. 
Lacan developed this idea about religion in his conference The Triumph of Religion 
(1974) when he said that one has to make a choice between religion and its required belief in the 
existence of an ultimate truth and psychoanalysis, which requires letting go of the belief in 
truth.  And one could add that it is precisely to do away with the idea of truth, and to put in 427
 Lacan said, during his Seminar XXIII, “N’est vrai que ce qui a un sens” (116). “Quelle est la relation du réel au 424
vrai ? Le vrai sur le réel, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, c’est que le réel, (…), n’a aucun sens” (116). “(…) si vous 
creusez ce que je veux dire par cette notion de réel, il apparaît que le réel se fonde pour autant qu'il n'a pas de sens, 
qu'il exclut le sens, ou, plus exactement, qu'il se dépose d'en être exclu” (65). “Je parle du réel comme impossible 
dans la mesure où je crois justement que le réel – enfin, je crois, si c’est mon symptôme, dites-le-moi – le réel est, il 
faut bien le dire, sans loi. Le vrai réel implique l’absence de loi. Le réel n’a pas d’ordre” (138). “Le réel, celui dont il 
s’agit dans ce qu’on appelle ma pensée, est toujours un bout, un trognon autour duquel la pensée brode, mais son 
stigmate, à ce réel comme tel, c’est de ne se relier a rien. C’est tout du moins ainsi que je conçois le réel” (123). I 
will come-back to this question later in this chapter. 
 See, Miller, “The Real Unconscious,” trans. Frederic Baitinger & Azeen Kahn, in lacanian ink, #50, 2017, 22-41.  425
 See Alain Badiou, Lacan, Anti-philosophy 3, New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 426
 See, for more details, the conference “The Triumph of Religion” that Lacan gave as an introduction to his lecture 427
“La Troisième.” By true religion, Lacan means Christianity. Christianity is the true religion inasmuch as it is the 
only Religion that focuses exclusively on the question of resentment, and that pretends to have found the “true” 
subjective answer to it, i.e., “Love thy Neighbor as thyself.” (I will define precisely this notion in the Epilogue). 
Opposed to such pretension, psychoanalysis is, for Lacan, a discourse that aims at showing that there is no such 
thing as an ultimate truth. This is why, for Lacan, one has to make a choice between religion, and its required belief 
in the existence of an ultimate truth, and psychoanalysis, which requires letting go of the belief in truth. It is, as 
Kierkegaard would say, either the path of religion and truth, or the path of psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, as Lacan 
underscored, the path of psychoanalysis is also clearly the hardest one since it implies, at least on the side of the 
psychoanalyst, the adoption of an impossible position.
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place a non-religiously oriented type of psychoanalysis that Lacan invented the Real. And this 
replacement of truth by the Real, it is important to underscore it, was already on its way at the 
beginning of Lacan’s text “Television” (1973), which is to say at the very beginning of his late 
teaching, when he said that truth could only be half said for obvious material reasons (words are 
lacking to say it all).  In other words, in between truth and the Real, there is an impossibility: 428
the impossibility to say it all; and a refusal: the refusal to reduce psychoanalysis to form of 
religion, being the religion of science.   429
Hystory and Lying Truth 
Finally, beyond this attack on truth, what is also attacked by the last Lacan is the very principle 
that permits linking one signifier (S1) to another signifier (S2), since such a link, in the end, is at 
best a fictitious construction, a convention about which people agree upon. This distinction is 
also what enables Lacan to point to the fact that between Freud’s “Reality Principle” and his own 
idea about the Real there is an epistemological radical difference. To illustrates this idea, one just 
need to go back to the figure of the hysteric, and to point to the fact that, as Miller as it, “hysteria 
is a psychopathological structure where can be seen in its pure form the impact of the discourse 
of the Other on the subject, and perhaps, too, the impact of the desire of the Other” (Le tout 
dernier Lacan, lesson 3).  And within this structure, which represents par excellence the 430
 Lacan, Jacques. Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment. Trans. Joan Copjec, New York: 428
Norton, 2007. 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “Télévision,” in Autres Écrits, 509-546. Lacan said, “Je dis toujours la vérité: pas toute, 429
parce que toute la dire, on n’y arrive pas. La dire toute, c’est impossible, matériellement : les mots y manquent. 
C’est même par cet impossible que la vérité tient au réel” (509).
 See Miller, Jacques-Alain. Le Tout dernier Lacan (2006-2007), unpublished. Third Lesson, 29th of November 430
2006. 
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condition under which a transferential unconscious is possible, the very nature of the 
unconscious, as well as the very nature of the “cure” that psychoanalysis offers, is reducible to a 
will to organize, under the guiding supervision of the analyst, the life of the analysand in a 
coherent story (histoire). 
Within the framework of classical psychoanalysis, as well as for the early Lacan, the 
unconscious as transferential is nothing but “a hystory” (a word that combines “history” and 
“hysteria”) that the analysand is telling to himself with the help of the analyst in order to make 
sense of what remained previously at the level of the unknown. Miller writes, “For instance, in 
analysis, it is the desire that the subject pays attention, that the subject says the truth and, by 
doing so, that he lies, that he tells a story. It is the value of the written neologism that Lacan 
introduced by writing: hystory--with the y of hysteria” (my translation).  It is such an 431
“hystoire” and the kind of “friendship” that it implies (on the behalf of the analyst), as well as the 
kind of truth that it posits in the “Real” that is attacked by the late Lacan as a “lying truth.” And 
if this truth is called a “lying truth,” once again, it is precisely because it covers and hides the 
Real by turning it into an inchoative process of hystoricisation. In sum, within the paradigm of 
the transferential unconscious, there is no Real for the subject but only a Reality already 
translated into a hystory, which itself implies the existence of a “signifying chain,” grounded on 
the law of language, i.e., grounded on the laws of metaphor and metonymy as Lacan described 
See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. Choses de finesse en psychanalyse, VIII, L’orientation lacanienne 2008-2009, 431
Unpublished. Lesson of the 21th of January 2009. Miller said, “En l’occurrence, dans l’analyse, c’est le désir que le 
sujet fasse attention, que le sujet dise la vérité, et, par-là, qu’il mente, qu’il raconte une histoire. C’est la valeur du 
néologisme scripturaire que Lacan produit en écrivant : hystoire – avec le y grec d’hystérie (JAM écrit le mot 
hystoire au tableau). C’est une histoire qui répond au désir de l’autre.”
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them in “The function and the Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis.”   432
The Real Unconscious and its Relations to Psychosis 
Contrary to this approach of the unconscious through the notion of language, truth, transference 
and, to summarize them all, hysteria, the notion of the Real unconscious is directly linked to the 
early definition that Lacan gave of the phenomenon of psychosis in his text “On a Question Prior 
to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” (1958-1959).  Lacan said, “What is the psychotic 433
phenomenon? It is the emergence, in reality of an enormous meaning that has the appearance of 
being nothing at all—insofar as it cannot be tied to anything, since it has never entered into the 
system of symbolization—but under certain conditions it can threaten the entire edifice” (60). 
Just like in the case of the Real unconscious, “where a lapsus no longer carries any 
meaning” (Preface, vii), the psychotic phenomenon presents itself as a detached signifier that 
cannot be integrated within the Symbolic structure of a subject. This is why, one can argue that 
Lacan’s definition of the Real unconscious as what “has no law,” is not, strictly speaking, an 
invention of the late Lacan but, rather, a generalization of a phenomenon that was already present 
in Lacan’s comprehension of the psychotic phenomena.   434
In the case of the Wolf Man, for example, it is quite clear that his hallucination, as Lacan 
underlines it in “Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s “Verneingung” (1954), 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “Fonction et champs de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse,” in Ecrits I, pp. 235-321. 432
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “On a Question Prior to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” in Ecrits, Op. Cit. pp. 433
445-488.
 For a full explanation of the notion of the “Real without law,” see Miller, “The Real is Without Law.” lacanian 434
ink, #47, 2016, 50-78.
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puts into question the very possibility of hystoricization.  Hallucination, indeed escapes any 435
process of hystoricization insofar as the very process of hystoricization relies on the previous 
symbolization of the elements that need to be organized, while psychotic phenomenon is the 
direct consequence of the foreclosure of such possibility. The notion of foreclosure, in Lacan’s 
early teaching, is precisely meant to express this specific situation in which an element of the life 
of the subject has escaped the process of symbolization and cannot be reintegrated in a coherent 
story as such. Lacan said, in his Seminar III, on Psychosis,  
In the subject's relationship to the symbol there is the possibility of a primitive 
verwerfung [foreclosure], that is, that something is not symbolized and is going to appear 
in the Real. It is essential to introduce the category of the Real, it is impossible to neglect 
it in Freud's text. I give it this name so as to define a field different from the Symbolic. 
From there alone it is possible to throw light on the psychotic phenomenon and its 
evolution. (81)   436
Reciprocally, one can say that a hallucination is the mark of a Real that has bypassed the 
construction of truth. A hallucination is without any Other, is not made for any Other nor 
determined by it. It is as if something was speaking all alone. Miller, commenting on this 
proximity between psychosis and the Real unconscious, writes, “All alone, it is an adjective 
about which we know now how to give to it its value. It is an adjective that signals that we are 
not in hystory, nor in hysteria but, on the contrary, on the side of the solitary, on the side of a 
 See, for the clinical case of the Wolf Man, Freud, Three Case Histories. Transl. Philip Rieff, New York: Simon & 435
Schuster, 1996. And see, Lacan, “Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s “Verneingung,” in Ecrits, 
308-317. 
See, Lacan, Jacques. Séminaire III, Les Psychoses (1955-1956), Paris: Seuil, 1981.436
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Real that speaks all alone” (Le Tout dernier Lacan, Lesson Three, my translation). However, to 
go beyond the opposition between the meaninglessness of the Real unconscious (and the inner-
certitude that goes with it), and the transferential unconscious  (and the presence of the Other that 
it implies), Lacan, during the lesson IX of his Seminar XXIII, The Sinthome, suggested that 
beyond the opposition between being understood by the Other, and speaking for oneself, there is 
a third possibility that would coincide, for him, with the possibility of inventing a kind of 
“writing without word” (“une écriture sans parole”) that could be, at the same time, useful to 
understand better what the notion of the Real is. Lacan said, “One has to break oneself up, if I 
may say so, with a new Imaginary that establishes sense. This is what I am trying to establish 
with my language, which has the advantage of wagering on psychoanalysis inasmuch as I try to 
institute it as discourse, that is to say, as semblance at its most plausible” (Seminar XXIII, 
102-103).  But how should we imagine or understand what a writing that does not speak 437
means? 
A Discourse without Speech  
 Writing since antiquity (as we saw in Chapter Two, Section I and II), has always been associated 
with the practice of reading (and most of the time of reading aloud), and through the practice of 
reading, with the “art” of interpretation. A writing, normally, is always made to be read, that it to 
say, to be deciphered in order to extract from it a certain meaning. But this definition, or 
approach of the written is only valuable when it comes to written texts that have been written 
 Lacan writes in Seminar XXIII, “Il faut se briser, si je puis dire, à un nouvel imaginaire instaurant le sens. C’est 437
ce que j’essaie d’instaurer avec mon langage, qui a l’avantage de parier sur la psychanalyse en tant que j’essaie de 
l’instituer comme discours, c’est-à-dire comme semblant le plus vraisemblable” (122).
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from the start with the intention to be read and to communicate a certain meaning. However, 
there exists another form of writing. This form of writing, as we saw in Chapter II’s conclusion, 
is what Lacan called in “Lituraterre” (1971) the writing as a mark, the writing as a trait (un trait), 
and even more to the point, the writing as a unary trait (le trait unaire). The idea of unary trait 
comes from Freud. It translates, in Lacan’s language, what Freud called Einseiger Zug, which is 
to say, the unary elements of identification. To simplify the distinction between the two-forms of 
writing, Lacan named the first one signifier and the second letter.  
Of course, within Lacan’s theory, those two modes of writing are interconnected. For 
example, the writing of the graph of desire (presented in Chapter I), which belongs to the second 
kind of writing, is also always connected to the first mode of writing, which is there to give 
meaning, to interpret the second mode of writing. In this sense, the first mode of writing, which 
is the one that speaks, is comparable to a body since the body is what is being read and 
interpreted by the soul just like a text is being read by its reader. Opposed to such a mode of 
writing and reading there is the second mode of writing that cannot be read and, consequently, 
cannot be converted into meaning. (The title that Lacan gave to the collection of his articles 
“Ecrits” can be understood, somehow ironically, in this second sense.)  
Given this double mode of writing, Lacan said that the unconscious is, first and foremost, 
what can be read, what can be deciphered; and reciprocally that the (Freudian) unconscious is 
what excludes the second mode of writing (i.e., the letter) because of its structure. The kind of 
meaning that the unconscious is producing is, however, very deceiving. It is a meaning that can 
lie inasmuch as the unconscious can contradict itself, and then produces a series of arguments to 
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justify its own contradiction. This is why Lacan concluded, in “Lituraterre,” that the 
transferential unconscious is more of a rhetorician than a proper logician. This is why, also, the 
symptom and the operation of meaning making are to be placed on the side of semblance, while 
the letter as detached from any meaning should be placed on the side of the Real unconscious, 
that is, on the side of what is unilateral, i.e., detached from any connection to S2.  
As what follows will show, the writing of the Borromean knot is of that order. It is a 
unilateral writing, which means a writing that is not a semblant. The writing of the Borromean 
knots, in this specific sense, should not be confused with the other use that Lacan made of little 
letters in his other Graph, like the Graph of Desire, for example, where all the letters are taken as 
signifiers that have a specific meaning. Those previous graphs describe the “cage” of meaning 
that makes of every discourse a semblant. But it is precisely because Lacan described so 
accurately the nature of every discourse as a semblant that he was able to start elaborating a 
discourse that would not be a semblant. Lacan said,  
One has to break oneself up, if I may say so, with a new Imaginary that established sens. 
That is what I am trying to establish with my language, which has the advantage of 
wagering on psychoanalysis inasmuch as I try to institute it as discourse, that is to say, as 
semblance as its most vraisemblable, its most plausible. All in all, psychoanalysis is 
nothing more than a short-circuit via meaning, via sens as such. Just now I defined this as 
the copulation of language – since it is by means of this that I sport the unconscious – 
with our body.” (102-103) 
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Commenting on this sentence in his Seminar, Detached Pieces, Miller said, “this is what we see 
the efflorescence of in the Seminar XXIII, The Sinthome. It is what Lacan has built; he has built a 
discourse while trying not to make of it a semblant, that is to say to make of the letters a use that 
would not be the one of the signifier, but one that would bring back the signifier to the letter that 
supports it” (50, my translation). Let’s thus study how Lacan managed to build such a discourse 
that would not be of semblance.  
II. THE BORROMEAN CHAIN: A NEW WRITING FOR THE REAL 
It is in his Seminar XXII, RSI that Lacan introduced the metaphor of the Borromean chain in 
order to think anew the articulation of the three registers of the Imaginary, the Real and the 
Symbolic.  The Borromean chain is a chain of a minimum of three rings attached to one 438
another, and that gets broken as soon as one of the rings is detached from the others. Lacan said, 
during the first lesson of his Seminar XXII: “The definition of the Borromean knot takes its 
departure from three. It means that if, of the three, you break one of the rings, they are free, all 
three of them, which means that the two others rings are set free” (14).  What is the most 439
important element to understand in the construction of the Borromean geometry is that it is made 
to give to the Real—which is strictly irrepresentable—a form of writing that could render it 
thinkable, or at least inscribable in a form of writing. But how shall we describe this writing of 
the Real, and which status should be given to it?  
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Seminaire XXII, RSI (1974-1975), Unpublished. 438
 The French version says “La définition du nœud borroméen part de trois. C’est à savoir que si des trois, vous 439
rompez un des anneaux, ils sont libres tous les trois, c’est-à-dire que les deux autres anneaux sont libérés” (15).
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A Geometry against the Imaginary  
The writing of the Real, in the late Lacan, is not a direct writing but an indirect one that depends 
on the structure of the “Borromean chain.” The metaphor of the Borromean chain is the 
metaphor of the link that unites the three registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real in 
a way that would be different from the way in which the metaphor of the psychic energy, 
developed by Freud in his Project for a Scientific Psychology (1948), or in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (19), does. Lacan said, in “From the Unconscious to the Real,” “What is known as 
energetics is none other than the handling of a certain amount of numbers from which a constant 
number is extracted. In referring to science such as it was conceived of in his time, Freud took 
this as a reference point. He just turned it into a metaphor” (111).  For Freud, there exists, 440
metaphorically speaking, two forms of psychic energy, a first kind linked to the primary process, 
free and in need of an immediate and full discharge; and a second kind of energy, linked to the 
secondary process, which can accumulate itself within a certain neuronal configuration—this 
configuration being the material substratum of Freud’s conception of the ego. The ego being, 
precisely, as Miller puts it, “the name given to a certain mass of neurons maintaining the 
investment of a certain amount of psychic energy in a frozen state” (Le dernier Lacan, Lesson 4).  
Lacan’s Real, and its writing under the guise of the metaphor of the Borromean chain, is 
what Lacan invented to replace Freud’s psychic energy, and more broadly Freud’s distinction 
between the Pleasure principle (to which the psychic energy of the primary process corresponds), 
 See, Freud, Sigmund, James Strachey, Anna Freud, Alix Strachey, and Alan Tyson. The Standard Edition of the 440
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: (1886-1889). London: Vintage, 2001. Commenting on this 
metaphor, Lacan said, during his Seminar XXIII, “Ce qu’on appelle l’énergétique n’est rien d’autre que la 
manipulation d’un certain nombre d’où l’on extrait un nombre constant. Freud, se référant à la science telle qu’on la 
concevait de son temps, se referait à ça. Il n’en faisait qu’une métaphore. L’idée d’une énergétique psychique, il ne 
l’a jamais vraiment fondée, il n’aurait même pas pu en tenir la métaphore avec quelque vraisemblance” (130).
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and the Reality principle (to which the psychic energy of the secondary process corresponds).  441
And Lacan was able to do so inasmuch as he first managed to treat Freud’s concept of psychic 
energy not as something properly grounded in observations, but as something that was, just like 
his own writing of the Borromean chain, at the level of a metaphor. Of course, the Freudian 
metaphor is a metaphor that seems “real” insofar as it is still mostly aligned with the dominant 
Imaginary of our time (everyone knows what a neuron “is”) while, quite on the contrary, Lacan’s 
metaphor of the Borromean chain is anything but simple to imagine or to manipulate. Lacan said,  
Not that my aim was to traumatize anyone, especially not my audience, whom I have no 
reason whatsoever to be mad at to the point of causing them a trauma. Let’s say that this 
is the forcing of a new kind of writing, which possesses, through metaphor, a scope that 
really has to be called Symbolic. It is also the forcing of a new type of idea, if I may say 
so, an idea that does not burgeon spontaneously from the simple doing of that which 
forms meaning, that is to say, from the Imaginary. (112)  
This is why the writing of the Real in the form of a Borromean chain is not an idea in the 
classical sense of the term (i.e., an idea that can be easily imagined, and thus explained and 
communicated). On the contrary, it is an idea that is more of the order of a trauma, which is to 
say an idea that makes a hole in our common way of thinking and, at a more radical level, an 
idea that separates the way in which the Imaginary and the Symbolic are usually linked to one 
another. Commenting on this difficulty, Lacan said, at the opening of his Seminar XXIII, 
“Pondering commonly happens with eyes shut. When one ponders the knot—you can have a go 
 See in particular “From the Unconscious to the Real,” in Seminar XXIII, 110-120.441
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at it, it’s very hard—one can make neither head nor tail of it” (18). Or, even more to the point 
during the third lesson, “The resistance that imagination feels when cogitating what is involved 
in this new geometry is something that has struck me on account of having experienced it 
myself” (37).    442
If the geometry of the Borromean knots owes nothing to the Imaginary it is because the 
Imaginary is what makes the operation of thinking difficult, what creates all the confusions at the 
level of the Symbolic. This is why, also, as Miller aptly points out in Detached Pieces, in order to 
achieve a proper writing of the Real the Imaginary and the Symbolic need to be separated first.  443
Nonetheless, if the Imaginary and the Symbolic are not naturally joined, as they are in Freud’s 
work, it also means that they need to be reconnected. And it is to establish a new connection 
between the two that Lacan invented his category of the Real.  In other words, Lacan’s notion 444
of the Real, in order to be needed (to have a “place” and a function as Derrida would say), 
implies a disjunction of the Imaginary and the Symbolic.  
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “Il faut se briser, si je puis dire, à un nouvel imaginaire instaurant le sens. C’est 442
ce que j’essaie d’instaurer avec mon langage, qui a l’avantage de parier sur la psychanalyse en tant que j’essaie de 
l’instituer comme discours, c’est-à-dire comme semblant le plus vraisemblable.” (122); “Penser au nœud, chose qui 
s'opère le plus communément les yeux fermés, vous pouvez en faire l'essai, c'est très difficile.” (28) ; “La cogitation 
de cette nouvelle géométrie fait éprouver à l'imagination une résistance qui me frappe pour l'avoir moi-même 
éprouvée.” (49) ; “Celle-ci est constituée par une géométrie que l'on peut dire interdite à l'imaginaire, car elle ne 
s'imagine qu’à travers toutes sortes de résistances, voire de difficultés. C'est là ce qui substantifie le nœud en tant 
qu'il est borroméen” (31). 
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. Detached Pieces, Lesson IV. During this lesson, Miller argued that contrary to what 443
one may think, the Borromean knots are not made to be tied. On the contrary, they have been designed to be united, 
which means that they have been designed first to disjoin what the early Lacan had united under the concepts of the 
Name-of-the-Father and the Paternal metaphor: the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. 
 In Seminar XXIII, Lacan defines the notion of the Real, “(…) si vous creusez ce que je veux dire par cette notion 444
de réel, il apparaît que le réel se fonde pour autant qu'il n'a pas de sens, qu'il exclut le sens, ou, plus exactement, qu'il 
se dépose d'en être exclu” (65). “Je parle du réel comme impossible dans la mesure où je crois justement que le réel 
– enfin, je crois, si c’est mon symptôme, dites-le-moi – le réel est, il faut bien le dire, sans loi. Le vrai réel implique 
l’absence de loi. Le réel n’a pas d’ordre” (138).
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The Real as a Detached Piece 
The “natural” junction, as well as the “natural” functioning of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, is 
what Lacan calls Reality. Reality, of course, is what is relativized or opposed by the notion of the 
Real, which implies, precisely, the disjunction of the Imaginary and the Symbolic and their new 
linkage through the Real. The Real is thus what can link the Imaginary and the Symbolic beyond 
the link that the “natural” functioning of Reality imposes on them. At a purely abstract level, one 
could even say that the Real is the pure necessity of the link itself, while Reality is the actual and 
meaningful connection between the two.  Even more so, the difference between the Real and 
Reality can be evaluated according to the status that a discourse gives to the Other. While, on the 
side of Reality, the Other is well defined and well known, on the side of the Real, the Other, 
although not not at all there, is nonetheless in a very precarious position. When one speaks for 
oneself, for example, one is generating some meaning for oneself, but this meaning is perhaps 
not understandable by the other.  
The precariousness of the Other, within the perspective of the Real can also be glimpsed 
through the psychotic phenomenon of strangeness linked to one’s body. This phenomenon of 
strangeness—which refers to the moment when a subject feels that he is totally disconnected 
from his body—is related to the disjunction of the three rings of the Borromean chain—the body, 
in this case, corresponding to the category of the Imaginary.  It is, it has been well commented, 445
this disconnection that Lacan noticed in the passage in James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man (1916) where Stephen describes the ways in which he felt his body and the feelings 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je,” in Ecrits I, 92-99. It is, indeed, 445
in this early text that Lacan defines that body, or rather the image of one’s body as being entirely Imaginary. 
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that were attached to it peeling off him like the skin of an orange.  This disconnection between 446
the Symbolic and the Imaginary is also what produces the collapse of the notion of Reality in 
psychotic phenomenon. It is, indeed, insofar as the relationship between the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic are no longer functioning that the sense of Reality disappears and that something as the 
Real (as a collection of detached pieces) starts to emerge in the speech of psychotic patients. In 
other words, Reality in the late Lacan is associated with what is operational, what functions, 
what is successful. On the contrary, the Real is associated with what fails, what collapses, what 
confuses.  
Between Reality and the Real, the difference is thus not so much a difference of 
“function” (as they are both supposed to create a link between the Imaginary and the Symbolic), 
but a difference in terms of results and efficiency. Lacan is clear about it: “The truthful is a fact 
of saying in conformity with reality. On this occasion, reality is what functions, what functions 
truthfully” (113).   As such, the Real should not be seen as a subcategory of Reality but, on the 447
contrary, as representing all the other possibilities of linkage between the Symbolic of the 
Imaginary that have been discarded in the name of Reality, which is to say for their lack of 
efficiency. In this sense, one could even add that the Real, as well as the unconscious as Real can 
ex-sist only insofar as the axiom “there is no Other of the Other” has been posited prior to it. 
Lacan insists on it, “I draw a firm distinction between, on the one hand, the supposed real, which 
is that organ, so to speak, that has nothing whatsoever to do with an organ in the flesh, by which 
 I will come back to the details of this event in the next part of this chapter. 446
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “Le vrai est dire conforme à la réalité. La réalité est dans l’occasion ce qui 447
fonctionne, fonctionne vraiment. Mais ce qui fonctionne vraiment n’a rien à faire avec ce que je désigne du réel. 
C’est une supposition tout à fait précaire que mon réel” (132).
!343
Imaginary and Symbolic are tied together in a knot, and, on the other hand, that which plays its 
part in grounding the science of reality” (114). On the contrary, the Freudian hypothesis of 
Reality can ex-sist only insofar as the axiom “there is an Other of the Other” has been posited 
under the guise of the Name-of-the-Father first, and then under the guise of God. Miller writes, 
opposing the Lacanian Real unconscious to the Freudian transferential unconscious,  
We have here the Lacanian hypothesis that it is the hole in the Real, which is constituted 
by the absence of the Other of the Other, that could be the support of the unconscious, 
while the Freudian hypothesis, in reverse, presupposes the Other of the Other under the 
guise of the Name-of-the-Father which is God.” (Le tout dernier Lacan, Lesson 5, the 
13th of December 2006) 
Building on this distinction, it then becomes possible to understand Lacan’s late axiom: 
“Presupposing the Name-of-the-Father, which is certainly God, is how psychoanalysis, when it 
succeeds , proves that the Name-of-the-Father can just as well be bypassed. One can as well 
bypass it, on the condition that one makes use of it” (116). For if the steady connection between 
the Symbolic and the Imaginary is no longer assured by the presence of the Name-of-the-Father, 
nor by God, such a connection can nonetheless still be created at the level of the individual (and 
not at the level of the universal). And this link will be—so to speak—verified through the work it 
can produce, through the functions it can accomplish. To state it differently, the difference 
between the pure state of psychosis where the disjunction of the Symbolic and the Imaginary 
produces a gap, and the universal linkage of the two by the Name-of-the-Father, provides a third 
way to link the Symbolic and the Imaginary without having to use the universal tool of the 
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Name-of-the-Father. The whole problem here is to make sure that the gap that separates the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, once the Name-of-the-Father is missing, is being nonetheless 
crossed, and that an articulation between the Imaginary and the Symbolic remains possible 
without the reassuring presence of the God hypothesis (the hypothesis that “there is an Other of 
the Other). Such a possibility, of course, implies installing the subject in a position where the 
Other has no influence anymore, where the subject is all alone.  
However, there is no need to be an exceptional figure, like the figure of James Joyce, or 
the figure of a psychotic, to achieve this position. On the contrary, such a position is what Lacan 
conceived as the “first” end of the psychoanalytic treatment and that he named “the pass.”  The 448
“pass,” according to Lacan, is the name of the point of exit of the transferential unconscious. It 
designates a moment, within an analysis, when the transference to the analyst disappears. It is at 
this moment that the space of the Real unconscious opens and that “the space of a lapsus no 
longer carries any meaning (or interpretation)” (Preface to the English Edition, vii). It is also the 
moment when the forever changing mirage of the “lying truth” goes away and that a form of 
Real satisfaction is supposed to emerge in the life of the analysand.   
 See “Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur la psychanalyse de l’Ecole,” in Autres Ecrits, 243-260. Lacan developed 448
the notion of the “pass” as a new way to think, conceptually and concretely, about the end of an analysis. With the 
“pass,” the end of analysis is no longer associated with the Symbolic, as it was within Lacan’s “Return to Freud,” 
but associated with the Real. However, to assign to the end of analysis, the Real, is also to promise to the analysand, 
a form of “subjective destitution”, which means the destitution of what was grounding at an Imaginary level his ego. 
Lacan writes, “N’irions-nous à l’annoncer, décourager les amateurs? La destitution subjective inscrite sur le ticket 
d’entrée… n’est-ce point provoquer l’horreur, l’indignation, la panique, voir l’attentat, en tout cas donner le prétexte 
à l’objection de principe ?” (252) To assign to the psychoanalytic process the goal of obtaining the “subjective 
destitution” of the patient’s ego is, indeed, to place psychoanalysis in opposition to what the I.P.A. defines as the 
proper ending of a didactic psychoanalysis, i.e., the identification to the psychoanalyst’s ego.
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The Satisfaction of the Real Body  
This Real satisfaction, which could be opposed to an Imaginary satisfaction, emerges at a 
moment when an analysand is supposed to have learned how to manipulate his symptom so that, 
instead of suffering from it (as it was the case when he started his analysis), he has learnt how to 
extract from it as much satisfaction as possible. As such, the pass represents what can be 
expected from an analysis when it achieves its goal, i.e., when it enables the analysand to not 
only extract from his symptom a form of satisfaction but, also, when it gives to the analysand a 
way to make of his singularity the basis of his social recognition. Beyond this point, which could 
also be named a point beyond the Oedipus, Lacan thought that the analysand could only analyze 
himself in solitude, while coming back, from time to time, to the setting of the transferential 
unconscious as a way to verify his pass. This is also why, within Lacan’s late teaching where the 
Other is destitute and the “subject” is only posited through the structure of the three rings of the 
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, the consistency of the subject, renamed for the occasion 
the “speaking being,” is no longer assured by the Name-of-the-Father but by the Body as Real 
(as opposed to the Imaginary body). 
The neologism “speakingbeing” (Parlêtre) is a word that Lacan introduced towards the 
end of his teaching to emphasis the fact that it is not because God has created humans different 
from the rest of the animal kingdom that they are “humans,” but because they are creatures that 
speak. It is, in other words, because one has to express one’s needs, and answer the needs of 
others in and through language, that one is not, purely and simply, an animal obeying its instinct, 
but an animal that has lost its contact with nature and acquired, in exchanged, a Real Body, made 
of drives. Lacan said, in Seminar XXIII, “the drives are the echo in the body of a fact of 
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saying” (9). Commenting on this shift, Miller writes: “At the place of the Other, there is the 
body. Not the body of the Other, but one’s own body [corps-propre], as we used to say” (Le tout 
dernier Lacan, Lesson 7, my translation). It is in relation to the Body as Real, or to the One-
Body, as Miller names it, that Lacan will reframe his understanding of the formation of the ego, 
and not, as he did during his early teaching, in relation to the three procedures of identification 
isolated by Freud to think about the formation of the ego.  Lacan, indeed, in his Seminar XXIII, 449
The Sinthome, argues that the speaking being, unlike the Freudian subject, is not governed, at the 
end of the Oedipus by his love towards the father and his desire for his mother, but by the ways 
he loves his own body.  Lacan said, “the speaking being adores his body” (66). And this 450
adoration of one’s body is what Lacan will then posit as the root of the Real imaginary as well as 
what will put in motion all the other operations of thinking in his late teaching. In other words, 
within the late Lacan, thinking becomes a process that takes its departure in the Imaginary, while 
the Imaginary itself is grounded in the speaking being’s adoration of his own body.  
To Have a Body, and not to Be a Body   
In the perspective of the late Lacan, the body ceases to be reduced to the Imaginary and the 
 It is, indeed, through his constant return to Freud’s concept of identification that Lacan was able to elaborate 449
some of the major concepts of his early teaching that relate to the notion of the Other. Through the first identification 
to the father, which is of the order of love, Lacan developed his concept of transference. Through the hysteric 
identification, which is an active participation in the life of another, Lacan developed his concept of hystorisization. 
Finally, through the third mode of identification of the Unary Trait, Lacan developed his concepts of The-Name-of-
the-Father (which is at the basis of the Symbolic stabilization of reality). 
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “Il faut bien que vous réalisiez que ce que je vous ai dit des rapports de l’homme 450
à son corps, et qui tient tout entier dans le fait que l’homme dit que le corps, son corps, il l’a. Déjà dire son corps, 
c’est dire qu’il le possède, comme un meuble, bien entendu. Ça n’a rien à faire avec quoi que ce soit qui permette de 
définir strictement le sujet, lequel ne se définit d’une façon correcte que de ce qu’il est représenté par un signifiant 
auprès d’un autre signifiant.” (154) ; “Ce nœud, qualifiable du borroméen, est intranchable sans dissoudre le mythe 
du sujet – du sujet comme non-supposé, c'est-à-dire comme réel – qu'il ne rend pas plus divers que chaque corps 
signalable du parlêtre, lequel corps n'a de statut respectable, au sens commun du mot, que de ce nœud” (37).
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Imaginary to the visual idea of form. Instead, the body becomes an isolated entity, something that 
functions on its own. As a consequence, every speaking being is said to “have” a body in the late 
Lacan—and not to be a body, as Lacan had it previously (Lacan said, in Encore, “Being is a 
body”). The stakes of such a shift between being and having revolve around the function that 
“being a body” played previously in the “mystery” of the knotting of the three registers. While 
the body as an image was supporting, so far, the very “being” of every speaking being, it 
becomes, within the late Lacan, a problem. The body is what needs to be analyzed and not what 
can be taken as a “mysterious” solution.  
The example of Joyce here is very important. For it is Joyce that proves that a speaking 
being does not need to “be” his body in order to be properly knotted. Lacan, indeed, pointed 
during his Seminar XXIII, to an event that happened to James Joyce during his childhood during 
which he felt his body (i.e., the image of his body) peeling off him like the skin of an orange, and 
that this fundamental trauma is what Joyce managed to bypass through his writing. Commenting 
on this articulation between Joyce’s trauma and Joyce art of writing, Lacan said,  
Something happened to him that made what is commonly called the Ego play a role that 
for him was altogether different from the simple role – a role that one imagines to oneself 
simple – that it plays in the common run of those who are quite rightly termed mortals. 
The Ego fulfilled a function for him that I can only account for through my mode of 
writing. 
It is well worth taking the trouble of pointing out what it was that put me on this path. It 
is that writing is essential to his Ego. (127) 
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Just like the Ego for a normal person, the function of writing, for Joyce operates what Lacan 
calls a “certain mode of framing” (127). In the case of the trauma that happened to Joyce, this 
framing concerned an event when Joyce received a beating that Joyce narrates in A Portrait of 
the Artist of as Young Man.  Lacan, commenting on this passage, suggested that, thanks to his 451
art of writing, Joyce manage to metaphorize “his relationship to his body” (128). However, 
through the metaphor that Joyce used, he made explicit that contrary to most people, who are 
affected when violence is done to their body, Joyce felt nothing. Quite on the contrary, even, he 
used the metaphor of the fruit peel, to describe the way in which he felt his anger falling off him, 
and through his anger, the image of his body as an Ego image. By doing so, Joyce made clear 
that, contrary to what one might think, it is possible to have a relationship to one‘s body as if it 
was a foreign body. And it is precisely this dropping of the image of the body that normally 
characterizes the phenomenon of psychotics, and that Joyce, according to Lacan, managed to 
supplement with his art of writing. To put it simply, Joyce‘s art of writing played, in regard to his 
psychic structure, the function of knotting back Joyce‘s dropped Imaginary to the Symbolic and 
the Real. This is why, perhaps, Joyce’s style is enigmatic, a riddle.  As Lacan suggested, “the 452
enigma raised to the power of writing is something that deserves to give us a pause. Might not 
this connection that is so poorly made give rise to the consequence that it is an Ego of enigmatic 
function, of reparatory function?” Joyce, in a work like Finnegans Wake went even further and 
 See, Joyce, James. A Portrait of the the Artist as a Young Man, pp.86-87. Joyce writes, “While he was still 451
repeating the Confiteor amid the indulgent laughter of his hearers and while the senses of the malignant episode 
were still passing sharply and swiftly before his mind he wondered why he bore no malice now to those who had 
tormented him. He had not forgotten a whit of their cowardice and cruelty but the memory of it called forth no anger 
from him. All the descriptions of fierce love and hatred which he had met in books had seemed to him therefore 
unreal” (87). 
 Lacan writes, “When one reads Joyce’s text, and above all his commentators, what’s striking is the number of 452
riddles it contains. Not only do they abound, but one may say that Joyce played on this, knowing full well that there 
would be Joycians for two or three hundred years to come” (132). 
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managed to disjoin his writing production from his symptom, and as such produced a form of 
writing that was no longer interpretable from the perspective of the unconscious. But this 
disjunction from the unconscious also led him to give a new place to his jouissance. Joyce shows 
us how the notion of jouissance and the notion of the unconscious can be disjoined.  
This is why the question of the knotting in the late Lacan becomes: what is doing the 
knotting of the three registers if we admit that they are fundamentally disjoined? Is it the 
symptom itself that imposes its own order (a symptomatic order instead of a Symbolic one), or is 
it the Sinthome that can provide such an order? And to this question, Miller answers:  
In any case, Lacan validates the notion that one can free oneself from the symptom. I 
assure you of this. One can free oneself from the symptom on the condition that the 
analytic operation make the three hold together. Joyce is strictly speaking the one who 
can be said to remain the prisoner of the Sinthome. And there, as Being, he founds his art. 
(Spare Parts, 108) 
Naming not Communicating 
To understand what is at stake with Joyce, one needs to understand the difference that Lacan 
makes between the process of naming, and the process of communication. In the process of 
communication, what comes first is the Other that one addresses. There is a form of 
subordination of what is being said to the expectations of the Other. It is, for example, how 
teaching proceeds. It is entirely subordinated to whom it is being addressed. The entire early and 
mid-Lacan was founded on such a preeminence of the Other in a model of communication in 
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which speech prevails over writing. In Lacan’s late teaching, it is no longer communication that 
comes at the fore, but the operation of Naming. The operation of naming, for the late Lacan, is an 
operation that focuses on the Real. The operation of naming is described by Miller thus. “To 
name is to establish a relation, to install this relation between meaning and the Real. Not to reach 
an understanding with the Other with respect to meaning, but to add to the Real something that 
makes sense (Detached Pieces, 111). But if to name is to give meaning to something that is part 
of the Real, where does the accord between the Real and the Symbolic comes from? Normally, to 
finds this accord, one turns to God, or to The Name-of-the-father. For it is the Name-of-the-
Father that is normally supposed to give names to things. In other words, while it was the Name-
of-the-Father that was providing the quilting point between the Real and the Symbolic in the 
early Lacan, it is now the operation of naming that provides such a quilting point between the 
Symbolic and the Real. This is why, also, the meaning that the Symbolic is producing through 
words becomes a pale approximation of the “real content” that the speaking being finds in 
relation to his One-Body.  
Exiting from One’s Unconscious  
This “pale approximation” can be apprehended through the dialectical relationship that unites 
(and disjoins) the Real and the category of truth within the late Lacan. Miller, during lesson 
seven of his Seminar Le tout dernier Lacan, describes this dialectic as follows. First, one has to 
emphasize that there is no truth outside meaning since to access truth, one needs to go through 
meaning, which is to say through the transferential unconscious and its procedure of 
interpretation. Second, one has to notice that while opening an access to truth, the category of 
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meaning opens also the possibility of lying and errors. As such, the very notion of truth implies 
the presence of errors or falseness that, in turn, are where the Real emerges from within the 
category of meaning.  “Thus the thesis,” writes Miller in his Seminar, Le tout dernier Lacan, 453
“that the Real is located in the muddle of truth” (Lesson 7, the 17th of January 2007, my 
translation). In other words, to access the Real, when one is not psychotic, one needs to 
construct, first, a Hystory through the transferential unconscious, in order to access, through the 
muddle of truth the Real unconscious. A second consequence of this dialectic between truth and 
the Real is that truth, as the process of meaning making elaborated during an analysis unfolds, is 
what is capable of poking a hole within itself, which is to say of pointing towards a beyond of its 
own register through its repeated muddling. Such a property of truth is then what Lacan will try 
to isolate within the One-Body and its holes. Finally, a third consequence is to render self-evident 
Lacan’s famous axiom “there is no sexual relationship” since the absence of sexual relationship 
comes here as a direct consequence of the disappearance of the Other and as the emergence of 
the Real unconscious which, itself, implies the solitude of the one who has subtracted himself 
from any transferential relationship.  Within this situation the very possibility of installing a 454
sexual relationship between two speaking beings can only be found in what Lacan called an 
alterity internal to the structure of the speaking being. And this alterity, within the structure of the 
speaking being, is precisely what implies the detachment of the speaking being from the 
adoration of his One-Body. It is, as we will see, inasmuch as the speaking being manages to 
 Lacan said, “Le réel se trouve dans les embrouilles du vrai. C'est bien ce qui m'a amené à l'idée du nœud, qui 453
procède de ceci que le vrai s'auto-perfore du fait que son usage crée de toute pièce le sens, de ce qu'il glisse, de ce 
qu'il est aspiré par l'image du trou corporel dont il est émis, à savoir la bouche en tant qu'elle suce” (85).
 See, Lacan, Jacques. “L’Étourdit,” in Autres Écrits, pp. 449-496. Lacan writes, “… il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel. 454
Ceci suppose que le rapport (de rapport “en général”) il n’y a qu’énoncé, et que le réel n’en assure qu’à se confirmer 
de la limite qui se démontre des suites logiques de l’énonce” (455).
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disentangle himself from this almost autistic adoration of his own body that something like a 
sexual relationship can be established beyond narcissism. I will come back to this question in the 
Epilogue.  
What the late Lacan posits, as what can establish a sexual relationship between two 
speaking beings that are both encapsulated in the adoration of their own body, is lalangue. Lacan 
used the word for the first time during a series of conferences that he gave at Saint Anne on the 
knowledge of the psychoanalyst.  He then reintroduced it in his Seminar XX, Encore, which is 455
to say at the very beginning of his late teaching.  Through the invention of this neologism, 456
Lacan wanted to isolate, within the realm of language, what is purely material in it, i.e. its 
phonation. This is why lalangue is disconnected from grammar, as well as from syntax and, 
reciprocally, why lalangue is opened to all the equivocations possible. As such, lalangue, just 
like the notion of the One-Body, is defined by its relationship to its materiality. This notion of 
materiality is fundamental in the late Lacan. It is, indeed, through this reference that Lacan can 
posit a “new” principle of identity outside meaning. To take only one example, one can say that it 
is exclusively through his relation to the materiality of his body that a speaking being can be said 
to have an identity outside any hystorisization, which is to say an identity outside the three 
modes of identification that grounds the transferential unconscious. More importantly, it is 
thanks to his study of James Joyce that Lacan fully explored the connection between the Real 
 See Lacan, Je parle aux murs. Paris: Seuil, 2011. Print.455
 See, Lacan, Je parle aux murs. Lacan said, during this conference, “Eh bien, lalangue n’a rien à faire avec le 456
dictionnaire, quel qu’il soit. Le dictionnaire a affaire avec la diction, c’est-à-dire la poésie et avec la rhétorique par 
exemple. Ce n’est pas rien, hein? Cela va de l’invention à la persuasion. C’est très important, seulement ce n’est pas 
ce côté-là qui a affaire avec l’inconscient” (18-19). See also Lacan, Seminar XX, Encore. Lacan said, “Le langage 
sans doute est fait de lalangue. C’est une élucubration sur lalangue. Mais l’inconscient est un savoir, un savoir-faire 
avec lalangue. Et ce qu’on sait faire avec lalangue dépasse de beaucoup ce dont on peut rendre compte au titre du 
langage” (127).
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unconscious, the One-body, and the question of sexual difference under the notions of the 
sinthome and the escabeau. 
III. JOYCE AND THE ONE BODY OF JOUISSANCE 
To explore the notion of the sinthome, and the way in which it can be manipulated, Lacan did not 
follow Freud and his theory of the unconscious, but he chose to follow a new guide: James 
Joyce, and more specifically, the way in which Joyce practiced his art of writing. Joyce, one 
could even say, in a Kantian manner, awoke Lacan from his “dogmatic slumber” inasmuch as he 
showed to Lacan what it means to “incarnate the symptom.” The notion of incarnation, of course, 
is a notion that refers directly to the notion of the body, and more specifically to something that 
belongs to a mode of thinking that is trying to make its way into the body. In other words, what is 
incarnated is what is being embodied. The notion of symptom, likewise, refers normally in the 
early Lacan, as well as for Freud, to a formation of the unconscious, which is to say to a part of 
the discourse of the Other that is rendered visible on the surface of the body. In other words, the 
symptom is, just like language, split in two: on one side it has to do with the signifier, and on the 
other it has to do with jouissance. As such, the symptom belongs to the order of the mind, as well 
as to the body. But it is important to note that Lacan not only changed the spelling of the word 
symptom during his Seminar XXIII, The Sinthome, but that he gave to it a complete new 
definition.   457
 For a full definition of the notion of symptom and sinthome, see Soler, Colette. Lacan, Lecteur de Joyce. Paris, 457
PUF, 2015. See in particular chapter one, Symptôme, sinthome, 19-43.
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Joyce the Sinthome  
The sinthome, written with this “old” spelling, is not a formation of the unconscious, but it 
names what is properly singular in each individual. The Freudian unconscious, as well as the old 
definition of the symptom, on the contrary, implied a form of universalism. The very notion of 
diagnosis, for example, tends to reduce any manifestation of symptoms to three or four kinds of 
symptoms (Hysterics, Perverse, Psychotic and Autistic). The notion of sinthome aims at 
underlining the absolute singularity of one’s own sinthome, this singularity being not linked to 
the Other, but to a One-Body.   
 The two notions, the symptom and the sinthome, although distinct, can nonetheless be 
linked. And it is this link that Lacan discovered in Joyce and that he named, in his Seminar XXIV, 
“L’insu que sait de l’une bévue s’aile a mourre,” “l’une bévue” (the-One-Mistake)—which is a 
way to re-write phonetically the Freudian word for unconscious, Unbewusst.  Through this 458
phonetical rewriting of the Freudian unconscious, Lacan tried to introduce a notion that could 
link the two effects of the two types of unconscious (the transferential and the Real one): the 
symptom and the sinthome.  
This articulation of the two levels of the unconscious as well as the two effects that they 
produce is a complex one. If the Real unconscious of the One-Body precedes logically the 
emergence of the transferential unconscious, the Real unconscious is only accessible 
retroactively through an exit of the transferential unconscious, i.e., through the “Pass.” In the 
first lesson of his Seminar XXIV, De l’une bévue…, Lacan argues, “we believe that we’re saying 
 Lacan said, “J’ai dit qu’il y avait - au sens de l’usage en français du partitif - qu’il y avait « de  l’une-bévue ». 458
C’est une façon aussi bonne de traduire l’Unbewußt que n’importe quelle autre, que l’inconscient en particulier, qui 
en français,  et en allemand aussi d’ailleurs, équivoque avec inconscience.” (First Lesson)
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what we want to say” (my translation). In other words, we generally tend to believe in our 
intentions. But while we’re believing in what we’re saying, there is a second register in what 
we’re saying that escapes intentionality. This second register, because of its lack of intentionality, 
is removed from any possibility of interpretation insofar as the very possibility of interpretation 
is thinkable only through its relationship to intentionality. What grounds the notion of 
intentionality is, generally—at least in Freud—the Ego. But it is precisely the notion of the Ego 
that starts to be put under critical scrutiny within the late Lacan and his emphasis on Joyce.   459
A New Ego  
Instead of talking about the Ego to locate the origin of intentionality, Lacan goes back to the 
notion of the Other. Lacan says: “we believe that we’re saying what we want to say, but it is what 
the others wanted, even more so, what our family who spoke to us wanted” (Seminar XXIV, 
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “La psychose paranoïaque et la personnalité n'ont comme telles pas de rapports, 459
pour la simple raison que c'est la même chose. En tant qu'un sujet noue à trois l'imaginaire, le symbolique et le réel, 
il n'est supporté que de leur continuité. L'imaginaire, le symbolique et le réel sont une seule et même consistance, et 
c'est en cela que consiste la psychose paranoïaque” (53). “Avoir rapport à son propre corps comme étranger est 
certes une possibilité, qu’exprime le fait de l’usage du verbe avoir. (…) Mais la forme, chez Joyce, du laisser tomber 
du rapport au corps propre est tout à fait suspecte pour un analyste, car l’idée de soi comme corps a un poids. C’est 
précisément ce que l’on appelle l’ego” (150). « Quelque chose lui est arrivé qui fait que, chez lui, ce qu’on appelle 
couramment l’ego a joué un tout autre rôle que le rôle simple – qu’on s’imagine simple – qu’il joue dans le commun 
de ceux qu’on appelle à juste titre mortels. L’ego rempli chez lui une fonction dont je peux rendre compte que par 
mon mode d’écriture” (147). “Si l’ego est dit narcissique, c’est bien parce que, à un certain niveau, il y a quelque 
chose qui supporte le corps comme image. Dans le cas de Joyce, le fait que l’image ne soit pas intéressée dans 
l’occasion, n’est-ce pas ce qui signe que l’ego a chez lui une fonction toute particulière ?” (150) “L’écriture est 
essentielle à son ego” (147). “Dans ce qu’il écrit Joyce en passe toujours par ce rapport a l’encadrement” (152). 
“Stephen, c'est le Joyce que Joyce imagine. Et comme Joyce n'est pas un sot, il ne l'adore pas, bien loin de là. Il 
suffit qu'il parle de Stephen pour ricaner. Ce n'est pas très loin de ma position quand je parle de moi, ou en tout cas 
de ce que je vous jaspine” (64). “Stephen c'est Joyce en tant qu'il déchiffre sa propre énigme. Il ne va pas loin parce 
qu'il croit à tous ses symptômes. C'est très frappant. Il commence par croire à sa race” (69).
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lesson one).  The family is perhaps the simplest example of what the notion of the Other stands 460
for in the early Lacan.  And the impact of the family on the formation of an individual is also 461
what can illustrate how the contingency of life (what happens outside meaning on the side of the 
One-Body) is turned into a fate, that is to say, into an hystorisization. It is, indeed, insofar as the 
contingency of life and its impact on a One-Body is “interpreted” as a hystory by an Other that it 
is turned into a “fate”. But if one wants to put back at the fore the One-Body, one will have to 
think anew the relationship of the One-Body to its transferential unconscious. And it is precisely 
what Joyce accomplished in a work like Finnegans Wake. In it Joyce managed to write a piece of 
literature that seems to have no clear intention, and that cannot be interpreted. Lacan summarized 
Joyce’s paradoxical position as being “unsubscribed from the unconscious,” which means, for 
Lacan, that Joyce managed to incarnate—to give a body (of work)—to what was the most 
singular in his symptom.  This incarnation is precisely what implies the abolition of the 462
symptom in the first sense of the term. Miller writes: “There is here a radical “to each one his 
sinthome” that takes its distance from any form of sympathy, any form of communication or 
 Lacan also said, about Joyce, “Comment est-ce que nous ne sentons pas tous que des paroles dont nous 460
dépendons nous sont, en quelque sorte imposées? C'est bien en quoi ce que l'on appelle un malade va quelque fois 
plus loin que ce que l'on appelle un homme bien portant. La question est plutôt de savoir pourquoi un homme 
normal, dit normal, ne s'aperçoit pas que la parole est un parasite, que la parole est un placage, que la parole est la 
forme de cancer dont l'être humain est affligé. Comment y en a-t-il qui vont jusqu'à le sentir ? Il est certain que là-
dessus Joyce nous donne un petit soupçon” (95). 
 See, for example, “Les complexes familiaux,” in Autres Ecrits. Paris: Seuil, 2005. See also, Miller, Jacques-461
Alain. Affairs of the Family in the Unconscious, transl. Frederic-Charles Baitinger & Azeen Khan, The Lacanian 
Review, Issue 04, Winter 2017. 
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “Joyce a un symptôme qui part de ceci que son père était carrent, radicalement 462
carrent – il ne parle que de ça. J'ai centré la chose autour du nom propre, et j'ai pensé – faites en ce que vous 
voudrez, de ma pensée – que c'est de se vouloir un nom que Joyce a fait la compensation de la carence 
paternelle.” (94) ; “L’incroyable, c’est que Joyce (…) n’ait pu trouver que cette solution, écrire Finnegans Wake, soit 
un rêve qui, comme tout rêve, est un cauchemar, même s’il est un cauchemar tempéré. A ceci près, dit-il, et c’est 
comme ça qu’est fait ce Finnegans Wake, c’est que le rêveur n’y est aucun personnage particulier, il est le rêve 
même.” (125) ; “C’est en cela que Joyce glisse, glisse, glisse, au Jung, glisse à l’inconscient collectif. Il n’y a pas de 
meilleure preuve que Joyce, que l’inconscient collectif, c’est un sinthome, car on ne peut dire que Finnegans Wake, 
dans son imagination, ne participe pas de ce sinthome” (125).
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generality, and which invites grasping each one as an absolute One, which is to say as separated” 
(Le tout dernier Lacan, Lesson 9).   463
This emphasis on the sinthome, as well as on what escapes the register of the Other and 
its hystories, could be seen, of course, as a desire to do to the discipline of psychoanalysis what 
Joyce did to literature, which is to say to put an end to the dream of coherency and 
meaningfulness that supported it since its inception. Likewise, the elevation of the Real 
unconscious could be seen as a way to do away with the transferential unconscious and, as such, 
with the discourse of the Other that is all too often reduced to the discourse of the family of the 
analysand. But this moving away from the Other is also what allowed Lacan to put 
psychoanalysis in touch with the register of the One, and even more so, with the absolute 
sinthome of the One. In other words, the kind of psychoanalysis that the late Lacan wants to put 
into place is a practice that proceeds from the One-Body, and no longer from the Other. And 
through this new practice, what Lacan wants to access is no longer the identity of a subject that is 
being spoken by the Other (by its family), but the consistency of the absolute singularity of one’s 
sinthome. Such a goal can be summarized in the idea that the analysand needs, at the end of 
analysis, to identify with his symptomatic identity, which is to say with his sinthome. This is why 
Lacan’s late approach to psychoanalysis can be said to be deeply anti-normative, and thus also 
radically queer.  
However, to identify with his (or her) sinthome, an analysand needs, first, to recognize 
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “Pourquoi Joyce est-il illisible ? Il faut tacher de s’imaginer pourquoi. C’est 463
peut-être parce qu’il n’évoque en nous aucune sympathie. Mais quelque chose ne pourrait-il pas être suggère dans 
notre affaire par le fait, lui patent, qu’il a un ego d’une toute autre nature ?” (151) “Voilà exactement ce qui se passe, 
et où j’incarne l’ego comme correcteur du rapport manquant, soit ce qui, dans le cas de Joyce, ne noue pas 
borroméenement l’imaginaire à ce qui fait chaine de réel et d’inconscient. Par cet artifice d’écriture, se restitue, 
dirai-je le nœud borroméen” (152).
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what in his symptom has been generated by the Other. It is only after this recognition that what is 
left can be taken as the sinthome, and not the symptom. In other words, the very possibility of 
identifying with one sinthome implies, first, the possibility for an analysand to be able to make a 
distinction between what belongs to the symptom (and the Other), and what belongs to the 
sinthome (and the One-Body). It thus implies, first, a form of exit from the transferential 
unconscious. Of course, one could argue that the psychotic structure presents itself as being 
immediately outside the transferential unconscious, and thus immediately identified with the 
sinthome. However, such an immediate relationship to the sinthome, argues Lacan, is also what 
makes it impossible, in case of psychosis, to learn how to have the right distance from it, and 
through this distance, to learn how to manipulate it.  
A Step-stool for Mental Debility  
If it is true to say that the late Lacan takes as its point of arrival the structure of psychosis (and 
not neurosis), it would be wrong to conclude that the late Lacan celebrates psychosis as such. On 
the contrary, Lacan wants to develop, through the notion of the sinthome, a form of 
psychoanalysis that could help the analysand, once he (or she) has isolated his sinthome from his 
symptom, to know how to deal with his sinthome, to know how to make the best use of it. This 
emphasis on manipulation is the direct consequence of the fact that the sinthome cannot be 
removed, or displaced, or reduced by the process of transference and interpretation. As part of 
the Real unconscious, the sinthome can at best be manipulated and put at the service of the 
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analysand.   464
It is from this perspective that one can understand why the proper name James Joyce, in 
Lacan’s Seminar XXIII, designates a singularity that coincides with an extreme: the extreme of 
incarnating the symptom. To incarnate the symptom is the opposite of giving meaning to it, of 
reducing it to a form of the universal. Joyce, indeed, in his last book Finnegans Wake, managed 
to abstract his symptom from the system of interpretation through which he should have been 
understood. As such, Joyce stopped wanting to say anything and thus unhooked himself from the 
Other, and thus from meaning. And by doing this, Joyce showed the most fundamental relation 
that every speaking being has with language, i.e., a completely contingent and traumatic 
relationship to it. Nonetheless, Joyce managed to make out of this contingent and traumatic 
relation with language what Lacan called an escabeau, which is to say a step-stool or a 
stepladder for his own ego.  
The concept of the escabeau (stepstool) is a concept that Lacan developed exclusively 
during his late teaching. An escabeau for Lacan is first something that one needs to create by 
taking as its point of departure its symptom, i.e., what affects the body beyond the conscious 
grasp that one can have on it. In other words, what interests Lacan in Joyce’s case, is the way in 
 Lacan writes, “En quoi l'artifice peut-il viser expressément ce qui se présente d'abord comme symptôme ? En 464
quoi l'art, l'artisanat, peut-il déjouer, si l'on peut dire, ce qui s'impose du symptôme? A savoir, la vérité?” (22). “ (…) 
là est l'artisant, en tant que par la conjonction de deux signifiants, il est capable de produire ce que j'ai appelé l'objet 
petit a” (23). “Tout le problème est là – comment un art peut-il viser de façon divinatoire à substantialiser le 
sinthome dans sa consistance, mais aussi bien dans son ex-sistence et dans son trou?” “On est responsable que dans 
la mesure de son savoir-faire” (61). “Qu'est-ce que c'est que le savoir-faire? C'est l'art, l'artifice, ce qui donne à l'art 
dont on est capable une valeur remarquable, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'Autre de l'Autre pour opérer le jugement dernier. 
Du moins est-ce moi qui l'énonce ainsi” (61). “Ceci implique, au grès de la pensée, que, en ce sens où responsabilité 
veut dire non-réponse ou réponse à côté, il n'y a de responsabilité que sexuelle, ce dont tout le monde, en fin de 
compte, a le sentiment. En revanche, ce que j'ai appelé le savoir-faire va bien au-delà, et y ajoute l'artifice – que nous 
imputons à Dieu tout à fait gratuitement, comme Joyce y insiste (…)” (64). “L'Autre de l'Autre réel, c'est-à-dire 
impossible, c'est l'idée que nous avons de l'artifice, en tant qu'il est un faire qui nous échappe, c'est-à-dire qui 
déborde de beaucoup la jouissance que nous en pouvons avoir. Cette jouissance tout à fait mince, c'est ce que nous 
appelons l'esprit” (64).
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which he managed to make something out of what touched and affected his body. Joyce, to put it 
differently, helped Lacan to answer the following question: how can one make of something 
completely contingent and traumatic (such as the beating that Joyce received) what will remain, 
after his death, as a lesson that can potentially be of some interest for someone else. Commenting 
on this idea in his Seminar, Detached Pieces, Miller writes: 
How, from the singular event, from this contingent trauma, from this event which affects 
each speaking being in his singularity, to go about extracting something that can be valid 
as a lesson, and which will be valid for others, which they will take up, in ages to come, 
and potentially to infinity. How, from this misfortune, from this mediocre misfortune, to 
go about by making something that people have called beau and which is but escabeau. 
(my translation, 92)   
But to be able to extract something of value from a mediocre trauma, to be able to make 
something out of it, one has first to extract himself from the delusional meaning one attributed 
first to his symptom, in order to reach what is unreadable in it. Because it is only from this 
unreadable left over that one can start to create one own work.  
To illustrate this idea one can use the very concept of the “pass” that Lacan invented to 
talk about the end of analysis. The “pass,” for the late Lacan, does not mark the end of a process 
but the moment when an analysand can start to do something with the unreadable remainders of 
his symptom. As such, the “pass” is not to be understood as an exit or as the mark of the end of a 
process of understanding or normalization but, quite on the contrary, as the development of a 
“knowing how to do” with what is unreadable and meaningless in one own symptom. In the 
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particular case of Lacan one can suggest that Lacan’s late teaching is “the pass” of the early 
Lacan in the sense that Lacan tried, within his late teaching, to do something with his own 
symptom—the Real. Lacan himself declared, in the first lesson of his Seminar XXI, that the “the 
non-duppe-errent” has to be seen as a “pass,”i.e. as what comes after “the end” or, as what comes 
to take the place of a “beyond” the end once one has already passed through the end. And this 
beyond is also what gives to what came before the end its proper importance. As such, the non-
duppe-errent” designates first an “erre,” which is the space that can be still discovered once the 
process of propulsion has stopped. To put it differently, Lacan’s late teaching is what comes after 
the end of his first teaching (oriented towards the Symbolic and the process of meaning making), 
and what tries to elaborate a practical way to deal with what escapes the realm of truth.  
As such, Lacan’s late emphasis on the Real is but an escabeau that tries to do something 
with the unreadable leftover from his first conceptual elaboration. This is why, to build an 
escabeau, one has to remain faithful to his singular mode of jouissance while being able to not 
let himself be ruled by it. And this is why the process of psychoanalysis offers itself first as a 
reduction of one’s mode of jouissance to a certain meaning. But this meaning should only be 
there to access what has no meaning within one’s symptom. For it is this leftover that presents 
what is the most singular and what it the most precious in one person. It is what makes of a 
person a unique individual and what can give to this person the occasion of making something 
out of this uniqueness. Commenting on this idea, Miller says:  
This leftover is not the failure of psychoanalysis but is strictly speaking what constitutes 
your worth, if indeed you find out how to transfer it into the state of an oeuvre. It is 
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doubtless in this respect that everyone flounders, stumbles and hobbles along, but this is 
also what makes for the difference and nobility of each and every one of you. Lacan 
spoke of the bar on the S of his subject as a trait of noble bastardy. (96) 
And it is this “noble bastardy,” I would say, that makes  the late teaching of Lacan a very Queer 
one, since everyone flounders and stumbles on the ground of each one’s nobility. 
From Interpretation to Astonishment  
But if one gives to psychoanalysis such a goal, what then is at stake in psychoanalysis is no 
longer a question of deciphering the symptom through the process of interpretation, nor a 
question of reintegrating it within a certain Hystory, but a question of going beyond any form of 
intentionality—and thus beyond any sense of destiny or fate for the analysand—in order to 
recover the notion of the sinthome, the escabeau and the One-Body. But how can one learn how 
to manipulate his sinthome if the very “active” dimension of analysis—transference—is gone? 
As I already suggested, it is by substituting for the notion of interpretation the one of suggestion, 
and then the one of suggestion with the one of astonishment [sidération] and in this way the late 
Lacan tried to solve this dilemma.  Suggestion and astonishment are, indeed, the only two 465
possible forms of “communication” left between an analysand and an analyst once the 
transference has disappeared. Astonishment [sidération], compared to suggestion, could even be 
said to be superior to suggestion inasmuch as it implies a form of “annihilation” of the process of 
understanding within the analysand and, thus, a clear and complete exit from the transferential 
 Lacan writes, in Seminar XXIII, “(…) en fin de compte, nous n'avons que ça, l'équivoque, comme arme contre le 465
sinthome. (…). En effet, c'est uniquement par l'équivoque que l’interprétation opère. Il faut qu'il y ait quelque chose 
dans le signifiant qui résonne” (17).
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unconscious. This exit from the transferential unconscious by astonishment is not deprived, 
however, of any direction or orientation, quite the contrary. As Miller puts it, the exit from the 
transferential unconscious, in order not to become the equivalent of a fall into a state of 
psychosis, needs to remain oriented towards the pleasure principle, and not towards the death 
drive and its excess of jouissance. Miller said,  
It is instructive to notice that Lacan brings back here the principle of pleasure, and that he 
attributes to it a place at this stage of the One. This principle, almost animalistic, this 
acephalic principle—if one defines it as a way to suffer as little as possible—is what 
never ceases to happen, not even a single second. One can even say that it is the only law 
at the level of the sinthome (Le tout dernier Lacan, Lesson 9, my translation).  
In other words, at the level of the sinthome and the Real unconscious, the ultimate goal of 
psychoanalysis is to constantly bring back, by using suggestion and astonishment [sidération], 
the sinthome on the side of the pleasure principle. Thus, one could say that while the early Lacan 
stands on the side of a Being and posits all the notions that structure Being: i.e. the Other, the 
Name-of-the-Father, Meaning, Transference, Desire, etc.; the late Lacan stands on the side of the 
One and posits all the notion that goes with it: Lalangue, the One-Body, Jouissance, Solitude, 
Matter, etc.  And one could also add that if Lacan ends his teaching on the side of the One it is 466
because, contrary to the “lying truth” of Being, the materiality of the One-Body (or of lalangue) 
 There is thus not an opposition between the early and the late Lacan but a relation of implication. It is inasmuch 466
as Lacan's early teaching made of the articulation between the Imaginary and the Symbolic a problem to be 
analyzed, rather than a natural point of departure (as was the case in Freud's Oedipus complex), that the late Lacan 
can think the ex-sistence of the Real. In other words, and contrary to what might be tempting to think, Lacan's 
category of the Real is not a category that precedes logically or supports empirically the articulation between the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, but a category that comes to existence only as the result of the prior construction of the 
articulation of the two others.
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is incapable of lying or, even more to the point, because matter (“materiality”) is what is the most 
opposed to the very possibility of lying. However, this opposition between the early Lacan and 
the late Lacan is also what makes the late teaching of Lacan appear to be full of paradoxes 
which, eventually, makes psychoanalysis itself looks like a “scam” (une escroquerie). But those 
paradoxes are not the product of any inconsistency on the behalf of Lacan himself. Quite the 
contrary, they spread out from a single antinomy: the antinomy between the end goal of 
psychoanalysis and the way in which it is being practiced.   467
IV. PSYCHOANALYSIS AGAINST PSYCHOANALYSIS 
There is an absolute antinomy between the goal of psychoanalysis, which coincides with the 
entrance in the Real unconscious and the daily practice of psychoanalysis, which condemns the 
analysand to remain trapped with the dream of an endless pursuit of a truth that can only be half 
said. In some ways, one could summarize this antinomy through the idea that psychoanalysis is a 
practice that aims at exposing the semblant that truth is—including the semblant that the practice 
of psychoanalysis itself is. And when it reaches this stage, psychoanalysis ceases to be 
psychoanalysis as we know it and becomes what Jacques-Alain Miller calls: absolute 
psychoanalysis.  And this absolute psychoanalysis is but the logical (although paradoxical) 468
conclusion that his previous stand on psychoanalysis obliged Lacan to reach. It is psychoanalysis 
against psychoanalysis: the Real against the Symbolic, the sinthome against the symptom, 
 This antinomy is what Lorenzo Chiesa has tried to describe in his last book, The Not-Two in his first chapter 467
called: “Lacan’s para-ontology,” see Chiesa, The Not-Two: Logic and God in Lacan, Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2017.
 See, Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Pure Psychoanalysis, Applied Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy,” in lacanian ink, 468
#20. In this text, Miller develops all the antinomies that spread out of the confrontation between pure psychoanalysis 
and applied psychoanalysis.  
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astonishment [sidération] against interpretation, the One all alone against the Hysterics.  
A Debasement of Meaning 
In the realm of absolute psychoanalysis it is the very core of what supports any kind of semblant 
that is under attack, which is to say the very concept of meaning. Anything that presents itself as 
having a meaning is immediately suspected to be of the order of a semblant, to be of the order of 
the process of hystoricisation and, as such, to be part of what the late Lacan calls the “lying 
truth.” In other words, within absolute psychoanalysis there is an equivalence between the idea 
of semblant and the idea of meaning: everything that is of the order of meaning is but a semblant. 
Of course, such a stand on meaning makes the late teaching of Lacan a very postmodern 
doctrine. However, differing from many postmodern philosophers, such as Georges Bataille or 
Jacques Derrida, for example, the late Lacan did not only attack meaning and the notion of 
semblant as such, but he did it in the name of the Real. It is, indeed, because the Real excludes 
meaning that meaning can be equated by Lacan, no matter what kind of meaning is being 
elaborated, to a semblant. However, the antinomy between the goal and the practice of 
psychoanalysis raises a fundamental question: what can guarantee that the Real is not itself a 
product of the semblant?  Or worst, even, how can one be sure that the Real is not, in Lacan’s 
late teaching, itself a semblant?  To escape this question, one has to be able to locate how the 469
Real can really be emptied out from any meaning—even the negative meaning of what excludes 
meaning. In other words, it is a question of not reifying the Real as what has the meaning of not 
 Lacan said, in Seminar XXIII, “Là se soulève la question de la critique du vrai. Qu'est-ce que le vrai sinon le vrai 469
réel? Et comment distinguer le vrai réel du faux?” (85)
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having any meaning and, consequently, of maintaining the Real as a constantly moving target. 
  
The Two False Meanings of the Real  
The most obvious temptation to attribute a meaning to the Real is to associate it to the One, and 
perhaps even more to the One-Body. Of course, some links exists between the Real and the One-
Body, just as there exists some links between the process of meaning making and the Other. But 
it is precisely by disconnecting the two, and at a more fundamental level, by disabling any 
possibility of connection between one signifier (S1) to another signifier (S2) that one enters into 
the domain of absolute psychoanalysis. In the domain of absolute psychoanalysis, which itself is 
the product of the radical disconnection between signifiers that marks the entrance into the Real 
unconscious, the One-Body should be seen as a remainder: as what is left once the disconnection 
has been accomplished. In this sense, the One-Body is the ultimate station before reaching the 
absolute non-meaning of the Real.  It is, in a way, the ultimate thing that ex-sists at the level of 
the Real unconscious. Even more to the point, the One-Body is the only thing, in the late Lacan, 
that subsists outside meaning and semblant.  The difficulty, here, is to be able to use meaning 470
as an instrument in order to go beyond meaning. It is thus a question of forcing meaning to go 
beyond meaning and thus to force the practice of psychoanalysis, which is anchored in meaning 
and interpretation, to aim at a beyond meaning, i.e. to aim at the Real outside meaning that 
Lacan, as early as the elaboration of his graph of desire, named: S (₳).   471
 For a full explanation of the notion of Existence in Lacan’s late teaching, see, Miller, Jacques- 470
Alain. “Ex-sistence.” Translated by  Frederic-Charles Baitinger & John Wallace, lacanian ink , #48, 2016, 32-65. 
 See Séminaire VI, Le désire et son interprétation (1958-1959). And see “The Subversion of the Subject and the 471
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious” (1960) in Ecrits, 671-703. 
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The matheme S (₳) is the way in which Lacan writes the absence of an Other of the 
Other in his first teaching, which is to say the idea that there is something always interrupted 
within the connections between one signifier and another. Even more to the point, S (₳) 
formalizes the fact that there is a knowledge (a S2) that is missing in the Other which makes of 
the “Che Voi” (the question What do you want?) that the subject addresses to the Other (at the 
very top of the Graph of Desire) a question without any answer. As such, S (₳) can be said to 
represent a subject facing the absence of the answer of the Other, i.e. its absence or 
disappearance. Lacan summarized this situation in a formula: “I am waiting, but I am not hoping 
for anything to come”.  When a subject does not hope, or long for any form of answer to come 
from the Other, when his S1 does not expect to be completed by the S2 of the Other, such a 
subject is then bound to constantly start anew and fall short in anything he wants to do. Such a 
situation, remarks Miller, is what can explain why Lacan kept starting anew his own teaching at 
least every year, and even sometimes from one week to another. Likewise, it is the reason why 
Lacan claimed that the “pass” needs to always be retaken and reaffirmed.  
Psychoanalysis: A Truthful Scam  
To extract himself from this endless cycle, Lacan advanced the thesis, in his Seminar XXV, Le 
moment de conclure (1977-1978) that psychoanalysis is a scam that is nonetheless truthful when 
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it comes to the signifier.  In other words, psychoanalysis becomes more than a scam when it 472
manages to produce an effect of signification that is not of the order of semblant, but that is 
aiming at the Real. To understand how such an effect of signification is possible, one has to 
distinguish two modes of relations between the Symbolic and the Real. The first relation is the 
one that grounds the position of science and which presupposes that the Symbolic is in the Real, 
which is to say that there is an overlapping between the Symbolic and the Real. Such a position 
can be summarized by the Galilean formula: “Nature is written in mathematical language”. The 
second relation is the one that Lacan develops in his late teaching and that denies such a 
possibility. It is a position that aims at reducing the first position to the level of a semblant, which 
is to say to make of the discourse of science itself a “lying truth.”  To this “lying truth” of the 473
Symbolic in the Real, Lacan opposes, in his late teaching, what is symbolically Real, which is to 
say the idea that there is something Real, something that does not lie like anxiety within the 
Symbolic. The Real within the Symbolic is what the first Lacan in Seminar X, Anxiety 
(1962-1963) called object a, and which he associated with the affect of anxiety. But it is also at 
the same place that the last Lacan situates the symptom as what does not lie, and what does not 
 Lacan said in Seminar XXIV, “Ce que j’ai à vous dire je vais vous le dire, c’est que la psychanalyse est à prendre 472
au sérieux bien que ça ne soit pas une science. C’est même pas une science du tout. Parce que l’ennuyeux, comme 
l’a montré surabondamment un nommé Karl Popper, c’est que ce n’est pas une science parce que c’est irréfutable. 
C’est une pratique. C’est une pratique qui durera ce qu’elle durera. C’est une pratique de bavardage. Aucun 
bavardage n’est sans risques. Déjà le mot « bavardage » implique quelque chose. Ce que ça implique est 
suffisamment dit par le mot « bavardage ». Ce qui veut dire qu’il n’y a pas que les phrases - c’est-à-dire ce qu’on 
appelle les propositions - qui impliquent des conséquences, les mots aussi. « Bavardage » met la parole au rang de 
baver ou de postillonner. Elle la réduit à la sorte d’éclaboussement qui en résulte. Voilà. Ça n’empêche pas que 
l’analyse a des conséquences : elle dit quelque chose” (Seminar XXV, lesson one).
 “Je voudrais vous faire remarquer que ce qu’on appelle « le raisonnable » est un fantasme. C’est tout à fait 473
manifeste dans le début de la science. La géométrie euclidienne a tous les caractères du fantasme. Un fantasme n’est 
pas un rêve, c’est une aspiration. L’idée de la ligne, de la ligne droite par exemple, c’est manifestement un fantasme. 
Par bonheur, on en est sorti. Je veux dire que la topologie a restitué ce qu’on doit appeler le tissage. (…) Pour que 
l’Imaginaire s’exfolie, il n’y a qu’à le réduire au fantasme. L’important est que la science elle-même n’est qu’un 
fantasme et que l’idée d’un réveil soit à proprement parler impensable” (Seminar XXV, Lesson one).
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cease to write itself while always returning to the same place.  
 The symptom, in Lacan’s last teaching, is what keeps a meaning in the Real. An 
illustration of this idea can be found in the fact that an interpretation, which belongs to the order 
of the “lying truth,” can only have an impact on what in the symptom is of the order of the 
semblant, and not on what is of the order of the Real. In other words, what is symbolically Real 
within a symptom is what keeps its meaning beyond any effects of interpretation. It is what 
remains once the symptom has been stripped bare by the process of interpretation of all its alien 
elements.  
Poetry as Interpretation 
If poetry is elevated by the late Lacan as the one and only interpretation that can touch the Real, 
it is because only poetry is able to produce an effect of meaning and a hole effect in meaning. In 
other words, poetry uses meaning and its “lying truth” to go towards the hole of the Real, and not 
the semblant of meaning. It is because poetry uses meaning as a way to go beyond meaning that 
it can poke a hole in the Symbolic and access, to a certain extent, the Real. The way in which 
poetry obtains such an effect is related to a form of disconnection between two signifiers (S1 and 
S2). In the case of poetry, indeed, S1 is followed by a S2 but the S2 is not the one that should 
follow the S1. It is an inappropriate S2. It is as if the S2, instead of producing an effect of 
meaning, was opening up two new possibilities of interpretation. This effect is what Lacan called 
the imaginary Symbolic, which is to say a Symbolic that is included in the Imaginary (which 
explains why poetry can be seen as “torturing” the regular structure of speech).  
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Poetry is what shows the connection between meaning and the Imaginary insofar as it 
goes beyond what is falsely taken as “reality” in common sense (since this “reality” is only a 
reified Imaginary), which is to say that poetry reveals how common sense is made out of an 
Imaginary that has been imposed, at a political level, on the lawlessness of the Real. This is why 
Lacan can even go as far as saying that poetry is linked to truth in the exact measure that it 
makes, through the manipulation that it operates on language, its Imaginary root visible. To go 
even further, Miller says that common sense is grounded on a symbolic Imaginary, i.e., on a 
Symbolic dominated by the common use of language. And it is insofar as the Symbolic is 
dominated by the Imaginary that meaning can be generated and communicated. Reciprocally, it 
is insofar as the Imaginary is dominated by the Symbolic that truth can be accessed as what goes 
beyond meaning. Of course, the notion of truth, here, does not refer to the notion of a supposed 
adequatio between what is, and what is represented, but to the “truth” revealed by the practice of 
psychoanalysis, which is to say the truth that Lacan formulated in his now famous formula, 
“there is no relationship between the sexes.”  
This conception of poetry is what can give us an idea about how interpretation should 
proceed when it aims at the Real. Normally, interpretation, as Lacan defined it in his Seminar V, 
Les Formations de l'inconscient (1957-1958), aims at helping the patient to make a distinction 
between Demand and Desire, which is to say at substituting to the complaint of Demand, the 
recognition of Desire and of object a as what causes desire.  But this form of interpretation can 474
only work within the paradigm of the Symbolic where the subject is defined as represented by a 
 See, Lacan, Jacques. Seminaire V, Les Formations de l’inconscient (1958-1959). See in particular, the lesson 474
from the 18th of June 1958 where Lacan discusses Edward Glover’s article on “The therapeutic effect of inexact 
interpretation.” See, Glover, Edward. “The therapeutic effect of inexact interpretation: a contribution to the theory 
of suggestion,” in International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1931, XII. 
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signifier (S1) for another signifier (S2).  As opposed to such a way to practice interpretation, 475
the kind of interpretation that is required within the late teaching of Lacan needs to go beyond 
meaning, and thus, beyond any value.  
The notion of value is irremediably linked to the notion of usage and exchange. To 
attribute value to something is always to measure its use-value within a given system of 
exchange. Within the late Lacan, the interpretation cannot have a value inasmuch as it should be 
disconnected from any form of exchange, from any form of friendship. Nonetheless, the act of 
interpretation needs to keep its usefulness, which is to say needs to have an impact, in one way or 
another on the symptom. As such, the notion of usefulness needs to be redefined beyond the 
notion of exchange (outside a relation of twos), which is to say, as something absolutely adjusted 
and singularized for the analysand.  
To Manipulate, not to Interpret  
In order to give a new definition  of interpretation, Lacan proposed, during his late teaching, a 
new way to approach the articulation between the notion of interpretation and poetry in order to 
think anew the relationship between language (as a written form) and speech (as a system of 
communication). While the notion of speech, as well as the notion of communication were 
absolutely central to the “early” and the “later” Lacan, it is the notion of writing that comes at the 
fore during his late teaching. Lacan’s radical new approach of the notion of writing emerged at 
the moment when he started to use the writing of the Borromean chain. The specificity of the 
 Lacan defines the signifier in his Seminar XX, thus: “le signifiant, c’est ce qui représente le sujet pour un autre 475
signifiant.” 
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writing of the Borromean chain is that it is completely detached from speech. In Lacan’s sense, 
one could say that it is a form of writing that gives a materiality to the immateriality of speech. It 
is, as such, radically removed from any form of utterances. In other words, while writing is 
generally seen as a materialization of speech—a process that Lacan describes in his text 
“Lituraterre” as a condensation of signifiers that could be compared to the traces that rain leaves 
on the earth —the Borromean writing is more like a mix of logic and drawing. The writing of 476
the Borromean knot is a mix a logic and drawing to the extent that Lacan uses them to show 
what is possible, and what is impossible regarding the nature and the kind of manipulation that 
the Borromean knots allow. The term logic, in this specific Lacanian sense, becomes thus the 
science of what is impossible, which makes of it, adds Miller at the very end of his Seminar, 
something like “the science of the Real.”  
The new notion of interpretation, as Lacan develops it in his last teaching, has to be 
related to this new form of writing inasmuch as it requires a form of manipulation, as well as a 
sense of what is possible, and what is impossible regarding one specific analysand. In other 
words, the act of interpretation becomes, within the last teaching of Lacan, an art of manipulation 
which operates through the practice of equivocation, which is to say through a subtle dialectic of 
effects of meaning which generates within the analysand a hole in his knowledge.  Of course, 477
underlines Miller, a difference needs to be made between the notion of equivocation as Lacan 
 See Lacan, Jacques, “Lituraterre,” in Autres Ecrits, 11-22.476
 See Lacan, “L’Etourdit”, in Autres Ecrits. pp. 449-496. See also Séminaire XXV, Le moment de conclure 477
(1978-1979), when Lacan said, “Ce que j’ai appelé le rhéteur qu’il y a dans l’analyse - c’est l’analyste dont il s’agit - 
le rhéteur n’opère que par suggestion. Ιl suggère, c’est le propre du rhéteur, il n’impose pas d’aucune façon quelque 
chose qui aurait consistance et c’est même pour cela que j’ai désigné de l’« ex » ce qui ne se supporte que d’ex-
sister. Comment faut-il que l’analyste opère pour être un convenable rhéteur ? C’est bien là que nous arrivons à une 
ambiguïté.” (lesson one)
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defined it in his early teaching (i.e., as a way to produce some echoes or resonances within the 
analysand’s speech), and the ways in which the same notion is supposed to produce holes in the 
analysand’s knowledge, i.e. interpretations that resonate not at the level of meaning but at the 
level of the body. In the latter, the concept of interpretation is related to Lacan’s new definition of 
the drive in his Seminar XXIII, The Sinthome when he said: “Drives are the echoes in a body of 
the fact that there is a something being said,” which is a way to emphasize the impact of speech 
at the strict level of the body. In other words, while Lacan’s early approach of interpretation 
posits meaning as the third category that links the body and speech, the later approach to 
interpretation posits the Real as the third category that links the body and speech.  
The notion of the Real, at this late stage of Lacan’s thinking, relates to the notion of the 
hole in the Symbolic, i.e., to what is of the order of the Real within the Symbolic. The notion of 
meaning, on the other hand, relates to what is of the order of the Imaginary within the Symbolic, 
while the notion of jouissance ends up being defined as what floats between what is Real in the 
Symbolic, and what is Imaginary within the Symbolic, engendering the question that haunts the 
late teaching of Lacan: how can interpretation have an effect on jouissance? Through this 
question, it is, once again, the status of the unconscious that becomes paradoxical. How is it 
possible to be sure that an analysand is no longer in the transferential unconscious, but that he 
has reached the Real unconscious? Is the difference perceivable at the level of the body, i.e. in 
the ways in which the resonance of an interpretation takes place not at the level of meaning, but 
at the level of the body? And if it does takes place at the level of the body, how is it possible to 
explain how an effect of meaning can affect the One-body beyond the Imaginary echoes that an 
interpretation can produce in it?  
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CONCLUSION: THE LATE LACAN OR THE IMPOSSIBLE AWAKENING 
To conclude, one could say that in Lacan’s last teaching, it is the very idea of an awakening 
(which was associated in the early Lacan with the moment of the traversal of the fantasy) that 
becomes a dream.  The idea that the awakening is impossible implies that, in one way or 478
another, it is impossible to extract oneself from meaning and with meaning from the “lying truth” 
that it implies. To put it otherwise, every speaking being in  Lacan’s last approach of 
psychoanalysis is locked within a process of meaning making that aims at getting outside 
meaning while this “getting outside” is, strictly speaking, impossible. This impossibility is what 
makes, at a fundamental level, every speaking being not a tragic being, as Freud thought, but a 
comical one, as in Bataille’s thinking.  But the comical aspect of every speaking being is not 479
linked  to the discovery of the void, as Bataille, but to the fact that there is no way for a speaking 
being to find a way out of his sinthome, which is to say a way out of what, in his One-Body, is 
not touchable or modifiable through the process of interpretation. The only thing that can be 
done, at the level of the sinthome, is to know why one is entangled in it. This is why the notion of 
knowledge, in Lacan’s late teaching, is itself degraded to the level of a fantasy.  
However, it is precisely to go beyond this fantasy that the late Lacan invented the writing 
of the Borromean chain as what makes it impossible to reduce the Real to its Symbolic 
representation, or the Symbolic to the Imaginary of common sense. Reciprocally, the writing of 
 Lacan said, in his Seminar XXV, Le moment de conclure, “L’important est que la science elle-même n’est qu’un 478
fantasme et que l’idée d’un réveil soit à proprement parler impensable” (first lesson). 
 Lacan said, in his Seminar XXV, Le moment de conclure, “La vie n’est pas tragique, elle est comique et c’est 479
pourtant assez curieux que Freud n’ait rien trouvé de mieux que de désigner du complexe d’Œdipe, c’est-à-dire 
d’une tragédie, ce dont il s’agissait dans l’affaire. On ne voit pas pourquoi Freud a désigné - alors qu’il pouvait 
prendre un chemin plus court - a désigné d’autre chose que d’une comédie ce à quoi il avait affaire, ce à quoi il avait 
affaire dans ce rapport qui lie le Symbolique, l’Imaginaire et le Réel” (first lesson).  
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the Borromean chain is what is supposed to make it possible to imagine differently the Real since 
the Borromean chains, as concrete objects, do have certain properties that can be explored and 
known through their careful manipulation. As such, the Borromean knots are, for the late Lacan, 
a way to materialize the operation of thinking while forcing the imagination to go beyond the 
ways in which it is normally used to imagine what is. Lacan says “The consistency, for the 
speaking being, for the being-that-speaks, it is what is fabricated, what is invented. For instance, 
it is the knot inasmuch as one has braided it” (95). In other words, Lacan did not try, in his late 
teaching, unlike Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in The Anti-Oedipus, to advocate for a 
complete disappearance of the function of the father, and thus of the function of stitching.  On 480
the contrary, he tried to invent a new form of thinking, beyond the Imaginary, that could keep the 
three registers stitched (and thus not in a state of psychosis) without having to reduce such a 
stitching to the “psychic reality” of religion or patriarchy.  
WORK CITED 
Assoun, Paul-Laurent. Freud et les sciences sociales : psychanalyse et théorie de la culture.   
 Paris: Armand Collin, 2008. 
Chiesa, Lorenzo. The Not-Two: Logic and God in Lacan. Boston: MIT Press, 2017. 
Ellmann, Richard. James Joyce. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Freud, Sigmund. “The interpretation of Dreams.” Standard Ed., Vol. 4-5 (1900-1901), Translated  
 by James Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1953. 
—-. “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.” Standard Ed., Vol. 7 (1905), Translated by James 
 See, Deleuze, Gilles & Felix Guattari. The Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Transl. Robert Hurley. 480
Pinguins Classics,  New York, 2009. 
!376
  Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1953, pp. 125-244.  
—-. “Totem and Taboo.” Standard Ed., Vol. 13 (1913-1914), Translated by James Strachey,    
 London: Hogarth Press, 1955, 1-162. 
—-. “An Infantile Neurosis.” Standard Ed., Vol 17 (1917-1919). Translated by James Strachey,   
 London: Hogarth Press, 1955, 3-122.   
—-. “Civilization and its Discontent.” in Standard Ed., Vol. 21 (1927-1931), Translated by James 
 Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, 59-168. 
Glover, Edward. “The Therapeutic Effect of Inexact Interpretation: a Contribution to the Theory  
 of Suggestion,” in International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1931, XII. 
Joyce, James. Stephen Hero: Part of the First Draft of "a Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man.   
 New York: New Directions Books, 2011. 
—-. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. New York: Norton, 2007. 
—-. Ulysses. London: Bodley Head, 2002. 
—-. Ulysse. Translation and Edition under the supervision of Jacques Aubert, Paris: Folio, Livre   
 de Poche, 2013.   
—-. Finnegans Wake. London: Penguin, Classic, 1999. 
—-. Finnegans Wake. Translated by Philippe Lavergne. Paris: Folio, Livre de poche, 1997.  
Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits, I-II. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1971. 
—. “Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je,” in Ecrits I, 92-99. 
—-. “Intervention sur le transfert,” in Écrits I., 212-226. 
—-. “Fonction et champs de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse,” in Ecrits I,    
 235-321. 
—-. “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian      
 Unconscious” (1960) in Ecrits I, 671-703. 
—-. “D’une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose,” in Ecrits II, 9-61. 
—-. The Triumph of Religion: Preceded by Discourse to Catholics, Polity Press, Cambridge,   
 2013. 
—-. Autres Ecrits, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 2001. 
—-. “Lituraterre”, in Autres Ecrits. 11-22. 
—-. “Les complexes familiaux,” in Autres Ecrits, 23-84. 
—-. “Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur la psychanalyse de l’Ecole,” in Autres Ecrits,     
 243-260. 
!377
—-. “L’Étourdit,” in Autres Écrits, 449-496. 
—-. “Télévision,” in Autres Ecrits, 509-546.  
—-. “Preface to the English-Language Edition” in The Four Fundamental Concepts of     
 Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Karnac, 1977. 
—-. Je parle aux murs. Paris: Seuil, 2011. 
—-. “The Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real” (1953) published in The Names-of-the-Father,   
 trans. Bruce Fink, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2013. 
—-. Seminar III, The Psychosis (1955-1956), Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell   
 Grigg, New York: Norton & Company, 1993. 
—-. Le Séminaire IV, La Relation d’objet (1956-1957), Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris:   
 Edition du Seuil, 1998. 
—-. Le Séminaire V, Les formations de l’inconscient (1957-1958), Edited by Jacques-Alain    
 Miller. Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1998.  
—-. Le Séminaire VI, Le désir et son interprétation (1958-1959), Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, 
  Paris: Edition du Seuil, 2013. 
—-. “Beyond the Oedipus Complex” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII, The Other   
 Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. Russell Grigg, New York: Norton & Company, 2007, 
110-154. 
—-. Le Séminaire XX, Encore, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1999. 
—-. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and   
 Knowledge, Transl. Bruce Fink, New York: Norton, 1999.  
—-. Le Séminaire XXII, RSI (1974-1975), unpublished, unedited. 
—-. Le Séminaire XXIII, Le sinthome, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Edition du Seuil,   
 2005. 
—-. Lacan, Jacques. The Sinthome: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book Xxiii., Trans. A R.    
 Malden: Price, Polity, 2016. 
—-. Le Séminaire XXIV, L’insu que sait de l’une bévue s’aile à mourre, (1976-1977),     
 Unpublished, Unedited. 
—-. Le Séminaire XXV, Le moment de conclure (1977-1978), unpublished, unedited. 
Miller, Jacques-Alain. “The Real is Without Law,” Transl. Frédéric-Charles Baitinger & John   
 Burton Wallace, in lacanian ink 47 (Fall 2015), 50-78. 
—-. “Ex-sistence.” Translated by Frédéric Baitinger & John Wallace, lacanian ink, 48,    
2016, 32-65. 
!378
—-. “Pure Psychoanalysis, Applied psychoanalysis”, trans. by Barbara P. Fulks, in lacanian ink   
 20, (Spring 2002), 4-43. 
—-. “From the Unconscious to the Real”, trans. Frédéric Baitinger & Azeen Kahn,     
 lacanian ink 50 (Fall 2017). 
—-. “The Real Unconscious,” Transl. Frédéric-Charles Baitinger & Azeen Kahn, in lacanian ink, 
  #50, 2017. 22-41.   
—-. “Affairs of the Family in the Unconscious,” transl. Frédéric-Charles Baitinger & Azeen 
Khan, The Lacanian Review, Issue 04, Winter 2017.  
—-. Séminaire, L’Orientation lacanienne [2004-2005], Pièces Détachées. Unedited,     
 Unpublished. 
—-. Séminaire, L’Orientation lacanienne [2006-2007], Le dernier enseignement de Lacan,    
 Unedited, Unpublished. 
—-. Séminaire, L’orientation lacanienne [2008-2009], Choses de finesse en psychanalyse,    
 Unedited, Unpublished. 
—-. Séminaire, L’Orientation lacanienne [2010-2011], L’Un tout seul. Unedited, Unpublished.  
Mitchell, Stephen A. & Margaret J. Black, Freud and Beyond, A History of Modern     
 Psychoanalytic thought, New York: Basics Books, 1995. 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth. “Totem et Tabou.” Dictionnaire de la psychanalyse. Fayard, Paris, 1997,   
 1057-1062. 
Soler, Colette. Lacan, Lecteur de Joyce. Paris: PUF, 2015. 
—-. Lacan Reading Joyce. Translated by Devra Simiu, New York: Routledge, 2018. 
—-. L’aventure Littéraire ou la psychose inspirée : Rousseau, Joyce, Pessoa. Paris: Edition du 
champ  lacanien, 2000.   
!379
!380
EPILOGUE: TOWARDS AN ETHICS OF JOUISSANCE 
Without a sadistic understanding of 
an incontestably thundering and 
torrential nature, there could be no 
revolutionaries, there could only be a 
revolting utopian sentimentality.  481
Georges Bataille 
I have already referred to what it is 
that arouses Freud’s horror, arouses 
the horror of the civilized man he 
essentially was. It derives from the 
evil in which he does not hesitate to 
locate man’s deepest heart.  482
Jacques Lacan 
A Perverse Fascination for Death and Jouissance 
For the sake of spending a night with a woman, no one would be mad enough to accept 
an outcome that would be fatal to him, since it isn’t a question of combat but of death by 
hanging. For Kant, the answer to this question is in no doubt. (…) But it is important to 
note that one only has to make a conceptual shift and move the night spent with the lady 
from the category of pleasure to that of jouissance, given that jouissance implies 
precisely to accept death—and there’s no need of sublimation—for the example to be 
ruined. In other words, it is enough for jouissance to be a form of evil, for the whole 
 Georges Bataille, “The Use-Value of D.A.F de Sade (An Open Letter to My Current Comrades)” in The Bataille 481
Reader, Part II, “Heterology”, Editor and Trans. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson. New York: Blackwell Publishing, 
1997, 157.
 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Seminar VII, trans. Dennis Porter, New York: Norton & Company, 482
1986.
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thing to change its character completely, and for the meaning of the moral law itself to be 
completely changed. Anyone can see that if the moral law is, in effect, capable of playing 
some role here, it is precisely as a support for the jouissance involved; it is so that the sin 
becomes what Saint Paul calls inordinately sinful. That’s what Kant on this occasion 
simply ignores. (Lacan, SVII, 189) 
To the simple question “Is sex worth dying for?” Kant’s answer is clear. No rational man, 
applying to his action the moral maxim of his pure practical reason, would be willing to die for a 
good lay. Who would be crazy enough, indeed, to give up his entire life for one night of sexual 
pleasure? No rational subject would do such a thing since it would be irrational, against common 
sense. Nonetheless, according to Lacan, it would suffice to substitute for the idea of pleasure 
attached to the one of “spending the night with a woman,” the one of jouissance for the whole 
example to be ruined. Of course, the word jouissance, here, should not be approached from a 
legal or philosophical perspective, but from a strictly psychoanalytic point of view.  
While the notion of jouissance, when approached from a legal and philosophical 
perspective, represents a strictly negative notion—what needs to be limited since it has no utility 
and no values; the notion of jouissance, when approached from a psychoanalytic point of view, 
represents an imperative to enjoy.  Jouissance, from a psychoanalytic perspective, does not 483
 Lacan defines, in his Seminar XX, Encore (1972-1973), the notion of jouissance, from the point of view of the 483
Law, as follow. “J’éclaircirai d’un mot le rapport du droit et de la jouissance. L’usufruit – c’est une notion de droit, 
n’est-ce pas ? – réunit en un mot ce que j’ai déjà évoqué dans mon séminaire sur l’éthique, à savoir la différence 
entre l’utile et la jouissance (11)” “L’usufruit veut dire qu’on peut jouir de ses moyens, mais qu’il ne faut pas les 
gaspiller. Quand on a l’usufruit d’un héritage, on peut en jouir à condition de ne pas trop en user. C’est bien là qu’est 
l’essence du droit – répartir, distribuer, rétribuer ce qu’il en est de la jouissance (11). “Qu’est-ce que c’est que la 
jouissance ? Elle se réduit ici à n’être qu’une instance négative. La jouissance c’est ce qui ne sert à rien” (11). 
Opposed to this definition of jouissance in terms of « usufruct », Lacan defines the notion of jouissance from the 
point of view of psychoanalysis, thus: “Je pointe la réserve qu’implique le champ du droit-à-la-jouissance. Le droit 
n’est pas le devoir. Rien ne force personne à jouir, sauf le surmoi. Le surmoi, c’est l’impératif de la jouissance – 
jouis ! C’est bien la que se trouve le point tournant qu’interroge le discours psychanalytique” (11).
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designate the satisfaction of the drives under the supervision of the pleasure principle but, 
precisely, the kind of deviation and excess that happens to the drives once they have been 
impacted by language. In other words, jouissance is what happens to the drives when a certain 
chain of signifiers comes to structure them at an unconscious level and requires then to obtain 
satisfaction according to these new unconscious coordinates. This is why the notion of jouissance 
is primarily linked to the notion of the super-ego for Lacan. Jouissance is the name of what can 
force an individual to enjoy, even when to enjoy means to suffer! Such is the paradox that lies at 
the very heart of the notion of jouissance, and thus at the very heart of the moral subject too since 
it makes of jouissance, just like of Kant’s moral maxim, the heir of the super-ego. This is why 
also Kant's example, once approached from the perspective of jouissance, comes up short since 
the idea of “spending one night with a lady” is not an idea that could be evaluated rationally, but 
an idea that imposes itself on the subject of jouissance as a categorical imperative, just as Kant’s 
moral maxim imposes itself on the moral subject. 
A Tragic Disdain For Love 
Unfortunately, it is precisely this paradox that many recent queer scholars, belonging to what 
Jack Halberstam has called “the Anti-Social Turn in queer studies,” have clearly overlooked 
when they used Lacan’s notion of jouissance to argue in favor of their right to “opt out,” which is 
to say when they argued against the lgbtiq++ movement and its effort to gain more rights for gay 
and lesbian communities, in favor of their right to “die for a good lay.”   484
 For an assessment of this “anti-social turn in queer theory,” see for example, Haschemi, Yekani E, Eveline Kilian, 484
and Beatrice Michaelis. Queer Futures: Reconsidering Ethics, Activism, and the Political. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. 
See also Ruti, The Ethic of Opting Out.,New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. Print.
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The best representative of this position is Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and 
the Death Drive. In this book, Edelman rejects all the fantasies about a better future, all the 
fantasies of progress that supports the development of neo-liberalism and the mainstream of 
lgbtiq++ identity politics. Edelman calls the hope that supports this position, “reproductive 
futurism,” a hope which itself subordinates the vision of the future to a set of values that 
Edelman summarizes in the notion of "reproductive futurism," which is to say a vision of the 
future centered around the figure of the child. For Edelman, the point at stake is to make visible 
that queer theorists who want to escape this vision of the future, which is entirely subordinated to 
a certain vision of the common good, need to posit a sense of ethics that departs radically from 
any categories of right and wrong. Likewise, Michael Warner’s “Why Gay men are Having Risky 
Sex” (2003), Leo Bersani Is the Rectum a Grave (2010), Lynne Huffer Are the Lips a Grave? 
(2013), or Scott O’Hara “Safety First,” to only mention the most important of them, have all 
argued, in one way or another, that to remain true to the radical non-normativity defended by 
queer theory one has to defend the idea that “sex is worth dying for” against any other form of 
queer “normalization.  Foucault himself, who had unprotected sex many times in his life and 485
who died out of AIDS, wrote in his History of Sexuality, Vol. 1:  
The Faustian pact, whose temptation has been instilled in us by deployment of sexuality, 
is now as follows: to exchange life in its entirety for sex itself, for the truth and the 
 The antisocial turn consists of prominent Lacanian scholars who, beyond their differences, valorize negativity in 485
order to oppose what they consider to be the “fake” optimism of the lgbtiq++ movement. See for more details 
Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? And Other Essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Print; Edelman, 
Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. Print; Huffer, Lynne. 
Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory, New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2010. Print; 
Huffer, Lynne. Are the Lips a Grave? Queer Feminist Reflections on the Ethics of Sex., 2013. Print; O'Hara, Scott, 
and Samuel A. Streit. Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Selected Essays of Scott O'hara. Hoboken: Routledge, Taylor 
and Francis, 2014. Internet resource. Warner, Michael. The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of 
Queer Life. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. Print.
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sovereignty of sex. Sex is worth dying for. It is in this (strictly historical) sense that sex is 
indeed imbedded with the death instinct. When a long while ago the West discovered 
love, it bestowed on it a value high enough to make death acceptable; nowadays it is sex 
that claims this equivalence, the highest of all. (Michel Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality, 156) 
If (same) sex is worth dying for today, according to Foucault, it is because it has come to occupy
—at least for a part of the libertines, the dandy, and the queer community today—the place that 
love formerly occupied in the West.  
 Love, in the tradition of courtly love, for example, was the reason why people would put 
their life at risk and accept a premature and unjust death. It was also the main reason why people 
would suspend their personal quest for pleasure and impose on themselves the abstract demands 
of an Other. Finally, love was also, in its most ravishing forms, what was capable of undoing the 
self-mastery of the rational subject, what was capable, in a word, of a radical subversion of all 
the values attached to the rational subject. But love, as Foucault points out in his text, is not 
considered subversive anymore, just as it was not considered so during the 18th century among 
libertines.  Many feminist and queer scholars, as a result, have launched a war on love and put 486
in its place sex and, perhaps even more than sex, the experience of perversion. Leo Bersani and 
Adam Philips, for example, in Intimacies (2010), argue that the potentially masochist jouissance 
contained in sex (and especially in the position of the one who is being penetrated) is the only 
 See, for example, Cusset, Catherine. "Editor's Preface: the Lesson of Libertinage." Yale French Studies. 94 486
(1998): 1. Print. In this essay, Cusset suggests that “the opposite of libertinage is love, as a deep, long-lasting 
sentiment.”
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true force that can perform the task of undoing the coherent-self and is, as such, the one and only 
true subversive experience that should be not only defended, but promoted as the only truly non-
normative and thus subversive way to think a defiant subject. This is why sex, and more broadly 
perversion, has come to occupy such an important position within a large part of contemporary 
queer theory. It has even become, for a scholar like Cindy Patton, the center of what queer 
defiant and non-normative agency is.   487
Of course, from the perspective of capitalism and patriarchy, it is better that you are 
married than you cruise sex clubs until 4am. Marriage, as such, is the oldest institution that was 
created to channel sexual energy into specific pathways in order to protect the economic order by 
submitting sexuality and jouissance to the “performance principle” that is guiding the system of 
neo-liberalism. Foucault, in The Birth of Biopolitics also saw in marriage a biopolitical tool used 
by power to use sexuality as a way to control the unruliness of jouissance, to channel it in order 
to put it at the service of the community, and not at the service of the individual.  Laura Kipnis, 488
in Against Love (2003), suggests that within a neo-liberal context, one has to work on his 
marriage, on his sex-life, as one has to work to make money since marriage is an investment that 
requires work, like everything else.  As such, marriage is the negation of jouissance and its 489
instant reward. Kipnis also argues that the ideology of romantic love that supports the ideology 
of marriage is what has created, in the first place, “the modern notion of the soul,” and with the 
 See, Patton, Cindy. Fatal Advice: How Safe-Sex Education Went Wrong. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012. 487
Print. In this book, Cindy Patton argues that “we must think about sex as the form of power that makes and saves 
queer lives” (155).
 Foucault, Michel, and Michel Senellart. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979. 488
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print.
 Kipnis, Laura. Against Love: A Polemic. Vintage, 2009. Print. 489
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notion of the soul, the submission of the one that loves to a series of images or ideals that 
reinforce its submission to the power in place. To love, according to Kipnis, is always to love 
according to certain idealized images that have certain values on the neo-liberal market. 
Similarly, Jessica Benjamin, in The Bonds of Love (2006), argues that love, in a patriarchal 
context, is nothing but a tool of subordination used by patriarchal men to keep women in a 
vulnerable and masochist position.  This is why the “anti-social turn” in queer studies has 490
promoted the notion of jouissance and the death drive (and not the notions of desire and love) in 
order to maintain, within the field of queer theory, a radical non-normative orientation.  
However, one could argue, as Slavoj Zizek does in Neighbors and Other Monsters that, 
today, we are in fact constantly “bombarded from all sides by the different versions of the super-
ego injunction, “Enjoy,” (52) which means that compared to a prior stage of capitalism, neo-
liberalism does not repress jouissance or sexuality as such but, on the contrary, uses it to increase 
the productivity of its workers, or to create new markets.  As long as jouissance or sexuality is 491
contained with the boundaries of a certain kind of “sur-plus-jouissance,” as Lacan has it,  
jouissance is valued as something "good" and, even, as one of the motors of late capitalism.  To 492
take only the example of the porno industry, it has become quite clear that neo-liberalism uses 
 Benjamin, Jessica. The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of Domination. New York: 490
Pantheon Books, 2006. Print.
 Žižek, Slavoj, Kenneth Reinhard, and Eric L. Santner. The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology. 491
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013. See also, McNair, Brian. Porno? Chic!: How Pornography 
Changed the World and Made It a Better Place. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013. Print.
 Lacan, in Seminar XVI writes: “Le discours détient les moyens de jouir en tant qu’il implique le sujet. Il n’y 492
aurait aucune raison de sujet, au sens où l’on dit raison d’État, s’il n’y avait au marché de l’Autre ce corrélatif, qu’un 
plus-de-jouir s’établisse qui est capté par certains. Démontrer comment le plus-de-jouir tient à l’énonciation, qu’il 
est produit par le discours, et apparaît comme un effet, exigerait sans doute un discours assez poussé. Mais aussi 
bien n’est-ce pas là chose si nouvelle à vos oreilles si vous m’avez lu, car c’est l’objet de mon écrit Kant avec Sade. 
La démonstration y est faite de la totale réduction du plus-de-jouir à l’acte d’appliquer sur le sujet ce qu’est le terme 
a du fantasme par quoi le sujet peut être posé comme cause-de-soi dans le désir” (48-49).
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libido itself, with its polymorphous perversity, to fuel new porno markets. As long as the 
perversity of the drives does not threaten directly the lives of others, it is used as a potential 
"niche" to create new products, new consumers, new markets, and why not, new addictions! 
Therefore, one can wonder if such an elevation of the category of unsafe sex, and most of the 
time through this category, of every other perverse (BDSM) or kinky practices, as the true 
category capable of subverting the notion of self-hood, does not hide a profound 
misunderstanding of the psychoanalytic notions of jouissance and perversion.  
Consequently, the goal of this epilogue is to provide a critique of the false usage of the 
notion of jouissance that the “anti-social turn,” in the contemporary field of “queer theory,” has 
propagated. To do so, the chapter proceeds as follow. It starts by showing how Freud, in 
Civilization and its Discontents (1931),  after having isolated at the heart of the human mind a 493
sadistic component, used it to justify, in a very Christian way, why civilization was actually in 
need of returning in a masochist way this violence onto each of its member so that civilization 
would not to be in constant danger of disappearing. The chapter then shows how Georges 
Bataille, through his use of Sade’s work, foreshadowed, in many ways, the “anti-social” position 
defended by Edelman, while already pointing at some of its inner paradoxes. Finally, I show how 
Bataille’s stand against morality, in the name of sadism, furnished the urtext upon which Lacan 
built his own critique of perversion, and then his own conception of ethics. Lacan’s ethics is an 
ethics that is, at the same time, an ethics that takes into account jouissance and its ties to the 
death drive, and which is thus in agreement with the non-normative goal of gender and queer 
studies. But it is also an ethics that is capable of “limiting” the perversity and the morbidity 
 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontent, Trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton & Company, 1961.493
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contained in jouissance by grounding the subject in an experience of love and desire that implies 
the existence of the Other—even if degraded at the level of a semblant.  
I. IS MASOCHISM A NECESSITY? FREUD’S DIAGNOSTIC OF CIVILIZATION 
Freud, in Civilization and its Discontents, argues that the main problem that civilization is facing 
is to know how to put the energy of the libido not at the service of a restricted community of 
lovers—which eventually becomes what isolates individuals form one another—but to put it at 
the service of a larger community. It is thus a question of knowing how to derive some energy 
from love and sexuality (which is at the service of the individual or at the service of the 
community of lovers), in order to put it at the service of society and its larger network of 
sociality.  
A Desire for Aggression  
A society could not resist if it was only grounded on utility and reason. It would be wiped away 
by the strength of the drives and their autistic dimension. It is thus, according to Freud, an 
absolute necessity for civilization to be able to turn some of the energy of the libido into the 
ground of an extended form of friendship, that is, to turn a part of the libido into something that 
can be used to enlarge the social bond. Freud writes: “The masses of men must be bound to one 
another at a libidinal level, necessity alone, the advantage of common work, would not hold them 
together. The natural instinct of aggressiveness in man, the hostility of each one against all and of 
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all against each one, opposes the program of civilization” (102).   What opposes such a view, 494
and more so the possibility of using the libido to indifferently “love one’s neighbor” is that there 
are variations in one’s neighbor appreciation of what is good and what is evil. Even more so, 
there is, within one’s neighbor a form of wickedness that is inescapable, and that Freud called a 
desire for aggression. Freud writes: 
The bit of truth behind all this—one so eagerly denied—is that men are not gentle, 
friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are attacked, 
but that a powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned as part of their 
instinctual endowment. The result is that their neighbor is to them not only a possible 
helper or sexual object, but also a temptation to them to gratify their aggressiveness on 
him, to exploit his capacity for work without recompense, to use him sexually without his 
consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to 
kill him. (85) 
If it is impossible to love one’s neighbor, for Freud, it is because there is, in human beings, a 
desire for aggression. This desire for aggression, that Freud called the death instinct in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920),  is also what is at the center of Sade’s vision of sexuality, and 495
what is used to think the ethical problem anew by Bataille and Lacan. How is it possible to love 
 One could remark, here, that the way in which Freud is problematizing the articulation between love and 494
sociality is the reverse of what Bataille will do in Eroticism or in The Moral of the Summit! What Bataille wants, is 
to use the energy contained in the community of lovers in order to think of an experience that goes beyond the 
experience of the ego, an experience that breaks the solitude of each lover’s ego through the intensity of their 
encounter. It is thus an experience that goes back toward the primitive affective ego described by Freud at the 
opening of his book. And not the product of the secondary ego. What Freud wants, on the contrary, is to avoid this 
situation. And in order to avoid this situation, he wants to use the extra amount of energy that may have led the 
lovers to reach ecstasy and to put it at the service of a homoerotic friendship, a homoerotic friendship that will 
become the root, it has been argued by feminist and queer scholars, the basis of capitalism and patriarchy.
 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton & Company1961.495
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oneself, and to love one’s neighbor once one has accepted this horrible truth: the truth that there 
is, at the heart of men, a tendency towards aggression? And it is this tendency that makes the 
demands of civilization on the drives a necessity, and what makes also the Christian 
commandment an impossible one to apply. Freud writes: “Culture has to call up every possible 
reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instinct of men and hold their 
manifestation in check by reaction-formations in men’s mind” (86). The most important 
conclusion drawn by Freud from this “realization” is the necessity, for culture, to take into 
account this desire for aggression. The same conclusion will also constitute the point of departure 
of Bataille and Lacan. Culture and civilization, instead of denying or fully repressing this desire 
needs to organize its expression within symbolic and imaginary spaces. How should the theory 
of the drives be revisited once the “desire for aggressiveness” has been fully recognized? It is 
thanks to this discovery that Freud elaborated, in The Ego and the Id (1923), his Second Topic.  496
The main point of this second topic is to think anew the articulation between narcissism, the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle once the desire for aggression has been posited at the 
center of men’s lives.  
Hunger and Love  
In his second topic, which will become the point of departure of ego-psychology, Freud isolates 
two sources of energy within the organism: hunger and love. These sources of energy, in turn, are 
associated to two opposite forms of instincts. The side of hunger is associated with what Freud 
called the ‘ego instincts,’ instincts that work towards the self-preservation of the organism. One 
could argue here that this is also the side of Bataille’s moral of the decline, that is to say the side 
 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, Trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton & Company, 1961. 496
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of the possible, of reason, of the mundane world, etc.. The side of love, on the contrary, is 
associated with the ‘object instincts,’ instincts that work towards the acquisition of an external 
object suited for the satisfaction of the sexual drive. However, within the instincts that belongs to 
the object, there is one—the sadistic instinct—that is strangely working hand in hand with the 
ego, that is, in agreement with its desire for mastery, while being oriented, strictly speaking, 
towards an object. In other words, sadism stands, within the realm of love, as the solution that an 
autistic ego has found to have a relationship with an external object without being threatened by 
this external object. Freud writes:  
One of these object instincts, the sadistic certainly stood out from the rest in that its aim 
was so very unloving; moreover, it clearly allied itself in many of its aspects with the ego 
instincts, and its close kinship with instinct of mastery without any libidinal purpose 
could not be concealed, but these ambiguities could be overcome; in spite of them, 
sadism plainly belongs to sexual life—the game of cruelty could take the place of the 
game of love. (95) 
It is to solve this apparent riddle that Freud reworked his theory of narcissism. In a paper called 
“On Narcissism,” (1914) Freud introduced the idea that the libido (which was supposed to be 
exclusively turned towards an external object) is first cathected by the ego for its own profit (this 
is what Freud, and then Klein will call: primary narcissism).  As such, the libido’s 497
headquarters, remarks Freud, is the ego, and not the Id. It is only during a second phase (the 
secondary narcissism) that the narcissistic libido can turn in the direction of an object (becoming 
Sigmund Freud, “To introduce Narcissism” in Complete Work Vol. XIV, Trans. James Strachey, The Hogarth 497
Press, London, 1957. pp.67-104. 
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thus a libido-object) before, in case of neurosis, turning back again in the direction of the ego 
(returning to the ego-libido position). As a consequence, it is the very concept of libido that is at 
stake once the desire for aggression has been posited. How is it possible to maintain such a 
concept while its domain of expression and the extension of its validity seem to have vanished in 
the air? 
According to Freud, the simplest way to solve this problem is to introduce an opposition 
of two instincts at the very core of life: an instinct of self-preservation, and an instinct towards 
destruction. However, while the instinct of self-preservation is easily observable, the one of self-
destruction is way more difficult to study, except when it manages to express itself outward, as in 
the case of sadism.  Given the alternative between an instinct of destruction that expresses 498
itself silently within one’s own organism (as in masochism), and an instinct of destruction that 
manages to express itself outward, i.e. onto an external object (as in sadism), the difference is not 
in the nature of the violence expressed, but in the form and in the visibility that is given to it. It is 
thus within the realm of eroticism—which will become the very field of study of Bataille—that 
Freud isolated, for the first time, the impact of the death drive onto human’s love relations. When 
directed outward, against an external object, the desire for aggression is called sadism; when it is 
directed inward, against oneself, it is called masochism. But the desire for aggression goes 
further than eroticism for Freud. It can also be observed in non-sexual relationships. What are the 
tools and means through which civilization has tried, so far, to put in check the desire for 
aggression? How can a desire for aggression be rendered innocuous?  
 “In sadism, where it bends the erotic aim to its own will and yet at the same time gratifies the sexual craving 498
completely, we can obtain the clearest insight into its nature and its relation to Eros” (101).
!393
The Dread of Losing Love  
The simplest solution, argues Freud, is to make sure that the aggression, instead of being 
expressed outward, is introjected, which is to say redirected against the ego itself. Through this 
process a division is created within the ego between the ego itself, and the super-ego. The super-
ego is the part of the ego that represents consciousness, and through consciousness guilt. The 
super-ego, in this sense, is what “exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against 
the ego that the ego would have liked to enjoy against others. The tension between the strict 
super-ego and the subordinate ego we call the sense of guilt; it manifests itself as the need for 
punishment” (105). Civilization gains some control over the desire for aggression by using it to 
install, within the potentially sadistic ego of everyone, an even crueler super-ego that is in charge 
of exploiting the desire for aggression in the name of some “superior values.” The origin of the 
feeling of guilt is located by Freud in a very simple phenomenon: “the dread of losing 
love” (107).  
It is because humans are in need of one another for their survival (and especially  
children) that the possibility for them to lose the love of the ones they are depending on is so 
important. They thus fear or dread losing this love and are ready to give up some immediate 
satisfaction in order to keep it. But it is only when this dread, which is produced by a real 
external threat, is being interiorized in the manner of a “super-ego” that the difference between 
doing evil and thinking about doing evil is erased and that moral masochism is born.  Freud 
writes:  
A great change takes place as soon as the authority has been internalized by the 
development of the super-ego. The manifestations of consciousness are then raised to a 
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new level; to be accurate, one should not call them conscious and sense of guilt before 
this. At this point the dread of discovery ceases to operate and also once for all any 
difference between doing evil and wishing to do it, since nothing is hidden from the 
super-ego, not even thoughts. (108)  
Once the fear for punishment has been interiorized, the subject can no longer find any form of 
inner peace, since his ego cannot hide from his super-ego any desire for aggression that his ego 
may have wanted to commit towards someone else. It becomes thus an impossible situation 
where people with the highest moral standards are also the people who are constantly judging 
themselves guilty.  
The circle of moral life, as Freud describes it, is thus a vicious circle that takes as its aims 
and recipient of its impossible demands the ego which, in turn becomes more and more the 
victim of its own ideals. This is why Lacan will even go as far as saying that once the super-ego 
has been posited, there is nothing that can limit its cruelty against the ego. There is no inner limit 
to its inner cruelty. All the bad luck in life, all the misfortunes can become fuel for the super-
ego’s aggression. Freud writes: “It [the super-ego] simply carries on the severity of external 
authority which it has succeeded and to some extent replaced” (111). One could conclude, from 
there, that the passage from the presence of an external authority, to an inner authority is what 
provokes, in the human psyche, the most important displacement; a displacement that makes 
impossible, for a human being, to access satisfaction without feeling guilty.  
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II. IN PRAISE OF TRANSGRESSION: BATAILLE’S MORAL OF THE SUMMIT 
To go beyond this feeling of guilt, while still taking into account all of Freud’s insights about 
sadism, masochism and perversion, I turn now to the work of Georges Bataille.   Bataille used 499
the figure of Sade to build a double approach of ethics that is, at the same time, an ethics that 
makes room for Freud’s concern about the natural aggressiveness of human nature, but that also 
tries to go beyond it, in a manner that is not without link with the “anti-social” position defended 
by Lee Edelman or Leo Bersani.  
Sade for the Jederman  
It is in a letter called “The Use-Value of D.A.F. de Sade (an Open Letter to My Current 
Comrades)” that Bataille laid out, for the first time, his vision of Sade, and the way in which his 
teaching could have an influence in the realm of ethics. The teaching of Sade, argues Bataille—
its use-value—is not easy to grasp. It is a teaching that is not addressed to the “normal man” (the 
jederman is Freud’s term) insofar as the “normal man,” submitted to “fear,” and more broadly to 
the castration complex, can only feel but disgust towards the vision of the world developed by 
Sade. In other words, Sade’s teaching is only addressed to a type of men that did not exist, at the 
time when Bataille was writing, but that will surely appear once the current forms of the social 
bonds—the forms created by the Oedipus complex—are undone (which means now). For the 
“normal man” Sade represents what should be condemned the most in human behaviors. Bataille 
writes:  
 See, for example, Bataille, Georges, Mary Dalwood, and Colin McCabe. Eroticism. 2012. Print; Bataille, 499
Georges, and Robert Hurley. Accursed Share. New York: Zone Books, 1992.
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The figure of Sade is certainly unsympathetic to people moved by need and by fear. The 
sympathies and the dreads—the cowardice too, one must add—which determine man’s 
usual behavior are diametrically opposed to the passion responsible for the sovereignty of 
the voluptuary. (179) 
The proper attitude, thus, when one wants to talk about Sade, is to acknowledge first the reaction 
of the “normal man.” For it is only at the condition of acknowledging the reason why the 
“normal man” rejects Sade, that one could eventually gain the chance to see what challenges 
Sade is proposing to a “future” man that would stand beyond the limits imposed on the “normal 
man” by society. In other words, to understand Sade, one has to adopt the opposite reaction than 
the one of Breton who saw in Sade a revolutionary hero. 
For Bataille, among others ejected surrealists , the problem with Breton’s reading of 500
Sade was that he tried to use it as an idealist, that is, as a person who wanted to critique the 
values of bourgeoisie by introducing, through an Icarian complex, higher values that were 
impossible to put in practice or to detach from reality.  For example, when Breton in his Second 501
Manifesto of Surrealism (1929) invited every madmen to kill his psychiatrist, or to go out in the 
street and start shooting, the French psychiatrists institutions accused Breton of being completely 
 When Breton started to eject many surrealists from the group and publicly insulted them in his Second manifesto 500
(1929) Bataille managed to write, with the help of all those ejected surrealists, a counter manifesto called “Un 
Cadavre” (1930) – “A Dead Body” which was also a reference to Breton’s Manifesto “Un Cadavre” (1924) written 
about Anatole France’s funeral. The manifesto was composed of ten texts: one written by Bataille (“A castrated 
lion”, cf. “Un lion châtré” in OC I, p. 218.), and the others by Queneau, Leiris, Desnos, Prevert, and some other 
disgraced surrealists. To say the least, the manifesto “Un Cadavre” was first made to attack Breton’s nepotism and 
pope-like attitude towards what he alone thought was the « true » surrealism (Breton would soon join the communist 
party—and, by an interesting twist, would also apply Stalin's rule to its own “party,” i.e., “A party gets stronger by 
“purging” itself.”). Ironically, Breton himself was expelled from the communist party in 1933. 
 For a full critique à Breton's idealism, see « La vieille taupe » et le préfixe sur dans les mots surhomme et 501
surréalisme”, in Georges Bataille, Œuvres Complètes, Tome II, Gallimard, Paris, 1970. pp. 93-109.
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irresponsible vis-à-vis those who were actually mad, and not only surrealists like him. Another 
example of such an idealistic and irresponsible way to go beyond the values of the bourgeois’ 
world is to be found in the way in which Breton talked about the figure of Le marquis de Sade. 
When Breton attacked Bataille in his Second Manifesto, he argued that while Sade had the right 
to write what he wrote, Bataille had none because he was only a librarian and not a man who 
spent most of his life in prison for his ideas. In other words, while Breton praised Sade for being 
a great revolutionary thinker and writer, he accused Bataille of being a pervert and a sick man.   502
To counter such a harsh judgment, Bataille accused Breton of being a coward and a 
hypocrite who was praising Sade while never considering him in his poetical or political works. 
In other words, Breton's admiration towards Sade was hypocritical for Bataille inasmuch as it 
had no theoretical or practical consequences for him. Additionally, his admiration for the marquis 
de Sade made of him a special case instead of one that would have forced Breton to include him 
in his way of thinking about human sexuality and sadistic violence. As such, Breton, for Bataille, 
did to Sade what primitive cultures do to their king: he admired him in order to eject him outside 
the safe space of mundanity.  Breton's admiration for Sade is also what Bataille's called, using his 
heterological concepts, an excretion. “The behavior of Sade’s admirers resembles that of 
André Breton wrote, “M. Bataille fait profession de ne vouloir considérer au monde que ce qu'il y a de plus vile, 502
de plus décourageant et de plus corrompu et il invite l'homme, pour éviter de se rendre utile à quoi que ce soit de 
déterminer, « à courir absurdement avec lui – les yeux devenus tout à coup troubles et chargés d'inavouables larmes 
– vers quelque provinciale maison hantée, plus vilaines que des mouches, plus vicieuses, plus rances que des salons 
de coiffure.” S'il m'arrive de rapporter de tels propos c'est qu'ils ne me paraissent pas seulement engager M. Bataille 
mais encore ceux des anciens surréalistes qui ont voulu avoir leurs coudées libres pour se commettre un peu partout. 
Peut-être M. Bataille est-il de force à les grouper et qu'il y parvienne, à mon sens, sera très intéressant. Prenant le 
départ pour la course que, nous venons de la voir, M. Bataille organise, il y a déjà : Desnos, Leiris, Masson, Vitrac. 
Je dis qu'il est extrêmement significatif de voir à nouveau s'assembler tous ceux qu'une tare quelconque a éloignés 
d'une première activité définie parce qu'il est très probable qu'ils n'ont que leur mécontentement à mettre en 
commun. Je m'amuse d'ailleurs à penser qu'on ne peut sortir du surréalisme sans tomber sur M. Bataille, tant il est 
vrai que le dégoût de la rigueur ne sait se traduire que par une soumission nouvelle à la rigueur. Avec M. Bataille, 
rien que de très connu, nous assistons à un retour offensif du vieux matérialisme antidialectique qui tente, cette fois, 
de se frayer gratuitement un chemin à travers Freud” (122).
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primitive subjects in relation to their king, whom they adore and loath, and whom they cover 
with honors and narrowly confine” (56). Consequently, it is always better, for Bataille, to be part 
of the group of people who are clearly scandalized by Sade's writing, than being part of Breton's 
group that praised Sade's writing while rejecting the real consequences at stake in such a 
judgment, i.e. the practical and theoretical consequences contained in such praise.  
Apathy, or the Paradox of Sade’s Position  
If one wants to praise Sade, one has to learn how to think with Sade, which means that one has to 
learn how to think about the human condition by putting at its very core the presence of sadistic 
urges. Bataille writes:  
Without a profound complicity with natural forces such as violent death, gushing 
blood, sudden catastrophes and the horrible cries of pain that accompany them, 
terrifying ruptures of what had seemed to be immutable, the fall into stinking filth of 
what had been elevated–without a sadistic understanding of an incontestably 
thundering and torrential nature, there could be no revolutionaries, there could only 
be a revolting utopian sentimentality. (The Use-Value-of-Sade, 157)   
But to be able to think with Sade (or, as we would say in French, “à hauteur de Sade”), it is 
necessary, Bataille argued in Eroticism, Death and Sensuality,  (1957) to understand that Sade’s 503
experience is grounded on a paradox. This paradox, put in a syllogism, goes as follow. If life is 
the pursuit of pleasure, and if the intensity of pleasure is a direct ratio of the destruction of life, 
then life can only reach its highest intensity through a monstrous denial of its own principle. To 
 Georges Bataille, Eroticism, Death and Sensuality, Trans. Mary Dalwood, an Francisco: City Lights Book, 1986. 503
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make the paradox more vivid, it is important to connect the first part—the pursuit of pleasure—
to the fact that Sade’s heroes are always entirely self-centered in the sense that they deny any 
right at all to their partner. Even more to the point, they always count for less the suffering that 
they are inflicting on their victims than the pleasure that they are getting from them. In this 
sense, Sade’s heroes are denying the very fact that they are the product of a certain society that, 
itself, is the result of a certain configuration of the social bond. They are, to say the least, 
radically unhooked from the demands of the Other, and thus radically outside the limits of the 
kind of social bounds that the Oedipus complex generally establishes between people (they are 
outside the Oedipus, but not beyond).   
Sade’s heroes to put in motion their “quest for the most intense pleasure” have to deny 
first the fact that they are themselves not only “separate beings,” but also members of a given 
society. In order to put into operation such a denial, they simply generalize the idea of excess—
that goes beyond reason—at the expense of the concrete presence of the social bond (which is 
the expression of reason). Such a movement is visible in Sade’s characters boundless quest for 
pleasure. For such a quest for pleasure, seen from a rational point of view, is mostly extravagant. 
Bataille writes, “One can see how the excesses of pleasure lead to the denial of the rights of other 
people, which is, as far as man is concerned, an excessive denial of the principle upon which his 
life is based” (169). Consequently, Sade’s heroes have first to destroy all the limits that society 
imposes on man to regulate their inclination towards an unlimited jouissance. Second, they have 
to come to term with the “odd” fact that they have to apply to themselves the very principle that 
they have used to subject others to their quest of pleasure. Sade called this ultimate paradoxical 
moment of his quest for pleasure apathy. Apathy, for Sade, is the result of a rejection of all the 
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feelings that would have attached a man (or a woman) to the rest of the group and, as such, a 
rejection of all the feelings that would have stopped such an isolation. In other words, to deny 
fully the existence of others, Sade’s heroes have to repress within themselves feelings of love, 
tenderness, pity and gratitude. For it is only at that condition that Sade’s world becomes not only 
a world divided into victims and torturers, but a world where each torturer accepts, in the name 
of his own pleasure, to be the victim of someone else’s pleasure. Sade’s world, as such, is a 
world where victim and torturer exchange roles not in the name of desire (and the repression it 
implies), but in the name of their radical singularity and its right to unlimited jouissance.  504
Sade’s paradox is thus, according to Bataille, that there exists a hidden link between the quest for 
unlimited sexual pleasure and death. How would it be possible to put this hidden truth not at the 
service of a Sadean apathy, but at the service of what Bataille called “communication”. How 
could the link between eroticism and death (which will become jouissance with Lacan) be used 
as a trampoline to reach a new form of social bond, and not as what will fuel, secretly, the super-
ego and apathy? In order to grasp how Sade’s paradox had a direct influence on Bataille’s stand 
on morality, one need to study the conference that Bataille gave, right after the publication of his 
first theoretical book, Inner Experience (1943), called The Summit and the Decline! (1944)  in 505
which he developed in a very systematic fashion the kind of hyper-moral that unfolds from 
thinking with Sade, that is to say, by placing the urges for excretion at the center of the question 
of morality, and by putting them at the service of an experience of “communication” and not at 
the service of apathy.  
 See also Chapter Five, and the notion of the Sinthome and the One-Body. 504
 Georges Bataille, “Le Sommet et le déclin !” in Discussion sur le péché, Editor, Michel Surya, Paris: Edition 505
Lignes, 2010, 51-88. See also “Discussion on Sin” in The unfinished system of Nonknowledge, 26-76. 
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The Moral of the Summit  
From a “normal” perspective—i.e., from the perspective of the “natural man”—the notion of 
Good relates to the idea of what is good for a being, and the notion of Evil to what is bad for a 
being. In other words, Good goes with the respect of the integrity of a being, and Evil with the 
violation of this integrity. Nonetheless, counter to such “normal” evidence, Christianity inverts 
this “normal” perspective in order to claim that the source of Evil lies in the principle of 
individuation that the former position takes as its point of departure. From a Christian moral 
perspective, indeed, the idea of Good is not associated with what is good for a being, but with 
what can disrupt the selfishness at the root of the “natural” perspective. The famous Christian 
solution to this apparent paradox (which opposes paganism to Christianity) is, as everybody 
knows, “Love your neighbor as yourself,” which is to say that a being needs to look for the good 
of others in order to look for his own good. Such a solution, however, is not satisfying for 
Bataille inasmuch as it implies the maintaining of the principle of closeness and oneness in the 
form of Salvation over what shatters and opens the self.  
To move beyond the “natural” perspective on ethics, as well as to move beyond the 
Christian stand on morality, Bataille proceeds to introduce a distinction between two new kinds 
of morals. A moral of the summit to which he associates moments of excess and exuberance of 
forces, and a moral of decline, to which Bataille associates moments of exhaustion and fatigue. 
Instead of thinking the opposition between a “natural” morality, and Christian morality from a 
purely transcendent and idealistic perspective, Bataille wants to problematize such an opposition 
by connecting it to the kind of energy that morality has to order. In the case of an excess of 
energy, morality has to deal with a problem of excretion. In the case of exhaustion, it has to deal 
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with a problem of appropriation. But in both cases, it has to deal with the fundamental problem 
of installing, between human beings, a form a “communication” that would break their isolation
—and not a form of apathy as Sade’s position implies. Bataille writes, “It is by ruining in myself 
as in others the integrity of being that I open myself to communication, that I access the moral 
summit. And the summit is not to suffer evil, but in wanting it” (my translation, Discussion sur le 
péché, 65). This is why the only authentic moral position, for Bataille, would be a position that 
could combine the Christian goal of shattering the self, and the sadistic means of using the other 
without any limits. As such, the real moral commandment should be “Don’t be afraid to hurt 
your neighbor,” which would mean, do not be afraid to place yourself in the position of those 
who nailed Christ on his cross. Bataille writes:  
Humanity attains the summit of evil in the crucifixion. But it is precisely in having 
attained this summit that humanity ceased being separated from God. From here we 
understand that communication cannot take place from one full and intact being to 
another: communication wants being with their beings at stake, placed at the limit of 
death, of nothingness; the moral summit is a moment of risk taking, of the suspension of 
being beyond itself, at the limit of nothingness. (28)  
The summit, in order to become moral, needs to be what opens the possibility for isolated beings 
to “communicate” with one another, to shatter their integrity. The very structure of sacrifice, 
when it is placed under such a light, goes as follows. The agent of the crime (like Judas in Christ 
sacrifice) shatters the integrity of the victim by trying to break, in it, the very principle of its 
oneness, and the victim shatters the integrity of the agent of the crime through the potential guilt 
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that his crime can generate within him. In both cases, thus, what is at stake is the search of what 
stands beyond the oneness of a being, which is to say, the search for “nothingness,” 
“nothingness” being defined by Bataille as an ontological concept that situates that which is 
beyond being (discussed in more detail later).  
To illustrate this point, Bataille refers to the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross.  Christians, 506
indeed, generally see this sacrifice as the summit of evilness. Through this sacrifice, indeed, 
humans not only killed an innocent man, but they killed the Son of God himself. However, 
Bataille emphasizes, that it is through this crime that the being of God was wounded by men for 
the first time, and that the being of men, in return, got wounded by God through the culpability 
that His murder generated in them (Felix Culpa!). In other words, it is thanks to the wound 
inflicted to God by the sacrifice of Christ that God and mankind broke their isolation and started 
to “communicate” with one another, that is to say to mutually break their isolation. Bataille, 
commenting on this phenomenon, writes: “It thus becomes visible from here that the 
“communication” between separate beings is rendered possible by evil. Human beings, without 
the presence of evil, would be encapsulated within themselves, locked up in their independent 
sphere” (my translation, 56). Human beings are thus facing an “impossible” moral situation. 
They can either persevere in their own being at the price of maintaining their fundamental 
isolation from one another (which leads them to a form of spiritual death), or they can try to 
“communicate” with one another by taking the risk of violating the integrity of the other human 
beings that they want to communicate with.  
 For a full analysis of Bataille’s reading of the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, see Frederic-Charles Baitinger, 506
“De l'innocence de la victime aux délices angoissées du sacrificateur: Georges Bataille, René Girard et la question 
du sacrifice.” in Les Représentations du Sacrifice et du Don, Editor Irene Chassaing, Juliette Valcke and Ziyan 
Yang, Moncton: Perce-Neige, 2018.
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There is thus a risk to be taken by those who want to go beyond the isolation of beings, 
and a risk of annihilation to be faced once the movement of “communication” between two 
beings have started to take place. The agent of the crime (like Judas in Christ’s sacrifice) shatters 
the integrity of the victim by trying to break, in it, the very principle of its oneness, and the 
victim shatters the integrity of the agent of the crime through the potential guilt that his crime 
can generate within him. In both cases, thus, what is at stake is the search of what stands beyond 
the oneness of a being.  
Sovereign Desire and Nothingness  
What pushes people to enter this movement of “communication” is, according to Bataille, desire. 
Desire is defined by Bataille as a “sovereign desire,” that is to say, as “what engages a being, my 
being, in a search for that which is beyond it: nothingness” (Discussion on Sin, 29). In other 
words, and as will we see in the next part of this epilogue, Bataille defines “sovereign desire” not 
as Lacan does—i.e. as the desire of the Other—but, precisely, as what pushes a human being to 
go beyond such a desire (entirely caught up in the Hegelian dialectic of recognition). As such, 
one could say that Bataille’s “sovereign desire” is here playing the function of what Lacan, in his 
teaching, calls jouissance. This sliding between desire and jouissance can be grasped through the 
way in which Bataille is connecting his definition of “sovereign desire” to the notion of 
nothingness. The term of nothingness requires all our attention here. Jean Hyppolite, indeed, 
during the conversation that followed Bataille’s presentation on The Moral of the Summit!, asked 
him if he was locating this nothingness inside or outside being. Hyppolite said:  
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I would simply like to know if this need to go beyond the self, which was consequently 
the negation of our own being, locates nothingness in our desire or beyond our desire. 
There are two opposed perspectives here depending on whether it is we who are 
nothingness, if desire is within us, if nothingness is in the desire itself or, on the contrary, 
depending whether we go into nothingness to escape ourselves. (Discussion on Sin, 50) 
The perspective that makes of nothingness a part of desire itself is, in fact, the perspective 
defended by Heidegger in What is Metaphysics (1927)  as well as the perspective defended by 507
Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1943).  But contrary to this phenomenological perspective, 508
Bataille’s answer remained firmly attached to an ontological plane, that it to say, attached to the 
idea that nothingness, strictly speaking, is what is opposed to the notion of being and, as such, 
what stands beyond this notion. Bataille answered Hyppolite thus: “When I talk about 
nothingness, I put myself on the ontological plane, and by this I am referring to that which is 
situated beyond the limits of being” (50). In other words, contrary to the position defended by 
Heidegger and Sartre, Bataille wants to maintain a strict opposition between being and 
nothingness by placing nothingness outside being, and thus outside desire (which, in a way, 
reinforces the idea that Bataille’s “sovereign desire” is nothing but Lacan’s jouissance).  
“Le Néant ne reste pas l'opposé indéterminé à l'égard de l’étant, mais il se dévoile comme composant l'être de cet 507
étant”, Martin Heidegger, Qu’est-ce que la Métaphysique, trans, Henry Corbin, Paris: Edition Nathan, (1929) p.65 
 “L'être est antérieur au néant et le fonde. Par quoi il faut entendre non seulement que l'être a sur le néant une 508
préséance logique, mais encore que c'est de l'être que le néant tire concrètement son efficace. C'est ce que nous 
exprimions en disant que le néant hante l'être”, Jean-Paul Sartre, “Le problème du néant,” in L’Etre et le néant, 
Paris: Edition Gallimard, Col. Tel, 1943. p. 51. 
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The Ego and the Void  
The notion of being, in Bataille’s position, is also worth defining. By being, Bataille means the 
ego.  Consequently, if being is equated to the Ego for Bataille, and nothingness to what stands 509
beyond the Ego, the movement towards the summit is, as Hyppolite underlined it, “a movement 
to escape the self” that is to say, a movement where nothingness provokes the annihilation of 
being, but also a point at which being annihilates itself. As such, Bataille’s articulation of being 
and nothingness is the exact reverse of Sartre’s stand on the question. While Bataille posits 
nothingness outside being, and makes of the movement towards the summit a way to escape the 
self through a confrontation of nothingness, Sartre establishes nothingness inside being, and 
makes of the desire to annihilate the self a desire to escape nothingness. Summarizing this split, 
Sartre said, during the conversation “These are the two possible positions: either we are 
plenitudes and what we seek is nothingness, or we are voids and what we seek is being” (52). 
Sartre argued that Bataille, by positing nothingness outside being, posited in fact not nothingness 
per se, but something that is more like a “nothing” or a void, i.e., something that doesn’t imply a 
form of negation or privation but, on the contrary, something like a “positive” absence. Sartre, 
indeed, argued:  
If desire isn’t in a sense nothingness, if in yourself you don’t have the possibility of 
making nothingness appear, what is outside of you is in a sense nothing. It is equally a 
plenum. You cannot name it or make it appear. (…) During your [Bataille’s] presentation, 
you seemed to present being as a full being and to present what is outside as a void. (52)  
To answer Sartre’s critique, Bataille proceeded to integrate Sartre’s opposition into a larger 
 “When I speak of being, I am speaking of a particular being and I am designating myself in particular and 509
generally the egos of others as well” (Discussion on Sin, 50). 
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dialectical movement that goes as follow. First, Bataille admitted that the movement of being 
towards a beyond does not have nothingness as its object first, but more likely so, another 
being.  This other being, however, in order to not be reduced to the status of an object of desire, 510
can only be attained through an experience of nothingness. And this experience of nothingness 
implies, in turn, a “depreciation of the being that desires,” (53) an experience that implies a kind 
“annihilation of the being that desires” (53). Otherwise, remarks Bataille, the Ego (i.e. the 
subject of desire) would remain trapped within himself, and thus entirely defined by its 
relationship to boredom—just like in Heidegger’s existential analytic—and through this 
relationship to boredom, attached to the void that is in him. It is thus not a question of escaping 
one’s nothingness, for Bataille, but a question of using the void at the core of the Ego to gain 
access to a beyond of the Ego and its boredom. As such, I would argue, here, the Bataille is 
giving a pre-definition of what Lacan calls in his early teaching “the crossing of the phantasy,” 
and then “the Pass” in his late teaching. Bataille writes:  
The question of being is at risk in the dialectic I talked about, which opposes the ego and 
the other, and it is correct that I always envision the other as the object of a desire, that 
the ego is the subject of desire and that this subject of desire is a priori a contestation of 
itself inasmuch as it is the desire of another. (53) 
To sum up, I would say that while Sartre remains faithful to Heidegger and to Hegel’s 
phenomenological description of the dialectic of recognition as he developed it in 
“In sensuality as in death, nothingness itself is, moreover, not that which attracts us any more than it captivates 510
the corpse as such. It is to the artificial aspects—the apparent severity of the dead—that pious respect, calm 
veneration is bound” (Discussion on Sin, 29). 
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Phenomenology of Spirit (1807),  Bataille through his reversal of perspective is trying to think 511
of an ethical experience that would go beyond the ego. And by doing so, Bataille is also fostering 
a sense of ethics that goes beyond the subject of desire and its enslavement to the desire of the 
other, and that foreshadows, at the same time, Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis, grounded on an 
experience of jouissance that could be called queer since the act it requires is neither to perform a 
“gender,” nor an identity, but precisely an act that undoes both.   512
III. IN PRAISE OF DESIRE: LACAN’S ETHICS OF DESIRE 
Lacan’s notion of ethics of desire, as he developed it in his famous text “Kant with Sade” (1962), 
takes its departure from Bataille’s interpretation of Sade’s ethical paradox. Echoes of this ethics 
can also be found in the third part of Lacan’s Seminar VII ,The Ethics of Psychoanalysis  513
(1959-1960). And also in two conferences that Lacan gave in front of a Catholic audience, 
“Regarding Morality, Freud Has What it Takes,” and “Can Psychoanalysis Constitute the Kind of 
Ethics Necessitated by our Times”  in which Lacan produces a fundamental critique of Kant’s 514
categorical imperative, and more broadly, a critique of morality as being secretly linked, in one 
way or another, to Sade’s position.   515
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald Landes, New York: Routledge, 2013. 511
 See, for an illustration of this movement at the level of a love relationship between two people, Georges Bataille, 512
L’amour d’un être mortel, Luud, 1989, pp.26. where Bataille describes with great precision such a movement. But 
see also Shannon Winnubst, “Bataille’s Queer Pleasure” in Reading Bataille Now.  
Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, The Seminar Book VII, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis 513
Porter. Norton & Company, New York, 1992. See specifically, Part III, “The Paradox of Jouissance,” 167-242.
Jacques Lacan, “Discourse to Catholics” in The Triumph of Religion. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans. 514
Bruce Fink, Malden: Polity Press, 2013, 3-54. 
 Jacques Lacan, “Kant with Sade”, Ecrits, Trans, Bruce Fink, Heloise Fink and Russell Grigg. New York: Norton 515
& Company, 2002, 645-670.  
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Das Ding and Christian Morality 
Lacan opened his first conference addressed to the Catholics by arguing that the notions of “Sin” 
and “Grace,” which are of central importance in Christian morality, should no longer be left at 
the discretion of theology or faith but, on the contrary, placed at the very center of 
psychoanalytic investigation. For Lacan, just as for Bataille, the Christian notion of sin, instead 
of being considered an “obsolete category” is, on the contrary, what renders visible the 
articulation between evil and the Law. Thus taking a position in the debate that opposed Bataille 
and Sartre on this question, Lacan endorses Bataille’s position by stating that “there is a paradox 
involved in practically excluding from the debate and from analysis things, terms and doctrines 
that have been articulated in the field of faith, on the pretext that they belong to a domain that is 
reserved to believers” (“the death of god,” 171).  
To go beyond this paradox, Lacan substituted for the notion of sin, the one of the The 
Thing (Das Ding), which enabled him to rearticulate, in a very precise manner, the notion of Law 
and desire as St. Paul did, but within the coordinates of psychoanalysis. Das Ding, of course, 
should not be approached as a “thing,” that is, as an object. Quite the contrary, das Ding is the 
correlate of the subject at the moment of his fading under the signifying chain. Das Ding is what, 
in every speaking being, marks the place of the effects of the signifier onto a living creature.  516
Lacan writes: “Das Ding is thus what, in a living being that comes to inhabit discourse, no matter 
what it is, and that uses words to speak about itself, marks the place where this living being 
 Jacques Lacan, “Das Ding” and “Das Ding II”, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Seminar VII, Trans. Dennis 516
Porter, New York: Norton & Company, 1986, 43-70.
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suffers about the fact that language has effect in the world.”  As such, das Ding is the very 517
reason why speaking beings cannot have sexual relationships that are anchored in any form of 
“biological” norms, but are all haunted by a Thing (a das Ding) that prevents them from reaching 
any point of complete satisfaction. Nonetheless, adds Lacan, such a discovery did not push Freud 
to propose a solution to this “structural” discontent, nor did it prevent him (or most of his 
students) from trying to build certain norms around which could be mapped the different 
“pathological development” (what Freud called the different stages of development of the libido) 
of human sexuality. Opposing such a temptation, Lacan writes, “Unfortunately, is it the task of 
psychoanalysis to repress the fundamental perversion of human desire in the Hell of the pre-
genital, as a mark of affective regression? Is it his job as psychoanalyst to make one forget the 
truth that was being confessed during the antique mysteries, i.e., that ‘Eros is a black God’?”  518
The Truth about Monotheism 
According to Lacan, although Freud was a materialist and an atheistic person who did not 
believe in God or in any revealed Truth—“it was literally a dead letter for him” (171)—he 
remained for the most part entrenched in a Judeo-Christian tradition inasmuch as the question of 
morality was at stake for him.  Indeed, when Freud provided in Totem and Taboo  (1913) and 519 520
 “La Chose est donc ce qui, dans le vivant quel qu’il soit que vient habiter le discours et qui se profère en paroles, 517
marque la place ou il pâtit de ce que le langage se manifeste dans le monde”(55).
 Lacan writes, “Hélas, est-ce au psychanalyste de refouler la perversion foncière du désir humain dans l’enfer du 518
prégénital, comme connote de régression affective ? Est-ce à lui de faire rentrer dans l’oubli la vérité avouée dans le 
mystère antique, que “Eros est un dieu noir” ?” 
Lacan writes: “La méditation de Freud autour de la fonction, du rôle et de la figure du Nom-du-Père, comme 519
toute sa référence éthique, tourne autour de la tradition proprement judéo-chrétienne et y sont entièrement 
articulables” (33).
 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, Trans. James Strachey, New York: Norton & Company, 1950.520
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twenty-five years later in “Moses and Monotheism”  (1939) an anthropological account of the 521
birth of human society, he argued that it was around the figure of a primordial father and his 
murder that the whole problem revolved. Such a paradox, according to Lacan, can be easily 
explained in the sense that even if the “letter” of the Catholic faith was a “dead letter” to Freud, it 
was nonetheless a letter that was definitely well articulated for him, i.e. a letter that was 
producing very precise effects. In other word, although Freud was a non-believer, he nonetheless 
had at its disposal “what it took,” that is to say, he was well aware of the articulation at stake in 
the revealed Truth of Judeo-Christianism. Lacan writes, 
You only have to open the little book entitled Moses and Monotheism that Freud 
cogitated over for some ten years, for after Totem and Taboo he thought of nothing but 
that, of Moses and the religion of his fathers. And if it weren’t for the article on the 
Spaltung of the ego, one might say that the pen fell from his hands at the end of Moses 
and Monotheism. (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 171-172) 
According to Freud, the message carried by monotheism is important because it has a super 
value over any other non-monotheistic religious system. What is the most opposed to 
monotheism is, in a way, the conception of the sacred defended by some kind of caricature of 
Bataille, that is to say, a conception of the sacred where the sacred is attached to a kind of 
“riotousness, drunkenness, and anarchy born of divine passion” (172). And this form of passion, 
in turn, is what produces what Lacan calls “the laughter of the Olympian” and its complement, 
the disembodied seriousness of the philosophers.  
 Sigmund Freud, “Moses and Monotheism” in Complete Works, Volume XXIII (1937-1939), trans. James Strachey, 521
London: The Hogarth Press, 1964. 3-140. 
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Opposed to this state of anarchy born out of divine passion stands monotheism. 
Monotheism, according to Freud, has a double origin. Contrary to what most historians of his 
time thought about the origin of Judaism, Freud defends the thesis, in “Moses and Monotheism,” 
that there have been, in fact, not one Moses, but two: one that is noble and elevated, and the 
other that is not. The elevated one can be found in the figure of Moses the Egyptian. Moses the 
Egyptian was the first figure in history who started to rationalize our understanding of the world 
through the use of a single principle (the Sun) and of reason.  Opposed to this figure stands 522
Moses the Midianite, the son-in-law of Jethro who, according to Freud, has been confused with 
the other Moses.  
 Moses the Midianite is the one who claimed to have heard, in the burning bushes (that 
Lacan compares to Moses’ Thing) the words of a hidden and jealous God, who said about 
himself “I am what I am”. It is also thanks to Moses the Midianite that the Ten Commandments
—which correspond to the laws of speech for Lacan —were transmitted to the Jewish people. 523
There is thus, for Freud, a strict opposition between Moses the Egyptian, who is the bearer of the 
message of one rational God, and Moses the Midianite who is the inspired and obscurantist one. 
But this opposition is somehow resolved by Freud when he argued, in Moses and Monotheism, 
that the transmission of the message of Moses the Egyptian was assured by Moses the Midianite, 
that is to say, that the message of reason was transmitted through the obscurantist thanks to the 
following logic. First, Moses the Egyptian is murdered. And then, through the promulgation of 
 “Moses the Egyptian is the Great Man, the legislator, the politician, the rationalist, the one whose path Freud 522
claims to discover with the historical appearance in the Fourteenth century B.C. of the religion of Akhenaton” (173).
 Lacan writes: “Given that these commandments turn out to be proof against anything – and by that I mean that 523
whether or not we obey them, we still cannot help hearing them – in their indestructible character they prove to be 
the very laws of speech, as I tried to show you” (174). 
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the Ten Commandments, the murder of this Great Man is being remembered, and used as a tool 
to transmit efficiently the message of reason of Moses the Egyptian. This is why, according to 
Lacan, Freud’s double theory on the origin of Monotheism is very close to the Christian symbol 
of the death of Christ on the Cross and,  also foreshadows Rene Girard’s theory on the question  
he has developed it in his books The Violence and the Sacred (1972).  Lacan said: “It is 524
because the murder of the Great Man reemerges in a second murder that in a sense translates and 
brings it to light, the murder of Christ, that the monotheistic message is complete” (174). There 
is thus a very strange Christo-centrism within Freud’s thought. 
“God is Dead”: Nothing Is No Longer Permitted! 
However, the idea of the “death of God,” contrary to what one could be tempted to imagine, is a 
phenomenon that carries with it no real “liberation.”  On the contrary, the “death of God” 525
signifies primarily that nothing is permitted. Freud went even as far as constructing, in Totem and 
Taboo, a dialectic between desire and the law that borrowed most of its articulation from Saint 
Paul’s analysis of the symbol of the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. When Freud argued in Totem 
 Rene Girard, “The Gods, the Dead, the Sacred, and the Sacrificial Substitution,” in The Violence and the Sacred, 524
trans. Patrick Gregory, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, 250-274. In this chapter, Rene Girard argues that the 
sacrifice of Christ on the Cross was the necessary crime without which the innocence of the victim sacrificed could 
not have been revealed. Likewise, one could argue that when Freud argued that in order for Moses the Egyptian to 
be admired and respected for his greatness, it was necessary for him to be killed first, and then to commemorate the 
positive effect that his death produced in the society of his time. But while, for Freud and Lacan, what the murder of 
the father hides is the fact that his murder did not open the way for a full satisfaction of jouissance (for the sons who 
killed him), it hides, for Rene Girard, the very mechanic of violence and scapegoating that such murder is the 
product of. 
 See Jacques Lacan, “The Death of God”, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Seminar VII, Trans. Dennis Porter, 525
Norton & Company, New York, 1986. pp. 167-178. “All the mystery is in the act. It is designed to hide something, 
namely, that not only does the murder of the father not open the path to jouissance that the presence of the father was 
supposed to prohibit, but it, in fact, strengthens prohibition. The whole problem is there; that’s where, in fact as well 
as in theory, the fault lies. Although the obstacle is removed as the result of the murder, jouissance is still prohibited, 
not only that, but the prohibition is reinforced” (176). 
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and Taboo that the father could only forbid desire efficiently inasmuch as he was dead, he 
actually proposed to modern man who no longer believes in God a renewed version of the “death 
of God” as it had been already staged in Christianity. In order to maintain desire, to preserve it, a 
figure of authority such as a primordial father was needed. Even more to the point, Freud 
suggested that the more a desire was forbidden, the more intense it was bound to become and, 
reciprocally, that the less a desire was repressed, the less intense it was bound to be. In the case 
of the modern man, this idea becomes vivid at the end of the Oedipus complex that can only 
happen as the correlate of the “murder” and the grieving process of the imaginary Father. As 
such, it is a process that implicates an unleashing of desire that, in turn, triggers an even bigger 
need to forbid it. This is why, argues Lacan, the main outcome of the Oedipus complex is the 
birth of an all too powerful super-ego that ends up taking the place of the dead father. In other 
words, the “death of God” as Lacan describes it, far from liberating humanity from its discontent, 
increases it in the rise of the super-ego. Lacan said: “Whoever attempts to submit to the moral 
law sees the demands of his superego grow increasingly meticulous and increasingly 
cruel” (176).  
 Lacan extended his understanding of Freud’s reading of “the death of God” in the chapter 
XIII of his Seminar VII called “The death of God”. In this chapter, Lacan articulates the 
Christian notion of the “death of God” to his own conception of desire, and more specifically to 
his matheme S(Ⱥ) that represents the inconsistency of the Other at a Symbolic level. As such, S 
(Ⱥ) is the sign of the Other’s own death, or the Other’s own disappearance in Lacan’s early 
teaching. And this self-erasure of the Other is itself related to the paradox that no one can either 
fully fulfill or transgress the Law which he or she is in relation to. Lacan said:  
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Situated as you know in the upper left section [of the Graph of Desire] it [S (Ⱥ)] signifies 
the final response to the guarantee asked of the Other concerning the meaning of the Law 
articulated in the depth of the unconscious. If there is nothing more than a lack, the Other 
is wanting, and the signifier is that of his death. (193)  
Only Christianity, in fact, through the symbolism of the death of Christ on the cross, gave to this 
phenomenon (the self-erasure of the Other) its full representation. And it is also Christianity who 
linked this phenomenon of self-erasure to the “Hegelian” notion of aufhebung of the Law. Christ 
indeed, by dying for us on the cross, brought the commandment of the Law to the level of the 
commandment: “you shall love your neighbor as yourself.” In other words, the notion of the 
death of God, and the Christian commandment are linked to one another. It is precisely because 
Christ died on the cross that he has, one the one hand, abolished the Law (that was previously 
impossible to accomplish) and that he has given to it its new formulation: “You should love your 
neighbor as yourself”. But, as Freud underlined it in his book Civilization and Its Discontent  526
(1929), the commandment “love your neighbor as yourself” is inhuman, that is to say impossible 
to put in practice.  Freud linked this impossibility to five arguments, the main one being that 527
violence and aggressiveness are at the very core of the human condition. This violence, 
according to Freud (as well as for Lacan, as we will see) is not so much related to a human’s 
nature as to a human’s aspiration towards happiness.  
 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontent, Trans. James Strachey, Norton & Company, New York, 1961.526
See also, for a very thorough analysis of this idea, see Ernest Wallwork, “Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor as 527
thyself: The Freudian Critique,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 10 n 2 (Fall 1982), 264-319.
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It is, indeed, because each one of us wants to be happy that we cannot love our neighbor 
as ourselves without feeling that the neighbor is becoming our rival in our quest for happiness. 
To love your neighbor, and to look for the maximization of your own pleasure are two 
antagonistic demands. This is why, according to Freud, unconscious aggressiveness is always 
what prevents a subject from going towards his own jouissance. Even more to the point, Lacan 
argued that the less a subject was able to express his aggressiveness, the stronger his super-ego 
was bound to become. Reciprocally, the stronger the super-ego, the stronger the need for an 
external Law capable of stopping the super-ego from gaining more power over the Ego. This is 
why, for Lacan, the super-ego should not be seen, like Freud did, as the source of the moral 
imperative, but as a basic aggressiveness turned towards the ego.   528
 This is why the Christian formula “Love your neighbor as you love yourself” is, 
as we will see in more detail, an inverted Sadean maxim for Lacan, which is to say a form of 
masochism. While it presupposes a primary love for oneself, it only fuels, in fact, a primary hate 
against oneself. Lacan said “I retreat from loving my neighbor as myself because there is 
something on the horizon there that is engaged in some form of intolerable cruelty. In that sense, 
to love one’s neighbor may be the cruelest of choices” (194).  
See Sigmund Freud, “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924) in Complete Works, Volume XIX 528
(1923-1925), Trans. James Strachey, London: The Hogarth Press, 1961, 157-172.   
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IV. LOVE THY NEIGHBOR IS A SADIAN MAXIM 
In order to problematize the cruelty that is at the heart of the Christian’s commandment “Love 
thy neighbor,” Lacan relates it to the work of Sade. And through this articulation, Lacan’s 
implicit goal, as I will try to demonstrate, is to oppose Bataille’s reading of Sade as developed in 
his text The Use Value of Sade. 
The Misunderstanding with Sade 
 Lacan said right at the opening of his lecture:  
I would like at least during this lecture to clear up the misunderstanding that might occur 
because we are dealing with Sade, and it might be thought that that constitutes a wholly 
external way of looking upon ourselves as pioneers or militants embracing a radical 
position. Such a view implies that, as a result of our function or profession, we are 
destined to embrace extremes, so to speak, and that Sade in this respect is our progenitor 
or precursor, who supposedly opened up some impasse, aberration or aporia, in that 
domain of ethics we have chosen to explore this year, and that we would be well-advised 
to follow him. 
It is very important to clear up that misunderstanding, which is related to a number of 
others I am struggling against in order to make some progress here before you (191). 
It is pretty easy to identify, under the periphrasis “militant embracing a radical position,” not 
only all the surrealists who praised Sade after Breton, but even more so, Bataille himself who 
was the only one, as noted in the opening of this chapter, to follow Sade into his aberration by 
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developing first his theory of heterology, and then his moral of the Summit. 
To understand what Lacan is reproaching in Bataille’s reading of Sade and, indirectly, 
what Lacan would have reproached in the “anti-social turn” in queer theory, one has to 
understand the relationship between the notion of jouissance and the one of transgression; and 
perhaps even more, the relation between the Christian commandment (“Love thy neighbor”) and 
what is most opposed to it: the aspiration towards happiness and jouissance. This relation can be 
articulated through the following question: what stops us from transgressing on our way to 
jouissance?  
For Lacan, we are stopped on the road towards transgression when we start to imagine the 
bad consequences that our action will have on others (i.e., when we’re not apathetic). Lacan said: 
“And we retreat from what? From assaulting the image of the other, because it was the image on 
which we were formed as an ego. Here we find the convincing power of altruism” (195). 
Altruism and pity are thus not the product of a natural inclination towards the good, as it is 
generally argued, but they are rooted in fear of hurting the image into which our ego was formed. 
This is why Lacan, just like Bataille, can criticize altruism and pity as being fundamentally the 
expression of a narcissistic ego and, as such, the expression of a “revolting utopian 
sentimentality.” Consequently, this narcissistic image of the ego is precisely what prevents men 
to go beyond their condition and, by implication, what prevents them from discovering the empty 
place that God occupies within their system of belief. Just like the relationship to the Other, the 
relationship to God is entangled in a narcissistic illusion. And it is precisely at this crossroad that 
Sade becomes interesting. Sade, as Bataille had already pointed it out, was the first one to go 
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beyond this narcissistic illusion, i.e., where God becomes an empty space and the image of man 
starts to fade in the dark—just like Bataille’s vision of a future Acephalic man.  
 This is why, argues Lacan, Sade’s work on evil could be said to have cleared the way for 
Freud's atheistic approach to the pleasure principle. For Lacan, indeed, science is never detached 
from the realm of ethics. Quite the contrary, in order for science to be possible, a certain ethical 
position has to be reached first. Otherwise, the discourse and the work of science cannot take 
place. In the case of the pleasure principle, the ethical position that predominated within the 
history of philosophy and theology was the correlation between pleasure and Good. For most 
philosophers and theologians, humans are spontaneously attracted to Good. And only a 
perversion in humans can disentangle this association. But, thanks to Sade, the idea that pleasure 
and pain could be tightly associated became a common idea in the 18th century, and an idea 
developed and popularized under the slogan: “happiness in evil” in the 19th century. As such, 
Lacan goes even as far as saying that Sade himself has been rendered possible by Kant. Lacan's 
thesis is that Sade's Philosophy in the Boudoir  (1795) completes and tells the truth about 529
Kant's universal imperative.  
Kant is dreaming in Sade’s Boudoir 
Kant's approach to morality detaches morality from any form of emotions or affect. Kant, indeed, 
has been the first one to proclaim that men are spontaneously attracted to evil and repelled by the 
good. Worse, humans are never inclined to do well, but always on the lookout for evil. In Freud's 
 Marquis de Sade, Philosophy in the Boudoir, Trans. Joachim Neugroschel, New York: Pinguine Classics Edition, 529
2006. 
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pleasure principle, the pleasure that is named is not a pleasure that refers to the notion of Good, 
but a pleasure that refers to the notion of well-being. The Good stands beyond any form of 
pleasure or well-being. The Good should no longer be attached to the notion of pleasure, but 
strictly referred to an inner voice, which is the moral voice that is calling upon the subject. The 
Good, according to Kant, is strictly opposed to any emotions or feelings, or inclinations that 
could attract a subject towards someone or something. Because all those emotions, according to 
Kant, are pathological. Which means that they are the reasons why humans are attracted to evil. 
The Good, as defined by Kant, is thus not a “positive” power that can help the subject to act 
according to the Good. It is, rather, something that helps that subject to feel repulsed by his 
ordinary pleasures. To put it differently, the Good can diminish the value of evil, but has no 
attractiveness in itself. But why does the Good have no object in the world that could give to it 
an attractive content? To give a proper answer to this question, Lacan, first, recommends  
rereading the Critique of Practical Reason, by Kant, and then to follow him into his reading of 
Philosophy in the Boudoir. 
 Philosophy in the Boudoir contains, right in the middle of it, a pamphlet within the 
pamphlet called: “Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicain.” Sade, in it, 
advocates in favor of an unlimited right to jouissance. And he wants to give to this right the 
universality that Kant gives to his moral maxims. Everyone has the right to say to me: I have the 
right to enjoy (jouir) your body. And this right has no limit. With such a maxim, Sade attempts to 
subordinate everyone, although such a maxim, underlines Lacan, is at best just black humor 
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(humor noir). But it is this drop of black humor, according to Lacan, that gives to Kant's 
universal maxim its proper meaning. Of course, no one will imagine that Sade's maxim 
surrounding jouissance will ever become real, or will ever become strictly speaking universal. 
But, Lacan notices one thing that is striking in it: its lack of reciprocity. Like Kant's maxim, 
Sade's maxim is not grounded in any object, or emotion, or passion, or even less compassion for 
the object that suffers. Consequently, between Kant and Sade there is a symmetry and an 
inversion. There is a symmetry in the sense that the ethical experience is asymmetric. But there is 
a reversal in the sense that, in Kant, it is the subject which does not enjoy its ethical experience, 
while in Sade, it is the object which does not enjoy its ethical experience. Sade says that the 
universal declaration of human rights, which says that no man can be the property of someone 
else, does not mean that people cannot be used by everyone for their sexual enjoyment.  530
Nonetheless, the hardest thing, with Sade's maxim, is to be able to apply it to yourself as the 
object of use of the other and not as the one who is enjoying the other. The hardest thing, then, in 
Sade's maxim, is the difference between the subject of enunciation, and the one who is saying the 
sentence. For the one who is saying the sentence can become the “victim” of his own maxim.  
  
Lacan’s Synthetic Sense of Morality 
To go deeper into Lacan's consideration on this specific inversion of Kant and Sade’s position, 
 Interestingly enough, Sade uses here the argument made by the mendicant order founded by St Francis of Assisis, 530
when they argued that although their founder forbade them to own anything; he did not prevent them from using or 
enjoying anything. Consequently, although the order was not supposed to own any private property, they managed to 
give their property to another order while enjoying the use of it (which is exactly what the word “jouir de quelque 
chose” means in French). 
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Miller’s text called “A discussion on Lacan’s Kant with Sade” is useful.   In this text, Miller 531
comes back first to Lacan's comments and inversion of Jarry's exclamation: “Long live Poland, 
because without Poland there would be no Poles”. Against such a claim, Lacan wants to 
disconnect the existence of Poland from the existence of particular Poles. Lacan “disconnects the 
set and the members of the set. Polishness is independent from Poland. Poland has ceased to 
exist and yet Poles remain, hoping for the second coming of Poland” (225). It means that in spite 
of the logical and linguistic relationships that links together Poland to the Poles, historically 
speaking, there can be Poles without Poland.  
 Just as in Jarry's statement about the Polish, Kant's stand on ethics is a kind of bulldozer 
that clears the way for a universal ethics that would do away with the old link between the 
Supreme Good and the Supreme Truth on which the tradition of antiquity (of discriminating taste 
for various kinds of objects) was grounded.  Kant's ethic is thus a kind of Terror because, in it, 532
the world disappears. And, in its wake, it creates a void. “The void of all that is ‘pathological’ in 
the subject. Pathological meaning, here, pathos, emotion, all the subject's sensory interests, 
everything that gives pleasure” (228). And the consequence of this void is to make appear an 
inner “voice” (the voice of the super-ego) as what is left after the subject has subtracted from 
himself all pathological emotions and desires.  
In Kant's work, the remainder is a voice, the voice which appears at the very moment that 
it makes the object disappear. What remains is the voice of consciousness a voice which 
 Jacques-Alain Miller, “A Discussion on Lacan’s ‘Kant with Sade’ in Reading Seminar I and II, Lacan’s Return to 531
Freud. Edited by Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink and Maire Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York, 1996, 
212-240.
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has something of the signifier about it, because it's a voice with a formulation, a voice 
that says something (230).  
The Voice formulates an imperative. And the subject is bound to obey it. The voice commands 
the subject. But while this voice, for Kant, is an auto-affection of the subject, it will precisely 
become, for Lacan, the voice of the super-ego. This is why, according to Kant, the logical 
criterion for morality is analytic and not synthetic. It means that such a criterion is directly 
accessible by anyone who possesses reason. It is, by the virtue of its definition, universal. 
Contrary to Kant's logical reduction of the field of morality, Lacan wants to introduce the idea 
“that we could come up with a more synthetic foundation for moral law, synthetic being the 
opposite of analytic” (229). It is precisely what the reversal of Jarry's sentence of the relationship 
between Poland and Poles is illustrating. For Lacan, the relationship between the two is not only 
analytic, but also synthetic in the sense that Poles do exist, historically, while Poland does not. 
On the contrary, with Kant, we have the inverted situation. We do have a very precise definition 
of what is “Moral land,” but we are not sure that there is any person living in that Land. That is 
to say; we do have Poland, but might not have any Poles. A Pole without Poland is a Pole that is 
dreaming of Poland. A Pole that loves the idea of Poland. Miller writes, “You describe him as 
motivated by a kind of Courtly love for Lady Poland” (229). Which means that, at this level, 
there is no use at looking into a dictionary to define what is a Pole. There is no analytical 
judgment that can help us to make this definition clear. Because this very definition is now 
linked to every single Pole's desire. Commenting on this reversal, and bringing it back to Sade’s 
case, Miller writes: 
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Hence, my client is much more honest than Kant. Kant leads us to believe that the subject 
is speaking to himself, enunciating a law that terrorizes him. Whereas Sade presents us 
with a formulation in which the distinction between subject and other is explicit. He 
reveals the division of the subject, whereas Kant makes us think it is an auto-, non-
division affectation. (Miller, 234)  
If Sade's moral maxim is more moral than Kant's voice within, it is because it acknowledges the 
division of the subject that is needed in order to function. Also, it makes the sadistic component 
of the superego visible, and not hidden in the depth of the moral subject. In the formulation, “I 
have the right to enjoy any parts of your body,” the “I” is not the one of the one speaking, but the 
“I” of the one who will abuse. This is why the subject is split in two parts. Thus, the subject is no 
longer S, but $ as it is split between the Other and itself. Law is thus the inverse of desire and 
vice versa since what we call duty (moral duty) is connected to the drives and libidinal 
enjoyment. But if this is true, one could legitimately wonder, as Miller does in a text called Duty 
and the Drives,  “where does the surplus value go if the libido is sacrificed?”  Miller answers 533
the question by arguing that “all the libido sacrificed is being accumulated at the same place 
where the duty speaks” (10), i.e., in the superego. In other words, all the libido gets concentrated 
in ideals. Thus, the stricter the voice of duty, the greater the corruption. “The authority of duty 
derives from the libidinal energy of the drive, and it is the same thing” (12). That is why Freud 
can say, in “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, that Kant's moral imperative is the direct 
heir of the Oedipus complex. Freud speaks directly about the sadism of the superego. This is why 
the superego is never satisfied but keeps asking for more. God, in Christianity, and as it is clear 
 Miller, “Duty and the Drives,” NFF 6.1 & 2 (Spring/Fall 1992), 5-15.533
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in the story of Abraham, is animated by a will to enjoy at your expense. Superego is what makes 
you renounce your desire and repays you with a high sense of guilt.  
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN ETHICS OF JOUISSANCE 
Lacan’s ethic of psychoanalysis is not to be confused with the ethic of the Good, nor with the 
ethic of social duties. It does not ask the question, did you act in agreement with what you were 
supposed to do, but did you act in agreement with your most fundamental desire? However, to 
emphasize this non-normative aspect of Lacan’s ethics does not imply that Lacan mixes, as 
sometimes some queer theorists with an “anti-social edge” do, desire and jouissance.   
A Queer Lacanian Ethics of  Desire 
It is true, on the one hand, that Lacan’s ethics, far from implying a form of correction of the 
subject, aims at almost forcing the subject to “stop” acting in conformity with his social duties if 
such a conformity goes against the affirmation of its own desire. As such, one could even say that 
there is a strict opposition between what ethics normally requires from a subject, and what Lacan 
wants to build as an ethic of psychoanalysis, since the morality of power, at the service of the 
Good, always goes as follows: as far as desires are concerned, come back later. Make them wait. 
One could thus conclude, on a very basic level, that Lacan’s ethics is in agreement with the non-
normative dimension of the anti-social turn. However, Lacan does not believe, unlike most 
scholars of the anti-social turn, that the liberation from the desire of the Other comes from 
jouissance, or at least from jouissance itself. Quite the contrary, Lacan’s ethics resides on this 
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awareness. And this awareness is itself the product of the psychoanalytical knowledge that 
jouissance is always secretly tied to the super-ego. Lacan writes:  
This is where the experience of human action resides. And it is because we know better 
than those who went before how to recognize the nature of desire, which is at the heart of 
this experience, that a reconsideration of ethics is possible, that a form of ethical 
judgment is possible, of a kind that gives this question the force of a last judgment: have 
you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you? (Seminar VII, 314) 
Following this definition, one could argue that Lacan, just like Bataille, or the anti-social queer, 
is not trying to build an ethic of private happiness inasmuch as, in order to not “give ground to 
one’s desire,” one has to be able to go beyond fear and pity, or public shame like in the case of 
Antigone or Oedipus.  
At the same time, such an ethics of desire should not be confused with Bataille’s moral of 
the Summit, nor with Edelman’s definition of queerness since, in between the two, lies the 
passage from the model of the tragic hero—which goes all the way onto death by being ready to 
pay the full price for it—to the model of the tragi-comic hero, who has learnt how to make 
something socially constructive with his excessive and opaque jouissance. The difference 
between Lacan and the anti-social can also be seen, for example, in the movement that goes from 
jouissance to desire, and then from desire to the sinthome in Lacan, and in the one that goes from 
jouissance to anxiety, and from anxiety to ecstasy in Bataille or Edelman. While, on the side of 
Bataille and Edelman, there is no reconciliation possible—but only an encounter with the 
absolute non-sense of life—there exists a way, within Lacan’s ethics of desire, to achieve a form 
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of sinthomal redemption of the Other through a redeeming of the notion of dupery and 
semblant.   534
Secondly, while Bataille’s moral of the Summit, or Edelman’s rejection of futurity aims at 
the dissolution of the ego, Lacan’s ethics of desire aims at helping the subject at traversing his 
ego by freeing it from its excessive and sometimes morbid jouissance. As such, on could say 
that, even if Bataille’s or the anti-social turn’s stand on morality do not fall on the side of the 
happiness script, and neither, strictly speaking, on the side of the super-ego (either the masochist 
or the sadistic one), they do maintain at an essential level a tie to jouissance and its demands for 
transgression. While, one the contrary, on the side of Lacan, because desire represents essentially 
the structure of the signifying chain that composes the subject, desire has the function of 
verifying that the subject is, actually, in agreement with the structure of its chain, or if it is 
obstructing this chain in the name of jouissance, and under the command of its superego. 
To Live as if Death Was Pushing Us to Be  
Thirdly, the difference between Bataille and Lacan is also visible when it comes to the function 
that death plays in both thinkers position. For Bataille, the moral of the Summit represents the 
accomplishment of the movement of eroticism, which is defined as the affirmation of life all the 
way onto death. Lacan’s definition of desire implies, on the contrary, the idea of wholeness that 
the idea of death brings to a subject when he sees it as the end point of its personal life. It is, 
 “In the definition of sublimation as satisfaction without repression, whether implicitly or explicitly, there is a 534
passage from not-knowing [non-savoir] to knowing, a recognition of the fact that desire is nothing more than the 
metonymy of the discourse of demand. It is change as such. I emphasize the following: the proper relation between 
one signifier and another that we call desire is not a new object or a previous object but the change of object in 
itself” (293).
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indeed, only through the perspective of its own death, insists Lacan that a subject can 
legitimately ask himself if he has acted in agreement with his desire, i.e., if he has acted in 
conformity with the structure of his or her signifying chain. Lacan said: 
What I call ‘giving ground relative to one’s desire’ is always accompanied in the destiny 
of the subject by some betrayal—you will observe it in every case and should note its 
importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is 
significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has 
more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their 
pact entailed—whatever the pact may be, fated or ill-fated, risky, shortsighted, or indeed 
a matter of rebellion or flight, it doesn’t matter. (320-321)  
Of course, to affirm one’s own desire can lead to very tragic consequences, like in the case of 
Antigone or Oedipus, but it does not have to be so. Oedipus is the best figure to show what 
happens to a man when he starts to renounce his social duty in order to follow his desire. The 
result is his banishment from the city, then his own mutilation, and then his death in dishonor. 
The example of Oedipus shows us, thus, that the jederman, the normal man should always 
choose to submit to his social duty and to give up his desire in order to avoid the bad 
consequences that Oedipus had to face. The jederman, the second he encounters difficulties on 
the road towards the affirmation of his desire always chooses a certain living death (the service 
of the Good) in order to avoid the other death, the real one.  
This is why, when life is lived through the perspective of death, it can be approached in 
two opposite ways. It can be approached tragically, as it is mostly the case in Bataille (even 
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though he developed a form of tragic laughter) or in Edelman, or it can be approached comically, 
as it is the case with Lacan’s ethic of psychoanalysis. In the case of Bataille or Edelman, it shows 
the triumph of the being-onto-death, as is the case with Oedipus when, at the very end of 
Oedipus at Cologne, he says “Me Funai” “Better not to be born” (although let’s not forget that 
Bataille said, not long before he died “I don’t hate life”). In the case of Lacan, it is not the 
triumph of the being-onto-death that is being portrayed, but a way to learn how to laugh about 
the structural failure of any possible coincidence between our action and our true intentions. It is 
as if, like in a comedy, life was constantly showing how we cannot do otherwise but to slide 
beyond what we should have done, how we keep escaping the order of the our signifying chain 
while, nonetheless, remaining alive and more eager than ever to pursue our desire. 
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